| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Add preempt_count_{sub,add} into btf id deny list
The recursion check in __bpf_prog_enter* and __bpf_prog_exit*
leave preempt_count_{sub,add} unprotected. When attaching trampoline to
them we get panic as follows,
[ 867.843050] BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at 0000000009d325cf (stack is 0000000046a46a15..00000000537e7b28)
[ 867.843064] stack guard page: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 867.843067] CPU: 8 PID: 11009 Comm: trace Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.2.0+ #4
[ 867.843100] Call Trace:
[ 867.843101] <TASK>
[ 867.843104] asm_exc_int3+0x3a/0x40
[ 867.843108] RIP: 0010:preempt_count_sub+0x1/0xa0
[ 867.843135] __bpf_prog_enter_recur+0x17/0x90
[ 867.843148] bpf_trampoline_6442468108_0+0x2e/0x1000
[ 867.843154] ? preempt_count_sub+0x1/0xa0
[ 867.843157] preempt_count_sub+0x5/0xa0
[ 867.843159] ? migrate_enable+0xac/0xf0
[ 867.843164] __bpf_prog_exit_recur+0x2d/0x40
[ 867.843168] bpf_trampoline_6442468108_0+0x55/0x1000
...
[ 867.843788] preempt_count_sub+0x5/0xa0
[ 867.843793] ? migrate_enable+0xac/0xf0
[ 867.843829] __bpf_prog_exit_recur+0x2d/0x40
[ 867.843837] BUG: IRQ stack guard page was hit at 0000000099bd8228 (stack is 00000000b23e2bc4..000000006d95af35)
[ 867.843841] BUG: IRQ stack guard page was hit at 000000005ae07924 (stack is 00000000ffd69623..0000000014eb594c)
[ 867.843843] BUG: IRQ stack guard page was hit at 00000000028320f0 (stack is 00000000034b6438..0000000078d1bcec)
[ 867.843842] bpf_trampoline_6442468108_0+0x55/0x1000
...
That is because in __bpf_prog_exit_recur, the preempt_count_{sub,add} are
called after prog->active is decreased.
Fixing this by adding these two functions into btf ids deny list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fsi: occ: Prevent use after free
Use get_device and put_device in the open and close functions to
make sure the device doesn't get freed while a file descriptor is
open.
Also, lock around the freeing of the device buffer and check the
buffer before using it in the submit function. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: fix potential panic dues to unprotected smc_llc_srv_add_link()
There is a certain chance to trigger the following panic:
PID: 5900 TASK: ffff88c1c8af4100 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "kworker/1:48"
#0 [ffff9456c1cc79a0] machine_kexec at ffffffff870665b7
#1 [ffff9456c1cc79f0] __crash_kexec at ffffffff871b4c7a
#2 [ffff9456c1cc7ab0] crash_kexec at ffffffff871b5b60
#3 [ffff9456c1cc7ac0] oops_end at ffffffff87026ce7
#4 [ffff9456c1cc7ae0] page_fault_oops at ffffffff87075715
#5 [ffff9456c1cc7b58] exc_page_fault at ffffffff87ad0654
#6 [ffff9456c1cc7b80] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff87c00b62
[exception RIP: ib_alloc_mr+19]
RIP: ffffffffc0c9cce3 RSP: ffff9456c1cc7c38 RFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000000004
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff88c1ea281d00 R8: 000000020a34ffff R9: ffff88c1350bbb20
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000010 R14: ffff88c1ab040a50 R15: ffff88c1ea281d00
ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018
#7 [ffff9456c1cc7c60] smc_ib_get_memory_region at ffffffffc0aff6df [smc]
#8 [ffff9456c1cc7c88] smcr_buf_map_link at ffffffffc0b0278c [smc]
#9 [ffff9456c1cc7ce0] __smc_buf_create at ffffffffc0b03586 [smc]
The reason here is that when the server tries to create a second link,
smc_llc_srv_add_link() has no protection and may add a new link to
link group. This breaks the security environment protected by
llc_conf_mutex. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Use correct encap attribute during invalidation
With introduction of post action infrastructure most of the users of encap
attribute had been modified in order to obtain the correct attribute by
calling mlx5e_tc_get_encap_attr() helper instead of assuming encap action
is always on default attribute. However, the cited commit didn't modify
mlx5e_invalidate_encap() which prevents it from destroying correct modify
header action which leads to a warning [0]. Fix the issue by using correct
attribute.
