| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: add srng->lock for ath11k_hal_srng_* in monitor mode
ath11k_hal_srng_* should be used with srng->lock to protect srng data.
For ath11k_dp_rx_mon_dest_process() and ath11k_dp_full_mon_process_rx(),
they use ath11k_hal_srng_* for many times but never call srng->lock.
So when running (full) monitor mode, warning will occur:
RIP: 0010:ath11k_hal_srng_dst_peek+0x18/0x30 [ath11k]
Call Trace:
? ath11k_hal_srng_dst_peek+0x18/0x30 [ath11k]
ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_status+0xc45/0x1190 [ath11k]
? idr_alloc_u32+0x97/0xd0
ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_rings+0x32a/0x550 [ath11k]
ath11k_dp_service_srng+0x289/0x5a0 [ath11k]
ath11k_pcic_ext_grp_napi_poll+0x30/0xd0 [ath11k]
__napi_poll+0x30/0x1f0
net_rx_action+0x198/0x320
__do_softirq+0xdd/0x319
So add srng->lock for them to avoid such warnings.
Inorder to fetch the srng->lock, should change srng's definition from
'void' to 'struct hal_srng'. And initialize them elsewhere to prevent
one line of code from being too long. This is consistent with other ring
process functions, such as ath11k_dp_process_rx().
Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03125-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-3.6510.30
Tested-on: QCN9074 hw1.0 PCI WLAN.HK.2.7.0.1-01744-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jfs: add check read-only before txBeginAnon() call
Added a read-only check before calling `txBeginAnon` in `extAlloc`
and `extRecord`. This prevents modification attempts on a read-only
mounted filesystem, avoiding potential errors or crashes.
Call trace:
txBeginAnon+0xac/0x154
extAlloc+0xe8/0xdec fs/jfs/jfs_extent.c:78
jfs_get_block+0x340/0xb98 fs/jfs/inode.c:248
__block_write_begin_int+0x580/0x166c fs/buffer.c:2128
__block_write_begin fs/buffer.c:2177 [inline]
block_write_begin+0x98/0x11c fs/buffer.c:2236
jfs_write_begin+0x44/0x88 fs/jfs/inode.c:299 |
| Improper authorization in Smart Switch installed on non-Samsung Device prior to version 3.7.64.10 allows local attackers to read data with the privilege of Smart Switch. User interaction is required for triggering this vulnerability. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jfs: add check read-only before truncation in jfs_truncate_nolock()
Added a check for "read-only" mode in the `jfs_truncate_nolock`
function to avoid errors related to writing to a read-only
filesystem.
Call stack:
block_write_begin() {
jfs_write_failed() {
jfs_truncate() {
jfs_truncate_nolock() {
txEnd() {
...
log = JFS_SBI(tblk->sb)->log;
// (log == NULL)
If the `isReadOnly(ip)` condition is triggered in
`jfs_truncate_nolock`, the function execution will stop, and no
further data modification will occur. Instead, the `xtTruncate`
function will be called with the "COMMIT_WMAP" flag, preventing
modifications in "read-only" mode. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI/ASPM: Fix link state exit during switch upstream function removal
Before 456d8aa37d0f ("PCI/ASPM: Disable ASPM on MFD function removal to
avoid use-after-free"), we would free the ASPM link only after the last
function on the bus pertaining to the given link was removed.
That was too late. If function 0 is removed before sibling function,
link->downstream would point to free'd memory after.
After above change, we freed the ASPM parent link state upon any function
removal on the bus pertaining to a given link.
That is too early. If the link is to a PCIe switch with MFD on the upstream
port, then removing functions other than 0 first would free a link which
still remains parent_link to the remaining downstream ports.
The resulting GPFs are especially frequent during hot-unplug, because
pciehp removes devices on the link bus in reverse order.
On that switch, function 0 is the virtual P2P bridge to the internal bus.
Free exactly when function 0 is removed -- before the parent link is
obsolete, but after all subordinate links are gone.
