| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PM: sleep: Fix possible deadlocks in core system-wide PM code
It is reported that in low-memory situations the system-wide resume core
code deadlocks, because async_schedule_dev() executes its argument
function synchronously if it cannot allocate memory (and not only in
that case) and that function attempts to acquire a mutex that is already
held. Executing the argument function synchronously from within
dpm_async_fn() may also be problematic for ordering reasons (it may
cause a consumer device's resume callback to be invoked before a
requisite supplier device's one, for example).
Address this by changing the code in question to use
async_schedule_dev_nocall() for scheduling the asynchronous
execution of device suspend and resume functions and to directly
run them synchronously if async_schedule_dev_nocall() returns false. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm: Don't unref the same fb many times by mistake due to deadlock handling
If we get a deadlock after the fb lookup in drm_mode_page_flip_ioctl()
we proceed to unref the fb and then retry the whole thing from the top.
But we forget to reset the fb pointer back to NULL, and so if we then
get another error during the retry, before the fb lookup, we proceed
the unref the same fb again without having gotten another reference.
The end result is that the fb will (eventually) end up being freed
while it's still in use.
Reset fb to NULL once we've unreffed it to avoid doing it again
until we've done another fb lookup.
This turned out to be pretty easy to hit on a DG2 when doing async
flips (and CONFIG_DEBUG_WW_MUTEX_SLOWPATH=y). The first symptom I
saw that drm_closefb() simply got stuck in a busy loop while walking
the framebuffer list. Fortunately I was able to convince it to oops
instead, and from there it was easier to track down the culprit. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PM: hibernate: Avoid deadlock in hibernate_compressor_param_set()
syzbot reported a deadlock in lock_system_sleep() (see below).
The write operation to "/sys/module/hibernate/parameters/compressor"
conflicts with the registration of ieee80211 device, resulting in a deadlock
when attempting to acquire system_transition_mutex under param_lock.
To avoid this deadlock, change hibernate_compressor_param_set() to use
mutex_trylock() for attempting to acquire system_transition_mutex and
return -EBUSY when it fails.
Task flags need not be saved or adjusted before calling
mutex_trylock(&system_transition_mutex) because the caller is not going
to end up waiting for this mutex and if it runs concurrently with system
suspend in progress, it will be frozen properly when it returns to user
space.
syzbot report:
syz-executor895/5833 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff8e0828c8 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: lock_system_sleep+0x87/0xa0 kernel/power/main.c:56
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8e07dc68 (param_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kernel_param_lock kernel/params.c:607 [inline]
ffffffff8e07dc68 (param_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: param_attr_store+0xe6/0x300 kernel/params.c:586
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #3 (param_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730
ieee80211_rate_control_ops_get net/mac80211/rate.c:220 [inline]
rate_control_alloc net/mac80211/rate.c:266 [inline]
ieee80211_init_rate_ctrl_alg+0x18d/0x6b0 net/mac80211/rate.c:1015
ieee80211_register_hw+0x20cd/0x4060 net/mac80211/main.c:1531
mac80211_hwsim_new_radio+0x304e/0x54e0 drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim.c:5558
init_mac80211_hwsim+0x432/0x8c0 drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim.c:6910
do_one_initcall+0x128/0x700 init/main.c:1257
do_initcall_level init/main.c:1319 [inline]
do_initcalls init/main.c:1335 [inline]
do_basic_setup init/main.c:1354 [inline]
kernel_init_freeable+0x5c7/0x900 init/main.c:1568
kernel_init+0x1c/0x2b0 init/main.c:1457
ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
-> #2 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730
wg_pm_notification drivers/net/wireguard/device.c:80 [inline]
wg_pm_notification+0x49/0x180 drivers/net/wireguard/device.c:64
notifier_call_chain+0xb7/0x410 kernel/notifier.c:85
notifier_call_chain_robust kernel/notifier.c:120 [inline]
blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust kernel/notifier.c:345 [inline]
blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0xc9/0x170 kernel/notifier.c:333
pm_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x27/0x60 kernel/power/main.c:102
snapshot_open+0x189/0x2b0 kernel/power/user.c:77
misc_open+0x35a/0x420 drivers/char/misc.c:179
chrdev_open+0x237/0x6a0 fs/char_dev.c:414
do_dentry_open+0x735/0x1c40 fs/open.c:956
vfs_open+0x82/0x3f0 fs/open.c:1086
do_open fs/namei.c:3830 [inline]
path_openat+0x1e88/0x2d80 fs/namei.c:3989
do_filp_open+0x20c/0x470 fs/namei.c:4016
do_sys_openat2+0x17a/0x1e0 fs/open.c:1428
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1443 [inline]
__do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1459 [inline]
__se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1454 [inline]
__x64_sys_openat+0x175/0x210 fs/open.c:1454
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #1 ((pm_chain_head).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}:
down_read+0x9a/0x330 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1524
blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust kerne
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: vlan: don't propagate flags on open
With the device instance lock, there is now a possibility of a deadlock:
[ 1.211455] ============================================
[ 1.211571] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[ 1.211687] 6.14.0-rc5-01215-g032756b4ca7a-dirty #5 Not tainted
[ 1.211823] --------------------------------------------
[ 1.211936] ip/184 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 1.212032] ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_set_allmulti+0x4e/0xb0
[ 1.212207]
[ 1.212207] but task is already holding lock:
[ 1.212332] ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_open+0x50/0xb0
[ 1.212487]
[ 1.212487] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 1.212626] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 1.212626]
[ 1.212751] CPU0
[ 1.212815] ----
[ 1.212871] lock(&dev->lock);
[ 1.212944] lock(&dev->lock);
[ 1.213016]
[ 1.213016] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 1.213016]
[ 1.213143] May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[ 1.213143]
[ 1.213294] 3 locks held by ip/184:
[ 1.213371] #0: ffffffff838b53e0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_nets_lock+0x1b/0xa0
[ 1.213543] #1: ffffffff84e5fc70 (&net->rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_nets_lock+0x37/0xa0
[ 1.213727] #2: ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_open+0x50/0xb0
[ 1.213895]
[ 1.213895] stack backtrace:
[ 1.213991] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 184 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5-01215-g032756b4ca7a-dirty #5
[ 1.213993] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014
[ 1.213994] Call Trace:
[ 1.213995] <TASK>
[ 1.213996] dump_stack_lvl+0x8e/0xd0
[ 1.214000] print_deadlock_bug+0x28b/0x2a0
[ 1.214020] lock_acquire+0xea/0x2a0
[ 1.214027] __mutex_lock+0xbf/0xd40
[ 1.214038] dev_set_allmulti+0x4e/0xb0 # real_dev->flags & IFF_ALLMULTI
[ 1.214040] vlan_dev_open+0xa5/0x170 # ndo_open on vlandev
[ 1.214042] __dev_open+0x145/0x270
[ 1.214046] __dev_change_flags+0xb0/0x1e0
[ 1.214051] netif_change_flags+0x22/0x60 # IFF_UP vlandev
[ 1.214053] dev_change_flags+0x61/0xb0 # for each device in group from dev->vlan_info
[ 1.214055] vlan_device_event+0x766/0x7c0 # on netdevsim0
[ 1.214058] notifier_call_chain+0x78/0x120
[ 1.214062] netif_open+0x6d/0x90
[ 1.214064] dev_open+0x5b/0xb0 # locks netdevsim0
[ 1.214066] bond_enslave+0x64c/0x1230
[ 1.214075] do_set_master+0x175/0x1e0 # on netdevsim0
[ 1.214077] do_setlink+0x516/0x13b0
[ 1.214094] rtnl_newlink+0xaba/0xb80
[ 1.214132] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x440/0x490
[ 1.214144] netlink_rcv_skb+0xeb/0x120
[ 1.214150] netlink_unicast+0x1f9/0x320
[ 1.214153] netlink_sendmsg+0x346/0x3f0
[ 1.214157] __sock_sendmsg+0x86/0xb0
[ 1.214160] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1c8/0x220
[ 1.214164] ___sys_sendmsg+0x28f/0x2d0
[ 1.214179] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0xef/0x140
[ 1.214184] do_syscall_64+0xec/0x1d0
[ 1.214190] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 1.214191] RIP: 0033:0x7f2d1b4a7e56
Device setup:
netdevsim0 (down)
^ ^
bond netdevsim1.100@netdevsim1 allmulticast=on (down)
When we enslave the lower device (netdevsim0) which has a vlan, we
propagate vlan's allmuti/promisc flags during ndo_open. This causes
(re)locking on of the real_dev.
