Technical impact
Exploitation of weak key‑derivation parameters (PBKDF2‑HMAC‑SHA256 with 2048 iterations and a 64‑bit salt) in the jose library reduces the cost of cracking the password used to encrypt exported private‑key blobs. When an attacker obtains a PKCS#8 EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo blob produced by jose_jwk:to_der/2, a modest offline dictionary or brute‑force attack can recover the private key, leading to full compromise of the key holder’s cryptographic credentials. The weakness is confined to the derivation stage; the underlying AES‑256‑CBC encryption remains unaffected.
Affected Systems
The flaw impacts the Jose library shipped by potatosalad under the name jose, versions 1.10.0 through 1.11.12 inclusive. Any Erlang application employing these versions for password‑protected private‑key export is vulnerable. The issue does not affect later releases (≥ 1.11.13) where the library substitutes stronger PBKDF2 parameters.
Risk and Exploitability
The CVSS base score of 7.4 categorises the problem as high severity, but the EPSS score is not available, leaving the current global exploitation likelihood unclear. The vulnerability is not in CISA’s KEV list, indicating no documented high‑profile exploitation yet. An attacker must first obtain an exported encrypted private key blob, which is commonly stored in backups, configuration repositories, or logs. Once the file is in hand, the low iteration count and short salt render offline cracking inexpensive compared to modern best practices, making the attack feasible for both hobbyists and skilled adversaries.