[0]:
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: WARNING: CPU: 17 PID: 654 at drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c:684 mlx5e_tc_attach_mod_hdr+0x1cc/0x230 [mlx5_core]
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: RIP: 0010:mlx5e_tc_attach_mod_hdr+0x1cc/0x230 [mlx5_core]
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: Call Trace:
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: <TASK>
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: mlx5e_tc_fib_event_work+0x8e3/0x1f60 [mlx5_core]
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: ? mlx5e_take_all_encap_flows+0xe0/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: ? lock_downgrade+0x6d0/0x6d0
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3f0
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3f0
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: process_one_work+0x7c2/0x1310
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x3f0/0x3f0
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x230/0x230
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: worker_thread+0x59d/0xec0
Feb 21 09:47:35 c-237-177-40-045 kernel: ? __kthread_parkme+0xd9/0x1d0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
comedi: pcl818: fix null-ptr-deref in pcl818_ai_cancel()
Syzbot identified an issue [1] in pcl818_ai_cancel(), which stems from
the fact that in case of early device detach via pcl818_detach(),
subdevice dev->read_subdev may not have initialized its pointer to
&struct comedi_async as intended. Thus, any such dereferencing of
&s->async->cmd will lead to general protection fault and kernel crash.
Mitigate this problem by removing a call to pcl818_ai_cancel() from
pcl818_detach() altogether. This way, if the subdevice setups its
support for async commands, everything async-related will be
handled via subdevice's own ->cancel() function in
comedi_device_detach_locked() even before pcl818_detach(). If no
support for asynchronous commands is provided, there is no need
to cancel anything either.
[1] Syzbot crash:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000005: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f]
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6050 Comm: syz.0.18 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/18/2025
RIP: 0010:pcl818_ai_cancel+0x69/0x3f0 drivers/comedi/drivers/pcl818.c:762
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
pcl818_detach+0x66/0xd0 drivers/comedi/drivers/pcl818.c:1115
comedi_device_detach_locked+0x178/0x750 drivers/comedi/drivers.c:207
do_devconfig_ioctl drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c:848 [inline]
comedi_unlocked_ioctl+0xcde/0x1020 drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c:2178
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
... |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: compress: fix to call f2fs_wait_on_page_writeback() in f2fs_write_raw_pages()
BUG_ON() will be triggered when writing files concurrently,
because the same page is writtenback multiple times.
1597 void folio_end_writeback(struct folio *folio)
1598 {
......
1618 if (!__folio_end_writeback(folio))
1619 BUG();
......
1625 }
kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:1619!
Call Trace:
<TASK>
f2fs_write_end_io+0x1a0/0x370
blk_update_request+0x6c/0x410
blk_mq_end_request+0x15/0x130
blk_complete_reqs+0x3c/0x50
__do_softirq+0xb8/0x29b
? sort_range+0x20/0x20
run_ksoftirqd+0x19/0x20
smpboot_thread_fn+0x10b/0x1d0
kthread+0xde/0x110
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>
Below is the concurrency scenario:
[Process A] [Process B] [Process C]
f2fs_write_raw_pages()
- redirty_page_for_writepage()
- unlock page()
f2fs_do_write_data_page()
- lock_page()
- clear_page_dirty_for_io()
- set_page_writeback() [1st writeback]
.....
- unlock page()
generic_perform_write()
- f2fs_write_begin()
- wait_for_stable_page()
- f2fs_write_end()
- set_page_dirty()
- lock_page()
- f2fs_do_write_data_page()
- set_page_writeback() [2st writeback]
This problem was introduced by the previous commit 7377e853967b ("f2fs:
compress: fix potential deadlock of compress file"). All pagelocks were
released in f2fs_write_raw_pages(), but whether the page was
in the writeback state was ignored in the subsequent writing process.
