| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix warning in ext4_handle_inode_extension
We got issue as follows:
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_reserve_inode_write:5741: Out of memory
EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_setattr:5462: inode #13: comm syz-executor.0: mark_inode_dirty error
EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_setattr:5519: Out of memory
EXT4-fs error (device loop0): ext4_ind_map_blocks:595: inode #13: comm syz-executor.0: Can't allocate blocks for non-extent mapped inodes with bigalloc
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 4361 at fs/ext4/file.c:301 ext4_file_write_iter+0x11c9/0x1220
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 4361 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.10.0+ #1
RIP: 0010:ext4_file_write_iter+0x11c9/0x1220
RSP: 0018:ffff924d80b27c00 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: ffffffff815a3379 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000003b000000
RDX: ffff924d81601000 RSI: 00000000000009cc RDI: 00000000000009cd
RBP: 000000000000000d R08: ffffffffbc5a2c6b R09: 0000902e0e52a96f
R10: ffff902e2b7c1b40 R11: ffff902e2b7c1b40 R12: 000000000000000a
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff902e0e52aa10 R15: ffffffffffffff8b
FS: 00007f81a7f65700(0000) GS:ffff902e3bc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffff600400 CR3: 000000012db88001 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
do_iter_readv_writev+0x2e5/0x360
do_iter_write+0x112/0x4c0
do_pwritev+0x1e5/0x390
__x64_sys_pwritev2+0x7e/0xa0
do_syscall_64+0x37/0x50
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Above issue may happen as follows:
Assume
inode.i_size=4096
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize=4096
step 1: set inode->i_isize = 8192
ext4_setattr
if (attr->ia_size != inode->i_size)
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize = attr->ia_size;
rc = ext4_mark_inode_dirty
ext4_reserve_inode_write
ext4_get_inode_loc
__ext4_get_inode_loc
sb_getblk --> return -ENOMEM
...
if (!error) ->will not update i_size
i_size_write(inode, attr->ia_size);
Now:
inode.i_size=4096
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize=8192
step 2: Direct write 4096 bytes
ext4_file_write_iter
ext4_dio_write_iter
iomap_dio_rw ->return error
if (extend)
ext4_handle_inode_extension
WARN_ON_ONCE(i_size_read(inode) < EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize);
->Then trigger warning.
To solve above issue, if mark inode dirty failed in ext4_setattr just
set 'EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize' with old value. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: Trap RDMA segment overflows
Prevent svc_rdma_build_writes() from walking off the end of a Write
chunk's segment array. Caught with KASAN.
The test that this fix replaces is invalid, and might have been left
over from an earlier prototype of the PCL work. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
On Apple T2 Macs, when Linux attempts to read the db and dbx efi variables
at early boot to load UEFI Secure Boot certificates, a page fault occurs
in Apple firmware code and EFI runtime services are disabled with the
following logs:
[Firmware Bug]: Page fault caused by firmware at PA: 0xffffb1edc0068000
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 104 at arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c:735 efi_crash_gracefully_on_page_fault+0x50/0xf0
(Removed some logs from here)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
page_fault_oops+0x4f/0x2c0
? search_bpf_extables+0x6b/0x80
? search_module_extables+0x50/0x80
? search_exception_tables+0x5b/0x60
kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x9e/0x110
__bad_area_nosemaphore+0x155/0x190
bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16/0x20
do_kern_addr_fault+0x8c/0xa0
exc_page_fault+0xd8/0x180
asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
(Removed some logs from here)
? __efi_call+0x28/0x30
? switch_mm+0x20/0x30
? efi_call_rts+0x19a/0x8e0
? process_one_work+0x222/0x3f0
? worker_thread+0x4a/0x3d0
? kthread+0x17a/0x1a0
? process_one_work+0x3f0/0x3f0
? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
? ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>
---[ end trace 1f82023595a5927f ]---
efi: Froze efi_rts_wq and disabled EFI Runtime Services
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015
integrity: MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list
efi: EFI Runtime Services are disabled!
