| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: compress: Fix task creation error unwind
snd_compr_task_new() allocates the driver task before validating the
returned DMA buffers and reserving file descriptors. When either of
those later steps fails, the core frees its task wrapper and DMA-buffer
references without calling the driver's task_free() callback. Any
driver resources allocated by task_create() are therefore leaked.
The dual-fd allocation path also jumps to cleanup without storing the
negative get_unused_fd_flags() result in retval. Since retval still
contains the successful task_create() return value, TASK_CREATE can
incorrectly report success although the task was discarded.
Preserve the fd allocation errors and call task_free() when failure
occurs after a successful task_create() callback. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mld: stop TX during firmware restart
When iwlwifi firmware crashes (e.g., NMI_INTERRUPT_UNKNOWN on Intel
BE201/Wi-Fi 7), iwl_mld_nic_error() sets mld->fw_status.in_hw_restart
to true. However, iwl_mld_tx_from_txq() does not check this flag before
dequeuing frames from mac80211 and pushing them to the transport layer.
Since the firmware is dead, iwl_trans_tx() returns -EIO for each frame,
which then gets freed immediately. Under high-throughput conditions
(e.g., Tailscale UDP traffic or active SSH sessions), this creates a
tight dequeue-send-fail-free loop that wastes CPU cycles and generates
rapid skb allocation churn, leading to memory pressure from slab
fragmentation.
The RX path already has this guard (iwl_mld_rx_mpdu checks
in_hw_restart at rx.c:1906), and so does the TXQ allocation worker
(iwl_mld_add_txqs_wk at tx.c:156). Add the same guard to
iwl_mld_tx_from_txq() to stop all TX during firmware restart.
Frames left in mac80211's TXQs are naturally drained after restart
completes, when queue reallocation triggers iwl_mld_tx_from_txq()
via iwl_mld_add_txq_list(), or when new upper-layer traffic invokes
wake_tx_queue.
Tested on ASUS Zenbook 14 UX3405CA with Intel BE201 (Wi-Fi 7) on
kernel 6.19.5 where the firmware crashes approximately every 10-15
minutes under Tailscale traffic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: core: Run queues for all non-SDEV_DEL devices from scsi_run_host_queues
While a SCSI host is in a recovery state, scsi_mq_requeue_cmd() will not
set the requeue list for a requeued command to be kicked in the future.
The expectation is a call to scsi_run_host_queues() will kick all SCSI
devices once the recovery state is cleared.
However, scsi_run_host_queues() uses shost_for_each_device() which uses
scsi_device_get() and so will ignore devices in a partially removed
state like SDEV_CANCEL. But these devices may also have requeued
requests, leaving their requests stuck from not being kicked and causing
the removal process of the device to hang.
scsi_run_host_queues() needs to run against more devices than the macro
shost_for_each_device() allows. Instead of using the too limiting
scsi_device_get() state checks, only ignore devices in SDEV_DEL state or
when unable to acquire a reference. Attempt to run the queues for all
other devices when scsi_run_host_queues() is called. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/virtio: bind uarg before filling zerocopy skb
virtio_transport_send_pkt_info() allocates or reuses the zerocopy uarg
before entering the send loop, but virtio_transport_alloc_skb() still
fills the skb before it inherits that uarg. When fixed-buffer vectored
zerocopy hits MAX_SKB_FRAGS, io_sg_from_iter() may partially attach
managed frags and return -EMSGSIZE. The rollback path call kfree_skb()
to free an skb that carries SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS but no uarg, so
skb_release_data() falls through to ordinary frag unref.
Pass the uarg into virtio_transport_alloc_skb() and bind it immediately
before virtio_transport_fill_skb(). This keeps control or no-payload skbs
untouched while ensuring success and rollback share one lifetime rule. |
| markdown-it is a Markdown parser. Prior to 14.3.2 and 15.0.2, when typographer: true is enabled, specially crafted Markdown can cause quadratic processing time in the smartquotes rule, potentially leading to denial of service in applications processing untrusted input. Many opening double quotes followed by unmatched closing single quotes cause repeated scans of the entire opener stack. The same issue occurs with the quote types reversed. The default configuration (typographer: false) is not affected, but this option is enabled with high probability. This issue is fixed in versions 14.3.2 and 15.0.2. |
| Cpanel::JSON::XS versions before 4.80 for Perl leak the decoded arguments of a tagged value when its THAW method dies in decode_tag.
