identrail, a platform that binds machine identities to AWS, GitHub, and Kubernetes, contains a flaw in the GitHub connection completion endpoint. The endpoint accepts an installation identifier from the request body or header without confirming that the installation belongs to the caller’s workspace. Because the state is bound to the tenant, workspace, and project, an attacker can supply another tenant’s installation ID to create a connection that points to a non‑owner's GitHub organization. The result is the ability to read or inventory private repositories and trigger posture scans on a victim organization, thereby compromising confidentiality and integrity of that organization’s data.

Users of identrail before version 1.0.2 that have the default-on POST /v1/workspaces/:workspace_id/projects/:project_id/github/connect/complete endpoint enabled are affected. The same issue exists in the default-off V2 CompleteGitHubConnector path. The vulnerability applies to identrail version 1.0.2 and earlier.

The CVSS score of 8.5 indicates a high severity. The EPSS score is not available, meaning the current exploit probability estimate is unknown, but the lack of ownership verification makes the vulnerability relatively easy to exploit by an authenticated tenant. The issue is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog; however, the risk of cross‑tenant data exposure is significant. The most likely attack vector involves an authenticated identrail user submitting a forged installation_id to the connection completion endpoint and then querying the GitHub API via the legitimate application JWT.