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015
integrity: Couldn't get UEFI dbx list
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015
integrity: Couldn't get mokx list
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x80000000
So we avoid reading these UEFI variables and thus prevent the crash. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to do sanity check on total_data_blocks
As Yanming reported in bugzilla:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215916
The kernel message is shown below:
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2560!
Call Trace:
allocate_segment_by_default+0x228/0x440
f2fs_allocate_data_block+0x13d1/0x31f0
do_write_page+0x18d/0x710
f2fs_outplace_write_data+0x151/0x250
f2fs_do_write_data_page+0xef9/0x1980
move_data_page+0x6af/0xbc0
do_garbage_collect+0x312f/0x46f0
f2fs_gc+0x6b0/0x3bc0
f2fs_balance_fs+0x921/0x2260
f2fs_write_single_data_page+0x16be/0x2370
f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x428/0xd00
f2fs_write_data_pages+0x96e/0xd50
do_writepages+0x168/0x550
__writeback_single_inode+0x9f/0x870
writeback_sb_inodes+0x47d/0xb20
__writeback_inodes_wb+0xb2/0x200
wb_writeback+0x4bd/0x660
wb_workfn+0x5f3/0xab0
process_one_work+0x79f/0x13e0
worker_thread+0x89/0xf60
kthread+0x26a/0x300
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
RIP: 0010:new_curseg+0xe8d/0x15f0
The root cause is: ckpt.valid_block_count is inconsistent with SIT table,
stat info indicates filesystem has free blocks, but SIT table indicates
filesystem has no free segment.
So that during garbage colloection, it triggers panic when LFS allocator
fails to find free segment.
This patch tries to fix this issue by checking consistency in between
ckpt.valid_block_count and block accounted from SIT. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to do sanity check for inline inode
Yanming reported a kernel bug in Bugzilla kernel [1], which can be
reproduced. The bug message is:
The kernel message is shown below:
kernel BUG at fs/inode.c:611!
Call Trace:
evict+0x282/0x4e0
__dentry_kill+0x2b2/0x4d0
dput+0x2dd/0x720
do_renameat2+0x596/0x970
__x64_sys_rename+0x78/0x90
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215895
The bug is due to fuzzed inode has both inline_data and encrypted flags.
During f2fs_evict_inode(), as the inode was deleted by rename(), it
will cause inline data conversion due to conflicting flags. The page
cache will be polluted and the panic will be triggered in clear_inode().
Try fixing the bug by doing more sanity checks for inline data inode in
sanity_check_inode(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to do sanity check on block address in f2fs_do_zero_range()
As Yanming reported in bugzilla:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215894
I have encountered a bug in F2FS file system in kernel v5.17.
I have uploaded the system call sequence as case.c, and a fuzzed image can
be found in google net disk
The kernel should enable CONFIG_KASAN=y and CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE=y. You can
reproduce the bug by running the following commands:
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2291!
Call Trace:
f2fs_invalidate_blocks+0x193/0x2d0
f2fs_fallocate+0x2593/0x4a70
vfs_fallocate+0x2a5/0xac0
ksys_fallocate+0x35/0x70
__x64_sys_fallocate+0x8e/0xf0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The root cause is, after image was fuzzed, block mapping info in inode
will be inconsistent with SIT table, so in f2fs_fallocate(), it will cause
panic when updating SIT with invalid blkaddr.
Let's fix the issue by adding sanity check on block address before updating
SIT table with it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to clear dirty inode in f2fs_evict_inode()
As Yanming reported in bugzilla:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215904
The kernel message is shown below:
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:825!
