| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/64s/interrupt: Fix interrupt exit race with security mitigation switch
The RFI and STF security mitigation options can flip the
interrupt_exit_not_reentrant static branch condition concurrently with
the interrupt exit code which tests that branch.
Interrupt exit tests this condition to set MSR[EE|RI] for exit, then
again in the case a soft-masked interrupt is found pending, to recover
the MSR so the interrupt can be replayed before attempting to exit
again. If the condition changes between these two tests, the MSR and irq
soft-mask state will become corrupted, leading to warnings and possible
crashes. For example, if the branch is initially true then false,
MSR[EE] will be 0 but PACA_IRQ_HARD_DIS clear and EE may not get
enabled, leading to warnings in irq_64.c. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Fix page corruption caused by racy check in __free_pages
When we upgraded our kernel, we started seeing some page corruption like
the following consistently:
BUG: Bad page state in process ganesha.nfsd pfn:1304ca
page:0000000022261c55 refcount:0 mapcount:-128 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1304ca
flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
raw: 0017ffffc0000000 ffff8a513ffd4c98 ffffeee24b35ec08 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 00000000ffffff7f 0000000000000000
page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
CPU: 0 PID: 15567 Comm: ganesha.nfsd Kdump: loaded Tainted: P B O 5.10.158-1.nutanix.20221209.el7.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 04/05/2016
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x74/0x96
bad_page.cold+0x63/0x94
check_new_page_bad+0x6d/0x80
rmqueue+0x46e/0x970
get_page_from_freelist+0xcb/0x3f0
? _cond_resched+0x19/0x40
__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x164/0x300
alloc_pages_current+0x87/0xf0
skb_page_frag_refill+0x84/0x110
...
Sometimes, it would also show up as corruption in the free list pointer
and cause crashes.
After bisecting the issue, we found the issue started from commit
e320d3012d25 ("mm/page_alloc.c: fix freeing non-compound pages"):
if (put_page_testzero(page))
free_the_page(page, order);
else if (!PageHead(page))
while (order-- > 0)
free_the_page(page + (1 << order), order);
So the problem is the check PageHead is racy because at this point we
already dropped our reference to the page. So even if we came in with
compound page, the page can already be freed and PageHead can return
false and we will end up freeing all the tail pages causing double free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: hda: Do not unset preset when cleaning up codec
Several functions that take part in codec's initialization and removal
are re-used by ASoC codec drivers implementations. Drivers mimic the
behavior of hda_codec_driver_probe/remove() found in
sound/pci/hda/hda_bind.c with their component->probe/remove() instead.
One of the reasons for that is the expectation of
snd_hda_codec_device_new() to receive a valid pointer to an instance of
struct snd_card. This expectation can be met only once sound card
components probing commences.
As ASoC sound card may be unbound without codec device being actually
removed from the system, unsetting ->preset in
snd_hda_codec_cleanup_for_unbind() interferes with module unload -> load
scenario causing null-ptr-deref. Preset is assigned only once, during
device/driver matching whereas ASoC codec driver's module reloading may
occur several times throughout the lifetime of an audio stack. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: Fix invalid page access after closing deferred I/O devices
When a fbdev with deferred I/O is once opened and closed, the dirty
pages still remain queued in the pageref list, and eventually later
those may be processed in the delayed work. This may lead to a
corruption of pages, hitting an Oops.
This patch makes sure to cancel the delayed work and clean up the
pageref list at closing the device for addressing the bug. A part of
the cleanup code is factored out as a new helper function that is
called from the common fb_release(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mmc: sdio: fix possible resource leaks in some error paths
If sdio_add_func() or sdio_init_func() fails, sdio_remove_func() can
not release the resources, because the sdio function is not presented
in these two cases, it won't call of_node_put() or put_device().
To fix these leaks, make sdio_func_present() only control whether
device_del() needs to be called or not, then always call of_node_put()
and put_device().
In error case in sdio_init_func(), the reference of 'card->dev' is
not get, to avoid redundant put in sdio_free_func_cis(), move the
get_device() to sdio_alloc_func() and put_device() to sdio_release_func(),
it can keep the get/put function be balanced.
