| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: TC, Check if flow is PEER before acquiring devcom lock
In case __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow() fails in lower levels, the flow is
deleted via mlx5e_tc_del_flow(), and mlx5e_tc_del_flow() is acquiring
ESW devcom lock without condition. In addition, in case of peer_flow,
__mlx5e_add_fdb_flow() is called while holding ESW devcom comp lock.
This results in an AA deadlock.
To fix this, introduce a new PEER flag that is set on flows created as
peer flows (the duplicate flows on peer devices), and check it in
mlx5e_tc_del_flow() before acquiring ESW devcom lock.
Lockdep splat:
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
============================================
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&comp->lock_key#2);
lock(&comp->lock_key#2);
*** DEADLOCK ***
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x69/0xa0
print_deadlock_bug.cold+0xbd/0xca
__lock_acquire+0x1671/0x2ec0
lock_acquire+0x10e/0x2e0
down_read+0x95/0x430
mlx5_devcom_for_each_peer_begin+0x4e/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0x11d/0xa70 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_flow_put+0x99/0x100 [mlx5_core]
__mlx5e_add_fdb_flow+0x409/0xf00 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_configure_flower+0x2a86/0x4100 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_rep_setup_tc_cls_flower+0x12f/0x1b0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_rep_setup_tc_cb+0x153/0x750 [mlx5_core]
tc_setup_cb_add+0x1dc/0x470
fl_change+0x2f4d/0x626d [cls_flower]
tc_new_tfilter+0x79b/0x2310
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x778/0xad0
do_syscall_64+0x70/0x960
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/log: Fix infinite loop when scale is too large for display
When scale is large enough that scaled_font exceeds the display
dimensions, rows or columns become 0. A columns value of 0 causes
an infinite loop in drm_log_draw_kmsg_record() because the loop
never decrements len.
Check for zero rows/columns in drm_log_setup_modeset() and return
an error, cleaning up the already allocated buffer to avoid a leak. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: x_tables: allocate hook ops while under mutex
arp/ip(6)t_register_table() add the table to the per-netns list via
xt_register_table() before allocating the per-netns hook ops copy
via kmemdup_array(). This leaves a window where the table is
visible in the list with ops=NULL.
If the pernet exit happens runs concurrently the pre_exit callback finds
the table via xt_find_table() and passes the NULL ops pointer to
nf_unregister_net_hooks(), causing a NULL dereference:
general protection fault in nf_unregister_net_hooks+0xbc/0x150
RIP: nf_unregister_net_hooks (net/netfilter/core.c:613)
Call Trace:
ipt_unregister_table_pre_exit
iptable_mangle_net_pre_exit
ops_pre_exit_list
cleanup_net
Fix by moving the ops allocation into the xtables core so the table is
never in the list without valid ops. Also ensure the table is no longer
processing packets before its torn down on error unwind.
nf_register_net_hooks might have published at least one hook; call
synchronize_rcu() if there was an error.
audit log register message gets deferred until all operations have
passed, this avoids need to emit another ureg message in case of
error unwinding.
Based on earlier patch by Tristan Madani. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_ffa: Snapshot notifier callbacks under lock
Both notification handlers currently look up a notifier callback under
notify_lock, drop the lock, and then dereference the returned
notifier entry. A concurrent unregister can delete and free that
entry in the gap, leaving the handler to dereference stale memory.
Copy the callback pointer and callback data while notify_lock is
still held and invoke the callback only after the lock is dropped.
This keeps the existing callback execution model while removing the
use-after-free window in both the framework and non-framework
notification paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_ffa: Validate framework notification message layout
Framework notifications carry an indirect message in the shared RX
buffer. Validate the reported offset and size before using them, reject
zero-length payloads, and ensure that any non-header payload starts at
the UUID field rather than in the middle of the message header.
Use the validated offset and size values for both kmemdup() and the UUID
parsing path so malformed firmware data cannot drive an out-of-bounds
read or an oversized allocation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
selinux: reject a permission value exceeding the class permission count
perm_read() bounds a permission value by SEL_VEC_MAX but never by the
nprim of the owning class or common, which is taken verbatim from the
policy image. security_get_permissions() then writes perms[value - 1]
into an nprim-sized kcalloc() array, so a class declaring fewer
permissions than its largest permission value drives an out-of-bounds
heap write. The top-level symbol tables are validated this way; the
nested per-class permission table is not.
Reject a permission whose value exceeds nprim, which is already set when
perm_read() runs. Well-formed policies are unaffected.
[PM: tweak comment for line length] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: qcom: dispcc-eliza: Fix disp_cc_mdss_mdp_clk_src RCG stall on Eliza EVK
Eliza EVK (eliza-cqs-evk.dts) does not have display enabled, however its
Display Clock Controller is enabled and references parent clocks from
DSI PHYs, which causes clock reparenting issues during probe (init) and
warning on Eliza EVK:
disp_cc_mdss_mdp_clk_src: rcg didn't update its configuration.