Call Trace:
evict+0x282/0x4e0
__dentry_kill+0x2b2/0x4d0
shrink_dentry_list+0x17c/0x4f0
shrink_dcache_parent+0x143/0x1e0
do_one_tree+0x9/0x30
shrink_dcache_for_umount+0x51/0x120
generic_shutdown_super+0x5c/0x3a0
kill_block_super+0x90/0xd0
kill_f2fs_super+0x225/0x310
deactivate_locked_super+0x78/0xc0
cleanup_mnt+0x2b7/0x480
task_work_run+0xc8/0x150
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x14a/0x150
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40
do_syscall_64+0x48/0x90
The root cause is: inode node and dnode node share the same nid,
so during f2fs_evict_inode(), dnode node truncation will invalidate
its NAT entry, so when truncating inode node, it fails due to
invalid NAT entry, result in inode is still marked as dirty, fix
this issue by clearing dirty for inode and setting SBI_NEED_FSCK
flag in filesystem.
output from dump.f2fs:
[print_node_info: 354] Node ID [0xf:15] is inode
i_nid[0] [0x f : 15] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: tcp_rtx_synack() can be called from process context
Laurent reported the enclosed report [1]
This bug triggers with following coditions:
0) Kernel built with CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT=y
1) A new passive FastOpen TCP socket is created.
This FO socket waits for an ACK coming from client to be a complete
ESTABLISHED one.
2) A socket operation on this socket goes through lock_sock()
release_sock() dance.
3) While the socket is owned by the user in step 2),
a retransmit of the SYN is received and stored in socket backlog.
4) At release_sock() time, the socket backlog is processed while
in process context.
5) A SYNACK packet is cooked in response of the SYN retransmit.
6) -> tcp_rtx_synack() is called in process context.
Before blamed commit, tcp_rtx_synack() was always called from BH handler,
from a timer handler.
Fix this by using TCP_INC_STATS() & NET_INC_STATS()
which do not assume caller is in non preemptible context.
[1]
BUG: using __this_cpu_add() in preemptible [00000000] code: epollpep/2180
caller is tcp_rtx_synack.part.0+0x36/0xc0
CPU: 10 PID: 2180 Comm: epollpep Tainted: G OE 5.16.0-0.bpo.4-amd64 #1 Debian 5.16.12-1~bpo11+1
Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-5039MC-H8TRF/X11SCD-F, BIOS 1.7 11/23/2021
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x5e
check_preemption_disabled+0xde/0xe0
tcp_rtx_synack.part.0+0x36/0xc0
tcp_rtx_synack+0x8d/0xa0
? kmem_cache_alloc+0x2e0/0x3e0
? apparmor_file_alloc_security+0x3b/0x1f0
inet_rtx_syn_ack+0x16/0x30
tcp_check_req+0x367/0x610
tcp_rcv_state_process+0x91/0xf60
? get_nohz_timer_target+0x18/0x1a0
? lock_timer_base+0x61/0x80
? preempt_count_add+0x68/0xa0
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0xbd/0x270
__release_sock+0x6d/0xb0
release_sock+0x2b/0x90
sock_setsockopt+0x138/0x1140
? __sys_getsockname+0x7e/0xc0
? aa_sk_perm+0x3e/0x1a0
__sys_setsockopt+0x198/0x1e0
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0x21/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x38/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sfc: fix considering that all channels have TX queues
Normally, all channels have RX and TX queues, but this is not true if
modparam efx_separate_tx_channels=1 is used. In that cases, some
channels only have RX queues and others only TX queues (or more
preciselly, they have them allocated, but not initialized).
Fix efx_channel_has_tx_queues to return the correct value for this case
too.
