CVE-2026-65626

Bleichenbacher padding oracle in RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in jose

Published Oct 26, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 5.9 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
The pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the jose_jwa_pkcs1 module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. eme_pkcs1_decode/2 returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (a leading 0x00 0x02, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a 0x00 separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2 additionally returns {error, {badsize, _}} when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 §7.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in dp/2 is a raw, non-blinded crypto:mod_pow/3, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value.

An unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls decrypt_private/3 with rsa_pkcs1_padding) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries.

This issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

The pure‑Erlang implementation of RSAES‑PKCS1‑v1_5 decryption in jose contains a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. When a cipher block has valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding, the decryption function returns the plaintext; otherwise it returns a distinct error. Because the library performs no implicit‑rejection countermeasure and uses unblinded modular exponentiation, a one‑bit padding‑conformance signal leaks both in the return value and through timing. An unauthenticated attacker who can provide ciphertexts to the decryption endpoint (or call the underlying decrypt routine) can adaptively choose queries and recover the plaintext of intercepted messages or forge signatures with roughly 10^4 to 10^6 decryption requests. This directly threatens the confidentiality of data encrypted with RSA1_5 and the integrity of signed messages.

Affected Systems

The vulnerability affects the jöE Erlang library from potatosalad, specifically versions 1.3.0 through 1.11.12. All releases in this range are impacted; version 1.11.13 and later are presumed to contain the fix.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 5.9 places this issue in the medium severity range, but the EPSS score is not available and the vulnerability is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog, indicating that it has not been observed widely in the wild yet. The likely attack vector is external: an unauthenticated attacker submitting crafted ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that uses RSA1_5 padding. Exploitation requires repeated oracle queries, but if the endpoint is publicly reachable the adversary can perform a viable padding‑oracle attack to recover sensitive information.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade the jose library to version 1.11.13 or later, which includes the padding oracle fix and properly implements blinding countermeasures.
  • If an upgrade is not immediately possible, block or restrict access to decryption endpoints that use RSAES‑PKCS1‑v1_5, ensuring only trusted and authenticated callers can invoke them.
  • Implement a runtime countermeasure such as incorporating blind modular exponentiation, normalizing error responses to a single constant‑time value, or switching to OAEP padding for RSA encryption to remove the padding oracle vulnerability.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on October 27, 2026 at 01:19 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description The pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the jose_jwa_pkcs1 module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. eme_pkcs1_decode/2 returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (a leading 0x00 0x02, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a 0x00 separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2 additionally returns {error, {badsize, _}} when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 §7.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in dp/2 is a raw, non-blinded crypto:mod_pow/3, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value. An unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls decrypt_private/3 with rsa_pkcs1_padding) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries. This issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13.
Title Bleichenbacher padding oracle in RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in jose
First Time appeared Potatosalad
Potatosalad jose
Weaknesses CWE-203
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Potatosalad
Potatosalad jose
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 5.9, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
EEF
Published
Updated
Nov 2, 2026, 7:43 PM
Reserved
Jul 22, 2026, 1:55 PM
Status
Deferred
Published
Oct 26, 2026, 8:17 PM
Modified
Nov 2, 2026, 8:17 PM