WARNING: drivers/clk/qcom/clk-rcg2.c:136 at update_config+0xd4/0xe4, CPU#1: udevd/273
...
update_config (drivers/clk/qcom/clk-rcg2.c:136 (discriminator 2)) (P)
clk_rcg2_shared_disable (drivers/clk/qcom/clk-rcg2.c:1471)
clk_rcg2_shared_init (drivers/clk/qcom/clk-rcg2.c:1540)
__clk_register (drivers/clk/clk.c:3959 drivers/clk/clk.c:4368)
devm_clk_hw_register (drivers/clk/clk.c:4448 (discriminator 1) drivers/clk/clk.c:4672 (discriminator 1))
devm_clk_register_regmap (drivers/clk/qcom/clk-regmap.c:104)
qcom_cc_really_probe (drivers/clk/qcom/common.c:418)
qcom_cc_probe (drivers/clk/qcom/common.c:445)
disp_cc_eliza_probe (dispcc-eliza.c:?) dispcc_eliza
platform_probe (drivers/base/platform.c:1432) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables_offload: suppress WARN_ON_ONCE for ENOMEM in abort path
In nft_flow_rule_offload_abort(), WARN_ON_ONCE(err) is triggered on every
error during rollback, including -ENOMEM. Memory allocation failures are
expected under low-memory conditions and do not indicate a kernel bug.
Trace for example:
nft_flow_offload_chain() // FLOW_BLOCK_BIND
nft_flow_block_chain()
nft_chain_offload_cmd()
nft_block_offload_cmd()
->ndo_setup_tc()
nsim_setup_tc()
flow_block_cb_setup_simple()
flow_block_cb_alloc() // fails to -ENOMEM
The warning was reproduced on the 5.10 stable kernel under memory pressure
via fault injection, but the underlying bug exists in mainline as well,
as demonstrated by the ENOMEM trace above. The following splat was
triggered during nf_tables transaction processing:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8567 at net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:532 nft_flow_rule_offload_abort net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:532 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8567 at net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:532 nft_flow_rule_offload_commit+0x971/0xcd0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:591
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 8567 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.10.260-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:nft_flow_rule_offload_abort net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:532 [inline]
RIP: 0010:nft_flow_rule_offload_commit+0x971/0xcd0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:591
Call Trace:
nf_tables_commit+0x3bd/0x4bd0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:8604
nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xb1e/0x1f20 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:509
nfnetlink_rcv_skb_batch net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:579 [inline]
nfnetlink_rcv+0x3b3/0x420 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:597
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x6cd/0xa00 net/netfilter/af_netlink.c:1340
netlink_sendmsg+0x906/0xe10 net/netfilter/af_netlink.c:1919
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x155/0x190 net/socket.c:663
____sys_sendmsg+0x705/0x870 net/socket.c:2379
___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2433
__sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2462
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1
Change the condition to WARN_ON_ONCE(err && err != -ENOMEM) so that
warnings are only emitted for unexpected errors. This aligns with the
common kernel practice of not warning on -ENOMEM.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: xilinx: formatter_pcm: pass aud_drv_data to irq handlers
The irq handlers take a struct device pointer and call
dev_get_drvdata() to obtain the driver data. However, the driver
data is only set at the end of probe, after devm_request_irq(),
so an interrupt taken in between causes the handlers to pass a
NULL pointer to readl() and crash.
Pass the private data directly as the devm_request_irq() argument
instead of the device pointer, matching what the handlers expect. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
zram: fix use-after-free in zram_bvec_write_partial()
zram_read_page() picks the sync or async backing device read path based on
whether the parent bio is NULL. zram_bvec_write_partial() passes its
parent bio down, so for ZRAM_WB slots the read is dispatched
asynchronously and zram_read_page() returns 0 while the bio is still in
flight. The caller then runs memcpy_from_bvec(), zram_write_page() and
__free_page() on the buffer, leaving the async read to write into a freed
page.
zram_bvec_read_partial() was switched to NULL in commit 4e3c87b9421d
("zram: fix synchronous reads") for the same reason; the write_partial
counterpart was missed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: fix possible UAF in icmpv6_rcv()
Caching saddr and daddr before pskb_pull() is problematic
since skb->head can change.
Remove these temporary variables:
- We only access &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr and &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr
when net_dbg_ratelimited() is called in the slow path.
- Avoid potential future misuse after pskb_pull() call. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
futex: Drop CLONE_THREAD requirement for private default hash alloc
Currently need_futex_hash_allocate_default() depends on strict pthread
semantics, abusing CLONE_THREAD. This breaks the non-concurrency
assumptions when doing the mm->futex_ref pcpu allocations, leading to
bugs[0] when sharing the mm in other ways; ie:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in futex_hash_put
... where the +1 bias can end up on a percpu counter that mm->futex_ref
no longer points at.
