Technical impact
Prior to version 0.1.76, SOCFortress CoPilot’s webhook handlers for Graylog and Velociraptor used a hard‑coded header value as a fallback when the configuration values were unset. An attacker who supplies this known header can bypass the JWT authentication required by normal API calls. Once authenticated, the /api/graylog/invoke endpoint accepts arbitrary COMMAND, ACTION, VALUE, and AGENT_ID values and forwards them to the configured Wazuh manager without performing the command‑enum validation that the authenticated route performs, allowing disruptive or malicious scripts to run on endpoints. Additionally, the /api/incidents/alerts/create/threshold and /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma endpoints accept forged alerts with arbitrary customer_code values and forward attacker‑controlled OpenSearch queries, permitting information disclosure or injection attacks.
Affected Systems
SocFortress CoPilot releases earlier than 0.1.76 are affected. Any deployment that has not overridden the GRAYLOG_API_HEADER_VALUE or VELOCIRAPTOR_API_HEADER_VALUE in its environment configuration remains vulnerable. Deployments that have deliberately changed these header secrets are not exposed to the default‑secret bypass.
Risk and Exploitability
The CVSS score of 9.4 marks this flaw as critical. Although EPSS data is unavailable, the publicly known default secret reduces the effort and skill needed for exploitation, implying a high likelihood of attack. The issue is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. An attacker can trigger the vulnerability by sending HTTP POST requests to the affected endpoints, supplying the known header value, and tailoring the payloads to exploit the lack of input validation. Successful exploitation allows remote execution of arbitrary commands on the Wazuh manager and manipulation of OpenSearch queries against the target environment.