Without this patch, while doing fault inject test, it can get the
following leak reports, after this fix, the leak is gone.
unreferenced object 0xffff888112514000 (size 2048):
comm "kworker/3:2", pid 65, jiffies 4294741614 (age 124.774s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 e0 6f 12 81 88 ff ff 60 58 8d 06 81 88 ff ff ..o.....`X......
10 40 51 12 81 88 ff ff 10 40 51 12 81 88 ff ff .@Q......@Q.....
backtrace:
[<000000009e5931da>] kmalloc_trace+0x21/0x110
[<000000002f839ccb>] mmc_alloc_card+0x38/0xb0 [mmc_core]
[<0000000004adcbf6>] mmc_sdio_init_card+0xde/0x170 [mmc_core]
[<000000007538fea0>] mmc_attach_sdio+0xcb/0x1b0 [mmc_core]
[<00000000d4fdeba7>] mmc_rescan+0x54a/0x640 [mmc_core]
unreferenced object 0xffff888112511000 (size 2048):
comm "kworker/3:2", pid 65, jiffies 4294741623 (age 124.766s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 40 51 12 81 88 ff ff e0 58 8d 06 81 88 ff ff .@Q......X......
10 10 51 12 81 88 ff ff 10 10 51 12 81 88 ff ff ..Q.......Q.....
backtrace:
[<000000009e5931da>] kmalloc_trace+0x21/0x110
[<00000000fcbe706c>] sdio_alloc_func+0x35/0x100 [mmc_core]
[<00000000c68f4b50>] mmc_attach_sdio.cold.18+0xb1/0x395 [mmc_core]
[<00000000d4fdeba7>] mmc_rescan+0x54a/0x640 [mmc_core] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/usb: kalmia: Don't pass act_len in usb_bulk_msg error path
syzbot reported that act_len in kalmia_send_init_packet() is
uninitialized when passing it to the first usb_bulk_msg error path. Jiri
Pirko noted that it's pointless to pass it in the error path, and that
the value that would be printed in the second error path would be the
value of act_len from the first call to usb_bulk_msg.[1]
With this in mind, let's just not pass act_len to the usb_bulk_msg error
paths.
1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Y9pY61y1nwTuzMOa@nanopsycho/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: qcom: ipq8074: fix PCI-E clock oops
Fix PCI-E clock related kernel oops that are caused by a missing clock
parent.
pcie0_rchng_clk_src has num_parents set to 2 but only one parent is
actually set via parent_hws, it should also have "XO" defined.
This will cause the kernel to panic on a NULL pointer in
clk_core_get_parent_by_index().
So, to fix this utilize clk_parent_data to provide gcc_xo_gpll0 parent
data.
Since there is already an existing static const char * const gcc_xo_gpll0[]
used to provide the same parents via parent_names convert those users to
clk_parent_data as well.
Without this earlycon is needed to even catch the OOPS as it will reset
the board before serial is initialized with the following:
[ 0.232279] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000a00000000000
[ 0.232322] Mem abort info:
[ 0.239094] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 0.241778] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 0.244908] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 0.250377] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 0.253236] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[ 0.256277] Data abort info:
[ 0.261141] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 0.264262] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 0.267820] [0000a00000000000] address between user and kernel address ranges
[ 0.270954] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 0.278067] Modules linked in:
[ 0.282751] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.15.10 #0
[ 0.285882] Hardware name: Xiaomi AX3600 (DT)
[ 0.292043] pstate: 20400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 0.296299] pc : clk_core_get_parent_by_index+0x68/0xec
[ 0.303067] lr : __clk_register+0x1d8/0x820
[ 0.308273] sp : ffffffc01111b7d0
[ 0.312438] x29: ffffffc01111b7d0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000040
