| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix error path fall-through in mlx5_ib_dev_res_srq_init()
mlx5_ib_dev_res_srq_init() allocates two SRQs, s0 and s1. When
ib_create_srq() fails for s1, the error branch destroys s0 but falls
through and unconditionally assigns the freed s0 and the ERR_PTR s1 to
devr->s0 and devr->s1.
This leads to several problems: the lock-free fast path checks
"if (devr->s1) return 0;" and treats the ERR_PTR as already initialised;
users in mlx5_ib_create_qp() dereference the freed SRQ or ERR_PTR via
to_msrq(devr->s0)->msrq.srqn; and mlx5_ib_dev_res_cleanup() dereferences
the ERR_PTR and double-frees s0 on teardown.
Fix by adding the same `goto unlock` in the s1 failure path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipmi: Add limits to event and receive message requests
The driver would just fetch events and receive messages until the
BMC said it was done. To avoid issues with BMCs that never say they are
done, add a limit of 10 fetches at a time.
In addition, an si interface has an attn state it can return from the
hardware which is supposed to cause a flag fetch to see if the driver
needs to fetch events or message or a few other things. If the attn
bit gets stuck, it's a similar problem. So allow messages in between
flag fetches so the driver itself doesn't get stuck.
This is a more general fix than the previous fix for the specific bad
BMC, but should fix the more general issue of a BMC that won't stop
saying it has data.
This has been there from the beginning of the driver. It's not a bug
per-se, but it is accounting for bugs in BMCs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx4: Fix resource leak on error in mlx4_ib_create_srq()
Sashiko points out that mlx4_srq_alloc() was not undone during error
unwind, add the missing call to mlx4_srq_free(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sound: ua101: fix division by zero at probe
Add a missing sanity check for bNrChannels in detect_usb_format()
to prevent a division by zero in playback_urb_complete() and
capture_urb_complete().
USB core does not validate class-specific descriptor fields such
as bNrChannels, so drivers must verify them before use. If a
device provides bNrChannels = 0, frame_bytes becomes zero and is
later used as a divisor in the URB completion handlers, leading
to a kernel crash. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/client: fix out-of-bounds read in symlink_data()
Since smb2_check_message() returns success without length validation for
the symlink error response, in symlink_data() it is possible for
iov->iov_len to be smaller than sizeof(struct smb2_err_rsp). If the buffer
only contains the base SMB2 header (64 bytes), accessing
err->ErrorContextCount (at offset 66) or err->ByteCount later in
symlink_data() will cause an out-of-bounds read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: virtio_bt: validate rx pkt_type header length
virtbt_rx_handle() reads the leading pkt_type byte from the RX skb
and forwards the remainder to hci_recv_frame() for every
event/ACL/SCO/ISO type, without checking that the remaining payload
is at least the fixed HCI header for that type.
After the preceding patch bounds the backend-supplied used.len to
[1, VIRTBT_RX_BUF_SIZE], a one-byte completion still reaches
hci_recv_frame() with skb->len already pulled to 0. If the byte
happened to be HCI_ACLDATA_PKT, the ACL-vs-ISO classification
fast-path in hci_dev_classify_pkt_type() dereferences
hci_acl_hdr(skb)->handle whenever the HCI device has an active
CIS_LINK, BIS_LINK, or PA_LINK connection, reading two bytes of
uninitialized RX-buffer data. The same hazard exists for every
packet type the driver accepts because none of the switch cases in
virtbt_rx_handle() check skb->len against the per-type minimum HCI
header size before handing the frame to the core.
After stripping pkt_type, require skb->len to cover the fixed
header size for the selected type (event 2, ACL 4, SCO 3, ISO 4)
before calling hci_recv_frame(); drop ratelimited otherwise.
Unknown pkt_type values still take the original kfree_skb() default
path.
Use bt_dev_err_ratelimited() because both the length and pkt_type
values come from an untrusted backend that can otherwise flood the
kernel log. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeon_ep_vf: add NULL check for napi_build_skb()
napi_build_skb() can return NULL on allocation failure. In
__octep_vf_oq_process_rx(), the result is used directly without a NULL
check in both the single-buffer and multi-fragment paths, leading to a
NULL pointer dereference.
Add NULL checks after both napi_build_skb() calls, properly advancing
descriptors and consuming remaining fragments on failure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Reject unknown opcodes before ICRC processing
Even after applying commit 7244491dab34 ("RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC
before payload_size() in rxe_rcv"), a single unauthenticated UDP packet
can still trigger panic. That patch handled payload_size() underflow only
for valid opcodes with short packets, not for packets carrying an unknown
opcode. The unknown-opcode OOB read described below predates that commit
and reaches back to the initial Soft RoCE driver.
The check added there reads
pkt->paylen < header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE
where header_size(pkt) expands to rxe_opcode[pkt->opcode].length. The
rxe_opcode[] array has 256 entries but is only populated for defined IB
opcodes; any other entry (for example opcode 0xff) is zero-initialized, so
length == 0 and the check degenerates to
pkt->paylen < 0 + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE
which does not constrain pkt->paylen enough. rxe_icrc_hdr() then computes
rxe_opcode[pkt->opcode].length - RXE_BTH_BYTES
which underflows when length == 0 and passes a huge value to rxe_crc32(),
causing an out-of-bounds read of the skb payload.
