Technical impact
The vulnerability arises from the fallback AES‑GCM implementation in the pure‑Erlang module used by the jose library. The implementation calculates the number of bits to verify from the attacker‑supplied tag, allowing the tag length to be set arbitrarily. As a result, an attacker who controls a JWE token can truncate the authentication tag to as little as 8 bits, reducing forgery resistance from 2^128 to 2^8. A forged ciphertext is then accepted reliably as authentic within 256 attempts without key knowledge, and supplying too long a tag causes a crash. This constitutes an authentication tag forgery that bypasses integrity checks.
Affected Systems
The affected vendor is potatosalad and the product is jose. Versions from 1.2.0 up to (but not including) 1.11.13 are vulnerable; releases 1.11.13 and later contain the fix. The flaw is triggered only when the runtime does not provide native AES‑GCM support, such as on stripped or older OTP builds.
Risk and Exploitability
The CVSS score is 5.9, indicating moderate severity. EPSS data is not available and the issue is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. The vulnerability can be exploited when an application processes JWE tokens on builds lacking native crypto support; an attacker can forge a token by truncating the tag, which is then accepted or causes a crash. Systems that rely on jose with non‑native AES‑GCM on older or stripped OTP environments are at risk of integrity bypass and potential service interruption.