Let's fix it by waiting for the page to writeback before writing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm: fix NULL pointer dereference in __dm_suspend()
There is a race condition between dm device suspend and table load that
can lead to null pointer dereference. The issue occurs when suspend is
invoked before table load completes:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000054
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 6 PID: 6798 Comm: dmsetup Not tainted 6.6.0-g7e52f5f0ca9b #62
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:blk_mq_wait_quiesce_done+0x0/0x50
Call Trace:
<TASK>
blk_mq_quiesce_queue+0x2c/0x50
dm_stop_queue+0xd/0x20
__dm_suspend+0x130/0x330
dm_suspend+0x11a/0x180
dev_suspend+0x27e/0x560
ctl_ioctl+0x4cf/0x850
dm_ctl_ioctl+0xd/0x20
vfs_ioctl+0x1d/0x50
__se_sys_ioctl+0x9b/0xc0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x19/0x30
x64_sys_call+0x2c4a/0x4620
do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1b0
The issue can be triggered as below:
T1 T2
dm_suspend table_load
__dm_suspend dm_setup_md_queue
dm_mq_init_request_queue
blk_mq_init_allocated_queue
=> q->mq_ops = set->ops; (1)
dm_stop_queue / dm_wait_for_completion
=> q->tag_set NULL pointer! (2)
=> q->tag_set = set; (3)
Fix this by checking if a valid table (map) exists before performing
request-based suspend and waiting for target I/O. When map is NULL,
skip these table-dependent suspend steps.
Even when map is NULL, no I/O can reach any target because there is
no table loaded; I/O submitted in this state will fail early in the
DM layer. Skipping the table-dependent suspend logic in this case
is safe and avoids NULL pointer dereferences. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_ffa: Check if ffa_driver remove is present before executing
Currently ffa_drv->remove() is called unconditionally from
ffa_device_remove(). Since the driver registration doesn't check for it
and allows it to be registered without .remove callback, we need to check
for the presence of it before executing it from ffa_device_remove() to
above a NULL pointer dereference like the one below:
| Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
| Mem abort info:
| ESR = 0x0000000086000004
| EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
| SET = 0, FnV = 0
| EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
| FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
| user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000881cc8000
| [0000000000000000] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
| Internal error: Oops: 0000000086000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
| CPU: 3 PID: 130 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7 #6
| Hardware name: FVP Base RevC (DT)
| pstate: 63402809 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=-c)
| pc : 0x0
| lr : ffa_device_remove+0x20/0x2c
| Call trace:
| 0x0
| device_release_driver_internal+0x16c/0x260
| driver_detach+0x90/0xd0
| bus_remove_driver+0xdc/0x11c
| driver_unregister+0x30/0x54
| ffa_driver_unregister+0x14/0x20
| cleanup_module+0x18/0xeec
| __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x234/0x378
| invoke_syscall+0x40/0x108
| el0_svc_common+0xb4/0xf0
| do_el0_svc+0x30/0xa4
| el0_svc+0x2c/0x7c
| el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0
| el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix race between balance and cancel/pause
Syzbot reported a panic that looks like this:
assertion failed: fs_info->exclusive_operation == BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE_PAUSED, in fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:465
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/messages.c:259!
RIP: 0010:btrfs_assertfail+0x2c/0x30 fs/btrfs/messages.c:259
Call Trace:
<TASK>
btrfs_exclop_balance fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:465 [inline]
btrfs_ioctl_balance fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3564 [inline]
btrfs_ioctl+0x531e/0x5b30 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4632
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:856
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
The reproducer is running a balance and a cancel or pause in parallel.
The way balance finishes is a bit wonky, if we were paused we need to
save the balance_ctl in the fs_info, but clear it otherwise and cleanup.
However we rely on the return values being specific errors, or having a
cancel request or no pause request. If balance completes and returns 0,
but we have a pause or cancel request we won't do the appropriate
cleanup, and then the next time we try to start a balance we'll trip
this ASSERT.