With allow_tags, a tagged value's class name and argument array are decoded and passed to the class's THAW method. Both are released only after THAW returns, so a THAW that dies leaves the whole decoded argument structure allocated.
Each rejected document leaks data of a size the sender chooses, so a process that catches the error and keeps running exhausts its memory. |
| Cpanel::JSON::XS versions from 4.51 before 4.80 for Perl allow quadratic CPU use by revalidating the remaining buffer per value in incr_parse.
At the first non-ASCII byte in a string, the decoder validates UTF-8 from there to the end of its input. incr_parse decodes each buffered value with a fresh decoder, so every value revalidates the rest of the buffer, and doubling the input quadruples the work.
A peer that sends about a megabyte of ordinary non-ASCII JSON in one read ties up the process for seconds of CPU time. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, The cowboy WebSocket options at line 117 set compress => true, enabling RFC 7692 permessage-deflate negotiation. The handler does not set max_frame_size, so cowboy's default of infinity applies. cowlib's cow_ws:parse_payload/9 calls zlib:inflate/2 on the compressed payload with no output-size limit. An attacker can negotiate permessage-deflate during the WebSocket upgrade and send a frame containing a zlib bomb (e.g. 50 KB → 5 GB). Decompression occurs in the connection process before websocket_handle/2 ever sees the MQTT bytes. An unauthenticated attacker can crash a RabbitMQ node running the Web-MQTT plugin by sending a single highly-compressed WebSocket frame (a few KB on the wire) that inflates to gigabytes in memory. The cowboy WebSocket handler decompresses the entire frame before the MQTT CONNECT packet is processed, so no credentials are required. Preconditions include rabbitmq_web_mqtt plugin enabled (not default, but common for browser clients) Network reachability to port 15675/15676 No authentication required. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, add_vhost/2 calls rabbit_data_coercion:atomize_keys/1 (the unsafe variant using binary_to_atom) on the vhost metadata map. The 20 MB management body limit fits ~1M+ short keys. Admin-only. An administrator importing a crafted definitions file can crash the node in a single request: a vhosts entry with ~1M unique metadata keys exhausts the atom table during import. Preconditions include administrator tag. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, 4.3.0, When a binding is created on an x-jms-topic exchange, add_binding/3 reads the rjms_erlang_selector argument and passes it through erl_scan:string/1 then erl_parse:parse_term/1. erl_scan:string/1 interns every atom literal it tokenizes. validate_binding/2 is a no-op (-> ok.), there is no length cap, and the surrounding try/catch cannot reclaim atoms. The Java JMS client compiles selectors client-side, but the server does not enforce this , a raw AMQP client can send arbitrary selector strings. An authenticated low-privilege AMQP user confined to one vhost can crash the entire broker node (cross-tenant DoS) in <100 bind calls. Preconditions include rabbitmq_jms_topic_exchange plugin enabled (bundled; required for any JMS deployment) Authenticated AMQP user with read on an x-jms-topic exchange + write on a queue (or configure to declare both). This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, 4.3.0. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.1, get_chunk_selector/1 calls binary_to_atom on the raw client-supplied <<"chunk_selector">> property from post-auth subscribe and resolve_offset_spec frames, with no whitelist and no existing guard. An authenticated stream client with read access to any stream can crash the broker node. Preconditions include rabbitmq_stream plugin enabled Authenticated stream-protocol user with read access to at least one stream. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: Replace guest-triggerable BUG_ON() in ioeventfd datamatch with get_unaligned()
Drop a BUG_ON() that has been reachable since it was first added, way back
in 2009, and instead use get_unaligned() to perform potentially-unaligned
accesses.
For a given store, KVM x86's emulator tracks the entire value in the
destination operand, x86_emulate_ctxt.dst. If the destination is memory,
and the target splits multiple pages and/or is emulated MMIO, then KVM
handles each fragment independently. E.g. on a page split starting at page
offset 0xffc, KVM writes 4 bytes to the first page, then the remaining
bytes to the second page, using ctxt->dst as the source for both (with
appropriate offsets).
