CVE-2026-83594

Apache Wicket: FileUploadToResourceField accepts a client-asserted upload result and allocates the size it names

Published Nov 1, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 8.3 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
Memory allocation with an excessive size value in Apache Wicket.

org.apache.wicket.markup.html.form.upload.resource.FileUploadToResourceField uploads files to a separately mounted resource rather than through a form, and is told the outcome afterwards over its own Ajax callback. That callback reads the request parameter filesInfo, a JSON array carrying a client file name, a size and a content type for each file, and turns it into the list of FileUploadToResourceField.UploadInfo that onUploadSuccess() receives. Nothing binds that JSON to an upload the resource performed and nothing re-derives it from the stored files, so the number of entries and every value in them are whatever the request supplied. The callback URL is rendered into the page, no prior upload is required, and both GET and POST reach it, so any client that can load the page can have the component report files that were never uploaded, without authenticating beyond whatever the page itself requires and without any user interaction.

UploadInfo#get(), which the class offers as the way to obtain the bytes of an upload, allocates a byte array from UploadInfo#getSize() before it opens the file. The array is therefore sized by the number the request supplied, and the allocation happens even for a file that was never stored. One small request can cost the server close to two gigabytes of heap, and the request is trivially repeatable, so a few of them exhaust the heap for every request the Java virtual machine is serving. A size that the conversion to int turns negative instead throws NegativeArraySizeException, which the exception handler inside that method does not cover, so it escapes into the application.

An application is affected where it uses FileUploadToResourceField, which is not the ordinary upload path through FileUploadField and Form and has to be extended and mounted deliberately. The allocation additionally requires the application to call UploadInfo#get() rather than reading UploadInfo#getFile() itself. Where the application denies the ENABLE action on the field through its authorization strategy, the callback is refused like any other listener. The 8.x line does not contain this component and is not affected.

This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 9.14.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.11.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue.

Analysis

AI-generated

Technical impact

Apache Wicket’s FileUploadToResourceField accepts a client‑supplied JSON payload describing uploaded files. The callback does not verify that those files were actually uploaded nor that the size claims match the stored file. When an attacker supplies an oversized size, UploadInfo#get() allocates a byte array of that size before accessing the file. A single request can thus consume close to two gigabytes of heap, terminating the JVM or causing repeated requests to crash the application. The exception flow does not catch negative sizes, allowing the NegativeArraySizeException to surface in the application.

Affected Systems

The vulnerability exists in Apache Wicket for versions 9.14.0 through 9.24.0 and 10.0.0 through 10.11.0. Version 9.x and 10.x branches that use the FileUploadToResourceField component, and projects that have mounted this component deliberately, are affected. The 8.x line does not contain this component and is not affected.

Risk and Exploitability

With a CVSS score of 8.3 the issue is considered high severity. Although no EPSS value is currently available, the logic allows an attacker to repeat the attack trivially from any client that can access the page, making exploitation likely in an environment where the component is exposed. The lack of a KEV listing does not diminish the potential impact. The attack vector widely propagates via any GET or POST request to the component’s Ajax callback, requiring only the permissions granted to view the page.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Upgrade Apache Wicket to version 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which contains the fix for this allocation flaw.
  • If upgrading is not possible, remove the FileUploadToResourceField component from the application or restrict its use so that it never mounts in production.
  • Apply an authorization strategy that denies the ENABLE action on the field, effectively blocking the Ajax callback from reachable users.
  • Deploy application‑level monitoring to detect abnormal heap usage or frequent NegativeArraySizeExceptions, and consider implementing a Wicket request filter to reject any too‑large file descriptors from the callback JSON before processing.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on November 1, 2026 at 23:22 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Apache
Apache wicket
Vendors & Products Apache
Apache wicket
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Memory allocation with an excessive size value in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.markup.html.form.upload.resource.FileUploadToResourceField uploads files to a separately mounted resource rather than through a form, and is told the outcome afterwards over its own Ajax callback. That callback reads the request parameter filesInfo, a JSON array carrying a client file name, a size and a content type for each file, and turns it into the list of FileUploadToResourceField.UploadInfo that onUploadSuccess() receives. Nothing binds that JSON to an upload the resource performed and nothing re-derives it from the stored files, so the number of entries and every value in them are whatever the request supplied. The callback URL is rendered into the page, no prior upload is required, and both GET and POST reach it, so any client that can load the page can have the component report files that were never uploaded, without authenticating beyond whatever the page itself requires and without any user interaction. UploadInfo#get(), which the class offers as the way to obtain the bytes of an upload, allocates a byte array from UploadInfo#getSize() before it opens the file. The array is therefore sized by the number the request supplied, and the allocation happens even for a file that was never stored. One small request can cost the server close to two gigabytes of heap, and the request is trivially repeatable, so a few of them exhaust the heap for every request the Java virtual machine is serving. A size that the conversion to int turns negative instead throws NegativeArraySizeException, which the exception handler inside that method does not cover, so it escapes into the application. An application is affected where it uses FileUploadToResourceField, which is not the ordinary upload path through FileUploadField and Form and has to be extended and mounted deliberately. The allocation additionally requires the application to call UploadInfo#get() rather than reading UploadInfo#getFile() itself. Where the application denies the ENABLE action on the field through its authorization strategy, the callback is refused like any other listener. The 8.x line does not contain this component and is not affected. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 9.14.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.11.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue.
Title Apache Wicket: FileUploadToResourceField accepts a client-asserted upload result and allocates the size it names
Weaknesses CWE-789
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 8.3, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}

Weaknesses
  • CWE-789

    Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
apache
Published
Updated
Nov 6, 2026, 2:57 PM
Reserved
Aug 31, 2026, 8:07 PM
Status
Deferred
Published
Nov 1, 2026, 11:17 PM
Modified
Nov 6, 2026, 3:17 PM