| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: oc-tiny: switch to managed controller allocation
The controller is allocated with the non-managed spi_alloc_host() while
the interrupt is registered with devm_request_irq(). During removal,
spi_bitbang_stop() only unregisters the controller; the subsequent
spi_controller_put() then frees the controller together with its
embedded driver-private devdata, which is the IRQ handler's dev_id. The
devm_request_irq() release action (free_irq()), which drains the
handler, does not run until after .remove() returns. A late or latched
interrupt can therefore reach tiny_spi_irq() and dereference
already-freed memory (e.g. hw->base).
Switch to devm_spi_alloc_host() so that the devres LIFO order releases
the controller only after free_irq() has drained the handler, and drop
the now-redundant spi_controller_put() from .remove(). The probe error
path is simplified to direct returns.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched_ext: Abort directly from the hardlockup handler
scx_hardlockup() defers the abort to an irq_work because exit claiming used
to take scx_sched_lock and couldn't run from NMI. The deferral is now
unnecessary - claiming is NMI-safe and asserting ->aborting is exactly what
breaks the live-locks that hard-lock CPUs. Call handle_lockup() directly and
drop the irq_work. This also makes the self-detected case recoverable: the
perf watchdog fires on the hard-locked CPU itself, where a queued irq_work
never runs with IRQs off.
Also fix the return value: %true used to be returned whenever sched_ext was
loaded, suppressing the kernel's hardlockup report even when the abort was
refused. Return %true only when this call initiated the abort. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
remoteproc: Prevent crash handling to race with rproc_del()
There's no synchronization between rproc_crash_handler_work() and
rproc_del(), as such it's possible for a driver to be removed while
crash-handler work is scheduled, or even executing - resulting in
use-after-free issues.
To avoid this the scheduled work need to be cancelled and synchronized
against before the removal proceeds.
In order to ensure that this doesn't race with the reporting, and
thereby scheduling new work, a "deleting" flag is introduced. This is
similar to the RPROC_DELETE state that was introduced to ensure that
"start" didn't race with rproc_del(), but the existing mechanism can not
be used as it's valid to call rproc_report_crash() in atomic context -
and the "state" is protected by a mutex.
In the event that work is cancelled the pm_stay_awake() is left
unbalanced and need to be unrolled.
The blocking and cancelling of crash-handler work prior to the actual
rproc_shutdown() call does have the explicit side-effect that crashes
resulting from the shutdown process will not enter the crash-handling
path, and as such will not generate devcoredumps etc. Due to the
existing mutual exclusion between these code paths there's no concrete
reduction in functionality, but further work would be needed to handle
this case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/tegra241-cmdqv: Publish an LVCMDQ only after it is fully initialized
tegra241_vintf_init_lvcmdq() stores the freshly allocated vcmdq pointer to
the vintf->lvcmdqs[] array, before tegra241_vcmdq_alloc_smmu_cmdq() builds
the vcmdq->cmdq. The error ISR dereferences that cmdq, so a latched LVCMDQ
error (e.g. one inherited across a kexec) firing in this window would make
tegra241_vintf0_handle_error() pass the still-zeroed arm_smmu_cmdq down to
__arm_smmu_cmdq_skip_err(), dereferencing NULL queue register pointers.
Drop the store from tegra241_vintf_init_lvcmdq() and publish the vcmdq at
the end of the allocation instead, with an smp_store_release() that pairs
with an smp_load_acquire() in the ISR, which can see a fully built LVCMDQ
or NULL.
The user-owned LVCMDQ allocation moves accordingly, publishing the vcmdq
once tegra241_vcmdq_hw_init_user() succeeds, using a plain store since a
user VINTF's lvcmdqs[] has no lockless reader -- the error ISR only walks
the VINTF0 array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/tegra241-cmdqv: Synchronize the error ISR against VINTF (de)init
A user VINTF is torn down by tegra241_cmdqv_deinit_vintf(), which runs from
the destroy callback and from the init-failure unwind in the alloc handler.
It clears the cmdqv->vintfs[] slot and lets the iommufd core free it, but
nothing serializes that against the error interrupt: tegra241_cmdqv_isr()
reads cmdqv->vintfs[idx] and dereferences the vintf. A concurrent error can
make the ISR read a slot mid-clear (a NULL deref) or use a vintf which is
about to be freed (a use-after-free).
deinit_vintf() also returns idx to the IDA before clearing the slot, so a
concurrent create that reuses idx can publish its new vintf into the slot,
only for this teardown to erase it again with the stale NULL store.