Reproduced on v7.0-rc7 with that fix applied, QEMU/KVM with
CONFIG_RDMA_RXE=y and CONFIG_KASAN=y, after
rdma link add rxe0 type rxe netdev eth0
A single 48-byte UDP packet to port 4791 with BTH opcode=0xff and
QPN=IB_MULTICAST_QPN triggers:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in crc32_le+0x115/0x170
Read of size 1 at addr ...
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 704-byte region
Call Trace:
crc32_le+0x115/0x170
rxe_icrc_hdr.isra.0+0x226/0x300
rxe_icrc_check+0x13f/0x3a0
rxe_rcv+0x6e1/0x16e0
rxe_udp_encap_recv+0x20a/0x320
udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x7ed/0x12c0
Subsequent packets with the same shape fault on unmapped memory and panic
the kernel. The trigger requires only module load and "rdma link add"; no
QP, no connection, and no authentication.
Fix this by rejecting packets whose opcode has no rxe_opcode[] entry,
detected via the zero mask or zero length, before any length arithmetic
runs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7921: fix a potential clc buffer length underflow
The buf_len is used to limit the iterations for retrieving the country
power setting and may underflow under certain conditions due to changes
in the power table in CLC.
This underflow leads to an almost infinite loop or an invalid power
setting resulting in driver initialization failure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_event: Fix OOB read and infinite loop in hci_le_create_big_complete_evt
hci_le_create_big_complete_evt() iterates over BT_BOUND connections for
a BIG handle using a while loop, accessing ev->bis_handle[i++] on each
iteration. However, there is no check that i stays within ev->num_bis
before the array access.
When a controller sends a LE_Create_BIG_Complete event with fewer
bis_handle entries than there are BT_BOUND connections for that BIG,
or with num_bis=0, the loop reads beyond the valid bis_handle[] flex
array into adjacent heap memory. Since the out-of-bounds values
typically exceed HCI_CONN_HANDLE_MAX (0x0EFF), hci_conn_set_handle()
rejects them and the connection remains in BT_BOUND state. The same
connection is then found again by hci_conn_hash_lookup_big_state(),
creating an infinite loop with hci_dev_lock held.
Fix this by terminating the BIG if in case not all BIS could be setup
properly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: use kzalloc to zero-initialize security descriptor buffer
Commit 62e7dd0a39c2d ("smb: common: change the data type of num_aces
to le16") split struct smb_acl's __le32 num_aces field into __le16
num_aces and __le16 reserved. The reserved field corresponds to Sbz2
in the MS-DTYP ACL wire format, which must be zero [1].
When building an ACL descriptor in build_sec_desc(), we are using a
kmalloc()'ed descriptor buffer and writing the fields explicitly using
le16() writes now. This never writes to the 2 byte reserved field,
leaving it as uninitialized heap data.
When the reserved field happens to contain non-zero slab garbage,
Samba rejects the security descriptor with "ndr_pull_security_descriptor
failed: Range Error", causing chmod to fail with EINVAL.
Change kmalloc() to kzalloc() to ensure the entire buffer is
zero-initialized.
[1] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-dtyp/20233ed8-a6c6-4097-aafa-dd545ed24428 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: ah: account for ESN high bits in async callbacks
AH allocates its temporary auth/ICV layout differently when ESN is enabled:
the async ahash setup appends a 4-byte seqhi slot before the ICV or
auth_data area, but the async completion callbacks still reconstruct the
temporary layout as if seqhi were absent.
With an async AH implementation selected, that makes AH copy or compare
the wrong bytes on both the IPv4 and IPv6 paths. In UML repro on IPv4 AH
with ESN and forced async hmac(sha1), ping fails with 100% packet loss,
and the callback logs show the pre-fix drift:
ah4 output_done: esn=1 err=0 icv_off=20 expected_off=24
ah4 input_done: esn=1 auth_off=20 expected_auth_off=24 icv_off=32 expected_icv_off=36
Reconstruct the callback-side layout the same way the setup path built it
by skipping the ESN seqhi slot before locating the saved auth_data or ICV.
Per RFC 4302, the ESN high-order 32 bits participate in the AH ICV
computation, so the async callbacks must account for the seqhi slot.
Post-fix, the same IPv4 AH+ESN+forced-async-hmac(sha1) UML repro shows
the corrected offset (ah4 output_done: esn=1 err=0 icv_off=24
expected_off=24) and ping succeeds; net/ipv4/ah4.o and net/ipv6/ah6.o
build clean at W=1. IPv6 AH+ESN was not exercised at runtime, and the
change has not been tested against a real async hardware AH engine. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: libwx: fix VF illegal register access
Register WX_CFG_PORT_ST is a PF restricted register. When a VF is
initialized, attempting to read this register triggers an illegal
register access, which lead to a system hang.
When the device is VF, the bus function ID can be obtained directly from
the PCI_FUNC(pdev->devfn). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: qcom: q6apm-lpass-dai: Fix multiple graph opens
As prepare can be called mulitple times, this can result in multiple
graph opens for playback path.