[ 0.315919] x26: 0000000000000002 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffffff8000308800
[ 0.323037] x23: ffffff8000308850 x22: ffffff8000308880 x21: ffffff8000308828
[ 0.330155] x20: 0000000000000028 x19: ffffff8000309700 x18: 0000000000000020
[ 0.337272] x17: 000000005cc86990 x16: 0000000000000004 x15: ffffff80001d9d0a
[ 0.344391] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000006
[ 0.351508] x11: 0000000000000003 x10: 0101010101010101 x9 : 0000000000000000
[ 0.358626] x8 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x7 : 6468626f5e626266 x6 : 17000a3a403c1b06
[ 0.365744] x5 : 061b3c403a0a0017 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000001
[ 0.372863] x2 : 0000a00000000000 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : ffffff8000309700
[ 0.379982] Call trace:
[ 0.387091] clk_core_get_parent_by_index+0x68/0xec
[ 0.389351] __clk_register+0x1d8/0x820
[ 0.394210] devm_clk_hw_register+0x5c/0xe0
[ 0.398030] devm_clk_register_regmap+0x44/0x8c
[ 0.402198] qcom_cc_really_probe+0x17c/0x1d0
[ 0.406711] qcom_cc_probe+0x34/0x44
[ 0.411224] gcc_ipq8074_probe+0x18/0x30
[ 0.414869] platform_probe+0x68/0xe0
[ 0.418776] really_probe.part.0+0x9c/0x30c
[ 0.422336] __driver_probe_device+0x98/0x144
[ 0.426329] driver_probe_device+0x44/0x11c
[ 0.430842] __device_attach_driver+0xb4/0x120
[ 0.434836] bus_for_each_drv+0x68/0xb0
[ 0.439349] __device_attach+0xb0/0x170
[ 0.443081] device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20
[ 0.446901] bus_probe_device+0x9c/0xa4
[ 0.451067] device_add+0x35c/0x834
[ 0.454886] of_device_add+0x54/0x64
[ 0.458360] of_platform_device_create_pdata+0xc0/0x100
[ 0.462181] of_platform_bus_create+0x114/0x370
[ 0.467128] of_platform_bus_create+0x15c/0x370
[ 0.471641] of_platform_populate+0x50/0xcc
[ 0.476155] of_platform_default_populate_init+0xa8/0xc8
[ 0.480324] do_one_initcall+0x50/0x1b0
[ 0.485877] kernel_init_freeable+0x234/0x29c
[ 0.489436] kernel_init+0x24/0x120
[ 0.493948] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 0.497253] Code: d50323bf d65f03c0 f94002a2 b4000302 (f9400042)
[ 0.501079] ---[ end trace 4ca7e1129da2abce ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/pm: fix a potential gpu_metrics_table memory leak
Memory is allocated for gpu_metrics_table in renoir_init_smc_tables(),
but not freed in int smu_v12_0_fini_smc_tables(). Free it! |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: soc-compress: prevent the potentially use of null pointer
There is one call trace that snd_soc_register_card()
->snd_soc_bind_card()->soc_init_pcm_runtime()
->snd_soc_dai_compress_new()->snd_soc_new_compress().
In the trace the 'codec_dai' transfers from card->dai_link,
and we can see from the snd_soc_add_pcm_runtime() in
snd_soc_bind_card() that, if value of card->dai_link->num_codecs
is 0, then 'codec_dai' could be null pointer caused
by index out of bound in 'asoc_rtd_to_codec(rtd, 0)'.
And snd_soc_register_card() is called by various platforms.
Therefore, it is better to add the check in the case of misusing.
And because 'cpu_dai' has already checked in soc_init_pcm_runtime(),
there is no need to check again.
Adding the check as follow, then if 'codec_dai' is null,
snd_soc_new_compress() will not pass through the check
'if (playback + capture != 1)', avoiding the leftover use of
'codec_dai'. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ax25: Fix netdev refcount issue
The dev_tracker is added to ax25_cb in ax25_bind(). When the
ax25 device is detaching, the dev_tracker of ax25_cb should be
deallocated in ax25_kill_by_device() instead of the dev_tracker
of ax25_dev. The log reported by ref_tracker is shown below:
[ 80.884935] ref_tracker: reference already released.
