| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/riscv: prevent NULL deref in iova_to_phys
The riscv_iommu_pte_fetch() function returns either NULL for
unmapped/never-mapped iova, or a valid leaf pte pointer that
requires no further validation.
riscv_iommu_iova_to_phys() failed to handle NULL returns.
Prevent null pointer dereference in
riscv_iommu_iova_to_phys(), and remove the pte validation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/futex: ensure io_futex_wait() cleans up properly on failure
The io_futex_data is allocated upfront and assigned to the io_kiocb
async_data field, but the request isn't marked with REQ_F_ASYNC_DATA
at that point. Those two should always go together, as the flag tells
io_uring whether the field is valid or not.
Additionally, on failure cleanup, the futex handler frees the data but
does not clear ->async_data. Clear the data and the flag in the error
path as well.
Thanks to Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative and particularly ReDress for
reporting this. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFS: Fix a race when updating an existing write
After nfs_lock_and_join_requests() tests for whether the request is
still attached to the mapping, nothing prevents a call to
nfs_inode_remove_request() from succeeding until we actually lock the
page group.
The reason is that whoever called nfs_inode_remove_request() doesn't
necessarily have a lock on the page group head.
So in order to avoid races, let's take the page group lock earlier in
nfs_lock_and_join_requests(), and hold it across the removal of the
request in nfs_inode_remove_request(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: hda: tas2781: Fix wrong reference of tasdevice_priv
During the conversion to unify the calibration data management, the
reference to tasdevice_priv was wrongly set to h->hda_priv instead of
h->priv. This resulted in memory corruption and crashes eventually.
Unfortunately it's a void pointer, hence the compiler couldn't know
that it's wrong. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Flush delayed SKBs while releasing RXE resources
When skb packets are sent out, these skb packets still depends on
the rxe resources, for example, QP, sk, when these packets are
destroyed.
If these rxe resources are released when the skb packets are destroyed,
the call traces will appear.
To avoid skb packets hang too long time in some network devices,
a timestamp is added when these skb packets are created. If these
skb packets hang too long time in network devices, these network
devices can free these skb packets to release rxe resources. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/sclp: Fix SCCB present check
Tracing code called by the SCLP interrupt handler contains early exits
if the SCCB address associated with an interrupt is NULL. This check is
performed after physical to virtual address translation.
If the kernel identity mapping does not start at address zero, the
resulting virtual address is never zero, so that the NULL checks won't
work. Subsequently this may result in incorrect accesses to the first
page of the identity mapping.
Fix this by introducing a function that handles the NULL case before
address translation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Avoid a NULL pointer dereference
[WHY]
Although unlikely drm_atomic_get_new_connector_state() or
drm_atomic_get_old_connector_state() can return NULL.
[HOW]
Check returns before dereference.
(cherry picked from commit 1e5e8d672fec9f2ab352be121be971877bff2af9) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: server: split ksmbd_rdma_stop_listening() out of ksmbd_rdma_destroy()
We can't call destroy_workqueue(smb_direct_wq); before stop_sessions()!
Otherwise already existing connections try to use smb_direct_wq as
a NULL pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/buffer: fix use-after-free when call bh_read() helper
There's issue as follows:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in end_buffer_read_sync+0xe3/0x110
Read of size 8 at addr ffffc9000168f7f8 by task swapper/3/0
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 6.16.0-862.14.0.6.x86_64
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x55/0x70
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
print_report+0xb4/0x270
kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0
end_buffer_read_sync+0xe3/0x110
end_bio_bh_io_sync+0x56/0x80
blk_update_request+0x30a/0x720
scsi_end_request+0x51/0x2b0
scsi_io_completion+0xe3/0x480
? scsi_device_unbusy+0x11e/0x160
blk_complete_reqs+0x7b/0x90
handle_softirqs+0xef/0x370
irq_exit_rcu+0xa5/0xd0
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0x90
</IRQ>
Above issue happens when do ntfs3 filesystem mount, issue may happens
as follows:
mount IRQ
ntfs_fill_super
read_cache_page
do_read_cache_folio
filemap_read_folio
mpage_read_folio
do_mpage_readpage
ntfs_get_block_vbo
bh_read
submit_bh
wait_on_buffer(bh);
blk_complete_reqs
scsi_io_completion
scsi_end_request
blk_update_request
end_bio_bh_io_sync
end_buffer_read_sync
__end_buffer_read_notouch
unlock_buffer
wait_on_buffer(bh);--> return will return to caller
put_bh
--> trigger stack-out-of-bounds
In the mpage_read_folio() function, the stack variable 'map_bh' is
passed to ntfs_get_block_vbo(). Once unlock_buffer() unlocks and
wait_on_buffer() returns to continue processing, the stack variable
is likely to be reclaimed. Consequently, during the end_buffer_read_sync()
process, calling put_bh() may result in stack overrun.
