Description
A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Dia diagram editor when processing Network Bus objects from Dia XML project files.

In objects/network/bus.c, bus_load() reads the number of bus handles from the file attribute "bus_handles" using attribute_num_data() without validating an upper bound:

bus->num_handles = attribute_num_data(attr);

When a bus handle is subsequently moved, bus_handle_moved() allocates two temporary arrays on the stack:

parallel = (real *)g_alloca(num_handles * sizeof(real));
perp = (real *)g_alloca(num_handles * sizeof(real));

Because num_handles is fully attacker-controlled via the project file, sufficiently large values (for example 262144 or higher) cause g_alloca() to consume more stack space than the default thread stack limit (typically 8 MB on Linux), resulting in stack overflow, SIGSEGV, and potential stack frame / return-address corruption.

An attacker can embed a Bus object with an excessive bus_handles count in a malicious .dia file. Exploitation requires the victim to open the file in Dia (file dialog, command line, or file association) and trigger handle manipulation (moving a bus handle), which exercises the vulnerable code path.

The identical g_alloca pattern is present in objects/Misc/tree.c (copied from bus.c) and is likely vulnerable to the same class of attack via Tree objects.

Affected versions: Dia 0.98.0 and earlier versions containing this code; issue confirmed on upstream master as of 2026-08-21.
Upstream report: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/dia/-/issues/581
Published: 2026-08-26
Score: 7.8 High
EPSS: < 1% Very Low
KEV: No
Impact: Memory corruption (potential code execution)
Action: Apply Patch
AI Analysis

Impact

The Dia diagram editor contains a stack‑based buffer overflow that is triggered when a Network Bus object in a .dia file specifies an excessively large number of bus handles. The bus_load() function reads the handle count from the file attribute "bus_handles" without imposing an upper bound, and later bus_handle_moved() allocates two temporary arrays on the stack whose size is based on that count. An attacker can set a very large count, causing the g_alloca() allocations to exceed the thread stack limit, resulting in stack overflow that can corrupt return addresses and potentially enable arbitrary code execution. The identical, unvalidated allocation pattern also exists in the Tree object implementation, indicating a broader class of overflow vulnerabilities.

Affected Systems

The software affected is the Dia diagram editor, versions 0.98.0 and earlier. All users running these releases and who may open untrusted diagram files are at risk.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 7.8 indicates a high local impact; no EPSS score is available and the vulnerability is not listed in CISA’s KEV catalog. Exploitation requires a user to open a malicious .dia file, typically via the file dialog or command line, and then manipulate a bus handle to trigger the vulnerable code path. The attack vector is local, but the potential to corrupt memory and possibly execute arbitrary code makes it a significant threat for systems that use Dia.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 26, 2026 at 13:20 UTC.

Remediation

No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade Dia to the latest release that includes the bus handle validation fix.
  • If an update is not immediately possible, avoid opening or manipulating .dia files from untrusted sources.
  • Where possible, limit the number of bus handles in project files or apply a custom patch that enforces bounds checking on bus_handles.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 26, 2026 at 13:20 UTC.

Tracking

Sign in to view the affected projects.

Advisories

No advisories yet.

