| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| The Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the 'updateAddon' function in all versions up to, and including, 27.2. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to update any plugin with a main file of 'main.php' to its latest version. |
| In JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA before 2026.2.2 missing project-trust confirmation before building a Dev Container allowed host-level code execution |
| In JetBrains YouTrack before 2026.1.14047 predefined search fields leaked all group names to any user, regardless of visibility permission |
| In JetBrains YouTrack before 2025.3.160480,
2026.1.14047 pUT requests on link sub-resources allowed modification linked entities without update permission |
| In JetBrains YouTrack before 2026.2.18769 missing access control on Helpdesk authorized reporters exposed reporter email addresses |
| In JetBrains YouTrack before 2026.2.18687 missing permission checks allowed creating knowledge base articles in inaccessible projects |
| In JetBrains YouTrack before 2026.2.18634 cloning a whiteboard allowed unauthorized changes to links on inaccessible issues |
| In JetBrains YouTrack before 2026.2.18634 improper permission checks allowed read-only users to create and modify whiteboard cards |
| In JetBrains YouTrack before 2026.2.18634 improper permission checks allowed overwriting of bundled apps via the app import endpoint |
| In JetBrains YouTrack before 2026.2.18634 a crafted WebSocket message allowed read-only whiteboard users to modify canvas content |
| In JetBrains YouTrack before 2026.2.18788,
2026.1.14055,
2025.3.161254 missing authorisation allowed access to restricted REST API resources via IDOR |
| Due to a missing authorization check in Application Server ABAP of SAP NetWeaver and ABAP Platform, an authenticated attacker could gain unauthorized access to sensitive system configuration information. Successful exploitation could result in exposure of security relevant settings and internal system details, resulting in low impact on confidentiality while integrity and availability remain unaffected. |
| PostgreSQL Anonymizer contains a SQL injection vulnerability in two import functions. A user can create a malicious JSON document containing specially crafted object names. If a superuser subsequently calls anon.import_database_rules() or anon.import_roles_rules(), the malicious code is executed with superuser privileges. The issue is fixed in PostgreSQL Anonymizer 3.1.4 and later |
| PostgreSQL Anonymizer contains a vulnerability that allows unprivileged masked users to execute arbitrary code by abusing operators, domain casts, or view subqueries that carry untrusted expressions. When these objects are evaluated in the context of the extension’s masking mechanisms, the malicious code can run with elevated privileges. The issue is fixed in PostgreSQL Anonymizer 3.1.4 and later versions |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ebtables: zero chainstack array
sashiko reports:
looking at ebtables table
translation, could a sparse cpu_possible_mask lead to an uninitialized pointer
free?
If cpu_possible_mask is sparse (for example, CPU 0 and CPU 2 are possible,
but CPU 1 is not), the allocation loop skips CPU 1. If vmalloc_node() fails at
CPU 2, the cleanup loop will blindly decrement and call vfree() on
newinfo->chainstack[1].
Not a real-world bug, such allocation isn't expected to fail
in the first place. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: core: fix adapter registration race
Adapters can be looked up based on their id using i2c_get_adapter()
which takes a reference to the embedded struct device.
Make sure that the adapter (including its struct device) has been
initialised before adding it to the IDR to avoid accessing uninitialised
data which could, for example, lead to NULL-pointer dereferences or
use-after-free.
Note that the i2c-dev chardev, which is registered from a bus notifier,
currently uses i2c_get_adapter() so the adapter needs to be added to the
IDR before registration. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: mcast: Fix use-after-free when processing MLD queries
When processing an MLD query, a pointer to the multicast group address
is retrieved when initially parsing the packet. This pointer is later
dereferenced without being reloaded despite the fact that the skb header
might have been reallocated following the pskb_may_pull() calls, leading
to a use-after-free [1].
Fix by copying the multicast group address when the packet is initially
parsed.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mld_query_work (net/ipv6/mcast.c:1512)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881154b8e90 by task kworker/4:1/118
Workqueue: mld mld_query_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120)
print_address_description.constprop.0 (mm/kasan/report.c:378)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:482)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
__mld_query_work (net/ipv6/mcast.c:1512)
mld_query_work (net/ipv6/mcast.c:1563)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397 kernel/workqueue.c:3478)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
</TASK>
[...]
Freed by task 118:
kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:57)
kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:78)
kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:584)
__kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:253 mm/kasan/common.c:285)
kfree (./include/linux/kasan.h:235 mm/slub.c:2689 mm/slub.c:6251 mm/slub.c:6566)
pskb_expand_head (net/core/skbuff.c:2335)
__pskb_pull_tail (net/core/skbuff.c:2878 (discriminator 4))
__mld_query_work (net/ipv6/mcast.c:1495 (discriminator 1))
mld_query_work (net/ipv6/mcast.c:1563)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397 kernel/workqueue.c:3478)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: synproxy: add mutex to guard hook reference counting
As the synproxy infrastructure register netfilter hooks on-demand when a
user adds the first iptables target or nftables expression, if done
concurrently they can race each other.
Introduce a mutex to serialize the refcount control blocks access from
both frontends. While a per namespace mutex might be more efficient, it
is not needed for target/expression like SYNPROXY. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_exthdr: fix register tracking for F_PRESENT flag
nft_exthdr_init() passes user-controlled priv->len to
nft_parse_register_store(), which marks that many bytes in the
register bitmap as initialized. However, when NFT_EXTHDR_F_PRESENT
is set, the eval paths write only 1 byte (nft_reg_store8) or
4 bytes (*dest = 0 on TCP/DCCP error path). When len > 4,
registers beyond the first are never written, retaining
uninitialized stack data from nft_regs.
Bail out if userspace requests too much data when F_PRESENT is set. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_fib: fix stale stack leak via the OIFNAME register
For NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIFNAME the destination register is declared with
len = IFNAMSIZ (four 32-bit registers), but on the lookup-fail,
RTN_LOCAL and oif-mismatch paths nft_fib{4,6}_eval() only writes one
register via "*dest = 0". The remaining three registers are left as
whatever was on the stack in nft_do_chain()'s struct nft_regs, and a
downstream expression that loads the register span can leak that
uninitialised kernel stack to userspace.
The NFTA_FIB_F_PRESENT existence check has the same shape: it is only
meaningful for NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIF, yet it was accepted for any result type
while the eval stores a single byte via nft_reg_store8(), leaving the rest
of the declared span stale.
Fix both:
- replace the bare "*dest = 0" in the eval with nft_fib_store_result(),
which strscpy_pad()s the whole IFNAMSIZ for OIFNAME (and is already
used on the other early-return path), and
- restrict NFTA_FIB_F_PRESENT to NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIF and declare its
destination as a single u8, so the marked span matches the one byte
the eval writes. |