The error handling is just wrong here, we always want to clean up,
unless we got -ECANCELLED and we set the appropriate pause flag in the
exclusive op. With this patch the reproducer ran for an hour without
tripping, previously it would trip in less than a few minutes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/psi: use kernfs polling functions for PSI trigger polling
Destroying psi trigger in cgroup_file_release causes UAF issues when
a cgroup is removed from under a polling process. This is happening
because cgroup removal causes a call to cgroup_file_release while the
actual file is still alive. Destroying the trigger at this point would
also destroy its waitqueue head and if there is still a polling process
on that file accessing the waitqueue, it will step on the freed pointer:
do_select
vfs_poll
do_rmdir
cgroup_rmdir
kernfs_drain_open_files
cgroup_file_release
cgroup_pressure_release
psi_trigger_destroy
wake_up_pollfree(&t->event_wait)
// vfs_poll is unblocked
synchronize_rcu
kfree(t)
poll_freewait -> UAF access to the trigger's waitqueue head
Patch [1] fixed this issue for epoll() case using wake_up_pollfree(),
however the same issue exists for synchronous poll() case.
The root cause of this issue is that the lifecycles of the psi trigger's
waitqueue and of the file associated with the trigger are different. Fix
this by using kernfs_generic_poll function when polling on cgroup-specific
psi triggers. It internally uses kernfs_open_node->poll waitqueue head
with its lifecycle tied to the file's lifecycle. This also renders the
fix in [1] obsolete, so revert it.
[1] commit c2dbe32d5db5 ("sched/psi: Fix use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue()") |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vmci_host: fix a race condition in vmci_host_poll() causing GPF
During fuzzing, a general protection fault is observed in
vmci_host_poll().
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000019: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000c8-0x00000000000000cf]
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0xf3/0x5e00 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4926
<- omitting registers ->
Call Trace:
<TASK>
lock_acquire+0x1a4/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5672
__raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xb3/0x100 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162
add_wait_queue+0x3d/0x260 kernel/sched/wait.c:22
poll_wait include/linux/poll.h:49 [inline]
vmci_host_poll+0xf8/0x2b0 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_host.c:174
vfs_poll include/linux/poll.h:88 [inline]
do_pollfd fs/select.c:873 [inline]
do_poll fs/select.c:921 [inline]
do_sys_poll+0xc7c/0x1aa0 fs/select.c:1015
__do_sys_ppoll fs/select.c:1121 [inline]
__se_sys_ppoll+0x2cc/0x330 fs/select.c:1101
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x4e/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
Example thread interleaving that causes the general protection fault
is as follows:
CPU1 (vmci_host_poll) CPU2 (vmci_host_do_init_context)
----- -----
// Read uninitialized context
context = vmci_host_dev->context;
// Initialize context
vmci_host_dev->context = vmci_ctx_create();
vmci_host_dev->ct_type = VMCIOBJ_CONTEXT;
if (vmci_host_dev->ct_type == VMCIOBJ_CONTEXT) {
// Dereferencing the wrong pointer
poll_wait(..., &context->host_context);
}
In this scenario, vmci_host_poll() reads vmci_host_dev->context first,
and then reads vmci_host_dev->ct_type to check that
vmci_host_dev->context is initialized. However, since these two reads
are not atomically executed, there is a chance of a race condition as
described above.
To fix this race condition, read vmci_host_dev->context after checking
the value of vmci_host_dev->ct_type so that vmci_host_poll() always
reads an initialized context. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Fix data-race around unix_tot_inflight.
unix_tot_inflight is changed under spin_lock(unix_gc_lock), but
unix_release_sock() reads it locklessly.
Let's use READ_ONCE() for unix_tot_inflight.