Loosen the check to cover any CLONE_VM clone, except vfork(). Excluding
vfork keeps the existing paths untouched (no overhead), and we can't
race in the first place: either the parent is suspended and the child
runs alone, or mm->futex_ref is already allocated from an earlier
CLONE_VM. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: gro: don't merge zcopy skbs
skb_gro_receive() can currently copy frags between the source and GRO
skb, without checking the zerocopy status, and in particular the
SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS flag.
When SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS is set, the skb doesn't hold a reference
on the pages in shinfo->frags. Appending those frags to another skb's
frags without fixing up the page refcount can lead to UAF.
When either the last skb in the GRO chain (the one we would append
frags to) or the source skb is zerocopy, don't merge the skbs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mana: Validate rx_hash_key_len
Sashiko points out that rx_hash_key_len comes from a uAPI structure and is
blindly passed to memcpy, allowing the userspace to trash kernel
memory. Bounds check it so the memcpy cannot overflow. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv6: fix NOREF dst use in seg6 and rpl lwtunnels
seg6_input_core() and rpl_input() call ip6_route_input() which sets a
NOREF dst on the skb, then pass it to dst_cache_set_ip6() invoking
dst_hold() unconditionally.
On PREEMPT_RT, ksoftirqd is preemptible and a higher-priority task can
release the underlying pcpu_rt between the lookup and the caching
through a concurrent FIB lookup on a shared nexthop.
Simplified race sequence:
ksoftirqd/X higher-prio task (same CPU X)
----------- --------------------------------
seg6_input_core(,skb)/rpl_input(skb)
dst_cache_get()
-> miss
ip6_route_input(skb)
-> ip6_pol_route(,skb,flags)
[RT6_LOOKUP_F_DST_NOREF in flags]
-> FIB lookup resolves fib6_nh
[nhid=N route]
-> rt6_make_pcpu_route()
[creates pcpu_rt, refcount=1]
pcpu_rt->sernum = fib6_sernum
[fib6_sernum=W]
-> cmpxchg(fib6_nh.rt6i_pcpu,
NULL, pcpu_rt)
[slot was empty, store succeeds]
-> skb_dst_set_noref(skb, dst)
[dst is pcpu_rt, refcount still 1]
rt_genid_bump_ipv6()
-> bumps fib6_sernum
[fib6_sernum from W to Z]
ip6_route_output()
-> ip6_pol_route()
-> FIB lookup resolves fib6_nh
[nhid=N]
-> rt6_get_pcpu_route()
pcpu_rt->sernum != fib6_sernum
[W <> Z, stale]
-> prev = xchg(rt6i_pcpu, NULL)
-> dst_release(prev)
[prev is pcpu_rt,
refcount 1->0, dead]
dst = skb_dst(skb)
[dst is the dead pcpu_rt]
dst_cache_set_ip6(dst)
-> dst_hold() on dead dst
-> WARN / use-after-free
For the race to occur, ksoftirqd must be preemptible (PREEMPT_RT without
PREEMPT_RT_NEEDS_BH_LOCK) and a concurrent task must be able to release
the pcpu_rt. Shared nexthop objects provide such a path, as two routes
pointing to the same nhid share the same fib6_nh and its rt6i_pcpu
entry.
Fix seg6_input_core() and rpl_input() by calling skb_dst_force() after
ip6_route_input() to force the NOREF dst into a refcounted one before
caching.
The output path is not affected as ip6_route_output() already returns a
refcounted dst. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_set_pipapo_avx2: don't return non-matching entry on expiry
New test case fails unexpectedly when avx2 matching functions are used.
The test first loads a ranomly generated pipapo set
with 'ipv4 . port' key, i.e. nft -f foo.
This works. Then, it reloads the set after a flush:
(echo flush set t s; cat foo) | nft -f -
This is expected to work, because its the same set after all and it was
already loaded once.
But with avx2, this fails: nft reports a clashing element.
The reported clash is of following form:
We successfully re-inserted
a . b
c . d
Then we try to insert a . d
avx2 finds the already existing a . d, which (due to 'flush set') is marked
as invalid in the new generation. It skips the element and moves to next.
Due to incorrect masking, the skip-step finds the next matching
element *only considering the first field*,
i.e. we return the already reinserted "a . b", even though the
last field is different and the entry should not have been matched.
No such error is reported for the generic c implementation (no avx2) or when
the last field has to use the 'nft_pipapo_avx2_lookup_slow' fallback.
Bisection points to
7711f4bb4b36 ("netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: fix range overlap detection")
but that fix merely uncovers this bug.
Before this commit, the wrong element is returned, but erronously
reported as a full, identical duplicate.
The root-cause is too early return in the avx2 match functions.