[ 80.885150] ref_tracker: allocated in:
[ 80.885349] ax25_dev_device_up+0x105/0x540
[ 80.885730] ax25_device_event+0xa4/0x420
[ 80.885730] notifier_call_chain+0xc9/0x1e0
[ 80.885730] __dev_notify_flags+0x138/0x280
[ 80.885730] dev_change_flags+0xd7/0x180
[ 80.885730] dev_ifsioc+0x6a9/0xa30
[ 80.885730] dev_ioctl+0x4d8/0xd90
[ 80.885730] sock_do_ioctl+0x1c2/0x2d0
[ 80.885730] sock_ioctl+0x38b/0x4f0
[ 80.885730] __se_sys_ioctl+0xad/0xf0
[ 80.885730] do_syscall_64+0xc4/0x1b0
[ 80.885730] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f
[ 80.885730] ref_tracker: freed in:
[ 80.885730] ax25_device_event+0x272/0x420
[ 80.885730] notifier_call_chain+0xc9/0x1e0
[ 80.885730] dev_close_many+0x272/0x370
[ 80.885730] unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x3b5/0x1180
[ 80.885730] unregister_netdev+0xcf/0x120
[ 80.885730] sixpack_close+0x11f/0x1b0
[ 80.885730] tty_ldisc_kill+0xcb/0x190
[ 80.885730] tty_ldisc_hangup+0x338/0x3d0
[ 80.885730] __tty_hangup+0x504/0x740
[ 80.885730] tty_release+0x46e/0xd80
[ 80.885730] __fput+0x37f/0x770
[ 80.885730] __x64_sys_close+0x7b/0xb0
[ 80.885730] do_syscall_64+0xc4/0x1b0
[ 80.885730] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f
[ 80.893739] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 80.894030] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 140 at lib/ref_tracker.c:255 ref_tracker_free+0x47b/0x6b0
[ 80.894297] Modules linked in:
[ 80.894929] CPU: 2 PID: 140 Comm: ax25_conn_rel_6 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-g8cd26fd90c1a #11
[ 80.895190] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qem4
[ 80.895514] RIP: 0010:ref_tracker_free+0x47b/0x6b0
[ 80.895808] Code: 83 c5 18 4c 89 eb 48 c1 eb 03 8a 04 13 84 c0 0f 85 df 01 00 00 41 83 7d 00 00 75 4b 4c 89 ff 9
[ 80.896171] RSP: 0018:ffff888009edf8c0 EFLAGS: 00000286
[ 80.896339] RAX: 1ffff1100141ac00 RBX: 1ffff1100149463b RCX: dffffc0000000000
[ 80.896502] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff88800a0d6518
[ 80.896925] RBP: ffff888009edf9b0 R08: ffff88806d3288d3 R09: 1ffff1100da6511a
[ 80.897212] R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100da6511b R12: ffff88800a4a31d4
[ 80.897859] R13: ffff88800a4a31d8 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff88800a0d6518
[ 80.898279] FS: 00007fd88b7fe700(0000) GS:ffff88806d300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 80.899436] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 80.900181] CR2: 00007fd88c001d48 CR3: 000000000993e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
...
[ 80.935774] ref_tracker: sp%d@000000000bb9df3d has 1/1 users at
[ 80.935774] ax25_bind+0x424/0x4e0
[ 80.935774] __sys_bind+0x1d9/0x270
[ 80.935774] __x64_sys_bind+0x75/0x80
[ 80.935774] do_syscall_64+0xc4/0x1b0
[ 80.935774] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f
Change ax25_dev->dev_tracker to the dev_tracker of ax25_cb
in order to mitigate the bug. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: ir_toy: free before error exiting
Fix leak in error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
video: fbdev: nvidiafb: Use strscpy() to prevent buffer overflow
Coverity complains of a possible buffer overflow. However,
given the 'static' scope of nvidia_setup_i2c_bus() it looks
like that can't happen after examiniing the call sites.
CID 19036 (#1 of 1): Copy into fixed size buffer (STRING_OVERFLOW)
1. fixed_size_dest: You might overrun the 48-character fixed-size string
chan->adapter.name by copying name without checking the length.
2. parameter_as_source: Note: This defect has an elevated risk because the
source argument is a parameter of the current function.