If the destination splits a page *and* hits emulated MMIO on the second
page, then KVM will complete the write to the first page, then emulate the
MMIO access to the second page. If there is a datamatch-enabled ioeventfd
at offset 0 of the second page, then KVM will process the remainder of the
store as a potential ioeventfd signal.
Putting it all together, if the guest emits a store that splits a page
starting at page offset N, and the second page has a datamatch-enabled
ioeventfd at offset 0, then KVM will check for datamatch using
&dst.valptr[N] as the source. Due to dst (and thus dst.valptr) being
32-byte aligned, if N is not aligned to @len, the BUG_ON() fires.
E.g. with a 16-byte store at page offset 0xffc, to an ioeventfd of len 8,
all initial checks in ioeventfd_in_range() will succeed, and the BUG_ON()
fires due to @val being 4-byte aligned, but not 8-byte aligned.
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/eventfd.c:783!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 615 Comm: repro Not tainted 7.1.0-rc2-ff238429d1ea #365 PREEMPT
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:ioeventfd_write+0x6c/0x70 [kvm]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__kvm_io_bus_write+0x85/0xb0 [kvm]
kvm_io_bus_write+0x53/0x80 [kvm]
vcpu_mmio_write+0x66/0xf0 [kvm]
emulator_read_write_onepage+0x12a/0x540 [kvm]
emulator_read_write+0x109/0x2b0 [kvm]
x86_emulate_insn+0x4f8/0xfb0 [kvm]
x86_emulate_instruction+0x181/0x790 [kvm]
kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x313/0x630 [kvm]
vmx_handle_exit+0x18a/0x590 [kvm_intel]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xc81/0x1c90 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2d5/0x970 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0xb7/0x890
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7f19c931a9bf
</TASK>
Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
In a perfect world, the fix would be to simply delete the BUG_ON(), as KVM
x86 doesn't perform alignment checks on "normal" memory accesses at CPL0.
Sadly, C99 ruins all the fun; while the x86 architecture plays nice,
dereferencing an unaligned pointer directly is undefined behavior in C,
e.g. triggers splats when running with CONFIG_UBSAN_ALIGNMENT=y. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: allow subflow rcv wnd to shrink
In MPTCP connection, the `window` field in the TCP header refers to the
MPTCP-level rcv_nxt and it's right edge should not move backward. Such
constraint is enforced at DSS option generation time.
At the same time, the TCP stack ensures independently that the TCP-level
rcv wnd right's edge does not move backward. That in turn causes artificial
inflating of the MPTCP rcv window when the incoming data is acked at the
TCP level and is OoO in the MPTCP sequence space (or lands in the backlog).
As a consequence, the incoming traffic can exceed the receiver rcvbuf size
even when the sender is not misbehaving.
Prevent such scenario forcibly allowing the TCP subflow to shrink the
TCP-level rcv wnd regardless of the current netns setting. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/virtio: fix potential unbounded skb queue
virtio_transport_inc_rx_pkt() checks vvs->rx_bytes + len > vvs->buf_alloc.
virtio_transport_recv_enqueue() skips coalescing for packets
with VIRTIO_VSOCK_SEQ_EOM.
If fed with packets with len == 0 and VIRTIO_VSOCK_SEQ_EOM,
a very large number of packets can be queued
because vvs->rx_bytes stays at 0.
Fix this by estimating the skb metadata size:
(Number of skbs in the queue) * SKB_TRUESIZE(0) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: tls: fix strparser anchor skb leak on offload RX setup failure
When tls_set_device_offload_rx() fails at tls_dev_add(), the error path
calls tls_sw_free_resources_rx() to clean up the SW context that was
initialized by tls_set_sw_offload(). This function calls
tls_sw_release_resources_rx() (which stops the strparser via
tls_strp_stop()) and tls_sw_free_ctx_rx() (which kfrees the context),
but never frees the anchor skb that was allocated by alloc_skb(0) in
tls_strp_init().
Note that tls_sw_free_resources_rx() is exclusively used for this
"failed to start offload" code path, there's no other caller.