Messages shown at probe time before the fix:
sfc 0000:03:00.0 ens6f0np0: MC command 0x82 inlen 544 failed rc=-22 (raw=0) arg=0
------------[ cut here ]------------
netdevice: ens6f0np0: failed to initialise TXQ -1
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 626 at drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c:2393 efx_ef10_tx_init+0x201/0x300 [sfc]
[...] stripped
RIP: 0010:efx_ef10_tx_init+0x201/0x300 [sfc]
[...] stripped
Call Trace:
efx_init_tx_queue+0xaa/0xf0 [sfc]
efx_start_channels+0x49/0x120 [sfc]
efx_start_all+0x1f8/0x430 [sfc]
efx_net_open+0x5a/0xe0 [sfc]
__dev_open+0xd0/0x190
__dev_change_flags+0x1b3/0x220
dev_change_flags+0x21/0x60
[...] stripped
Messages shown at remove time before the fix:
sfc 0000:03:00.0 ens6f0np0: failed to flush 10 queues
sfc 0000:03:00.0 ens6f0np0: failed to flush queues |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to avoid f2fs_bug_on() in dec_valid_node_count()
As Yanming reported in bugzilla:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215897
I have encountered a bug in F2FS file system in kernel v5.17.
The kernel should enable CONFIG_KASAN=y and CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE=y. You can
reproduce the bug by running the following commands:
The kernel message is shown below:
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2511!
Call Trace:
f2fs_remove_inode_page+0x2a2/0x830
f2fs_evict_inode+0x9b7/0x1510
evict+0x282/0x4e0
do_unlinkat+0x33a/0x540
__x64_sys_unlinkat+0x8e/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The root cause is: .total_valid_block_count or .total_valid_node_count
could fuzzed to zero, then once dec_valid_node_count() was called, it
will cause BUG_ON(), this patch fixes to print warning info and set
SBI_NEED_FSCK into CP instead of panic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
watchdog: rzg2l_wdt: Fix 'BUG: Invalid wait context'
This patch fixes the issue 'BUG: Invalid wait context' during restart()
callback by using clk_prepare_enable() instead of pm_runtime_get_sync()
for turning on the clocks during restart.
This issue is noticed when testing with renesas_defconfig.
[ 42.213802] reboot: Restarting system
[ 42.217860]
[ 42.219364] =============================
[ 42.223368] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
[ 42.227372] 5.17.0-rc5-arm64-renesas-00002-g10393723e35e #522 Not tainted
[ 42.234153] -----------------------------
[ 42.238155] systemd-shutdow/1 is trying to lock:
[ 42.242766] ffff00000a650828 (&genpd->mlock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: genpd_lock_mtx+0x14/0x20
[ 42.250709] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 42.255753] context-{4:4}
[ 42.258368] 2 locks held by systemd-shutdow/1:
[ 42.262806] #0: ffff80000944e1c8 (system_transition_mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __do_sys_reboot+0xd0/0x250
[ 42.272388] #1: ffff8000094c4e40 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x0/0x150
[ 42.281795] stack backtrace:
[ 42.284672] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Not tainted 5.17.0-rc5-arm64-renesas-00002-g10393723e35e #522
[ 42.294577] Hardware name: Renesas SMARC EVK based on r9a07g044c2 (DT)
[ 42.301096] Call trace:
[ 42.303538] dump_backtrace+0xcc/0xd8
[ 42.307203] show_stack+0x14/0x30
[ 42.310517] dump_stack_lvl+0x88/0xb0
[ 42.314180] dump_stack+0x14/0x2c
[ 42.317492] __lock_acquire+0x1b24/0x1b50
[ 42.321502] lock_acquire+0x120/0x3a8
[ 42.325162] __mutex_lock+0x84/0x8f8
[ 42.328737] mutex_lock_nested+0x30/0x58
[ 42.332658] genpd_lock_mtx+0x14/0x20
[ 42.336319] genpd_runtime_resume+0xc4/0x228
[ 42.340587] __rpm_callback+0x44/0x170
[ 42.344337] rpm_callback+0x64/0x70
[ 42.347824] rpm_resume+0x4e0/0x6b8
[ 42.351310] __pm_runtime_resume+0x50/0x78
[ 42.355404] rzg2l_wdt_restart+0x28/0x68
[ 42.359329] watchdog_restart_notifier+0x1c/0x30
[ 42.363943] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x94/0x150
[ 42.368732] do_kernel_restart+0x24/0x30
[ 42.372652] machine_restart+0x44/0x70
[ 42.376399] kernel_restart+0x3c/0x60
[ 42.380058] __do_sys_reboot+0x228/0x250
[ 42.383977] __arm64_sys_reboot+0x20/0x28
[ 42.387983] invoke_syscall+0x40/0xf8 |
| All WorkExaminer Professional traffic between monitoring client, console and server is transmitted as plain text. This allows an attacker with access to the network to read the transmitted sensitive data. An attacker can also freely modify the data on the wire. The monitoring clients transmit their data to the server using the unencrypted FTP. Clients connect to the FTP server on port 12304 and transmit the data unencrypted. In addition, all traffic between the console client and the server at port 12306 is unencrypted. |
| An unauthenticated attacker with access to TCP port 12306 of the WorkExaminer server can exploit missing server-side authentication checks to bypass the login prompt in the WorkExaminer Professional console to gain administrative access to the WorkExaminer server and therefore all sensitive monitoring data. This includes monitored screenshots and keystrokes of all users.