If the bh is not allocated on the stack, it belongs to a folio. Freeing
a buffer head which belongs to a folio is done by drop_buffers() which
will fail to free buffers which are still locked. So it is safe to call
put_bh() before __end_buffer_read_notouch(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: accel: sca3300: fix uninitialized iio scan data
Fix potential leak of uninitialized stack data to userspace by ensuring
that the `channels` array is zeroed before use. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ftrace: Also allocate and copy hash for reading of filter files
Currently the reader of set_ftrace_filter and set_ftrace_notrace just adds
the pointer to the global tracer hash to its iterator. Unlike the writer
that allocates a copy of the hash, the reader keeps the pointer to the
filter hashes. This is problematic because this pointer is static across
function calls that release the locks that can update the global tracer
hashes. This can cause UAF and similar bugs.
Allocate and copy the hash for reading the filter files like it is done
for the writers. This not only fixes UAF bugs, but also makes the code a
bit simpler as it doesn't have to differentiate when to free the
iterator's hash between writers and readers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: light: as73211: Ensure buffer holes are zeroed
Given that the buffer is copied to a kfifo that ultimately user space
can read, ensure we zero it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
comedi: Make insn_rw_emulate_bits() do insn->n samples
The `insn_rw_emulate_bits()` function is used as a default handler for
`INSN_READ` instructions for subdevices that have a handler for
`INSN_BITS` but not for `INSN_READ`. Similarly, it is used as a default
handler for `INSN_WRITE` instructions for subdevices that have a handler
for `INSN_BITS` but not for `INSN_WRITE`. It works by emulating the
`INSN_READ` or `INSN_WRITE` instruction handling with a constructed
`INSN_BITS` instruction. However, `INSN_READ` and `INSN_WRITE`
instructions are supposed to be able read or write multiple samples,
indicated by the `insn->n` value, but `insn_rw_emulate_bits()` currently
only handles a single sample. For `INSN_READ`, the comedi core will
copy `insn->n` samples back to user-space. (That triggered KASAN
kernel-infoleak errors when `insn->n` was greater than 1, but that is
being fixed more generally elsewhere in the comedi core.)
Make `insn_rw_emulate_bits()` either handle `insn->n` samples, or return
an error, to conform to the general expectation for `INSN_READ` and
`INSN_WRITE` handlers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
comedi: pcl726: Prevent invalid irq number
The reproducer passed in an irq number(0x80008000) that was too large,
which triggered the oob.
Added an interrupt number check to prevent users from passing in an irq
number that was too large.
If `it->options[1]` is 31, then `1 << it->options[1]` is still invalid
because it shifts a 1-bit into the sign bit (which is UB in C).
Possible solutions include reducing the upper bound on the
`it->options[1]` value to 30 or lower, or using `1U << it->options[1]`.
The old code would just not attempt to request the IRQ if the
`options[1]` value were invalid. And it would still configure the
device without interrupts even if the call to `request_irq` returned an
error. So it would be better to combine this test with the test below. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
comedi: Fix use of uninitialized memory in do_insn_ioctl() and do_insnlist_ioctl()
syzbot reports a KMSAN kernel-infoleak in `do_insn_ioctl()`. A kernel
buffer is allocated to hold `insn->n` samples (each of which is an
`unsigned int`). For some instruction types, `insn->n` samples are
copied back to user-space, unless an error code is being returned. The
problem is that not all the instruction handlers that need to return
data to userspace fill in the whole `insn->n` samples, so that there is
an information leak. There is a similar syzbot report for
`do_insnlist_ioctl()`, although it does not have a reproducer for it at
the time of writing.