89 strcpy(chan->adapter.name, name);
Fix this warning by using strscpy() which will silence the warning and
prevent any future buffer overflows should the names used to identify the
channel become much longer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ubifs: Fix to add refcount once page is set private
MM defined the rule [1] very clearly that once page was set with PG_private
flag, we should increment the refcount in that page, also main flows like
pageout(), migrate_page() will assume there is one additional page
reference count if page_has_private() returns true. Otherwise, we may
get a BUG in page migration:
page:0000000080d05b9d refcount:-1 mapcount:0 mapping:000000005f4d82a8
index:0xe2 pfn:0x14c12
aops:ubifs_file_address_operations [ubifs] ino:8f1 dentry name:"f30e"
flags: 0x1fffff80002405(locked|uptodate|owner_priv_1|private|node=0|
zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_count(page) != 0)
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at include/linux/page_ref.h:184!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 3 PID: 38 Comm: kcompactd0 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc5
RIP: 0010:migrate_page_move_mapping+0xac3/0xe70
Call Trace:
ubifs_migrate_page+0x22/0xc0 [ubifs]
move_to_new_page+0xb4/0x600
migrate_pages+0x1523/0x1cc0
compact_zone+0x8c5/0x14b0
kcompactd+0x2bc/0x560
kthread+0x18c/0x1e0
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
Before the time, we should make clean a concept, what does refcount means
in page gotten from grab_cache_page_write_begin(). There are 2 situations:
Situation 1: refcount is 3, page is created by __page_cache_alloc.
TYPE_A - the write process is using this page
TYPE_B - page is assigned to one certain mapping by calling
__add_to_page_cache_locked()
TYPE_C - page is added into pagevec list corresponding current cpu by
calling lru_cache_add()
Situation 2: refcount is 2, page is gotten from the mapping's tree
TYPE_B - page has been assigned to one certain mapping
TYPE_A - the write process is using this page (by calling
page_cache_get_speculative())
Filesystem releases one refcount by calling put_page() in xxx_write_end(),
the released refcount corresponds to TYPE_A (write task is using it). If
there are any processes using a page, page migration process will skip the
page by judging whether expected_page_refs() equals to page refcount.
The BUG is caused by following process:
PA(cpu 0) kcompactd(cpu 1)
compact_zone
ubifs_write_begin
page_a = grab_cache_page_write_begin
add_to_page_cache_lru
lru_cache_add
pagevec_add // put page into cpu 0's pagevec
(refcnf = 3, for page creation process)
ubifs_write_end
SetPagePrivate(page_a) // doesn't increase page count !
unlock_page(page_a)
put_page(page_a) // refcnt = 2
[...]
PB(cpu 0)
filemap_read
filemap_get_pages
add_to_page_cache_lru
lru_cache_add
__pagevec_lru_add // traverse all pages in cpu 0's pagevec
__pagevec_lru_add_fn
SetPageLRU(page_a)
isolate_migratepages
isolate_migratepages_block
get_page_unless_zero(page_a)
// refcnt = 3
list_add(page_a, from_list)
migrate_pages(from_list)
__unmap_and_move
move_to_new_page
ubifs_migrate_page(page_a)
migrate_page_move_mapping
expected_page_refs get 3
(migration[1] + mapping[1] + private[1])
release_pages
put_page_testzero(page_a) // refcnt = 3
page_ref_freeze // refcnt = 0
page_ref_dec_and_test(0 - 1 = -1)
page_ref_unfreeze
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(-1 != 0, page)
UBIFS doesn't increase the page refcount after setting private flag, which
leads to page migration task believes the page is not used by any other
processes, so the page is migrated. This causes concurrent accessing on
page refcount between put_page() called by other process(eg. read process
calls lru_cache_add) and page_ref_unfreeze() called by mi
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix the pre-flush when appending to a file in writethrough mode
In netfs_perform_write(), when the file is marked NETFS_ICTX_WRITETHROUGH
or O_*SYNC or RWF_*SYNC was specified, write-through caching is performed
on a buffered file. When setting up for write-through, we flush any
conflicting writes in the region and wait for the write to complete,
failing if there's a write error to return.
The issue arises if we're writing at or above the EOF position because we
skip the flush and - more importantly - the wait. This becomes a problem
if there's a partial folio at the end of the file that is being written out
and we want to make a write to it too. Both the already-running write and
the write we start both want to clear the writeback mark, but whoever is
second causes a warning looking something like:
------------[ cut here ]------------
R=00000012: folio 11 is not under writeback
WARNING: CPU: 34 PID: 654 at fs/netfs/write_collect.c:105
...
