Description
motionEye (mEye) is an online interface for a piece of software called "motion," which is a video surveillance program with motion detection. Prior to 0.44.0, motionEye accepts the client-controlled meye_username and meye_password_hash cookies as authentication material without server-side session validation. An unauthenticated attacker who knows a target username and corresponding hash can set the cookies manually or cause them to be loaded by submitting blank credentials through the switch-user authentication flow, after which the server authenticates the attacker as that user. The administrator username and password-hash value are stored in /etc/motioneye/motion.conf, which is globally readable by default, allowing a local shell user to obtain reusable administrator credential material. Successful impersonation can enable account lockout, password changes and persistence, data enumeration, data destruction, and data exfiltration. This issue is fixed in version 0.44.0.
Published: 2026-09-15
Score: 9.1 Critical
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
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Remediation

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Tracking

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Advisories
Source ID Title
Github GHSA Github GHSA GHSA-r3cw-c95m-wfh9 motionEye: Authentication possible via password hash
History

Tue, 15 Sep 2026 17:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description motionEye (mEye) is an online interface for a piece of software called "motion," which is a video surveillance program with motion detection. Prior to 0.44.0, motionEye accepts the client-controlled meye_username and meye_password_hash cookies as authentication material without server-side session validation. An unauthenticated attacker who knows a target username and corresponding hash can set the cookies manually or cause them to be loaded by submitting blank credentials through the switch-user authentication flow, after which the server authenticates the attacker as that user. The administrator username and password-hash value are stored in /etc/motioneye/motion.conf, which is globally readable by default, allowing a local shell user to obtain reusable administrator credential material. Successful impersonation can enable account lockout, password changes and persistence, data enumeration, data destruction, and data exfiltration. This issue is fixed in version 0.44.0.
Title motionEye: Authentication possible via password hash
Weaknesses CWE-256
CWE-287
CWE-328
CWE-836
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 9.1, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}

Subscriptions

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cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published:

Updated: 2026-09-15T16:45:20.902Z

Reserved: 2026-05-14T18:06:06.811Z

Link: CVE-2026-46488

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-09-15T17:17:15.200

Modified: 2026-09-15T17:17:15.200

Link: CVE-2026-46488

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

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Weaknesses
  • CWE-256

    Plaintext Storage of a Password

  • CWE-287

    Improper Authentication

  • CWE-328

    Use of Weak Hash

  • CWE-836

    Use of Password Hash Instead of Password for Authentication