Technical impact
The gettext libraries in glibc allow the LANGUAGE environment variable to include directory traversal characters such as '/' or the string '..'. When a program uses gettext, it concatenates each LANGUAGE entry to its message catalog path, potentially loading an attacker‑provided .mo file from an arbitrary location. A crafted .mo file can trigger out‑of‑range offsets or contain mismatched format directives that lead to undefined behaviour in printf‑style functions, which may be leveraged to execute arbitrary code with the program’s privileges. This flaw is a classic file‑path traversal error (CWE‑22) that compromises confidentiality, integrity, and availability of affected applications.
Affected Systems
All installations of the GNU C Library (glibc) from version 2.0 onward are affected. The vulnerability exists whenever a non‑AT_SECURE binary reads the LANGUAGE variable – for example, a setuid or setgid program that does not enforce the AT_SECURE flag. No specific product versions beyond the glibc version boundary are listed, so any active glibc installation could be vulnerable.
Risk and Exploitability
The CVSS score of 7 indicates a high severity, but the EPSS score is not available, and the vulnerability is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog. Exploitation requires that an attacker can influence the LANGUAGE environment of a running process, which often means compromising a trusted environment such as an SSH server that accepts LANGUAGE via AcceptEnv or an application that copies this variable from user input. The attacker must also be able to place a malicious .mo file in a location readable by the target process and ensure the process is not running with AT_SECURE. While the attack surface is somewhat limited, once achieved it allows arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the vulnerable program, making the risk significant for systems that expose such environments to untrusted input.
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