[kwilczynski: commit log] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntb_hw_switchtec: Fix shift-out-of-bounds in switchtec_ntb_mw_set_trans
There is a kernel API ntb_mw_clear_trans() would pass 0 to both addr and
size. This would make xlate_pos negative.
[ 23.734156] switchtec switchtec0: MW 0: part 0 addr 0x0000000000000000 size 0x0000000000000000
[ 23.734158] ================================================================================
[ 23.734172] UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/ntb/hw/mscc/ntb_hw_switchtec.c:293:7
[ 23.734418] shift exponent -1 is negative
Ensuring xlate_pos is a positive or zero before BIT. |
| HCL Connections is vulnerable to a cross-site scripting attack where an attacker may leverage this issue to execute arbitrary script code in the browser of an unsuspecting user which leads to executing malicious script code. This may let the attacker steal cookie-based authentication credentials and comprise user's account then launch other attacks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: xhci: Don't skip on Stopped - Length Invalid
Up until commit d56b0b2ab142 ("usb: xhci: ensure skipped isoc TDs are
returned when isoc ring is stopped") in v6.11, the driver didn't skip
missed isochronous TDs when handling Stoppend and Stopped - Length
Invalid events. Instead, it erroneously cleared the skip flag, which
would cause the ring to get stuck, as future events won't match the
missed TD which is never removed from the queue until it's cancelled.
This buggy logic seems to have been in place substantially unchanged
since the 3.x series over 10 years ago, which probably speaks first
and foremost about relative rarity of this case in normal usage, but
by the spec I see no reason why it shouldn't be possible.
After d56b0b2ab142, TDs are immediately skipped when handling those
Stopped events. This poses a potential problem in case of Stopped -
Length Invalid, which occurs either on completed TDs (likely already
given back) or Link and No-Op TRBs. Such event won't be recognized
as matching any TD (unless it's the rare Link TRB inside a TD) and
will result in skipping all pending TDs, giving them back possibly
before they are done, risking isoc data loss and maybe UAF by HW.
As a compromise, don't skip and don't clear the skip flag on this
kind of event. Then the next event will skip missed TDs. A downside
of not handling Stopped - Length Invalid on a Link inside a TD is
that if the TD is cancelled, its actual length will not be updated
to account for TRBs (silently) completed before the TD was stopped.
I had no luck producing this sequence of completion events so there
is no compelling demonstration of any resulting disaster. It may be
a very rare, obscure condition. The sole motivation for this patch
is that if such unlikely event does occur, I'd rather risk reporting
a cancelled partially done isoc frame as empty than gamble with UAF.
This will be fixed more properly by looking at Stopped event's TRB
pointer when making skipping decisions, but such rework is unlikely
to be backported to v6.12, which will stay around for a few years. |
| Delinea Secret Server before 11.7.000001 allows attackers to bypass authentication via the SOAP API in SecretServer/webservices/SSWebService.asmx. This is related to a hardcoded key, the use of the integer 2 for the Admin user, and removal of the oauthExpirationId attribute. |
| HCL Connections is vulnerable to a broken access control vulnerability that may allow an unauthorized user to update data in certain scenarios. |
| SAP Business Warehouse - Business Planning and
Simulation application does not sufficiently encode user-controlled inputs,
resulting in Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability. This
vulnerability allows users to modify website content and on successful
exploitation, an attacker can cause low impact to the confidentiality and
integrity of the application. |
| Due to a Protection Mechanism Failure in SAP
NetWeaver Application Server for ABAP and ABAP Platform, a developer can bypass
the configured malware scanner API because of a programming error. This leads
to a low impact on the application's confidentiality, integrity, and
availability. |
| SAP BusinessObjects Business Intelligence Platform allows a high privilege user to run client desktop applications even if some of the DLLs are not digitally signed or if the signature is broken. The attacker needs to have local access to the vulnerable system to perform DLL related tasks. This could result in a high impact on confidentiality and integrity of the application. |