History

Wed, 26 Aug 2026 14:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Wed, 26 Aug 2026 12:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Dia diagram editor when processing Network Bus objects from Dia XML project files. In objects/network/bus.c, bus_load() reads the number of bus handles from the file attribute "bus_handles" using attribute_num_data() without validating an upper bound: bus->num_handles = attribute_num_data(attr); When a bus handle is subsequently moved, bus_handle_moved() allocates two temporary arrays on the stack: parallel = (real *)g_alloca(num_handles * sizeof(real)); perp = (real *)g_alloca(num_handles * sizeof(real)); Because num_handles is fully attacker-controlled via the project file, sufficiently large values (for example 262144 or higher) cause g_alloca() to consume more stack space than the default thread stack limit (typically 8 MB on Linux), resulting in stack overflow, SIGSEGV, and potential stack frame / return-address corruption. An attacker can embed a Bus object with an excessive bus_handles count in a malicious .dia file. Exploitation requires the victim to open the file in Dia (file dialog, command line, or file association) and trigger handle manipulation (moving a bus handle), which exercises the vulnerable code path. The identical g_alloca pattern is present in objects/Misc/tree.c (copied from bus.c) and is likely vulnerable to the same class of attack via Tree objects. Affected versions: Dia 0.98.0 and earlier versions containing this code; issue confirmed on upstream master as of 2026-08-21. Upstream report: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/dia/-/issues/581 A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Dia diagram editor when processing Network Bus objects from Dia XML project files. In objects/network/bus.c, bus_load() reads the number of bus handles from the file attribute "bus_handles" using attribute_num_data() without validating an upper bound: bus->num_handles = attribute_num_data(attr); When a bus handle is subsequently moved, bus_handle_moved() allocates two temporary arrays on the stack: parallel = (real *)g_alloca(num_handles * sizeof(real)); perp = (real *)g_alloca(num_handles * sizeof(real)); Because num_handles is fully attacker-controlled via the project file, sufficiently large values (for example 262144 or higher) cause g_alloca() to consume more stack space than the default thread stack limit (typically 8 MB on Linux), resulting in stack overflow, SIGSEGV, and potential stack frame / return-address corruption. An attacker can embed a Bus object with an excessive bus_handles count in a malicious .dia file. Exploitation requires the victim to open the file in Dia (file dialog, command line, or file association) and trigger handle manipulation (moving a bus handle), which exercises the vulnerable code path. The identical g_alloca pattern is present in objects/Misc/tree.c (copied from bus.c) and is likely vulnerable to the same class of attack via Tree objects. Affected versions: Dia 0.98.0 and earlier versions containing this code; issue confirmed on upstream master as of 2026-08-21. Upstream report: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/dia/-/issues/581
Title dia: dia: stack buffer overflow in Bus object via unvalidated handle count in project files Dia: dia: stack buffer overflow in bus object via unvalidated handle count in project files
References

Tue, 25 Aug 2026 14:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Gnome
Gnome dia
Vendors & Products Gnome
Gnome dia

Tue, 25 Aug 2026 12:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Dia diagram editor when processing Network Bus objects from Dia XML project files. In objects/network/bus.c, bus_load() reads the number of bus handles from the file attribute "bus_handles" using attribute_num_data() without validating an upper bound: bus->num_handles = attribute_num_data(attr); When a bus handle is subsequently moved, bus_handle_moved() allocates two temporary arrays on the stack: parallel = (real *)g_alloca(num_handles * sizeof(real)); perp = (real *)g_alloca(num_handles * sizeof(real)); Because num_handles is fully attacker-controlled via the project file, sufficiently large values (for example 262144 or higher) cause g_alloca() to consume more stack space than the default thread stack limit (typically 8 MB on Linux), resulting in stack overflow, SIGSEGV, and potential stack frame / return-address corruption. An attacker can embed a Bus object with an excessive bus_handles count in a malicious .dia file. Exploitation requires the victim to open the file in Dia (file dialog, command line, or file association) and trigger handle manipulation (moving a bus handle), which exercises the vulnerable code path. The identical g_alloca pattern is present in objects/Misc/tree.c (copied from bus.c) and is likely vulnerable to the same class of attack via Tree objects. Affected versions: Dia 0.98.0 and earlier versions containing this code; issue confirmed on upstream master as of 2026-08-21. Upstream report: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/dia/-/issues/581
Title dia: dia: stack buffer overflow in Bus object via unvalidated handle count in project files
Weaknesses CWE-121
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

 cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.8, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'}

threat_severity

Important

Subscriptions

Gnome Dia
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: fedora

Published:

Updated: 2026-08-26T13:11:12.732Z

Reserved: 2026-08-21T04:33:45.481Z

Link: CVE-2026-77658

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-08-26T13:11:08.414Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Awaiting Analysis

Published: 2026-08-26T13:19:22.043

Modified: 2026-08-28T15:44:39.323

Link: CVE-2026-77658

cve-icon Redhat

Severity : Important

Publid Date: 2026-08-21T00:00:00Z

Links: CVE-2026-77658 - Bugzilla

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-08-26T13:30:06Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-121

    Stack-based Buffer Overflow