On the other end, tegra241_cmdqv_init_vintf() publishes a new vintf with a
plain store to the cmdqv->vintfs[] slot, and the ISR dereferences fields of
a published vintf such as vintf->base. A plain store gives no ordering on a
weakly-ordered CPU, and a stale VINTF_ERR_MAP bit on a reused idx can make
the ISR pick a vintf the moment it is published, before its fields are set
or tegra241_vintf_hw_init() runs.
The cmdqv->vintfs[0] slot stays NULL until tegra241_cmdqv_init_structures()
first creates VINTF0, so the slot 0 read needs the same NULL check.
Publish every slot with an smp_store_release(), and read each slot in the
ISR with an smp_load_acquire() under a NULL check, so the ISR always sees
a fully built vintf or NULL. Also make deinit_vintf() clear the slot, and
synchronize_irq() prior to returning idx to the IDA, so no vintf is freed
under a running handler and no reused idx is clobbered. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/tegra241-cmdqv: Don't run the error ISR before probe sets up vintfs
__tegra241_cmdqv_probe() requests the error IRQ before it has allocated the
cmdqv->vintfs array and set cmdqv->num_vintfs. A CMDQV left enabled with a
latched error across a kexec fires the IRQ as soon as it is requested, and
tegra241_cmdqv_isr() then walks the uninitialized cmdqv->vintfs array.
Request the IRQ only after cmdqv->vintfs is allocated and zeroed, so that
a latched interrupt firing early runs the ISR against a valid array of NULL
slots that it safely skips. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/tegra241-cmdqv: Don't fall back to a freed smmu after devm_krealloc()
__tegra241_cmdqv_probe() uses devm_krealloc() to grow @smmu into the larger
tegra241_cmdqv, which frees the original @smmu once it relocates. A failure
after that returned NULL, and the caller then dereferenced the freed @smmu
on its fallback path.
Return an int and take @smmu by reference instead, then update *smmu to the
reallocated pointer after devm_krealloc() succeeds, so the caller and its
fallback path both use the live @smmu rather than the freed original. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/tegra241-cmdqv: Free the error IRQ before tearing down VINTFs
tegra241_cmdqv_remove() tears each VINTF down first, then calls free_irq().
Tearing a VINTF down frees vintf0 and clears cmdqv->vintfs[0]. An error in
that window makes tegra241_cmdqv_isr() read the stale slot and hand it to
tegra241_vintf0_handle_error(), which dereferences a NULL or freed pointer.
Free the IRQ before tearing the VINTFs down. free_irq() waits for in-flight
handlers to finish and blocks new ones, so no ISR can observe a VINTF as it
is torn down.
Note: a user-owned VINTF (viommu) could outlive this teardown, which unmaps
cmdqv->base and frees cmdqv->vintfs, so a later viommu close then touches
freed memory. This is neither introduced nor fixed here: a physical IOMMU
is not a pluggable device, so iommufd by design holds no reference on the
one behind a viommu, and this teardown is not expected while that viommu is
still alive. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/tegra241-cmdqv: Require exactly one Stream ID for a vSID
tegra241_vintf_init_vsid() maps a guest vSID to a single physical Stream ID
taken from master->streams[0], and only warns when the device does not have
exactly one stream. A device with several streams gets only its first one
mapped, so a guest vSID invalidation cannot reach the others' ATC and IOTLB
entries; a device with none makes master->streams a ZERO_SIZE_PTR, read out
of bounds.
Reject the mapping with -EOPNOTSUPP if master->num_streams is not one. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/tegra241-cmdqv: Fix VINTF0 leak on the init-failure path
tegra241_cmdqv_init_structures() allocates VINTF0 with kzalloc_obj(), inits
it, and preallocates its logical VCMDQs. Two of its error paths leak.
When tegra241_cmdqv_init_vintf() fails it returns before VINTF0 reaches the
cmdqv->vintfs[] array, so the devres unwind on probe failure cannot reach
it; free it directly there.
A later VCMDQ preallocation failure instead leaves VINTF0 published, and so
this time the unwind does reach tegra241_cmdqv_remove_vintf(), which then
frees it from vintf->hyp_own. But tegra241_vintf_hw_init() sets that flag
only afterward, from a HW read-back, so the still-uninited VINTF0 reads as
guest-owned and leaks, with mutex_destroy() and ida_destroy() run on fields
it never set up.