Note that the writer side was marked by commit 9d6d7f1cb67c ("af_unix:
annote lockless accesses to unix_tot_inflight & gc_in_progress")
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in unix_inflight / unix_release_sock
write (marked) to 0xffffffff871852b8 of 4 bytes by task 123 on cpu 1:
unix_inflight+0x130/0x180 net/unix/scm.c:64
unix_attach_fds+0x137/0x1b0 net/unix/scm.c:123
unix_scm_to_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:1832 [inline]
unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x46a/0x14f0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1955
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0x148/0x160 net/socket.c:747
____sys_sendmsg+0x4e4/0x610 net/socket.c:2493
___sys_sendmsg+0xc6/0x140 net/socket.c:2547
__sys_sendmsg+0x94/0x140 net/socket.c:2576
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2585 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2583 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x45/0x50 net/socket.c:2583
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
read to 0xffffffff871852b8 of 4 bytes by task 4891 on cpu 0:
unix_release_sock+0x608/0x910 net/unix/af_unix.c:671
unix_release+0x59/0x80 net/unix/af_unix.c:1058
__sock_release+0x7d/0x170 net/socket.c:653
sock_close+0x19/0x30 net/socket.c:1385
__fput+0x179/0x5e0 fs/file_table.c:321
____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:349
task_work_run+0x116/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:179
resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x174/0x180 kernel/entry/common.c:204
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:286 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1a/0x30 kernel/entry/common.c:297
do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000001
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 4891 Comm: systemd-coredum Not tainted 6.4.0-rc5-01219-gfa0e21fa4443 #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: mpi3mr: Fix missing mrioc->evtack_cmds initialization
Commit c1af985d27da ("scsi: mpi3mr: Add Event acknowledgment logic")
introduced an array mrioc->evtack_cmds but initialization of the array
elements was missed. They are just zero cleared. The function
mpi3mr_complete_evt_ack() refers host_tag field of the elements. Due to the
zero value of the host_tag field, the function calls clear_bit() for
mrico->evtack_cmds_bitmap with wrong bit index. This results in memory
access to invalid address and "BUG: KASAN: use-after-free". This BUG was
observed at eHBA-9600 firmware update to version 8.3.1.0. To fix it, add
the missing initialization of mrioc->evtack_cmds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-mq: fix tags leak when shrink nr_hw_queues
Although we don't need to realloc set->tags[] when shrink nr_hw_queues,
we need to free them. Or these tags will be leaked.
How to reproduce:
1. mount -t configfs configfs /mnt
2. modprobe null_blk nr_devices=0 submit_queues=8
3. mkdir /mnt/nullb/nullb0
4. echo 1 > /mnt/nullb/nullb0/power
5. echo 4 > /mnt/nullb/nullb0/submit_queues
6. rmdir /mnt/nullb/nullb0
In step 4, will alloc 9 tags (8 submit queues and 1 poll queue), then
in step 5, new_nr_hw_queues = 5 (4 submit queues and 1 poll queue).
At last in step 6, only these 5 tags are freed, the other 4 tags leaked. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: imx93: fix memory leak and missing unwind goto in imx93_clocks_probe
In function probe(), it returns directly without unregistered hws
when error occurs.
Fix this by adding 'goto unregister_hws;' on line 295 and
line 310.
Use devm_kzalloc() instead of kzalloc() to automatically
free the memory using devm_kfree() when error occurs.
Replace of_iomap() with devm_of_iomap() to automatically
handle the unused ioremap region and delete 'iounmap(anatop_base);'
in unregister_hws. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "IB/isert: Fix incorrect release of isert connection"
Commit: 699826f4e30a ("IB/isert: Fix incorrect release of isert connection") is
causing problems on OPA when DEVICE_REMOVAL is happening.
