CVE-2026-62301

MyTube: Visitor Can Access Hidden Video Metadata and Content

Published Oct 30, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 7.1 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
MyTube is a self-hosted downloader and player for several video websites. Prior to version 1.10.3, backend video access does not enforce the visitor role's intended public-only restriction when `loginEnabled=true` and a visitor password is configured. The frontend filter in `VideoContext.tsx` is only client-side, `roleBasedAuthMiddleware.ts` allows all visitor GET requests, and `storageService/videos.ts` performs `getVideos()` and `getVideoById(id)` queries without checking the caller's role or `visibility`. A visitor can enumerate `/api/videos` or request `/api/videos/:id` to retrieve hidden `visibility`=0 records, exposing titles, `sourceUrl` values, `videoPath` values, subtitle paths and `thumbnailPath` values. The `serveMountVideo()` path also serves mounted video files without `visibility` checks. Leaked paths work against unauthenticated `/videos/*` and `/subtitles/*` routes, allowing media downloads without credentials. The RSS visitor feed already filters `visibility`=1 content and is not the affected query path. Default loginEnabled=false single-user deployments are unaffected by this role-boundary issue because all callers are owner-equivalent. This issue is fixed in version 1.10.3.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

The flaw in MyTube occurs when the backend lacks enforcement of the visitor role’s visibility restrictions. When a site enables visitor authentication and assigns a visitor password, the API endpoints `/api/videos` and `/api/videos/:id` return all video records, including those marked with `visibility=0`. This exposes hidden metadata such as titles, source URLs, video file paths, subtitle paths, and thumbnails. Visitors can also download media files through the `serveMountVideo` route or unprotected `/videos/*` and `/subtitles/*` paths, effectively granting full media access without credentials. The vulnerability stems from missing authentication checks at the API and file‑serving layers, mapping to a significant loss of confidentiality for content owners and potential abuse by unauthenticated users.

Affected Systems

The flaw impacts installations of Franklioxygen's MyTube application running any version earlier than 1.10.3. The issue manifests when the configuration sets `loginEnabled=true` and a visitor password is defined, allowing visitor accounts to bypass intended read‑only access. Deployments that retain the default setting of `loginEnabled=false`, such as single‑user or owner‑equivalent setups, are not affected because all callers possess owner privileges. Updating to 1.10.3 removes the unrestricted visibility checks and corrects the backend endpoint behavior.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 7.1 places this weakness in the high‑to‑critical range, and although EPSS data is not available, the lack of authentication checks makes exploitation straightforward for anyone who can reach the API. The vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog, yet the public nature of the affected endpoints and the permissive visitor settings mean attackers can enumerate video resources without privileged credentials. The available paths to obtain media files risk unlicensed distribution and intellectual property exposure if the content is proprietary.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade MyTube to version 1.10.3 or later to apply the vendor‑provided fix that restores visibility checks at the API and file‑serving layers.
  • If an update is not immediately possible, disable visitor access by setting `loginEnabled=false` or removing the visitor password from the configuration to prevent the use of the visitor role.
  • As a temporary measure, block direct HTTP access to the `/videos/*` and `/subtitles/*` paths or configure the web server to require authentication for these routes, ensuring that exposed media files cannot be downloaded without proper authorization.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on October 30, 2026 at 20:36 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Franklioxygen
Franklioxygen mytube
Vendors & Products Franklioxygen
Franklioxygen mytube
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description MyTube is a self-hosted downloader and player for several video websites. Prior to version 1.10.3, backend video access does not enforce the visitor role's intended public-only restriction when `loginEnabled=true` and a visitor password is configured. The frontend filter in `VideoContext.tsx` is only client-side, `roleBasedAuthMiddleware.ts` allows all visitor GET requests, and `storageService/videos.ts` performs `getVideos()` and `getVideoById(id)` queries without checking the caller's role or `visibility`. A visitor can enumerate `/api/videos` or request `/api/videos/:id` to retrieve hidden `visibility`=0 records, exposing titles, `sourceUrl` values, `videoPath` values, subtitle paths and `thumbnailPath` values. The `serveMountVideo()` path also serves mounted video files without `visibility` checks. Leaked paths work against unauthenticated `/videos/*` and `/subtitles/*` routes, allowing media downloads without credentials. The RSS visitor feed already filters `visibility`=1 content and is not the affected query path. Default loginEnabled=false single-user deployments are unaffected by this role-boundary issue because all callers are owner-equivalent. This issue is fixed in version 1.10.3.
Title MyTube: Visitor Can Access Hidden Video Metadata and Content
Weaknesses CWE-862
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 7.1, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
GitHub_M
Published
Updated
Nov 6, 2026, 5:37 PM
Reserved
Jul 13, 2026, 6:37 PM
Status
Deferred
Published
Oct 30, 2026, 8:17 PM
Modified
Nov 6, 2026, 6:18 PM