CVE-2026-62337

SNARK Verifier: Halo 2 aggregation mishandles point-at-infinity proof elements

Published Oct 30, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 6.9 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
SNARK Verifier is a generic (S)NARK verifier. Prior to 0.2.5, the Halo 2 aggregation circuit can mishandle proof points encoded as the point at infinity. `EcPointLoader::multi_scalar_multiplication` places a `Value::Assigned(_)` base paired with `Value::Constant(ONE)` into its unscaled variable-base list and passes it directly to `sum_with_const`. The default shim delegates to halo2-lib `EccChip::sum`, whose incomplete affine addition assumes nonidentity input points. A prover-controlled proof point encoded as `(0, 0)` can therefore enter the final aggregation sum through the scalar-one shortcut and affect the MSM or accumulator computation. Practical exploitability depends on the surrounding aggregation and final-decider checks; the advisory does not establish universal acceptance of invalid proofs. This issue is fixed in version 0.2.5.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

The Halo 2 aggregation circuit in the SNARK Verifier library incorrectly handles proof elements encoded as the point at infinity. When a prover supplies a proof point represented as (0,0), the aggregation logic admits this invalid point into the multi-scalar multiplication step, allowing the point to influence the final accumulator computation. This flaw can enable the admission of malformed proofs if the surrounding aggregation and final-decider checks are not stringent enough, thereby compromising the integrity of cryptographic verification.

Affected Systems

This vulnerability affects the axiom-crypto SNARK Verifier library in all releases prior to v0.2.5. Any deployment that incorporates the library for verifying SNARK proofs is potentially invalidated unless the software is upgraded to the patched version.

Risk and Exploitability

With a CVSS base score of 6.9, the vulnerability is considered medium severity. The EPSS score is not available, and the issue is not listed in CISA's KEV catalog. The likely attack vector involves an adversary controlling the prover with the ability to submit crafted proofs; however, practical exploitation depends on the presence and rigor of additional validation logic within the verifier application. Because the flaw is not automatically exploitable in all deployments, the overall risk is moderate, but no audit of all integration points is assumed to be performed.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade the SNARK Verifier library to v0.2.5 or later to apply the vendor fix.
  • If an upgrade cannot be performed immediately, implement a pre-verification filter that rejects any proof containing point‑at‑infinity elements (e.g., coordinates (0,0)) before the aggregation circuit processes it.
  • Review custom integration code to ensure that no direct use of multi‑scalar multiplication bypasses point‑of‑identity checks, and apply input validation consistent with CWE‑20 to guard against malformed inputs.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on October 30, 2026 at 21:57 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

Source ID Title
Github GHSA Github GHSA GHSA-x26x-7f4v-cqx7 snark-verifier: Halo 2 aggregation circuit mishandles point-at-infinity proof elements
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Axiom-crypto
Axiom-crypto snark-verifier
Vendors & Products Axiom-crypto
Axiom-crypto snark-verifier
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description SNARK Verifier is a generic (S)NARK verifier. Prior to 0.2.5, the Halo 2 aggregation circuit can mishandle proof points encoded as the point at infinity. `EcPointLoader::multi_scalar_multiplication` places a `Value::Assigned(_)` base paired with `Value::Constant(ONE)` into its unscaled variable-base list and passes it directly to `sum_with_const`. The default shim delegates to halo2-lib `EccChip::sum`, whose incomplete affine addition assumes nonidentity input points. A prover-controlled proof point encoded as `(0, 0)` can therefore enter the final aggregation sum through the scalar-one shortcut and affect the MSM or accumulator computation. Practical exploitability depends on the surrounding aggregation and final-decider checks; the advisory does not establish universal acceptance of invalid proofs. This issue is fixed in version 0.2.5.
Title SNARK Verifier: Halo 2 aggregation mishandles point-at-infinity proof elements
Weaknesses CWE-20
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 6.9, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}

Weaknesses
  • CWE-20

    Improper Input Validation

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
GitHub_M
Published
Updated
Nov 2, 2026, 2:58 PM
Reserved
Jul 13, 2026, 9:42 PM
Status
Deferred
Published
Oct 30, 2026, 8:17 PM
Modified
Nov 2, 2026, 7:35 PM