| Vulnerability in the Oracle VM VirtualBox product of Oracle Virtualization (component: Core). The supported version that is affected is 7.1.6. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with logon to the infrastructure where Oracle VM VirtualBox executes to compromise Oracle VM VirtualBox. While the vulnerability is in Oracle VM VirtualBox, attacks may significantly impact additional products (scope change). Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized creation, deletion or modification access to critical data or all Oracle VM VirtualBox accessible data as well as unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Oracle VM VirtualBox accessible data and unauthorized ability to cause a partial denial of service (partial DOS) of Oracle VM VirtualBox. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 8.1 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L). |
| A vulnerability in ESM 11.6.10 allows unauthenticated access to the internal Snowservice API. This leads to improper handling of path traversal, insecure forwarding to an AJP backend without adequate validation, and lack of authentication for accessing internal API endpoints. |
| A vulnerability in ESM 11.6.10 allows unauthenticated access to the internal Snowservice API and enables remote code execution through command injection, executed as the root user. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmem: core: fix cleanup after dev_set_name()
If dev_set_name() fails, we leak nvmem->wp_gpio as the cleanup does not
put this. While a minimal fix for this would be to add the gpiod_put()
call, we can do better if we split device_register(), and use the
tested nvmem_release() cleanup code by initialising the device early,
and putting the device.
This results in a slightly larger fix, but results in clear code.
Note: this patch depends on "nvmem: core: initialise nvmem->id early"
and "nvmem: core: remove nvmem_config wp_gpio".
[Srini: Fixed subject line and error code handing with wp_gpio while applying.] |
| Under certain conditions SAP BusinessObjects Business Intelligence platform allows an attacker to access information which would otherwise be restricted.This has low impact on Confidentiality with no impact on Integrity and Availability of the application. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Squashfs: fix handling and sanity checking of xattr_ids count
A Sysbot [1] corrupted filesystem exposes two flaws in the handling and
sanity checking of the xattr_ids count in the filesystem. Both of these
flaws cause computation overflow due to incorrect typing.
In the corrupted filesystem the xattr_ids value is 4294967071, which
stored in a signed variable becomes the negative number -225.
Flaw 1 (64-bit systems only):
The signed integer xattr_ids variable causes sign extension.
This causes variable overflow in the SQUASHFS_XATTR_*(A) macros. The
variable is first multiplied by sizeof(struct squashfs_xattr_id) where the
type of the sizeof operator is "unsigned long".
On a 64-bit system this is 64-bits in size, and causes the negative number
to be sign extended and widened to 64-bits and then become unsigned. This
produces the very large number 18446744073709548016 or 2^64 - 3600. This
number when rounded up by SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE - 1 (8191 bytes) and
divided by SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE overflows and produces a length of 0
(stored in len).
Flaw 2 (32-bit systems only):
On a 32-bit system the integer variable is not widened by the unsigned
long type of the sizeof operator (32-bits), and the signedness of the
variable has no effect due it always being treated as unsigned.
The above corrupted xattr_ids value of 4294967071, when multiplied
overflows and produces the number 4294963696 or 2^32 - 3400. This number
when rounded up by SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE - 1 (8191 bytes) and divided by
SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE overflows again and produces a length of 0.
The effect of the 0 length computation:
In conjunction with the corrupted xattr_ids field, the filesystem also has
a corrupted xattr_table_start value, where it matches the end of
filesystem value of 850.
This causes the following sanity check code to fail because the
incorrectly computed len of 0 matches the incorrect size of the table
reported by the superblock (0 bytes).
len = SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCK_BYTES(*xattr_ids);
indexes = SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCKS(*xattr_ids);
/*
* The computed size of the index table (len bytes) should exactly
* match the table start and end points
*/
start = table_start + sizeof(*id_table);
end = msblk->bytes_used;
if (len != (end - start))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
Changing the xattr_ids variable to be "usigned int" fixes the flaw on a
64-bit system. This relies on the fact the computation is widened by the
unsigned long type of the sizeof operator.
Casting the variable to u64 in the above macro fixes this flaw on a 32-bit
system.