CPU: 34 PID: 654 Comm: kworker/u386:27 Tainted: G S ...
...
Workqueue: events_unbound netfs_write_collection_worker
...
RIP: 0010:netfs_writeback_lookup_folio
Fix this by making the flush-and-wait unconditional. It will do nothing if
there are no folios in the pagecache and will return quickly if there are
no folios in the region specified.
Further, move the WBC attachment above the flush call as the flush is going
to attach a WBC and detach it again if it is not present - and since we
need one anyway we might as well share it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
qede: confirm skb is allocated before using
qede_build_skb() assumes build_skb() always works and goes straight
to skb_reserve(). However, build_skb() can fail under memory pressure.
This results in a kernel panic because the skb to reserve is NULL.
Add a check in case build_skb() failed to allocate and return NULL.
The NULL return is handled correctly in callers to qede_build_skb(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/omap: Fix regression in probe for NULL pointer dereference
Commit 3f6634d997db ("iommu: Use right way to retrieve iommu_ops") started
triggering a NULL pointer dereference for some omap variants:
__iommu_probe_device from probe_iommu_group+0x2c/0x38
probe_iommu_group from bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xbc
bus_for_each_dev from bus_iommu_probe+0x34/0x2e8
bus_iommu_probe from bus_set_iommu+0x80/0xc8
bus_set_iommu from omap_iommu_init+0x88/0xcc
omap_iommu_init from do_one_initcall+0x44/0x24
This is caused by omap iommu probe returning 0 instead of ERR_PTR(-ENODEV)
as noted by Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>.
Looks like the regression already happened with an earlier commit
6785eb9105e3 ("iommu/omap: Convert to probe/release_device() call-backs")
that changed the function return type and missed converting one place. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/mempolicy: fix mpol_new leak in shared_policy_replace
If mpol_new is allocated but not used in restart loop, mpol_new will be
freed via mpol_put before returning to the caller. But refcnt is not
initialized yet, so mpol_put could not do the right things and might
leak the unused mpol_new. This would happen if mempolicy was updated on
the shared shmem file while the sp->lock has been dropped during the
memory allocation.
This issue could be triggered easily with the below code snippet if
there are many processes doing the below work at the same time:
shmid = shmget((key_t)5566, 1024 * PAGE_SIZE, 0666|IPC_CREAT);
shm = shmat(shmid, 0, 0);
loop many times {
mbind(shm, 1024 * PAGE_SIZE, MPOL_LOCAL, mask, maxnode, 0);
mbind(shm + 128 * PAGE_SIZE, 128 * PAGE_SIZE, MPOL_DEFAULT, mask,
maxnode, 0);
} |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix qgroup reserve overflow the qgroup limit
We use extent_changeset->bytes_changed in qgroup_reserve_data() to record
how many bytes we set for EXTENT_QGROUP_RESERVED state. Currently the
bytes_changed is set as "unsigned int", and it will overflow if we try to
fallocate a range larger than 4GiB. The result is we reserve less bytes
and eventually break the qgroup limit.
Unlike regular buffered/direct write, which we use one changeset for
each ordered extent, which can never be larger than 256M. For
fallocate, we use one changeset for the whole range, thus it no longer
respects the 256M per extent limit, and caused the problem.
The following example test script reproduces the problem:
$ cat qgroup-overflow.sh
#!/bin/bash
DEV=/dev/sdj
MNT=/mnt/sdj
mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV
mount $DEV $MNT
# Set qgroup limit to 2GiB.
btrfs quota enable $MNT
btrfs qgroup limit 2G $MNT
# Try to fallocate a 3GiB file. This should fail.
echo
echo "Try to fallocate a 3GiB file..."
fallocate -l 3G $MNT/3G.file
# Try to fallocate a 5GiB file.
echo
echo "Try to fallocate a 5GiB file..."
fallocate -l 5G $MNT/5G.file
# See we break the qgroup limit.
echo
sync
btrfs qgroup show -r $MNT
umount $MNT
When running the test:
$ ./qgroup-overflow.sh
(...)
