CVE-2026-6924

Weak entropy initialization in Silicon Labs Matter SiWx917 TinyCrypt path

Published Jul 23, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 8.7 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
A bug in the entropy initialization for SiWx917 causes the DRBG to use a predictable seed. As such, all random numbers generated in the Matter code use the same stream of numbers. This vulnerability was discovered after the impacted repository was already deprecated.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

A bug in the entropy initialization for Silicon Labs SiWx917 causes the DRBG to use a predictable seed. As a result, all random numbers generated in the Matter code use an identical stream of numbers, effectively eliminating the randomness that secures cryptographic operations. The weakness is classified as CWE-336, indicating a flaw in random number generation and entropy management. This defect could allow an attacker to forecast the random values employed in key generation, session tokens, or other security‑critical functions, thereby undermining confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of the Matter implementation.

Affected Systems

The vulnerability affects the Silicon Labs Matter project, specifically the SiWx917 device implementation using the TinyCrypt library path. No specific release or version is listed, and the impacted repository has already been deprecated, which limits direct applicability to newer iterations of the product. The affected systems are therefore legacy Matter firmware or software that incorporates the SiWx917 TinyCrypt code untouched.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 8.7 indicates a high severity level, while the EPSS score of < 1% points to a very low likelihood of exploitation at the time of analysis. The vulnerability is not listed in CISA KEV, suggesting no known active exploitation. Based on the description, the attack likely requires the attacker to interact with a device or process that uses the insecure DRBG; the exact vector is not detailed, so it could be local or remote, depending on how the random numbers are utilized. When functional, the exploit would let an adversary predict all random outputs, compromising cryptographic security without the need for privileged access.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Identify and inventory all Matter firmware or software deployed that includes the SiWx917 TinyCrypt implementation.
  • Where possible, replace the TinyCrypt library with a component that performs proper entropy seeding, or integrate a hardware RNG source on SiWx917 before initializing the DRBG.
  • If replacing the library is not feasible, modify or patch the affected code to introduce a strong, non‑predictable seed—such as combining device‑specific entropy, time, or random data—before DRBG initialization to restore randomness.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 3, 2026 at 20:56 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Silicon Labs
Silicon Labs silicon Labs Matter Github
Vendors & Products Silicon Labs
Silicon Labs silicon Labs Matter Github
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description A bug in the entropy initialization for SiWx917 causes the DRBG to use a predictable seed. As such, all random numbers generated in the Matter code use the same stream of numbers. This vulnerability was discovered after the impacted repository was already deprecated.
Title Weak entropy initialization in Silicon Labs Matter SiWx917 TinyCrypt path
Weaknesses CWE-336
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 8.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}

Weaknesses
  • CWE-336

    Same Seed in Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
Silabs
Published
Updated
Jul 24, 2026, 1:40 PM
Reserved
Apr 23, 2026, 5:11 PM
Status
Awaiting Analysis
Published
Jul 23, 2026, 9:17 PM
Modified
Oct 24, 2026, 1:10 PM