| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fprobe: Fix unregister_fprobe() to wait for RCU grace period
Commit 4346ba1604093 ("fprobe: Rewrite fprobe on function-graph tracer")
changed fprobe to register struct fprobe to an rcu-hlist, but it forgot
to wait for RCU GP. Thus there can be use-after-free if the fprobe is
released right after unregistering. This can be happened on fprobe
event and sample module code.
To fix this issue, add synchronize_rcu() in unregister_fprobe().
Note that BPF is OK because fprobe is used as a part of
bpf_kprobe_multi_link. This unregisters its fprobe in
bpf_kprobe_multi_link_release() and it is deallocated via
bpf_kprobe_multi_link_dealloc(), which is invoked from
bpf_link_defer_dealloc_rcu_gp() RCU callback.
For BPF, this also introduced unregister_fprobe_async() which does
NOT wait for RCU grace priod. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: bridge: eb_tables: close module init race
sashiko reports for unrelated patch:
Does the core ebtables initialization in ebtables.c suffer from a similar race?
Once nf_register_sockopt() completes, the sockopts are exposed globally.
sockopt has to be registered last, just like in ip/ip6/arptables. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: misc: usbio: fix disconnect UAF in client teardown
usbio_disconnect() walks usbio->cli_list in reverse and uninitializes each
auxiliary device. auxiliary_device_uninit() drops the device reference, and
for an unbound child that can run usbio_auxdev_release() and free the
containing struct usbio_client.
list_for_each_entry_reverse() advances after the loop body by reading
client->link.prev. If the current client is freed by
auxiliary_device_uninit(), the iterator dereferences freed memory.
Use list_for_each_entry_safe_reverse() so the previous client is
cached before the body can drop the final reference. This preserves
reverse teardown order while keeping the next iterator cursor independent
of the current client's lifetime.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in usbio_disconnect+0x12e/0x150
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
print_report+0xce/0x630
? usbio_disconnect+0x12e/0x150
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x320
? usbio_disconnect+0x12e/0x150
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
? usbio_disconnect+0x12e/0x150
usbio_disconnect+0x12e/0x150
usb_unbind_interface+0xf3/0x400
really_probe+0x316/0x660
__driver_probe_device+0x106/0x240
driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x110
__device_attach_driver+0xf1/0x1a0
? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10
bus_for_each_drv+0xf9/0x160
? __pfx_bus_for_each_drv+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x130
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x60
__device_attach+0x133/0x2a0
? __pfx___device_attach+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0x100
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
device_initial_probe+0x55/0x70
bus_probe_device+0x4a/0xd0
device_add+0x9b9/0xc10
? __pfx_device_add+0x10/0x10
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x60
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? usb_enable_lpm+0x3c/0x260
usb_set_configuration+0xb64/0xf20
usb_generic_driver_probe+0x5f/0x90
usb_probe_device+0x71/0x1b0
really_probe+0x46b/0x660
__driver_probe_device+0x106/0x240
driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x110
__device_attach_driver+0xf1/0x1a0
? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10
bus_for_each_drv+0xf9/0x160
? __pfx_bus_for_each_drv+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x130
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x60
__device_attach+0x133/0x2a0
? __pfx___device_attach+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0x100
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
device_initial_probe+0x55/0x70
bus_probe_device+0x4a/0xd0
device_add+0x9b9/0xc10
? __pfx_device_add+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? add_device_randomness+0xb7/0xf0
usb_new_device+0x492/0x870
hub_event+0x1b10/0x29c0
? __pfx_hub_event+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? lock_acquire+0x187/0x300
? process_one_work+0x475/0xb90
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? lock_release+0xc8/0x290
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
process_one_work+0x4d7/0xb90
? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x37/0xf0
? __pfx_hub_event+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
worker_thread+0x2d8/0x570
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x1ad/0x1f0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x3c9/0x540
? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __switch_to+0x2e9/0x730
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ebtables: move to two-stage removal scheme
Like previous patches for x_tables, follow same pattern in ebtables.