Decide ownership from vintf->idx instead, the index assigned when its id is
allocated: idx 0 is the kernel-owned VINTF0, while idx >= 1 marks a guest
VINTF. So the in-kernel free decision in tegra241_cmdqv_remove_vintf() and
tegra241_vintf_free_lvcmdq() now keys on idx too, and hyp_own stays a pure
HW-readback state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Fix UAF in ODP init error-handling path
rxe_odp_mr_init_user() stores &umem_odp->umem in mr->umem before
calling rxe_odp_init_pages(). If rxe_odp_init_pages() fails,
rxe_odp_mr_init_user() releases umem_odp and returns an error.
rxe_reg_user_mr() then unwinds the error through rxe_cleanup(),
rxe_mr_cleanup(), ib_umem_release(mr->umem). There is an
IS_ERR_OR_NULL(umem) check at the start of ib_umem_release().
But since mr->umem is NOT reset to NULL in the error handling
path of rxe_odp_mr_init_user(), the check passes and it reads
already-freed fields like umem->is_dmabuf, causing UAF.
Fix the UAF by clearing mr->umem after releasing the failed
ODP umem so the MR cleanup path does not release it again. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: mediatek: pllfh: Fix IO remapping leak in register_pllfhs error path
When mtk_clk_register_pllfhs function fails to register a PLL, it
unregisters all PLLs and cleans up itself in its error path before
returning, so the function callers don't need to do it.
But contrary to mtk_clk_unregister_pllfhs function, that does almost
the same sequence, it does not free the IO memory mapped on fhctl node,
leading to a leak.
Fix this leak by factorizing the cleanup sequence in a new private
function and use it both mtk_clk_register_pllfhs and
mtk_clk_unregister_pllfhs functions.
Also, change the loop index start value to avoid the -1 operation on
index at each loop. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: Fix UAF when probe runs concurrent to dyn ID removal
Dynamic IDs are only guaranteed to be valid when dynids.lock is held,
as remove_id_store() can free the node. Thus, make a copy in
pci_match_device(). Also, clarify that the id parameter is only valid
during probe. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nilfs2: fix infinite loop in nilfs_clean_segments()
syzbot reported a hung task in nilfs_transaction_begin(). This occurs
because the cleaner ioctl falls into an infinite loop if
nilfs_segctor_construct() repeatedly returns -EROFS (e.g. the device
is remounted as read-only after an I/O error).
Currently in nilfs_clean_segments(), if err is non-zero, it logs the
error and sleeps but doesn't abort when it encounters a terminal error
like -EROFS. This causes the thread to loop forever.
Fix this by breaking out of the loop if nilfs_segctor_construct()
returns -EROFS. This matches the behaviour in
nilfs_segctor_write_out(), which also handles -EROFS. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nilfs2: prevent out-of-bounds read in super root block parsing
super-root inode metadata size is trusted before nilfs_read_inode_common().
Reject super-root inode sizes whose computed on-disk footprint exceeds the
filesystem block size. This prevents malformed filesystem images from
making nilfs_read_inode_common() read past the end of the super-root block.
[ryusuke: clarify the commit title] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nilfs2: fix BUG in nilfs_copy_dirty_pages() on dirty state mismatch
Syzbot reported a kernel BUG triggered within nilfs_copy_dirty_pages(),
which copies dirty DAT file folios/pages to its shadow page cache. The
BUG occurs when a retrieved dirty folio/page unexpectedly loses its
'dirty' status.
This issue arises because, since the commit referenced below, the 'dirty'
flag of a folio/page can be cleared asynchronously after the filesystem
detects metadata corruption and transitions to read-only mode.
Resolve the issue by returning an -EROFS error if the filesystem has
transitioned to read-only mode. Also change the behavior to issue a
kernel warning only once instead of triggering a kernel BUG when this
unexpected 'dirty' state is detected while the filesystem is not in
read-only mode. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/cxgb4: Fix dereg_skb leak and double free in write_tpt_entry()
When the device is in the fatal error state, write_tpt_entry() returns -EIO
before handing the caller's preallocated skb to the transmit path; its
allocation-failure returns do the same. c4iw_dereg_mr() ignores the error
and frees mhp, leaking mhp->dereg_skb. c4iw_get_dma_mr() instead frees the
skb a second time after dereg_mem() already consumed it, a double free.
Make write_tpt_entry() the sole owner of a non-NULL skb, freeing it on
every return preceding handoff to c4iw_ofld_send(): fatal error, tpt and
stag allocation failure. c4iw_ofld_send() consumes the skb on success and
error alike, so drop the redundant kfree_skb() in c4iw_get_dma_mr() after
dereg_mem(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix stack out-of-bounds read in cc_params debugfs
get_param() reads a congestion parameter as a u32 but formats it with the
signed "%d" into an 11-byte stack buffer. A value with bit 31 set, such as
0x80000000, renders as "-2147483648\n" whose full length is 12. snprintf()
stores only 11 bytes yet returns 12, so simple_read_from_buffer() treats 12
bytes as valid and reads one byte past lbuf[].
