Description
Yeti bridges the gap between CTI and DFIR practitioners by providing a Forensics Intelligence platform and pipeline. Prior to 2.5.1, YETI derives ExportTask.file_name from the user-controlled task name and passes it to core/clients/file_storage/classes/local_storage.py without sanitizing traversal sequences or enforcing path confinement. A low-privileged authenticated user using the default local storage backend can call POST /api/v2/tasks/export/new with a traversal name and use ExportTask.file_contents through GET /api/v2/tasks/export/{export_id}/content to read files accessible to the YETI service account. Running ExportTask.run() can also write attacker-controlled export output to an attacker-selected writable path. The impact depends on the service account's filesystem permissions, and universal code execution is not established. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.1.
Published: 2026-11-03
Score: 8.3 High
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: Arbitrary file read and write by an authenticated low‑privileged user
Action: Immediate Patch
AI Analysis

Impact

A low‑privileged authenticated user can create an ExportTask with a name that includes traversal sequences, causing Yeti to generate a file name from the task name and store it in a local backend without sanitisation. The attacker can then read or write arbitrary files on the host that the Yeti service account can access, which may include sensitive configuration files or data. Though the CVE does not establish universal code execution, the ability to read or modify critical files presents a serious confidentiality and integrity risk, reflected in the CVSS score of 8.3.

Affected Systems

Yeti Platform "YETI" users running versions prior to 2.5.1 are affected. The vulnerability exists in the core/clients/file_storage component where ExportTask.file_name is derived from the user supplied task name and is passed to local_storage without path confinement.

Risk and Exploitability

The exploit requires only a valid user account with access to the default local storage backend, so the attack vector is authenticated local. No specific elevation of privilege is required, but the damage depends on the file system permissions of the Yeti service account. Because the EPSS score is not available and the issue is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog, no publicly known exploits are currently documented. Nonetheless, the high CVSS score and the ability to read/write arbitrary files make this a high‑risk vulnerability that should be addressed promptly.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on November 3, 2026 at 20:36 UTC.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade Yeti to version 2.5.1 or later to apply the path‑traversal fix in the ExportTask code.
  • If an upgrade cannot be performed immediately, disable or restrict the ExportTask API endpoint (/api/v2/tasks/export/) so that only trusted high‑privileged users can invoke it, and/or remove the default local storage backend entirely.
  • Audit the filesystem permissions of the Yeti service account to ensure that it does not have read or write access to sensitive directories, thereby limiting the potential impact if the path traversal were exploited.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on November 3, 2026 at 20:36 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

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History

Tue, 03 Nov 2026 21:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Yeti-platform
Yeti-platform yeti
Vendors & Products Yeti-platform
Yeti-platform yeti

Tue, 03 Nov 2026 19:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Yeti bridges the gap between CTI and DFIR practitioners by providing a Forensics Intelligence platform and pipeline. Prior to 2.5.1, YETI derives ExportTask.file_name from the user-controlled task name and passes it to core/clients/file_storage/classes/local_storage.py without sanitizing traversal sequences or enforcing path confinement. A low-privileged authenticated user using the default local storage backend can call POST /api/v2/tasks/export/new with a traversal name and use ExportTask.file_contents through GET /api/v2/tasks/export/{export_id}/content to read files accessible to the YETI service account. Running ExportTask.run() can also write attacker-controlled export output to an attacker-selected writable path. The impact depends on the service account's filesystem permissions, and universal code execution is not established. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.1.
Title Yeti: Path traversal in ExportTask name allows authenticated arbitrary file read and write
Weaknesses CWE-22
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 8.3, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L'}


Subscriptions

Yeti-platform Yeti
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published:

Updated: 2026-11-03T19:36:06.607Z

Reserved: 2026-07-16T21:49:52.069Z

Link: CVE-2026-63502

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Deferred

Published: 2026-11-03T20:18:17.280

Modified: 2026-11-03T20:18:17.423

Link: CVE-2026-63502

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-11-03T21:15:03Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-22

    Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')