CVE-2026-62162

Hydra: Deposit Claim omits Head state-token spending requirement

Published Oct 30, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 8.2 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
Hydra is a layer-two scalability solution for Cardano. Prior to 2.1.0, the `Claim` branch in `hydra-plutus/validators/deposit.ak` checks only that `datum.head_id` matches the attacker-controlled `redeemer.currencySymbol` and that the transaction is valid before the deposit deadline. It neither requires spending the Head state-token UTxO in the same transaction nor constrains outputs. After a deposit made through `POST /commit` is confirmed, any third party able to build a Cardano transaction can observe and consume the pending deposit UTxO before its deadline and redirect the assets to an arbitrary address. A standalone deposit spend invokes no Head validator, bypassing its safety checks; historical head-ID binding and the Aiken rewrite retained this missing invariant. The default deadline is three times depositPeriod, so the described attack applies to pending deposits before that deadline. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.0.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

The vulnerability occurs because Hydra's Claim validator omitted the requirement to spend the Head state‑token UTxO when a deposit is claimed. As a consequence, the validator does not enforce that the same transaction consumes this special token, leaving a pathway for an attacker to redirect assets to an arbitrary address. This flaw enables the theft of deposited funds before the deadline and bypasses all intended integrity checks.

Affected Systems

The flaw affects the Hydra layer‑two scaling solution for Cardano, specifically deployments of the Hydra client running any version prior to 2.1.0. This includes versions that include the hydra‑plutus/validators/deposit.ak code referenced in the publication. After the release of Hydra 2.1.0, the issue is addressed and existing vulnerabilities are closed.

Risk and Exploitability

Hydra was assigned a CVSS score of 8.2, indicating high severity. The EPSS score is 0.00367 ( < 1%), indicating a very low but non‑zero exploitation probability, but the flaw was present in a widely used scaling solution and there is no record that it has been exploited yet. The attack does not require prior insider access or privileged credentials; an adversary who can observe the on‑chain deposit transaction and has the ability to forge a transaction that consumes the pending UTxO before the pre‑defined deadline can re‑direct the assets. Because the missing state‑token requirement is checked at the validator level, the attack allows the attacker to bypass the intended safety controls, making the vulnerability particularly dangerous for any Hydra instance that has not applied the 2.1.0 fix.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Update Hydra to version 2.1.0 or later to enforce the state‑token spending requirement in the Claim validator.
  • Revoke or cancel any pending deposits that have not yet been finalized on versions lower than 2.1.0 to prevent further exposure.
  • Audit the asset ledger for unauthorized transfers originating from pending deposits and replace compromised assets with newly deposited funds validated by the latest Hydra release.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on November 4, 2026 at 11:12 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-807
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N'}

threat_severity

Important

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Cardano-scaling
Cardano-scaling hydra
Vendors & Products Cardano-scaling
Cardano-scaling hydra
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Hydra is a layer-two scalability solution for Cardano. Prior to 2.1.0, the `Claim` branch in `hydra-plutus/validators/deposit.ak` checks only that `datum.head_id` matches the attacker-controlled `redeemer.currencySymbol` and that the transaction is valid before the deposit deadline. It neither requires spending the Head state-token UTxO in the same transaction nor constrains outputs. After a deposit made through `POST /commit` is confirmed, any third party able to build a Cardano transaction can observe and consume the pending deposit UTxO before its deadline and redirect the assets to an arbitrary address. A standalone deposit spend invokes no Head validator, bypassing its safety checks; historical head-ID binding and the Aiken rewrite retained this missing invariant. The default deadline is three times depositPeriod, so the described attack applies to pending deposits before that deadline. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.0.
Title Hydra: Deposit Claim omits Head state-token spending requirement
Weaknesses CWE-862
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 8.2, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}

Weaknesses
  • CWE-807

    Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision

  • CWE-862

    Missing Authorization

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
GitHub_M
Published
Updated
Oct 30, 2026, 10:17 PM
Reserved
Jul 13, 2026, 2:16 PM
Status
Deferred
Published
Oct 30, 2026, 7:18 PM
Modified
Oct 30, 2026, 11:17 PM
Severity
Important
Public date
Oct 30, 2026, 6:30 PM