The leak did not exist before commit 84c61fe1a75b ("tls: rx: do not use
the standard strparser"), because the standard strparser doesn't try
to pre-allocate an skb.
The normal close path in tls_sk_proto_close() handles cleanup by calling
tls_sw_strparser_done() (which calls tls_strp_done()) after dropping
the socket lock, because tls_strp_done() does cancel_work_sync() and
the strparser work handler takes the socket lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: put folios not suitable for writeback
The batch holds references to the folios (see `filemap_get_folios`,
`folio_batch_release`), so we need to `folio_put` the folios we remove.
Tested on v6.18. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipc: limit next_id allocation to the valid ID range
The checkpoint/restore sysctl path can request the next SysV IPC id
through ids->next_id. ipc_idr_alloc() currently forwards that request to
idr_alloc() with an open-ended upper bound.
If the valid tail of the SysV IPC id space is full, the allocation can
spill beyond ipc_mni. The returned SysV IPC id still uses the normal
index encoding, so later lookup and removal can target the wrong slot.
This leaves the real IDR entry behind and breaks the IDR state for the
object.
The bug is in ipc_idr_alloc() in the checkpoint/restore path.
1. ids->next_id is passed to:
idr_alloc(&ids->ipcs_idr, new, ipcid_to_idx(next_id), 0, ...)
2. The zero upper bound makes the allocation effectively open-ended.
Once the valid SysV IPC tail is occupied, idr_alloc() can spill past
ipc_mni and allocate an entry beyond the valid IPC id range.
3. The new object id is still encoded with the narrower SysV IPC index
width:
new->id = (new->seq << ipcmni_seq_shift()) + idx
4. Later removal goes through ipc_rmid(), which uses:
ipcid_to_idx(ipcp->id)
That truncates the real IDR index. An object actually stored at a
high index can then be removed as if it lived at a low in-range
index.
5. For shared memory, shm_destroy() frees the current object anyway, but
the real high IDR slot is left behind as a dangling pointer.
6. A subsequent walk of /proc/sysvipc/shm reaches the stale IDR entry
and dereferences freed memory.
Prevent this by bounding the requested allocation to ipc_mni so the
checkpoint/restore path fails once the valid range is exhausted. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx4: Fix resource leak on error in mlx4_ib_create_srq()
Sashiko points out that mlx4_srq_alloc() was not undone during error
unwind, add the missing call to mlx4_srq_free(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: defio: Disconnect deferred I/O from the lifetime of struct fb_info
Hold state of deferred I/O in struct fb_deferred_io_state. Allocate an
instance as part of initializing deferred I/O and remove it only after
the final mapping has been closed. If the fb_info and the contained
deferred I/O meanwhile goes away, clear struct fb_deferred_io_state.info
to invalidate the mapping. Any access will then result in a SIGBUS
signal.
Fixes a long-standing problem, where a device hot-unplug happens while
user space still has an active mapping of the graphics memory. The hot-
unplug frees the instance of struct fb_info. Accessing the memory will
operate on undefined state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: call sk_data_ready() after listener migration
When inet_csk_listen_stop() migrates an established child socket from
a closing listener to another socket in the same SO_REUSEPORT group,
the target listener gets a new accept-queue entry via
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(), but that path never notifies the target
listener's waiters. A nonblocking accept() still works because it
checks the queue directly, but poll()/epoll_wait() waiters and
blocking accept() callers can also remain asleep indefinitely.
Call READ_ONCE(nsk->sk_data_ready)(nsk) after a successful migration
in inet_csk_listen_stop().
However, after inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add() succeeds, the ref acquired
in reuseport_migrate_sock() is effectively transferred to
nreq->rsk_listener. Another CPU can then dequeue nreq via accept()
or listener shutdown, hit reqsk_put(), and drop that listener ref.
Since listeners are SOCK_RCU_FREE, wrap the post-queue_add()
dereferences of nsk in rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock(), which also
covers the existing sock_net(nsk) access in that path.
The reqsk_timer_handler() path does not need the same changes for two
reasons: half-open requests become readable only after the final ACK,
where tcp_child_process() already wakes the listener; and once nreq is
visible via inet_ehash_insert(), the success path no longer touches
nsk directly. |
