Huawei openUBMC ships a default SNMPv3 Unified Security Model (USM) key that is identical for both authentication and privacy. The key is hard‑coded in the open‑source build and can be recovered from the repository. An attacker who obtains this key can authenticate to SNMPv3 and decrypt all SNMP traffic from any device that still uses the shipped key. Because SNMP access on these devices is mapped to complete administrative privileges, the attacker can perform system resets, firmware upgrades, and other high‑level management actions.

The vulnerability is present in Huawei openUBMC iBMC product builds that include the default_password.lua customization and the community seed default_password.lua. No specific minor version numbers are listed, but the flaw exists in any build that ships the hard‑coded key values described in the CNA references.

The flaw carries a CVSS score of 8.6, indicating high severity. EPSS data is not available, and the advisory is not listed in CISA KEV, but the ability to read a constant in the source code makes exploitation trivially easy for a determined adversary. The likely attack vector is that an attacker obtains the key from the public source code or a compromised build image; the key then allows authentication and decryption of SNMPv3 traffic to gain full device control. The vulnerability persists after administrator password resets, so it remains exploitable once a device is provisioned.