Description
The HTML report that plist-to-html, CodeChecker parse --export html and CodeChecker cmd diff --output html generate puts the report message, the checker name and the source file path into a script block through json.dumps. json.dumps does not escape the less-than character, so a closing script tag in any of those three fields ends the script element and what follows is parsed as HTML.




The input author is whoever controls the analysed tree or a third-party result file that report-converter ingests, or who holds PRODUCT_STORE in the cmd diff flow. The viewer is somebody else: docs/jenkins_gerrit_integration.md documents writing the report into Jenkins userContent and posting its URL into a Gerrit review. One caveat worth stating up front is that Jenkins serves userContent under a restrictive CSP that would block an inline handler, so that destination is probably safe as configured. The generated report sets no CSP of its own, so the impact lands wherever it is published without one.
Published: 2026-11-06
Score: 0 Low
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: Stored XSS
Action: Assess Impact
AI Analysis

Impact

The vulnerability is a stored cross‑site scripting flaw that arises when the static HTML report generated by CodeChecker components embeds user‑supplied fields directly into a JavaScript string via json.dumps. Because json.dumps does not escape the less‑than character, a closing </script> tag in the report message, checker name or source file path can terminate the script block and inject arbitrary HTML or script. An attacker who can influence these fields can make any user who views the exported report execute malicious code with the privileges of that user’s browser session, potentially exfiltrating data or defacing the report.

Affected Systems

The flaw affects Ericsson’s CodeChecker product, all releases that use the plist‑to‑html conversion, the “parse –export html” command, and the “cmd diff –output html” feature. No specific version range is supplied, so any instance where the report is generated with these commands is vulnerable until a fix is applied.

Risk and Exploitability

The EPSS score is not available and the vulnerability is not listed in CISA KEV, but the CVSS is not provided. Given the nature of XSS, the risk is medium to high if the generated report is publicly accessible or shared within an organization. Exploitation requires the attacker to inject crafted content into one of the three fields, then disseminate the resulting report to victims. The vulnerability can be triggered without elevated privileges; the attack surface is the report export interface and the hosting environment for the resulting HTML page.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on November 6, 2026 at 11:35 UTC.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record.

OpenCVE Recommended Actions

  • Apply the latest CodeChecker release that escapes markup characters in the HTML report or patch the report generation code to escape '<' in all fields before embedding them in a <script> block.
  • Configure a Content‑Security‑Policy on the web server that delivers the reports to disallow inline scripts, thereby preventing malicious code from running even if injected.
  • Sanitize or validate user‑supplied inputs that populate the report message, checker name, and source file path before passing them to the report generator.

Generated by OpenCVE AI on November 6, 2026 at 11:35 UTC.

Tracking

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Advisories

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History

Fri, 06 Nov 2026 12:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Ericsson
Ericsson codechecker
Vendors & Products Ericsson
Ericsson codechecker

Fri, 06 Nov 2026 10:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description The HTML report that plist-to-html, CodeChecker parse --export html and CodeChecker cmd diff --output html generate puts the report message, the checker name and the source file path into a script block through json.dumps. json.dumps does not escape the less-than character, so a closing script tag in any of those three fields ends the script element and what follows is parsed as HTML. The input author is whoever controls the analysed tree or a third-party result file that report-converter ingests, or who holds PRODUCT_STORE in the cmd diff flow. The viewer is somebody else: docs/jenkins_gerrit_integration.md documents writing the report into Jenkins userContent and posting its URL into a Gerrit review. One caveat worth stating up front is that Jenkins serves userContent under a restrictive CSP that would block an inline handler, so that destination is probably safe as configured. The generated report sets no CSP of its own, so the impact lands wherever it is published without one.
Title Stored XSS in the static HTML report export, because json.dumps does not escape the markup character
Weaknesses CWE-79
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 0, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}


Subscriptions

Ericsson Codechecker
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: ERIC

Published:

Updated: 2026-11-06T10:35:15.739Z

Reserved: 2026-09-01T08:00:17.055Z

Link: CVE-2026-84164

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-11-06T11:17:17.327

Modified: 2026-11-06T11:17:17.327

Link: CVE-2026-84164

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-11-06T12:15:02Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-79

    Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')