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 52 PID: 2117247 at drivers/infiniband/core/cq.c:359
ib_cq_pool_cleanup+0xac/0xb0 [ib_core]
Modules linked in: nfsd nfs_acl target_core_user uio tcm_fc libfc
scsi_transport_fc tcm_loop target_core_pscsi target_core_iblock target_core_file
rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs
rfkill rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_srpt sunrpc ib_isert iscsi_target_mod target_core_mod
opa_vnic ib_iser libiscsi ib_umad scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm
ib_cm hfi1(-) rdmavt ib_uverbs intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common sb_edac ib_core
x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp i2c_i801 mxm_wmi rapl iTCO_wdt
ipmi_si iTCO_vendor_support mei_me ipmi_devintf mei intel_cstate ioatdma
intel_uncore i2c_smbus joydev pcspkr lpc_ich ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter
acpi_pad xfs libcrc32c sr_mod sd_mod cdrom t10_pi sg crct10dif_pclmul
crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel drm_kms_helper drm_shmem_helper ahci libahci
ghash_clmulni_intel igb drm libata dca i2c_algo_bit wmi fuse
CPU: 52 PID: 2117247 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1+ #1
Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600CWR/S2600CW, BIOS
SE5C610.86B.01.01.0014.121820151719 12/18/2015
RIP: 0010:ib_cq_pool_cleanup+0xac/0xb0 [ib_core]
Code: ff 48 8b 43 40 48 8d 7b 40 48 83 e8 40 4c 39 e7 75 b3 49 83
c4 10 4d 39 fc 75 94 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 0b eb a1
90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f
RSP: 0018:ffffc10bea13fc80 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 000000000000010c RBX: ffff9bf5c7e66c00 RCX: 000000008020001d
RDX: 000000008020001e RSI: fffff175221f9900 RDI: ffff9bf5c7e67640
RBP: ffff9bf5c7e67600 R08: ffff9bf5c7e64400 R09: 000000008020001d
R10: 0000000040000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9bee4b1e8a18
R13: dead000000000122 R14: dead000000000100 R15: ffff9bee4b1e8a38
FS: 00007ff1e6d38740(0000) GS:ffff9bfd9fb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005652044ecc68 CR3: 0000000889b5c005 CR4: 00000000001706e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x80/0x130
? ib_cq_pool_cleanup+0xac/0xb0 [ib_core]
? report_bug+0x195/0x1a0
? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? ib_cq_pool_cleanup+0xac/0xb0 [ib_core]
disable_device+0x9d/0x160 [ib_core]
__ib_unregister_device+0x42/0xb0 [ib_core]
ib_unregister_device+0x22/0x30 [ib_core]
rvt_unregister_device+0x20/0x90 [rdmavt]
hfi1_unregister_ib_device+0x16/0xf0 [hfi1]
remove_one+0x55/0x1a0 [hfi1]
pci_device_remove+0x36/0xa0
device_release_driver_internal+0x193/0x200
driver_detach+0x44/0x90
bus_remove_driver+0x69/0xf0
pci_unregister_driver+0x2a/0xb0
hfi1_mod_cleanup+0xc/0x3c [hfi1]
__do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x17a/0x2f0
? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xc4/0xd0
? syscall_trace_enter.constprop.0+0x126/0x1a0
do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
? syscall_exit_work+0x103/0x130
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
? exc_page_fault+0x65/0x150
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
RIP: 0033:0x7ff1e643f5ab
Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 75 a8 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3
66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 b0 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0
ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 45 a8 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffec9103cc8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005615267fdc50 RCX: 00007ff1e643f5ab
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 00005615267fdcb8
RBP: 00005615267fdc50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00007ff1e659eac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00005615267fdcb8
R13: 00000000000
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "drm/msm: Add missing check and destroy for alloc_ordered_workqueue"
This reverts commit 643b7d0869cc7f1f7a5ac7ca6bd25d88f54e31d0.
A recent patch that tried to fix up the msm_drm_init() paths with
respect to the workqueue but only ended up making things worse:
First, the newly added calls to msm_drm_uninit() on early errors would
trigger NULL-pointer dereferences, for example, as the kms pointer would
not have been initialised. (Note that these paths were also modified by
a second broken error handling patch which in effect cancelled out this
part when merged.)
Second, the newly added allocation sanity check would still leak the
previously allocated drm device.