The WorkExaminer Professional console is used for administrative access to the server. Before access to the console is granted administrators must login. Internally, a custom protocol is used to call a respective stored procedure on the MSSQL database. The return value of the call is not validated on the server-side. Instead it is only validated client-side which allows to bypass authentication. |
| The WorkExaminer Professional server installation comes with an FTP server that is used to receive the client logs on TCP port 12304. An attacker with network access to this port can use weak hardcoded credentials to login to the FTP server and modify or read data, log files and gain remote code execution as NT Authority\SYSTEM on the server by exchanging accessible service binaries in the WorkExaminer installation directory (e.g. "C:\Program File (x86)\Work Examiner Professional Server"). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-iolatency: Fix inflight count imbalances and IO hangs on offline
iolatency needs to track the number of inflight IOs per cgroup. As this
tracking can be expensive, it is disabled when no cgroup has iolatency
configured for the device. To ensure that the inflight counters stay
balanced, iolatency_set_limit() freezes the request_queue while manipulating
the enabled counter, which ensures that no IO is in flight and thus all
counters are zero.
Unfortunately, iolatency_set_limit() isn't the only place where the enabled
counter is manipulated. iolatency_pd_offline() can also dec the counter and
trigger disabling. As this disabling happens without freezing the q, this
can easily happen while some IOs are in flight and thus leak the counts.
This can be easily demonstrated by turning on iolatency on an one empty
cgroup while IOs are in flight in other cgroups and then removing the
cgroup. Note that iolatency shouldn't have been enabled elsewhere in the
system to ensure that removing the cgroup disables iolatency for the whole
device.
The following keeps flipping on and off iolatency on sda:
echo +io > /sys/fs/cgroup/cgroup.subtree_control
while true; do
mkdir -p /sys/fs/cgroup/test
echo '8:0 target=100000' > /sys/fs/cgroup/test/io.latency
sleep 1
rmdir /sys/fs/cgroup/test
sleep 1
done
and there's concurrent fio generating direct rand reads:
fio --name test --filename=/dev/sda --direct=1 --rw=randread \
--runtime=600 --time_based --iodepth=256 --numjobs=4 --bs=4k
while monitoring with the following drgn script:
while True:
for css in css_for_each_descendant_pre(prog['blkcg_root'].css.address_of_()):
for pos in hlist_for_each(container_of(css, 'struct blkcg', 'css').blkg_list):
blkg = container_of(pos, 'struct blkcg_gq', 'blkcg_node')
pd = blkg.pd[prog['blkcg_policy_iolatency'].plid]
if pd.value_() == 0:
continue
iolat = container_of(pd, 'struct iolatency_grp', 'pd')
inflight = iolat.rq_wait.inflight.counter.value_()
if inflight:
print(f'inflight={inflight} {disk_name(blkg.q.disk).decode("utf-8")} '
f'{cgroup_path(css.cgroup).decode("utf-8")}')
time.sleep(1)
The monitoring output looks like the following:
inflight=1 sda /user.slice
inflight=1 sda /user.slice
...
