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Search Results (410490 CVEs found)

CVE Vendors Products Updated CVSS v3.1
CVE-2021-24104 1 Microsoft 6 Sharepoint Enterprise Server, Sharepoint Foundation, Sharepoint Foundation 2013 and 3 more 2026-08-19 4.6 Medium
Microsoft SharePoint Server Spoofing Vulnerability
CVE-2021-1640 1 Microsoft 19 Windows 10, Windows 10 1507, Windows 10 1607 and 16 more 2026-08-19 7.8 High
Windows Print Spooler Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
CVE-2021-24089 1 Microsoft 2 Hevc Video Extensions, High Efficiency Video Coding 2026-08-19 7.8 High
HEVC Video Extensions Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
CVE-2026-68147 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-08-19 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fscrypt: Avoid dynamic allocation in fscrypt_get_devices() When a blk_crypto_key starts being used or is evicted, fs/crypto/ calls fscrypt_get_devices() to get the filesystem's list of block devices, then iterates over them and calls blk_crypto_config_supported(), blk_crypto_start_using_key(), or blk_crypto_evict_key() on each one. Currently, the block device pointers are placed in a dynamically allocated array. This dynamic allocation is problematic because: - It can fail, especially at the fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() call site when it's invoked for inode eviction under direct reclaim. - fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() doesn't handle the failure. It just zeroizes and frees the blk_crypto_key without calling blk_crypto_evict_key(). That causes a use-after-free. For now, let's fix this in the straightforward and easily-backportable way by switching to an on-stack array. Currently the fscrypt multi-device functionality is used only by f2fs, which has a hardcoded limit of 8 block devices. An on-stack array works fine for that. (Of course, this solution won't scale up to large number of block devices. For that we'd need a different solution, like moving the block device iteration into the filesystem. Or in the case of btrfs, which will only support blk-crypto-fallback, we should make it just call blk-crypto-fallback directly, so the block devices won't be needed.)
CVE-2021-27083 1 Microsoft 1 Remote Development 2026-08-19 7.8 High
Remote Development Extension for Visual Studio Code Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
CVE-2021-27082 1 Microsoft 1 Quantum Development Kit 2026-08-19 7.8 High
Quantum Development Kit for Visual Studio Code Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
CVE-2021-27081 1 Microsoft 2 Eslint, Visual Studio Code Eslint Extension 2026-08-19 7.8 High
Visual Studio Code ESLint Extension Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
CVE-2021-27080 1 Microsoft 1 Azure Sphere 2026-08-19 9.3 Critical
Azure Sphere Unsigned Code Execution Vulnerability
CVE-2021-27077 1 Microsoft 19 Windows 10, Windows 10 1507, Windows 10 1607 and 16 more 2026-08-19 7.8 High
Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
CVE-2021-27075 1 Microsoft 6 Azure Container Instance, Azure Container Instances, Azure Container Registry and 3 more 2026-08-19 6.8 Medium
Azure Virtual Machine Information Disclosure Vulnerability
CVE-2021-27074 1 Microsoft 1 Azure Sphere 2026-08-19 6.2 Medium
Azure Sphere Unsigned Code Execution Vulnerability
CVE-2021-27070 1 Microsoft 6 Windows 10, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 20h2 and 3 more 2026-08-19 7.3 High
Windows 10 Update Assistant Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
CVE-2021-27060 1 Microsoft 1 Visual Studio Code 2026-08-19 7.8 High
Visual Studio Code Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
CVE-2021-24108 1 Microsoft 6 365 Apps, Excel, Office and 3 more 2026-08-19 7.8 High
Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
CVE-2021-24095 1 Microsoft 9 Windows 10, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 1909 and 6 more 2026-08-19 7 High
DirectX Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
CVE-2021-1729 1 Microsoft 9 Windows 10, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 1909 and 6 more 2026-08-19 7.1 High
Windows Update Stack Setup Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
CVE-2026-21083 1 Samsung 1 Smart Switch 2026-08-19 6.5 Medium
Improper input validation in Smart Switch prior to version 3.7.72.6 allows adjacent attackers to access sensitive data.
