The multi‑team provisioning routine in the Apache Airflow Keycloak provider incorrectly grants every team role global read access to audit logs. An attacker who authenticates to Airflow and belongs to any team can thus read audit events from all other teams via the UI or the event‑log API. This privilege escalation exposes sensitive operational data that should be restricted to the owning team, violating the principle of least privilege (CWE‑732).

Deployments that enable the Airflow Keycloak auth manager with multi‑team mode and use apache-airflow-providers-keycloak before version 0.11.1 are affected. Any environment where users authenticate to Airflow through Keycloak and store audit logs can be compromised by this flaw.

The vulnerability is exploitable by any authenticated user with a valid Keycloak account and does not require special permissions beyond normal team membership. Because no additional restrictions exist, an attacker can harvest audit data across teams. The CVSS score is 6.5, classifying the vulnerability as moderate, and the EPSS score is < 1%; it is not listed in CISA's KEV catalog, yet the impact of leaking global audit logs is significant. Administrators should treat this as a high‑risk misconfiguration that needs rapid remediation.