Instead of trying to salvage what was badly broken (and clearly not
tested), let's revert the bad commit so that clean and backportable
fixes can be added in its place.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/525107/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: sisusbvga: Add endpoint checks
The syzbot fuzzer was able to provoke a WARNING from the sisusbvga driver:
------------[ cut here ]------------
usb 1-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 3 != type 1
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 26 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:504 usb_submit_urb+0xed6/0x1880 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:504
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 26 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc5-syzkaller-00199-g5af6ce704936 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/12/2023
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
RIP: 0010:usb_submit_urb+0xed6/0x1880 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:504
Code: 7c 24 18 e8 6c 50 80 fb 48 8b 7c 24 18 e8 62 1a 01 ff 41 89 d8 44 89 e1 4c 89 ea 48 89 c6 48 c7 c7 60 b1 fa 8a e8 84 b0 be 03 <0f> 0b e9 58 f8 ff ff e8 3e 50 80 fb 48 81 c5 c0 05 00 00 e9 84 f7
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000a1ed18 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff888012783a80 RSI: ffffffff816680ec RDI: fffff52000143d95
RBP: ffff888079020000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000080000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000003
R13: ffff888017d33370 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: ffff888021213600
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005592753a60b0 CR3: 0000000022899000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
sisusb_bulkout_msg drivers/usb/misc/sisusbvga/sisusbvga.c:224 [inline]
sisusb_send_bulk_msg.constprop.0+0x904/0x1230 drivers/usb/misc/sisusbvga/sisusbvga.c:379
sisusb_send_bridge_packet drivers/usb/misc/sisusbvga/sisusbvga.c:567 [inline]
sisusb_do_init_gfxdevice drivers/usb/misc/sisusbvga/sisusbvga.c:2077 [inline]
sisusb_init_gfxdevice+0x87b/0x4000 drivers/usb/misc/sisusbvga/sisusbvga.c:2177
sisusb_probe+0x9cd/0xbe2 drivers/usb/misc/sisusbvga/sisusbvga.c:2869
...
The problem was caused by the fact that the driver does not check
whether the endpoints it uses are actually present and have the
appropriate types. This can be fixed by adding a simple check of
the endpoints. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: fix blktrace debugfs entries leakage
Commit 99d055b4fd4b ("block: remove per-disk debugfs files in
blk_unregister_queue") moves blk_trace_shutdown() from
blk_release_queue() to blk_unregister_queue(), this is safe if blktrace
is created through sysfs, however, there is a regression in corner
case.
blktrace can still be enabled after del_gendisk() through ioctl if
the disk is opened before del_gendisk(), and if blktrace is not shutdown
through ioctl before closing the disk, debugfs entries will be leaked.
Fix this problem by shutdown blktrace in disk_release(), this is safe
because blk_trace_remove() is reentrant. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: ov5675: Fix memleak in ov5675_init_controls()
There is a kmemleak when testing the media/i2c/ov5675.c with bpf mock
device:
AssertionError: unreferenced object 0xffff888107362160 (size 16):
comm "python3", pid 277, jiffies 4294832798 (age 20.722s)
hex dump (first 16 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000abe7d67c>] __kmalloc_node+0x44/0x1b0
[<000000008a725aac>] kvmalloc_node+0x34/0x180
[<000000009a53cd11>] v4l2_ctrl_handler_init_class+0x11d/0x180
[videodev]
[<0000000055b46db0>] ov5675_probe+0x38b/0x897 [ov5675]
[<00000000153d886c>] i2c_device_probe+0x28d/0x680
[<000000004afb7e8f>] really_probe+0x17c/0x3f0
[<00000000ff2f18e4>] __driver_probe_device+0xe3/0x170
[<000000000a001029>] driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120
[<00000000e39743c7>] __device_attach_driver+0xf7/0x150
[<00000000d32fd070>] bus_for_each_drv+0x114/0x180
[<000000009083ac41>] __device_attach+0x1e5/0x2d0
[<0000000015b4a830>] bus_probe_device+0x126/0x140
[<000000007813deaf>] device_add+0x810/0x1130
[<000000007becb867>] i2c_new_client_device+0x386/0x540
[<000000007f9cf4b4>] of_i2c_register_device+0xf1/0x110
[<00000000ebfdd032>] of_i2c_notify+0xfc/0x1f0
ov5675_init_controls() won't clean all the allocated resources in fail
path, which may causes the memleaks. Add v4l2_ctrl_handler_free() to
prevent memleak. |