CVE-2026-68137 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-08-19 9.8 Critical
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/x25: fix use-after-free in x25_kill_by_neigh() x25_kill_by_neigh() walks the global X.25 socket list looking for sockets attached to a terminating neighbour. x25_list_lock protects list membership while the lookup is in progress, but it does not pin a socket's lifetime after the lock is dropped. The function currently drops x25_list_lock before calling lock_sock(s). A concurrent close can run x25_release(), remove the same socket from x25_list, and drop the last socket reference in that window. The neighbour teardown path can then lock or inspect a freed struct sock/struct x25_sock. Take sock_hold(s) while x25_list_lock still proves that the list entry is live, then drop the temporary reference after the socket has been locked, rechecked, and released. Recheck x25_sk(s)->neighbour after lock_sock(), because another path may have disconnected the socket before this path acquired the socket lock. Restart the list walk after each disconnect because the list lock was dropped and the previous iterator state may no longer be valid. A QEMU/KASAN run against origin/master reproduced a slab-use-after-free in x25_kill_by_neigh().
CVE-2026-68135 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-08-19 5.9 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: hip04: fix RX buffer leak on build_skb failure When build_skb() fails in hip04_rx_poll(), the driver jumps to the refill path without releasing the current RX buffer and its DMA mapping. Installing a replacement buffer then overwrites the slot references and leaks both resources. Keep the current slot intact and return budget so NAPI retries the same buffer. Also free a newly allocated RX fragment when dma_map_single() fails. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.
CVE-2026-68124 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-08-19 9.6 Critical
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mctp: serial: handle zero-length frames to prevent rx buffer overflow The MCTP serial receive state machine reads a frame length byte in mctp_serial_push_header() case 2 and validates it upper-bound-only: if (c > MCTP_SERIAL_FRAME_MTU) { dev->rxstate = STATE_ERR; } else { dev->rxlen = c; dev->rxpos = 0; dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA; ... } A length of zero passes this check, so rxlen is set to 0 and the state machine advances to STATE_DATA. In mctp_serial_push() STATE_DATA, the incoming byte is stored and rxpos incremented before the terminator is dev->rxbuf[dev->rxpos] = c; dev->rxpos++; dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA; if (dev->rxpos == dev->rxlen) { dev->rxpos = 0; dev->rxstate = STATE_TRAILER; } With rxlen == 0 the "rxpos == rxlen" terminator can never fire (rxpos is already 1 on the first data byte), so subsequent bytes are written past the end of the fixed 74-byte rxbuf, which is the last member of the netdev private area. Every following data byte is an attacker-controlled 1-byte out-of-bounds heap write, and the overflow continues until a frame (0x7e) or escape byte resets the parser -- effectively unbounded. Reaching this requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach the N_MCTP line discipline and bring the resulting mctpserialN netdev up, after which the bytes arrive via the tty receive path. Route a zero-length frame straight to STATE_TRAILER instead of STATE_DATA. The trailer/framing bytes are still consumed, and the frame resolves to a zero-length skb that the MCTP core rejects; the parser never enters STATE_DATA with rxlen == 0, so the out-of-bounds write can no longer occur. KASAN, on a frame of 0x7e 0x01 0x00 followed by data bytes (before this change): UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/mctp/mctp-serial.c:370 index 74 is out of range for type 'u8 [74]' BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf Write of size 1 at addr ... by task kworker/u16:0 mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf tty_ldisc_receive_buf flush_to_ldisc Allocated by task 152: alloc_netdev_mqs mctp_serial_open v2: route zero-length frames to STATE_TRAILER instead of STATE_ERR so the trailer/framing bytes are still consumed (Jeremy Kerr). Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).