One culprit is `insn_rw_emulate_bits()` which is used as the handler for
`INSN_READ` or `INSN_WRITE` instructions for subdevices that do not have
a specific handler for that instruction, but do have an `INSN_BITS`
handler. For `INSN_READ` it only fills in at most 1 sample, so if
`insn->n` is greater than 1, the remaining `insn->n - 1` samples copied
to userspace will be uninitialized kernel data.
Another culprit is `vm80xx_ai_insn_read()` in the "vm80xx" driver. It
never returns an error, even if it fails to fill the buffer.
Fix it in `do_insn_ioctl()` and `do_insnlist_ioctl()` by making sure
that uninitialized parts of the allocated buffer are zeroed before
handling each instruction.
Thanks to Arnaud Lecomte for their fix to `do_insn_ioctl()`. That fix
replaced the call to `kmalloc_array()` with `kcalloc()`, but it is not
always necessary to clear the whole buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Limit access to parser->buffer when trace_get_user failed
When the length of the string written to set_ftrace_filter exceeds
FTRACE_BUFF_MAX, the following KASAN alarm will be triggered:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strsep+0x18c/0x1b0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff0000d00bd5ba by task ash/165
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 165 Comm: ash Not tainted 6.16.0-g6bcdbd62bd56-dirty
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
show_stack+0x34/0x50 (C)
dump_stack_lvl+0xa0/0x158
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x88/0x398
print_report+0xb0/0x280
kasan_report+0xa4/0xf0
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x20/0x30
strsep+0x18c/0x1b0
ftrace_process_regex.isra.0+0x100/0x2d8
ftrace_regex_release+0x484/0x618
__fput+0x364/0xa58
____fput+0x28/0x40
task_work_run+0x154/0x278
do_notify_resume+0x1f0/0x220
el0_svc+0xec/0xf0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe8
el0t_64_sync+0x1ac/0x1b0
The reason is that trace_get_user will fail when processing a string
longer than FTRACE_BUFF_MAX, but not set the end of parser->buffer to 0.
Then an OOB access will be triggered in ftrace_regex_release->
ftrace_process_regex->strsep->strpbrk. We can solve this problem by
limiting access to parser->buffer when trace_get_user failed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list
Each recvmsg() call must process either
- only contiguous DATA records (any number of them)
- one non-DATA record
If the next record has different type than what has already been
processed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record
has already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where
we don't know type until decryption) we queue the pending record
to the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there.
Queuing the skb to rx_list after zero-copy decrypt is not possible,
since in that case we decrypted directly to the user space buffer,
and we don't have an skb to queue (darg.skb points to the ciphertext
skb for access to metadata like length).
Only data records are allowed zero-copy, and we break the processing
loop after each non-data record. So we should never zero-copy and
then find out that the record type has changed. The corner case
we missed is when the initial record comes from rx_list, and it's
zero length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/cpu/hygon: Add missing resctrl_cpu_detect() in bsp_init helper
Since
923f3a2b48bd ("x86/resctrl: Query LLC monitoring properties once during boot")
resctrl_cpu_detect() has been moved from common CPU initialization code to
the vendor-specific BSP init helper, while Hygon didn't put that call in their
code.
This triggers a division by zero fault during early booting stage on our
machines with X86_FEATURE_CQM* supported, where get_rdt_mon_resources() tries
to calculate mon_l3_config with uninitialized boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_occ_scale.
Add the missing resctrl_cpu_detect() in the Hygon BSP init helper.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: rtl9300: Fix out-of-bounds bug in rtl9300_i2c_smbus_xfer
The data->block[0] variable comes from user. Without proper check,
the variable may be very large to cause an out-of-bounds bug.
Fix this bug by checking the value of data->block[0] first.
1. commit 39244cc75482 ("i2c: ismt: Fix an out-of-bounds bug in
ismt_access()")
2. commit 92fbb6d1296f ("i2c: xgene-slimpro: Fix out-of-bounds bug in
xgene_slimpro_i2c_xfer()") |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/nouveau/nvif: Fix potential memory leak in nvif_vmm_ctor().
When the nvif_vmm_type is invalid, we will return error directly
without freeing the args in nvif_vmm_ctor(), which leading a memory
leak. Fix it by setting the ret -EINVAL and goto done. |