We can't reuse xt helpers: ebt_table struct layout is incompatible.
table->ops assignment is now done while still holding the ebt mutex
to make sure we never expose partially-filled table struct. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: x_tables: add and use xtables_unregister_table_exit
Previous change added xtables_unregister_table_pre_exit to detach the
table from the packetpath and to unlink it from the active table list.
In case of rmmod, userspace that is doing set/getsockopt for this table
will not be able to re-instantiate the table:
1. The larval table has been removed already
2. existing instantiated table is no longer on the xt pernet table list.
This adds the second stage helper:
unlink the table from the dying list, free the hook ops (if any) and do
the audit notification. It replaces xt_unregister_table(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
selinux: do not cancel a policy conversion that never started
sel_write_load() calls selinux_policy_cancel() when sel_make_policy_nodes()
fails, and that helper dereferences the outgoing policy to cancel its
sidtab conversion. On the first policy load there is no outgoing policy:
security_load_policy() returns early for that case, before it converts
anything, and state->policy is still NULL. A first load that fails while
building the selinuxfs tree therefore takes a NULL dereference in
selinux_policy_cancel(), reached from a write(2) to /sys/fs/selinux/load.
Skip the cancel when there is no old policy, mirroring the check
security_load_policy() already makes before it converts. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
selinux: reject a class permission count below its inherited common
security_get_permissions() maps an inherited common's permissions into
an array sized by the class's own permissions.nprim, but class_read()
takes that nprim verbatim from the policy image and never checks that it
covers the common. A class that inherits a common of N permissions while
declaring a smaller nprim is accepted, and on load the common's
permissions are written past the class-sized array -- an out-of-bounds
heap write.
Reject a class whose permission count is below its inherited common's.
Well-formed policies, where the class count already includes the
inherited permissions, are unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/huge_memory: initialise workingset state before folio split
xas_try_split() adds __GFP_ACCOUNT for page-cache xa_nodes, but
__folio_split() leaves the xa_state's xa_lru unset. That lets a live,
memcg-charged xa_node exist without being linked into the mapping's
shadow_nodes list_lru; when reclaim later walks the list_lru it trips
VM_WARN_ON(!css_is_dying()).
Use mapping_set_update() to install both the workingset update callback
and the shadow_nodes list_lru on the xa_state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: TC, Check if flow is PEER before acquiring devcom lock
In case __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow() fails in lower levels, the flow is
deleted via mlx5e_tc_del_flow(), and mlx5e_tc_del_flow() is acquiring
ESW devcom lock without condition. In addition, in case of peer_flow,
__mlx5e_add_fdb_flow() is called while holding ESW devcom comp lock.
This results in an AA deadlock.
To fix this, introduce a new PEER flag that is set on flows created as
peer flows (the duplicate flows on peer devices), and check it in
mlx5e_tc_del_flow() before acquiring ESW devcom lock.
Lockdep splat:
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
============================================
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&comp->lock_key#2);
lock(&comp->lock_key#2);
*** DEADLOCK ***
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x69/0xa0
print_deadlock_bug.cold+0xbd/0xca
__lock_acquire+0x1671/0x2ec0
lock_acquire+0x10e/0x2e0
down_read+0x95/0x430
mlx5_devcom_for_each_peer_begin+0x4e/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0x11d/0xa70 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_flow_put+0x99/0x100 [mlx5_core]
__mlx5e_add_fdb_flow+0x409/0xf00 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_configure_flower+0x2a86/0x4100 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_rep_setup_tc_cls_flower+0x12f/0x1b0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_rep_setup_tc_cb+0x153/0x750 [mlx5_core]
tc_setup_cb_add+0x1dc/0x470
fl_change+0x2f4d/0x626d [cls_flower]
tc_new_tfilter+0x79b/0x2310
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x778/0xad0
do_syscall_64+0x70/0x960
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/log: Fix infinite loop when scale is too large for display
When scale is large enough that scaled_font exceeds the display
dimensions, rows or columns become 0. A columns value of 0 causes
an infinite loop in drm_log_draw_kmsg_record() because the loop
never decrements len.