When we process the last field, we should continue to process data
until the entire input size has been consumed to make sure no stale
bits remain in the map. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: fix inverted genmask check in nft_map_catchall_activate()
nft_map_catchall_activate() has an inverted element activity check
compared to its non-catchall counterpart nft_mapelem_activate() and
compared to what is logically required.
nft_map_catchall_activate() is called from the abort path to re-activate
catchall map elements that were deactivated during a failed transaction.
It should skip elements that are already active (they don't need
re-activation) and process elements that are inactive (they need to be
restored). Instead, the current code does the opposite: it skips inactive
elements and processes active ones.
Compare the non-catchall activate callback, which is correct:
nft_mapelem_activate():
if (nft_set_elem_active(ext, iter->genmask))
return 0; /* skip active, process inactive */
With the buggy catchall version:
nft_map_catchall_activate():
if (!nft_set_elem_active(ext, genmask))
continue; /* skip inactive, process active */
The consequence is that when a DELSET operation is aborted,
nft_setelem_data_activate() is never called for the catchall element.
For NFT_GOTO verdict elements, this means nft_data_hold() is never
called to restore the chain->use reference count. Each abort cycle
permanently decrements chain->use. Once chain->use reaches zero,
DELCHAIN succeeds and frees the chain while catchall verdict elements
still reference it, resulting in a use-after-free.
This is exploitable for local privilege escalation from an unprivileged
user via user namespaces + nftables on distributions that enable
CONFIG_USER_NS and CONFIG_NF_TABLES.
Fix by removing the negation so the check matches nft_mapelem_activate():
skip active elements, process inactive ones. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) reject short block-read responses in the GPIO accessors
adm1266_gpio_get() and adm1266_gpio_get_multiple() both compose the
pin-status word as
pins_status = read_buf[0] + (read_buf[1] << 8);
right after i2c_smbus_read_block_data(), guarding only against an
error return. A well-behaved device returns 2 bytes for
GPIO_STATUS/PDIO_STATUS, but the helper happily reports a 0- or
1-byte response too. If the device returns 0 bytes, both read_buf
slots are uninitialized stack memory; if it returns 1 byte, read_buf[1]
is.
The composed value then flows through set_bit() into the caller's
*bits in adm1266_gpio_get_multiple(), or into the return value of
adm1266_gpio_get(), and ends up in userspace via gpiolib (sysfs and
the char-dev ioctls). That leaks a few bits of kernel stack per
request on any device whose firmware glitch, bus error, or hostile
slave produces a short block-read response.
Add the missing length check to both call sites and surface a short
response as -EIO. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) cap PDIO scan in get_multiple at ADM1266_PDIO_NR
adm1266_gpio_get_multiple() iterates the PDIO portion of the
caller-supplied mask using
for_each_set_bit_from(gpio_nr, mask,
ADM1266_GPIO_NR + ADM1266_PDIO_STATUS) {
...
}
where ADM1266_PDIO_STATUS is the PMBus command code (0xE9, i.e. 233),
not the number of PDIO pins. The intended upper bound is
ADM1266_GPIO_NR + ADM1266_PDIO_NR = 25.
gpiolib hands in a mask sized for gc.ngpio (= 25 bits on this chip),
so the iteration walks find_next_bit() up to 242, reading up to 217
extra bits (a handful of unsigned-long words: four on 64-bit, seven
on 32-bit) of whatever lives past the end of the mask in the
caller's stack. Any incidental set bit in that range then drives a
set_bit(gpio_nr, bits) call that writes past the end of the
caller-supplied bits array too -- both out-of-bounds.
Substitute ADM1266_PDIO_NR for the constant so the scan stops at the
last real PDIO bit. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) bounce blackbox records through a protocol-sized buffer
adm1266_pmbus_block_xfer() copies the device-supplied block payload
into the caller-provided buffer using the device-supplied length:
memcpy(data_r, &msgs[1].buf[1], msgs[1].buf[0]);
The helper does not know how large data_r is and trusts the device to
return at most one record's worth of bytes. adm1266_nvmem_read_blackbox()
violates that contract: it advances read_buff inside data->dev_mem in
ADM1266_BLACKBOX_SIZE (64-byte) strides while the helper is willing to
write up to ADM1266_PMBUS_BLOCK_MAX (255) bytes. A device that returns
more than 64 bytes on the trailing record (read_buff offset 1984 in
the 2048-byte dev_mem allocation) overflows dev_mem by up to 191 bytes
before the post-call
if (ret != ADM1266_BLACKBOX_SIZE)
return -EIO;
can reject the response.
Contain the fix in the caller without changing the helper signature:
read each record into a 255-byte local bounce buffer that matches the
helper's maximum output, validate the returned length, and only then
copy exactly ADM1266_BLACKBOX_SIZE bytes into the dev_mem slot. |
