CVE-2026-81853

AshAdmin composite primary key decoding accepts arbitrary fields, enabling a secret-attribute oracle

Published Aug 31, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 2.3 Low EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes.

AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: "guess"} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus __struct__ key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

A flaw in Ash Admin allows the composite‑primary‑key decoding routine to return a map of user‑controlled attributes without validating that the keys are actual primary‑key fields. When that map is used as a lookup filter, an attacker can embed sensitive attribute names such as api_token or reset_token and test guesses one equality at a time, turning the record‑lookup endpoint into an equality oracle. The result is a direct authorization bypass that permits brute‑force discovery of confidential tokens or reset keys, compromising account security and privacy.

Affected Systems

The vulnerability affects the Ash Project’s Ash Admin application, specifically any release from version 0.1.0 up to, but not including, 1.3.1. Products are identified as ash-project:ash_admin, and all builds within this range are impacted.

Risk and Exploitability

The CVSS score of 2.3 indicates low overall severity, and the EPSS score is not available, but the vulnerability can be leveraged by anyone who can reach the record‑lookup URL, which is often publicly accessible. The exploitation requires only crafting HTTP requests with a Base64‑encoded composite key payload; no privileged code execution is needed. Because the attack surface consists of repeated equality checks, attackers can iterate over possible token values, potentially revealing secrets if rate limits or monitoring are absent. The vulnerability is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog, which suggests that publicly known exploits are scarce, yet the basic attack remains straightforward and could be combined with other weaknesses to achieve deeper compromise.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade Ash Admin to version 1.3.1 or later, where the decoder rejects non primary‑key fields.
  • Limit access to the record‑lookup endpoint using firewall rules or authentication to ensure only authorized users can reach it.
  • Add application‑level validation so that any lookup filter is checked to contain only declared primary‑key fields before execution.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on August 31, 2026 at 04:51 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes. AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: "guess"} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus __struct__ key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field. This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.
Title AshAdmin composite primary key decoding accepts arbitrary fields, enabling a secret-attribute oracle
First Time appeared Ash-project
Ash-project ash Admin
Weaknesses CWE-639
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:ash-project:ash_admin:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Ash-project
Ash-project ash Admin
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 2.3, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}

Weaknesses
  • CWE-639

    Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
EEF
Published
Updated
Nov 19, 2026, 8:38 AM
Reserved
Aug 30, 2026, 11:15 PM
Status
Deferred
Published
Aug 31, 2026, 3:16 AM
Modified
Nov 19, 2026, 9:18 AM