Check for zero rows/columns in drm_log_setup_modeset() and return
an error, cleaning up the already allocated buffer to avoid a leak. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: x_tables: allocate hook ops while under mutex
arp/ip(6)t_register_table() add the table to the per-netns list via
xt_register_table() before allocating the per-netns hook ops copy
via kmemdup_array(). This leaves a window where the table is
visible in the list with ops=NULL.
If the pernet exit happens runs concurrently the pre_exit callback finds
the table via xt_find_table() and passes the NULL ops pointer to
nf_unregister_net_hooks(), causing a NULL dereference:
general protection fault in nf_unregister_net_hooks+0xbc/0x150
RIP: nf_unregister_net_hooks (net/netfilter/core.c:613)
Call Trace:
ipt_unregister_table_pre_exit
iptable_mangle_net_pre_exit
ops_pre_exit_list
cleanup_net
Fix by moving the ops allocation into the xtables core so the table is
never in the list without valid ops. Also ensure the table is no longer
processing packets before its torn down on error unwind.
nf_register_net_hooks might have published at least one hook; call
synchronize_rcu() if there was an error.
audit log register message gets deferred until all operations have
passed, this avoids need to emit another ureg message in case of
error unwinding.
Based on earlier patch by Tristan Madani. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_ffa: Snapshot notifier callbacks under lock
Both notification handlers currently look up a notifier callback under
notify_lock, drop the lock, and then dereference the returned
notifier entry. A concurrent unregister can delete and free that
entry in the gap, leaving the handler to dereference stale memory.
Copy the callback pointer and callback data while notify_lock is
still held and invoke the callback only after the lock is dropped.
This keeps the existing callback execution model while removing the
use-after-free window in both the framework and non-framework
notification paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_ffa: Validate framework notification message layout
Framework notifications carry an indirect message in the shared RX
buffer. Validate the reported offset and size before using them, reject
zero-length payloads, and ensure that any non-header payload starts at
the UUID field rather than in the middle of the message header.
Use the validated offset and size values for both kmemdup() and the UUID
parsing path so malformed firmware data cannot drive an out-of-bounds
read or an oversized allocation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
selinux: reject a permission value exceeding the class permission count
perm_read() bounds a permission value by SEL_VEC_MAX but never by the
nprim of the owning class or common, which is taken verbatim from the
policy image. security_get_permissions() then writes perms[value - 1]
into an nprim-sized kcalloc() array, so a class declaring fewer
permissions than its largest permission value drives an out-of-bounds
heap write. The top-level symbol tables are validated this way; the
nested per-class permission table is not.
Reject a permission whose value exceeds nprim, which is already set when
perm_read() runs. Well-formed policies are unaffected.
[PM: tweak comment for line length] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: qcom: dispcc-eliza: Fix disp_cc_mdss_mdp_clk_src RCG stall on Eliza EVK
Eliza EVK (eliza-cqs-evk.dts) does not have display enabled, however its
Display Clock Controller is enabled and references parent clocks from
DSI PHYs, which causes clock reparenting issues during probe (init) and
warning on Eliza EVK:
disp_cc_mdss_mdp_clk_src: rcg didn't update its configuration.
WARNING: drivers/clk/qcom/clk-rcg2.c:136 at update_config+0xd4/0xe4, CPU#1: udevd/273
...
update_config (drivers/clk/qcom/clk-rcg2.c:136 (discriminator 2)) (P)
clk_rcg2_shared_disable (drivers/clk/qcom/clk-rcg2.c:1471)
clk_rcg2_shared_init (drivers/clk/qcom/clk-rcg2.c:1540)
__clk_register (drivers/clk/clk.c:3959 drivers/clk/clk.c:4368)
devm_clk_hw_register (drivers/clk/clk.c:4448 (discriminator 1) drivers/clk/clk.c:4672 (discriminator 1))
devm_clk_register_regmap (drivers/clk/qcom/clk-regmap.c:104)
qcom_cc_really_probe (drivers/clk/qcom/common.c:418)
qcom_cc_probe (drivers/clk/qcom/common.c:445)
disp_cc_eliza_probe (dispcc-eliza.c:?) dispcc_eliza
platform_probe (drivers/base/platform.c:1432) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables_offload: suppress WARN_ON_ONCE for ENOMEM in abort path
In nft_flow_rule_offload_abort(), WARN_ON_ONCE(err) is triggered on every
error during rollback, including -ENOMEM. Memory allocation failures are
expected under low-memory conditions and do not indicate a kernel bug.