This will result in a memory leaks, fix this by adding a check before
opening. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mana: Validate rx_hash_key_len
Sashiko points out that rx_hash_key_len comes from a uAPI structure and is
blindly passed to memcpy, allowing the userspace to trash kernel
memory. Bounds check it so the memcpy cannot overflow. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: Avoid potential endless loop in convert_chmap_v3()
The convert_chmap_v3() has a loop with its increment size of
cs_desc->wLength, but we forgot to validate cs_desc->wLength itself,
which may lead to potential endless loop by a malformed descriptor.
Add a proper size check to abort the loop for plugging the hole. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Fix pin leak and publication ordering in __pkvm_init_vcpu()
Two bugs exist in the vCPU initialisation path:
1. If a check fails after hyp_pin_shared_mem() succeeds, the cleanup
path jumps to 'unlock' without calling unpin_host_vcpu() or
unpin_host_sve_state(), permanently leaking pin references on the
host vCPU and SVE state pages.
Extract a register_hyp_vcpu() helper that performs the checks and
the store. When register_hyp_vcpu() returns an error, call
unpin_host_vcpu() and unpin_host_sve_state() inline before falling
through to the existing 'unlock' label.
2. register_hyp_vcpu() publishes the new vCPU pointer into
'hyp_vm->vcpus[]' with a bare store, allowing a concurrent caller
of pkvm_load_hyp_vcpu() to observe a partially initialised vCPU
object.
Ensure the store uses smp_store_release() and the load uses
smp_load_acquire(). While 'vm_table_lock' currently serialises the
store and the load, these barriers ensure the reader sees the fully
initialised 'hyp_vcpu' object even if there were a lockless path or
if the lock's own ordering guarantees were insufficient for nested
object initialization. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: microchip-core-qspi: control built-in cs manually
The coreQSPI IP supports only a single chip select, which is
automagically operated by the hardware - set low when the transmit
buffer first gets written to and set high when the number of bytes
written to the TOTALBYTES field of the FRAMES register have been sent on
the bus. Additional devices must use GPIOs for their chip selects.
It was reported to me that if there are two devices attached to this
QSPI controller that the in-built chip select is set low while linux
tries to access the device attached to the GPIO.
This went undetected as the boards that connected multiple devices to
the SPI controller all exclusively used GPIOs for chip selects, not
relying on the built-in chip select at all. It turns out that this was
because the built-in chip select, when controlled automagically, is set
low when active and high when inactive, thereby ruling out its use for
active-high devices or devices that need to transmit with the chip
select disabled.
Modify the driver so that it controls chip select directly, retaining
the behaviour for mem_ops of setting the chip select active for the
entire duration of the transfer in the exec_op callback. For regular
transfers, implement the set_cs callback for the core to use.
As part of this, the existing setup callback, mchp_coreqspi_setup_op(),
is removed. Modifying the CLKIDLE field is not safe to do during
operation when there are multiple devices, so this code is removed
entirely. Setting the MASTER and ENABLE fields is something that can be
done once at probe, it doesn't need to be re-run for each device.
Instead the new setup callback sets the built-in chip select to its
inactive state for active-low devices, as the reset value of the chip
select in software controlled mode is low. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: configfs: Bound snprintf() return in tg_pt_gp_members_show()
target_tg_pt_gp_members_show() formats LUN paths with snprintf() into a
256-byte stack buffer, then will memcpy() cur_len bytes from that
buffer. snprintf() returns the length the output would have had, which
can exceed the buffer size when the fabric WWN is long because iSCSI IQN
names can be up to 223 bytes. The check at the memcpy() site only
guards the destination page write, not the source read, so memcpy() will
read past the stack buffer and copy adjacent stack contents to the sysfs
reader, which when CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE is enabled, fortify_panic()
will be triggered.
Commit 27e06650a5ea ("scsi: target: target_core_configfs: Add length
check to avoid buffer overflow") added the same bound to the
target_lu_gp_members_show() but the tg_pt_gp variant was missed so
resolve that here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: usblp: fix heap leak in IEEE 1284 device ID via short response
usblp_ctrl_msg() collapses the usb_control_msg() return value to
0/-errno, discarding the actual number of bytes transferred. A broken
printer can complete the GET_DEVICE_ID control transfer short and the
driver has no way to know.
usblp_cache_device_id_string() reads the 2-byte big-endian length prefix
from the response and trusts it (clamped only to the buffer bounds).
The buffer is kmalloc(1024) at probe time. A device that sends exactly
two bytes (e.g. 0x03 0xFF, claiming a 1023-byte ID) leaves
device_id_string[2..1022] holding stale kmalloc heap.
That stale data is then exposed:
- via the ieee1284_id sysfs attribute (sprintf("%s", buf+2), truncated
at the first NUL in the stale heap), and
- via the IOCNR_GET_DEVICE_ID ioctl, which copy_to_user()s the full
claimed length regardless of NULs, up to 1021 bytes of uninitialized
heap, with the leak size chosen by the device.
Fix this up by just zapping the buffer with zeros before each request
sent to the device. |