It also means 64-bit systems do not implicitly rely on the type of the
sizeof operator to widen the computation.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/000000000000cd44f005f1a0f17f@google.com/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/MADV_COLLAPSE: catch !none !huge !bad pmd lookups
In commit 34488399fa08 ("mm/madvise: add file and shmem support to
MADV_COLLAPSE") we make the following change to find_pmd_or_thp_or_none():
- if (!pmd_present(pmde))
- return SCAN_PMD_NULL;
+ if (pmd_none(pmde))
+ return SCAN_PMD_NONE;
This was for-use by MADV_COLLAPSE file/shmem codepaths, where
MADV_COLLAPSE might identify a pte-mapped hugepage, only to have
khugepaged race-in, free the pte table, and clear the pmd. Such codepaths
include:
A) If we find a suitably-aligned compound page of order HPAGE_PMD_ORDER
already in the pagecache.
B) In retract_page_tables(), if we fail to grab mmap_lock for the target
mm/address.
In these cases, collapse_pte_mapped_thp() really does expect a none (not
just !present) pmd, and we want to suitably identify that case separate
from the case where no pmd is found, or it's a bad-pmd (of course, many
things could happen once we drop mmap_lock, and the pmd could plausibly
undergo multiple transitions due to intervening fault, split, etc).
Regardless, the code is prepared install a huge-pmd only when the existing
pmd entry is either a genuine pte-table-mapping-pmd, or the none-pmd.
However, the commit introduces a logical hole; namely, that we've allowed
!none- && !huge- && !bad-pmds to be classified as genuine
pte-table-mapping-pmds. One such example that could leak through are swap
entries. The pmd values aren't checked again before use in
pte_offset_map_lock(), which is expecting nothing less than a genuine
pte-table-mapping-pmd.
We want to put back the !pmd_present() check (below the pmd_none() check),
but need to be careful to deal with subtleties in pmd transitions and
treatments by various arch.
The issue is that __split_huge_pmd_locked() temporarily clears the present
bit (or otherwise marks the entry as invalid), but pmd_present() and
pmd_trans_huge() still need to return true while the pmd is in this
transitory state. For example, x86's pmd_present() also checks the
_PAGE_PSE , riscv's version also checks the _PAGE_LEAF bit, and arm64 also
checks a PMD_PRESENT_INVALID bit.
Covering all 4 cases for x86 (all checks done on the same pmd value):
1) pmd_present() && pmd_trans_huge()
All we actually know here is that the PSE bit is set. Either:
a) We aren't racing with __split_huge_page(), and PRESENT or PROTNONE
is set.
=> huge-pmd
b) We are currently racing with __split_huge_page(). The danger here
is that we proceed as-if we have a huge-pmd, but really we are
looking at a pte-mapping-pmd. So, what is the risk of this
danger?
The only relevant path is:
madvise_collapse() -> collapse_pte_mapped_thp()
Where we might just incorrectly report back "success", when really
the memory isn't pmd-backed. This is fine, since split could
happen immediately after (actually) successful madvise_collapse().
So, it should be safe to just assume huge-pmd here.
2) pmd_present() && !pmd_trans_huge()
Either:
a) PSE not set and either PRESENT or PROTNONE is.
=> pte-table-mapping pmd (or PROT_NONE)
b) devmap. This routine can be called immediately after
unlocking/locking mmap_lock -- or called with no locks held (see
khugepaged_scan_mm_slot()), so previous VMA checks have since been
invalidated.
3) !pmd_present() && pmd_trans_huge()
Not possible.
4) !pmd_present() && !pmd_trans_huge()
Neither PRESENT nor PROTNONE set
=> not present
I've checked all archs that implement pmd_trans_huge() (arm64, riscv,
powerpc, longarch, x86, mips, s390) and this logic roughly translates
(though devmap treatment is unique to x86 and powerpc, and (3) doesn't
necessarily hold in general -- but that doesn't matter since
!pmd_present() always takes failure path).
Also, add a comment above find_pmd_or_thp_or_none()
---truncated--- |