Trace for example:
nft_flow_offload_chain() // FLOW_BLOCK_BIND
nft_flow_block_chain()
nft_chain_offload_cmd()
nft_block_offload_cmd()
->ndo_setup_tc()
nsim_setup_tc()
flow_block_cb_setup_simple()
flow_block_cb_alloc() // fails to -ENOMEM
The warning was reproduced on the 5.10 stable kernel under memory pressure
via fault injection, but the underlying bug exists in mainline as well,
as demonstrated by the ENOMEM trace above. The following splat was
triggered during nf_tables transaction processing:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8567 at net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:532 nft_flow_rule_offload_abort net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:532 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8567 at net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:532 nft_flow_rule_offload_commit+0x971/0xcd0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:591
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 8567 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.10.260-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:nft_flow_rule_offload_abort net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:532 [inline]
RIP: 0010:nft_flow_rule_offload_commit+0x971/0xcd0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:591
Call Trace:
nf_tables_commit+0x3bd/0x4bd0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:8604
nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xb1e/0x1f20 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:509
nfnetlink_rcv_skb_batch net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:579 [inline]
nfnetlink_rcv+0x3b3/0x420 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:597
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x6cd/0xa00 net/netfilter/af_netlink.c:1340
netlink_sendmsg+0x906/0xe10 net/netfilter/af_netlink.c:1919
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x155/0x190 net/socket.c:663
____sys_sendmsg+0x705/0x870 net/socket.c:2379
___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2433
__sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2462
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1
Change the condition to WARN_ON_ONCE(err && err != -ENOMEM) so that
warnings are only emitted for unexpected errors. This aligns with the
common kernel practice of not warning on -ENOMEM.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: xilinx: formatter_pcm: pass aud_drv_data to irq handlers
The irq handlers take a struct device pointer and call
dev_get_drvdata() to obtain the driver data. However, the driver
data is only set at the end of probe, after devm_request_irq(),
so an interrupt taken in between causes the handlers to pass a
NULL pointer to readl() and crash.
Pass the private data directly as the devm_request_irq() argument
instead of the device pointer, matching what the handlers expect. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
zram: fix use-after-free in zram_bvec_write_partial()
zram_read_page() picks the sync or async backing device read path based on
whether the parent bio is NULL. zram_bvec_write_partial() passes its
parent bio down, so for ZRAM_WB slots the read is dispatched
asynchronously and zram_read_page() returns 0 while the bio is still in
flight. The caller then runs memcpy_from_bvec(), zram_write_page() and
__free_page() on the buffer, leaving the async read to write into a freed
page.
zram_bvec_read_partial() was switched to NULL in commit 4e3c87b9421d
("zram: fix synchronous reads") for the same reason; the write_partial
counterpart was missed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: fix possible UAF in icmpv6_rcv()
Caching saddr and daddr before pskb_pull() is problematic
since skb->head can change.
Remove these temporary variables:
- We only access &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr and &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr
when net_dbg_ratelimited() is called in the slow path.
- Avoid potential future misuse after pskb_pull() call. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
futex: Drop CLONE_THREAD requirement for private default hash alloc
Currently need_futex_hash_allocate_default() depends on strict pthread
semantics, abusing CLONE_THREAD. This breaks the non-concurrency
assumptions when doing the mm->futex_ref pcpu allocations, leading to
bugs[0] when sharing the mm in other ways; ie:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in futex_hash_put
... where the +1 bias can end up on a percpu counter that mm->futex_ref
no longer points at.
Loosen the check to cover any CLONE_VM clone, except vfork(). Excluding
vfork keeps the existing paths untouched (no overhead), and we can't
race in the first place: either the parent is suspended and the child
runs alone, or mm->futex_ref is already allocated from an earlier
CLONE_VM. |