Size the buffer for the widest unsigned decimal, format with "%u" to match
the u32, and use scnprintf() so the length passed to
simple_read_from_buffer() reflects the bytes actually stored. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/cxgb4: free STAG index when TPT entry write fails
write_tpt_entry() allocates a new STAG index with c4iw_get_resource() and
bumps stats.stag.cur before programming the entry. When
write_adapter_mem() fails, it returns the error without releasing the index
or reversing the statistic. No MR is inserted into rhp->mrs, so
deregistration never reclaims it, leaking the index until device teardown.
Record whether this call allocated the index and, on a failed write, return
it to tpt_table and decrement stats.stag.cur. Key the rollback on both the
write error and that flag, not the error alone: a non-reset update carries
a caller-owned STAG that this call did not allocate and must not free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/isert: reject PDUs declaring more data than was received
isert_recv_done() hands each received PDU to the opcode handlers without
ever looking at wc->byte_len, the number of bytes the HCA actually placed
in the receive descriptor. The handlers then copy that many bytes - the
data-segment length the initiator declared in the BHS
(ntoh24(hdr->dlength), via the derived unsol_data_len / imm_data_len) -
out of the fixed-size descriptor:
isert_handle_iscsi_dataout():
sg_copy_from_buffer(sg_start, sg_nents, isert_get_data(rx_desc),
unsol_data_len);
isert_handle_scsi_cmd():
sg_copy_from_buffer(cmd->se_cmd.t_data_sg, sg_nents,
isert_get_data(rx_desc), imm_data_len);
Because the declared length is never checked against wc->byte_len, an
initiator can declare a data segment larger than the bytes it actually
sent (and larger than the descriptor) and cause an out-of-bounds read of
the receive buffer.
Nothing upstream of isert closes this door:
- __iscsit_check_dataout_hdr() bounds the inbound payload against
conn_ops->MaxXmitDataSegmentLength (MXDSL) - a transmit parameter,
used here for the inbound check.
- iscsi_set_connection_parameters() sets
ops->MaxXmitDataSegmentLength = ops->TargetRecvDataSegmentLength;
and TARGETRECVDATASEGMENTLENGTH is absent from the min()-clamp list in
iscsi_check_acceptor_state(), so the value the initiator declares is
adopted verbatim (type range 512..16777215). The initiator effectively
raises its own ceiling.
- isert never clamps the negotiated value to its own fixed receive
descriptor (ISER_RX_SIZE, 9216 bytes), so the target core's bound and
the descriptor size are unrelated.
The imm_data_len == data_len path is more than an over-read: it aliases
the receive descriptor via sg_set_buf() and passes it to the backend as
the data source for the SCSI WRITE, so an over-declared length causes heap
contents past the descriptor to be written through the backend to the
backing store. The backend is the victim of the oversized scatterlist
isert hands it, not the cause; no read-back of the written bytes was
demonstrated.
Trigger: after login completes (full feature phase), an initiator that has
declared a large TargetRecvDataSegmentLength and a FirstBurstLength that
permits unsolicited/immediate data sends a PDU whose declared data-segment
length exceeds what was received. With KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0
Read of size 4096 at addr ffff888109720800 by task kworker/1:0H/25
Workqueue: ib-comp-wq ib_cq_poll_work
Call Trace:
sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0
isert_recv_done+0xba6/0x2390
__ib_process_cq+0xe1/0x390
ib_cq_poll_work+0x46/0x150
isert_recv_done+0xba6 resolves to isert_handle_iscsi_dataout()
(ib_isert.c:1160), inlined through isert_rx_opcode().
Validate wc->byte_len against the framing in isert_recv_done() before the
PDU reaches any handler, and reinstate the connection if it is short.
Because the test compares without subtracting the header length, it also
rejects PDUs shorter than the iSER and iSCSI headers, which would otherwise
be parsed out of stale descriptor contents. The login handler rejects PDUs
shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN (commit 29e7b925ae6d ("IB/isert: Reject login
PDUs shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN")) but does not bound the declared
length either; that is fixed in the next patch. The data handlers had no
length check at all.
isert reads the data segment from a fixed offset: isert_get_data()
returns the iSER header plus ISER_HEADERS_LEN and makes no adjustment for
an AHS. The bytes the handlers touch are therefore exactly
[ISER_HEADERS_LEN, ISER_HEADERS_LEN + dlength), and comparing that sum
against wc->byte_len bounds precisely the region that is read. An AHS
term would only make the test stricter without bounding anything furth
---truncated--- |