Try to fallocate a 3GiB file...
fallocate: fallocate failed: Disk quota exceeded
Try to fallocate a 5GiB file...
qgroupid rfer excl max_rfer
-------- ---- ---- --------
0/5 5.00GiB 5.00GiB 2.00GiB
Since we have no control of how bytes_changed is used, it's better to
set it to u64. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ata: sata_dwc_460ex: Fix crash due to OOB write
the driver uses libata's "tag" values from in various arrays.
Since the mentioned patch bumped the ATA_TAG_INTERNAL to 32,
the value of the SATA_DWC_QCMD_MAX needs to account for that.
Otherwise ATA_TAG_INTERNAL usage cause similar crashes like
this as reported by Tice Rex on the OpenWrt Forum and
reproduced (with symbols) here:
| BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000000
| Faulting instruction address: 0xc03ed4b8
| Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
| BE PAGE_SIZE=4K PowerPC 44x Platform
| CPU: 0 PID: 362 Comm: scsi_eh_1 Not tainted 5.4.163 #0
| NIP: c03ed4b8 LR: c03d27e8 CTR: c03ed36c
| REGS: cfa59950 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (5.4.163)
| MSR: 00021000 <CE,ME> CR: 42000222 XER: 00000000
| DEAR: 00000000 ESR: 00000000
| GPR00: c03d27e8 cfa59a08 cfa55fe0 00000000 0fa46bc0 [...]
| [..]
| NIP [c03ed4b8] sata_dwc_qc_issue+0x14c/0x254
| LR [c03d27e8] ata_qc_issue+0x1c8/0x2dc
| Call Trace:
| [cfa59a08] [c003f4e0] __cancel_work_timer+0x124/0x194 (unreliable)
| [cfa59a78] [c03d27e8] ata_qc_issue+0x1c8/0x2dc
| [cfa59a98] [c03d2b3c] ata_exec_internal_sg+0x240/0x524
| [cfa59b08] [c03d2e98] ata_exec_internal+0x78/0xe0
| [cfa59b58] [c03d30fc] ata_read_log_page.part.38+0x1dc/0x204
| [cfa59bc8] [c03d324c] ata_identify_page_supported+0x68/0x130
| [...]
This is because sata_dwc_dma_xfer_complete() NULLs the
dma_pending's next neighbour "chan" (a *dma_chan struct) in
this '32' case right here (line ~735):
> hsdevp->dma_pending[tag] = SATA_DWC_DMA_PENDING_NONE;
Then the next time, a dma gets issued; dma_dwc_xfer_setup() passes
the NULL'd hsdevp->chan to the dmaengine_slave_config() which then
causes the crash.
With this patch, SATA_DWC_QCMD_MAX is now set to ATA_MAX_QUEUE + 1.
This avoids the OOB. But please note, there was a worthwhile discussion
on what ATA_TAG_INTERNAL and ATA_MAX_QUEUE is. And why there should not
be a "fake" 33 command-long queue size.
Ideally, the dw driver should account for the ATA_TAG_INTERNAL.
In Damien Le Moal's words: "... having looked at the driver, it
is a bigger change than just faking a 33rd "tag" that is in fact
not a command tag at all."
BugLink: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/issues/9505 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: Restrict usage of GPIO chip irq members before initialization
GPIO chip irq members are exposed before they could be completely
initialized and this leads to race conditions.
One such issue was observed for the gc->irq.domain variable which
was accessed through the I2C interface in gpiochip_to_irq() before
it could be initialized by gpiochip_add_irqchip(). This resulted in
Kernel NULL pointer dereference.
Following are the logs for reference :-
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: gpiod_to_irq+0x53/0x70
kernel: acpi_dev_gpio_irq_get_by+0x113/0x1f0
kernel: i2c_acpi_get_irq+0xc0/0xd0
kernel: i2c_device_probe+0x28a/0x2a0
kernel: really_probe+0xf2/0x460
kernel: RIP: 0010:gpiochip_to_irq+0x47/0xc0
To avoid such scenarios, restrict usage of GPIO chip irq members before
they are completely initialized. |