inflight=14 sda /user.slice
inflight=13 sda /user.slice
inflight=17 sda /user.slice
inflight=15 sda /user.slice
inflight=18 sda /user.slice
inflight=17 sda /user.slice
inflight=20 sda /user.slice
inflight=19 sda /user.slice <- fio stopped, inflight stuck at 19
inflight=19 sda /user.slice
inflight=19 sda /user.slice
If a cgroup with stuck inflight ends up getting throttled, the throttled IOs
will never get issued as there's no completion event to wake it up leading
to an indefinite hang.
This patch fixes the bug by unifying enable handling into a work item which
is automatically kicked off from iolatency_set_min_lat_nsec() which is
called from both iolatency_set_limit() and iolatency_pd_offline() paths.
Punting to a work item is necessary as iolatency_pd_offline() is called
under spinlocks while freezing a request_queue requires a sleepable context.
This also simplifies the code reducing LOC sans the comments and avoids the
unnecessary freezes which were happening whenever a cgroup's latency target
is newly set or cleared. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: dwc3: gadget: Replace list_for_each_entry_safe() if using giveback
The list_for_each_entry_safe() macro saves the current item (n) and
the item after (n+1), so that n can be safely removed without
corrupting the list. However, when traversing the list and removing
items using gadget giveback, the DWC3 lock is briefly released,
allowing other routines to execute. There is a situation where, while
items are being removed from the cancelled_list using
dwc3_gadget_ep_cleanup_cancelled_requests(), the pullup disable
routine is running in parallel (due to UDC unbind). As the cleanup
routine removes n, and the pullup disable removes n+1, once the
cleanup retakes the DWC3 lock, it references a request who was already
removed/handled. With list debug enabled, this leads to a panic.
Ensure all instances of the macro are replaced where gadget giveback
is used.
Example call stack:
Thread#1:
__dwc3_gadget_ep_set_halt() - CLEAR HALT
-> dwc3_gadget_ep_cleanup_cancelled_requests()
->list_for_each_entry_safe()
->dwc3_gadget_giveback(n)
->dwc3_gadget_del_and_unmap_request()- n deleted[cancelled_list]
->spin_unlock
->Thread#2 executes
...
->dwc3_gadget_giveback(n+1)
->Already removed!
Thread#2:
dwc3_gadget_pullup()
->waiting for dwc3 spin_lock
...
->Thread#1 released lock
->dwc3_stop_active_transfers()
->dwc3_remove_requests()
->fetches n+1 item from cancelled_list (n removed by Thread#1)
->dwc3_gadget_giveback()
->dwc3_gadget_del_and_unmap_request()- n+1 deleted[cancelled_list]
->spin_unlock |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tty: goldfish: Use tty_port_destroy() to destroy port
In goldfish_tty_probe(), the port initialized through tty_port_init()
should be destroyed in error paths.In goldfish_tty_remove(), qtty->port
also should be destroyed or else might leak resources.
Fix the above by calling tty_port_destroy(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ftrace: Clean up hash direct_functions on register failures
We see the following GPF when register_ftrace_direct fails:
[ ] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address \
0x200000000000010: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
[...]
[ ] RIP: 0010:ftrace_find_rec_direct+0x53/0x70
[ ] Code: 48 c1 e0 03 48 03 42 08 48 8b 10 31 c0 48 85 d2 74 [...]
[ ] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000138bc10 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ ] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff813e0df0 RCX: 000000000000003b
[ ] RDX: 0200000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000c RDI: ffffffff813e0df0
[ ] RBP: ffffffffa00a3000 R08: ffffffff81180ce0 R09: 0000000000000001
[ ] R10: ffffc9000138bc18 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffff813e0df0
[ ] R13: ffffffff813e0df0 R14: ffff888171b56400 R15: 0000000000000000
[ ] FS: 00007fa9420c7780(0000) GS:ffff888ff6a00000(0000) knlGS:000000000
[ ] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ ] CR2: 000000000770d000 CR3: 0000000107d50003 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
[ ] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ ] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ ] Call Trace:
[ ] <TASK>
[ ] register_ftrace_direct+0x54/0x290
[ ] ? render_sigset_t+0xa0/0xa0
[ ] bpf_trampoline_update+0x3f5/0x4a0
[ ] ? 0xffffffffa00a3000
[ ] bpf_trampoline_link_prog+0xa9/0x140
[ ] bpf_tracing_prog_attach+0x1dc/0x450
[ ] bpf_raw_tracepoint_open+0x9a/0x1e0
[ ] ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x90
[ ] ? lock_release+0x150/0x430
[ ] __sys_bpf+0xbd6/0x2700
[ ] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd8/0x130
[ ] __x64_sys_bpf+0x1c/0x20
[ ] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80
[ ] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ ] RIP: 0033:0x7fa9421defa9
[ ] Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 9 f8 [...]
[ ] RSP: 002b:00007ffed743bd78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141
[ ] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000069d2480 RCX: 00007fa9421defa9
[ ] RDX: 0000000000000078 RSI: 00007ffed743bd80 RDI: 0000000000000011
[ ] RBP: 00007ffed743be00 R08: 0000000000bb7270 R09: 0000000000000000
[ ] R10: 00000000069da210 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
[ ] R13: 00007ffed743c4b0 R14: 00000000069d2480 R15: 0000000000000001
[ ] </TASK>
[ ] Modules linked in: klp_vm(OK)
[ ] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
One way to trigger this is:
1. load a livepatch that patches kernel function xxx;
2. run bpftrace -e 'kfunc:xxx {}', this will fail (expected for now);
3. repeat #2 => gpf.
This is because the entry is added to direct_functions, but not removed.
Fix this by remove the entry from direct_functions when
register_ftrace_direct fails.
Also remove the last trailing space from ftrace.c, so we don't have to
worry about it anymore. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: r8188eu: prevent ->Ssid overflow in rtw_wx_set_scan()
This code has a check to prevent read overflow but it needs another
check to prevent writing beyond the end of the ->Ssid[] array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: annotate races around sk->sk_bound_dev_if
UDP sendmsg() is lockless, and reads sk->sk_bound_dev_if while
this field can be changed by another thread.
Adds minimal annotations to avoid KCSAN splats for UDP.
Following patches will add more annotations to potential lockless readers.
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __ip6_datagram_connect / udpv6_sendmsg
write to 0xffff888136d47a94 of 4 bytes by task 7681 on cpu 0:
__ip6_datagram_connect+0x6e2/0x930 net/ipv6/datagram.c:221
ip6_datagram_connect+0x2a/0x40 net/ipv6/datagram.c:272
inet_dgram_connect+0x107/0x190 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:576
__sys_connect_file net/socket.c:1900 [inline]
__sys_connect+0x197/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1917
__do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1927 [inline]
__se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1924 [inline]
__x64_sys_connect+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1924
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
read to 0xffff888136d47a94 of 4 bytes by task 7670 on cpu 1:
udpv6_sendmsg+0xc60/0x16e0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1436
inet6_sendmsg+0x5f/0x80 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:652
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:725 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x39a/0x510 net/socket.c:2413
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2467 [inline]
__sys_sendmmsg+0x267/0x4c0 net/socket.c:2553
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2579 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2579
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0xffffff9b
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 7670 Comm: syz-executor.3 Tainted: G W 5.18.0-rc1-syzkaller-dirty #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
I chose to not add Fixes: tag because race has minor consequences
and stable teams busy enough. |
