Description
The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 4.8.3 via the `create_support_user()` function. This is due to the function identifying the support account solely by matching against publicly hardcoded constants — `user_login` `'groundhogg'` and email addresses `'support@groundhogg.io'` / `'help@groundhogg.io'` — where the `in_array()` email-equality check at line 238 is not a security boundary because any user fully controls their own email value. This makes it possible for an attacker with an account whose `user_login` is `'groundhogg'` and whose `user_email` matches one of the hardcoded support constants to have that account silently promoted to administrator — and additionally to super admin on multisite when the triggering administrator holds `manage_network_options` — resulting in full site takeover. Exploitation requires a two-actor flow: the attacker must first obtain or pre-plant an account with the hardcoded credentials (possible when open user registration is enabled or another account-creation path exists), after which a legitimate administrator must invoke the support-access feature via the `submit_ticket` or `process_send_support_access` entry points to trigger the promotion.
No analysis available yet.
Remediation
No remediation available yet.
Tracking
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Advisories
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References
History
Sat, 10 Oct 2026 05:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 4.8.3 via the `create_support_user()` function. This is due to the function identifying the support account solely by matching against publicly hardcoded constants — `user_login` `'groundhogg'` and email addresses `'support@groundhogg.io'` / `'help@groundhogg.io'` — where the `in_array()` email-equality check at line 238 is not a security boundary because any user fully controls their own email value. This makes it possible for an attacker with an account whose `user_login` is `'groundhogg'` and whose `user_email` matches one of the hardcoded support constants to have that account silently promoted to administrator — and additionally to super admin on multisite when the triggering administrator holds `manage_network_options` — resulting in full site takeover. Exploitation requires a two-actor flow: the attacker must first obtain or pre-plant an account with the hardcoded credentials (possible when open user registration is enabled or another account-creation path exists), after which a legitimate administrator must invoke the support-access feature via the `submit_ticket` or `process_send_support_access` entry points to trigger the promotion. | |
| Title | Groundhogg <= 4.8.3 - Unauthenticated Privilege Escalation to Support User Identity Confusion | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-269 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Subscriptions
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Wordfence
Published:
Updated: 2026-10-10T05:31:03.178Z
Reserved: 2026-09-17T13:29:18.159Z
Link: CVE-2026-92975
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Status : Received
Published: 2026-10-10T06:16:44.253
Modified: 2026-10-10T06:16:44.253
Link: CVE-2026-92975
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OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses
-
CWE-269
Improper Privilege Management