Description
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes.
AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: "guess"} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus __struct__ key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field.
This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.
AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: "guess"} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus __struct__ key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field.
This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.
No analysis available yet.
Remediation
No remediation available yet.
Tracking
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Advisories
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References
History
Mon, 31 Aug 2026 03:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes. AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: "guess"} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus __struct__ key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field. This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1. | |
| Title | AshAdmin composite primary key decoding accepts arbitrary fields, enabling a secret-attribute oracle | |
| First Time appeared |
Ash-project
Ash-project ash Admin |
|
| Weaknesses | CWE-639 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash_admin:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Ash-project
Ash-project ash Admin |
|
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: EEF
Published:
Updated: 2026-08-31T02:31:29.547Z
Reserved: 2026-08-30T23:15:02.371Z
Link: CVE-2026-81853
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-08-31T03:16:42.670
Modified: 2026-08-31T03:16:42.670
Link: CVE-2026-81853
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses
-
CWE-639
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key