CVE-2026-61708

SOCFortress CoPilot: Cross-Tenant Arbitrary Object-Store Write via the Data-Store Upload Endpoint (customer_user)

Published Oct 30, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 8.5 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, `POST /api/agent_data_store/upload` in `backend/app/data_store/data_store_routes.py` permits `customer_user` callers to choose `bucket_name` and `object_name` without an allowlist, tenant prefix, ownership check or content restriction. The only file check requires a nonempty filename. The operations in `backend/app/data_store/data_store_operations.py` create missing buckets and upsert objects, allowing existing objects belonging to any tenant to be overwritten. Targets include `sysmon-configs/<customer_code>/sysmon_config.xml` distributed to managed Windows endpoints, `copilot-case-report-templates/<name>` rendered server-side, and case evidence or forensic artifacts under `copilot-cases/<case_id>/<file>` and `velociraptor-artifacts/<agent_id>/<flow_id>/<file>`. A lowest-privilege user can tamper with cross-tenant evidence, blind endpoint telemetry, poison report templates for later code execution, plant data or exhaust storage. Sibling list, download and delete routes remain restricted to admin/analyst; the exposed operation is the upload write path. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

SOCFortress CoPilot allows `customer_user` roles to call the upload endpoint with arbitrary bucket and object names, bypassing any allowlist or tenant prefix checks. The only required file test is non‑empty filename, so an attacker can overwrite existing objects belonging to any tenant. The ability to replace files such as sysmon configurations, case‑report templates, or forensic evidence enables the attacker to alter telemetry, inject malicious code through poisoned templates, plant data, or exhaust storage. The CVE reports that a lowest‑privilege user can affect cross‑tenant data, compromising integrity and potentially enabling remote code execution. The weakness is a failure of access control and input validation, consistent with CWE‑284, CWE‑639 and CWE‑862.

Affected Systems

CoPilot versions prior to 0.1.76. The vulnerability is present in all releases where the upload endpoint exists without an allowlist. The specific target product is SocFortress CoPilot, any tenant using the backend data‑store upload route.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS base score of 8.5 indicates high severity. EPSS is not available, but the known lack of a KEV listing suggests the vulnerability may not be actively exploited yet. The attack vector is through the authenticated upload API, which is accessible to all customer users. Because the vulnerability permits arbitrary writes without role restriction, a single low‑privilege account can impact other tenants’ data and potentially trigger exploitation of template‑based code execution. The combination of high severity, broad impact across tenants, and easy exploitation via the API makes this a serious risk for organizations running CoPilot before version 0.1.76.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade SocFortress CoPilot to version 0.1.76 or later to patch the upload endpoint and enforce tenant isolation on bucket and object names.
  • Restrict the `/api/agent_data_store/upload` endpoint to only privileged roles such as administrator or analyst, removing customer_user access if possible.
  • Implement monitoring of upload activity and file integrity checks to detect unauthorized object overwrites or malicious file injections.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on October 30, 2026 at 15:57 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Socfortress
Socfortress copilot
Vendors & Products Socfortress
Socfortress copilot
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, `POST /api/agent_data_store/upload` in `backend/app/data_store/data_store_routes.py` permits `customer_user` callers to choose `bucket_name` and `object_name` without an allowlist, tenant prefix, ownership check or content restriction. The only file check requires a nonempty filename. The operations in `backend/app/data_store/data_store_operations.py` create missing buckets and upsert objects, allowing existing objects belonging to any tenant to be overwritten. Targets include `sysmon-configs/<customer_code>/sysmon_config.xml` distributed to managed Windows endpoints, `copilot-case-report-templates/<name>` rendered server-side, and case evidence or forensic artifacts under `copilot-cases/<case_id>/<file>` and `velociraptor-artifacts/<agent_id>/<flow_id>/<file>`. A lowest-privilege user can tamper with cross-tenant evidence, blind endpoint telemetry, poison report templates for later code execution, plant data or exhaust storage. Sibling list, download and delete routes remain restricted to admin/analyst; the exposed operation is the upload write path. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.
Title SOCFortress CoPilot: Cross-Tenant Arbitrary Object-Store Write via the Data-Store Upload Endpoint (customer_user)
Weaknesses CWE-284
CWE-639
CWE-862
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 8.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L'}

Weaknesses
  • CWE-284

    Improper Access Control

  • CWE-639

    Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

  • CWE-862

    Missing Authorization

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
GitHub_M
Published
Updated
Oct 30, 2026, 3:52 PM
Reserved
Jul 10, 2026, 6:51 PM
Status
Deferred
Published
Oct 30, 2026, 3:16 PM
Modified
Oct 30, 2026, 5:13 PM