CVE-2026-54872

Timing Side-Channel in Scalar Multiplication for Non-NIST EC Curves

Published Sep 29, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 3.7 Low EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
Issue summary: The generic elliptic-curve scalar multiplication used for
ECDSA and SM2 signature operations with curves that do not have a dedicated
implementation leaks information about the secret nonce through timing.

Impact summary: An attacker able to measure signing times may learn
information about the per-signature secret nonce, which over many signatures
can, via a lattice / Hidden Number Problem attack, lead to recovery of the
private key.

CWE: CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy

Description: The generic elliptic-curve scalar multiplication used for
curves that do not have a dedicated constant-time implementation pads the
secret scalar with non-constant-time BIGNUM operations, so the time taken
depends on the value of the secret scalar derived from the ECDSA and SM2 nonce.

The leak is very small; observing it requires a large number of
measurements. The effect is largest for curves whose group order lies
on a machine-word boundary, such as brainpoolP384r1.

Applications using ECDSA signing over the Brainpool and other generic prime
curves, and SM2 signing on platforms that use the generic implementation,
are vulnerable to this issue.

The NIST curves P-256, P-384 and P-521 use dedicated constant-time
implementations and are not affected.

FIPS Impact: no
The FIPS modules are not affected: the approved NIST curves used in the FIPS
provider have dedicated constant-time implementations and do not use the
affected code path.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

The vulnerability is a timing side‑channel in the generic elliptic‑curve scalar multiplication routine used by OpenSSL for ECDSA and SM2 signature operations on non‑NIST curves. The scalar multiplication pads the secret scalar with non constant‑time BIGNUM operations, so the execution time depends on the value of the secret nonce. An attacker who can measure the time taken for many signature operations can recover information about the per‑signature nonce, and over a large number of signatures can apply lattice or Hidden Number Problem techniques to reconstruct the private key. The leak is very small and requires a large volume of timing measurements, but with sufficient data it can lead to a full key compromise.

Affected Systems

Any instance of OpenSSL executing ECDSA or SM2 signatures on non‑NIST curves that rely on the generic scalar multiplication path is affected. Curves such as brainpoolP384r1 are particularly vulnerable. The NIST curves P-256, P-384, and P-521 use dedicated constant‑time implementations and are not affected, nor are the FIPS modules. The issue is present in OpenSSL repositories before the patches referenced in the commit URLs, and applies to deployments that use the default generic EC implementation.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score is 3.7, indicating a low to moderate severity. EPSS data is not available and the vulnerability is not listed in CISA's KEV catalog, suggesting exploitation is not common at present. The attack requires many precise timing measurements, so the effort is high, especially for remote or distributed signing services. However, if an adversary can observe or induce a large number of signature operations, the information leakage could eventually lead to a private key compromise. The vulnerability is therefore moderate risk in environments where signing operations are exposed and high volumes of signatures can be collected.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade to the latest OpenSSL release that includes the patches from the listed commit URLs to eliminate the timing leak
  • Switch to NIST EC curves with dedicated constant‑time implementations, or use a library that provides a constant‑time scalar multiplication for the curves you need
  • If an immediate upgrade is not possible, restrict the signing service to a trusted, monitored environment and limit the volume and frequency of exposed signatures to reduce the feasibility of a lattice attack

Generated by OpenCVE AI on September 30, 2026 at 01:15 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

Source ID Title
Debian DLA Debian DLA DLA-4859-1 openssl security update
Debian DSA Debian DSA DSA-6531-1 openssl security update
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8847-1 OpenSSL vulnerabilities
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:openssl:openssl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 3.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N'}

ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Openssl
Openssl openssl
Vendors & Products Openssl
Openssl openssl
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Issue summary: The generic elliptic-curve scalar multiplication used for ECDSA and SM2 signature operations with curves that do not have a dedicated implementation leaks information about the secret nonce through timing. Impact summary: An attacker able to measure signing times may learn information about the per-signature secret nonce, which over many signatures can, via a lattice / Hidden Number Problem attack, lead to recovery of the private key. CWE: CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy Description: The generic elliptic-curve scalar multiplication used for curves that do not have a dedicated constant-time implementation pads the secret scalar with non-constant-time BIGNUM operations, so the time taken depends on the value of the secret scalar derived from the ECDSA and SM2 nonce. The leak is very small; observing it requires a large number of measurements. The effect is largest for curves whose group order lies on a machine-word boundary, such as brainpoolP384r1. Applications using ECDSA signing over the Brainpool and other generic prime curves, and SM2 signing on platforms that use the generic implementation, are vulnerable to this issue. The NIST curves P-256, P-384 and P-521 use dedicated constant-time implementations and are not affected. FIPS Impact: no The FIPS modules are not affected: the approved NIST curves used in the FIPS provider have dedicated constant-time implementations and do not use the affected code path.
Title Timing Side-Channel in Scalar Multiplication for Non-NIST EC Curves
Weaknesses CWE-208
References
Weaknesses
  • CWE-208

    Observable Timing Discrepancy

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
openssl
Published
Updated
Nov 10, 2026, 12:48 PM
Reserved
Jun 16, 2026, 10:18 AM
Status
Modified
Published
Sep 29, 2026, 4:17 PM
Modified
Nov 10, 2026, 1:19 PM
Severity
Moderate
Public date
Sep 29, 2026, 3:32 PM