MCP Context Forge shipped a default JWT secret key in its code base and example environment file up to version 1.0.1. The token verification routine accepted HS256 tokens signed with this known key and automatically promoted any user whose token subject matched the platform administrator email to an administrative account when the database check was disabled. Consequently, an unauthenticated attacker could create a valid administrator JWT and gain unrestricted control over the platform, enabling disclosure, modification, and disruption of administrative resources. These weaknesses correspond to missing login authority, improper authorization, weak encryption key management, and insecure default configuration.

IBM’s MCP Context Forge gateway and administrative platform prior to version 1.0.2 is affected. Any deployment that has not applied the 1.0.2 release or newer, and still uses the shipped hard‑coded JWT secret or has the platform-admin bootstrap enabled, is vulnerable.

The CVSS base score of 9.8 classifies this as critical, and the EPSS score is not provided, implying no publicly known exploitation trends. The vulnerability is remote and does not require authentication; an attacker only needs to craft a JWT signed with the default key, which is embedded in the source code and example configuration. Even after password rotations, account deletion, or session revocation, forged tokens continue to grant administrative access as long as the default key remains in effect. Because the vulnerability is not listed in KEV, there is no known active exploitation, but the high severity and ease of exploitation make it a high‑priority risk for all installations awaiting the patch.