The vulnerability allows an attacker to push a pull request that is then captured by a privileged GitHub Actions workflow, which builds and deploys that code into a Docker image and runs it in production. This results in the bot running arbitrary code with full privileges, effectively giving the attacker control over the bot’s runtime environment. The weakness is a security misconfiguration that permits untrusted code to enter a privileged deployment pipeline.

The issue affects the Duck Organization’s Quest Bot for Discord, specifically versions prior to 1.0.3. The repository’s privileged deploy workflow, which runs after the unprivileged build workflow, is the root cause of the vulnerability.

The CVSS score of 9.5 indicates critical severity, reflecting high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact. While no EPSS score is published, the absence of a known exploit in the KEV catalog does not diminish the likelihood of exploitation in environments that enable the described workflow. Attackers must be able to submit a pull request targeting the main branch; the workflow’s condition inadvertently treats this as a deployable event, allowing the attacker to execute code in a privileged context. The attack can be performed via the normal PR submission interface without additional credentials beyond those required to open a PR.