Technical impact
The pure‑Erlang implementation of RSAES‑PKCS1‑v1_5 decryption in jose contains a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. When a cipher block has valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding, the decryption function returns the plaintext; otherwise it returns a distinct error. Because the library performs no implicit‑rejection countermeasure and uses unblinded modular exponentiation, a one‑bit padding‑conformance signal leaks both in the return value and through timing. An unauthenticated attacker who can provide ciphertexts to the decryption endpoint (or call the underlying decrypt routine) can adaptively choose queries and recover the plaintext of intercepted messages or forge signatures with roughly 10^4 to 10^6 decryption requests. This directly threatens the confidentiality of data encrypted with RSA1_5 and the integrity of signed messages.
Affected Systems
The vulnerability affects the jöE Erlang library from potatosalad, specifically versions 1.3.0 through 1.11.12. All releases in this range are impacted; version 1.11.13 and later are presumed to contain the fix.
Risk and Exploitability
The CVSS score of 5.9 places this issue in the medium severity range, but the EPSS score is not available and the vulnerability is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog, indicating that it has not been observed widely in the wild yet. The likely attack vector is external: an unauthenticated attacker submitting crafted ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that uses RSA1_5 padding. Exploitation requires repeated oracle queries, but if the endpoint is publicly reachable the adversary can perform a viable padding‑oracle attack to recover sensitive information.