Technical impact
SOCFortress CoPilot allows `customer_user` roles to call the upload endpoint with arbitrary bucket and object names, bypassing any allowlist or tenant prefix checks. The only required file test is non‑empty filename, so an attacker can overwrite existing objects belonging to any tenant. The ability to replace files such as sysmon configurations, case‑report templates, or forensic evidence enables the attacker to alter telemetry, inject malicious code through poisoned templates, plant data, or exhaust storage. The CVE reports that a lowest‑privilege user can affect cross‑tenant data, compromising integrity and potentially enabling remote code execution. The weakness is a failure of access control and input validation, consistent with CWE‑284, CWE‑639 and CWE‑862.
Affected Systems
CoPilot versions prior to 0.1.76. The vulnerability is present in all releases where the upload endpoint exists without an allowlist. The specific target product is SocFortress CoPilot, any tenant using the backend data‑store upload route.
Risk and Exploitability
The CVSS base score of 8.5 indicates high severity. EPSS is not available, but the known lack of a KEV listing suggests the vulnerability may not be actively exploited yet. The attack vector is through the authenticated upload API, which is accessible to all customer users. Because the vulnerability permits arbitrary writes without role restriction, a single low‑privilege account can impact other tenants’ data and potentially trigger exploitation of template‑based code execution. The combination of high severity, broad impact across tenants, and easy exploitation via the API makes this a serious risk for organizations running CoPilot before version 0.1.76.