Propagate allmulti/promisc on flags change, not on the open. There
is a slight semantics change that vlans that are down now propagate
the flags, but this seems unlikely to result in the real issues.
Reproducer:
echo 0 1 > /sys/bus/netdevsim/new_device
dev_path=$(ls -d /sys/bus/netdevsim/devices/netdevsim0/net/*)
dev=$(echo $dev_path | rev | cut -d/ -f1 | rev)
ip link set dev $dev name netdevsim0
ip link set dev netdevsim0 up
ip link add link netdevsim0 name netdevsim0.100 type vlan id 100
ip link set dev netdevsim0.100 allm
---truncated--- |
| A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Simple Machines Forum v2.1.6 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via injecting a crafted payload into the Forum Name parameter. |
| eProsima Fast-DDS v3.3 and before has an infinite loop vulnerability caused by integer overflow in the Time_t:: fraction() function. |
| MEGACO dissector infinite loop in Wireshark 4.6.0 to 4.6.1 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.11 allows denial of service |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFS: Avoid writeback threads getting stuck in mempool_alloc()
In a low memory situation, allow the NFS writeback code to fail without
getting stuck in infinite loops in mempool_alloc(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vc4: Fix deadlock on DSI device attach error
DSI device attach to DSI host will be done with host device's lock
held.
Un-registering host in "device attach" error path (ex: probe retry)
will result in deadlock with below call trace and non operational
DSI display.
Startup Call trace:
[ 35.043036] rt_mutex_slowlock.constprop.21+0x184/0x1b8
[ 35.043048] mutex_lock_nested+0x7c/0xc8
[ 35.043060] device_del+0x4c/0x3e8
[ 35.043075] device_unregister+0x20/0x40
[ 35.043082] mipi_dsi_remove_device_fn+0x18/0x28
[ 35.043093] device_for_each_child+0x68/0xb0
[ 35.043105] mipi_dsi_host_unregister+0x40/0x90
[ 35.043115] vc4_dsi_host_attach+0xf0/0x120 [vc4]
[ 35.043199] mipi_dsi_attach+0x30/0x48
[ 35.043209] tc358762_probe+0x128/0x164 [tc358762]
[ 35.043225] mipi_dsi_drv_probe+0x28/0x38
[ 35.043234] really_probe+0xc0/0x318
[ 35.043244] __driver_probe_device+0x80/0xe8
[ 35.043254] driver_probe_device+0xb8/0x118
[ 35.043263] __device_attach_driver+0x98/0xe8
[ 35.043273] bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xd8
[ 35.043281] __device_attach+0xf0/0x150
[ 35.043290] device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28
[ 35.043300] bus_probe_device+0xa4/0xb0
[ 35.043308] deferred_probe_work_func+0xa0/0xe0
[ 35.043318] process_one_work+0x254/0x700
[ 35.043330] worker_thread+0x4c/0x448
[ 35.043339] kthread+0x19c/0x1a8
[ 35.043348] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Shutdown Call trace:
[ 365.565417] Call trace:
[ 365.565423] __switch_to+0x148/0x200
[ 365.565452] __schedule+0x340/0x9c8
[ 365.565467] schedule+0x48/0x110
[ 365.565479] schedule_timeout+0x3b0/0x448
[ 365.565496] wait_for_completion+0xac/0x138
[ 365.565509] __flush_work+0x218/0x4e0
[ 365.565523] flush_work+0x1c/0x28
[ 365.565536] wait_for_device_probe+0x68/0x158
[ 365.565550] device_shutdown+0x24/0x348
[ 365.565561] kernel_restart_prepare+0x40/0x50
[ 365.565578] kernel_restart+0x20/0x70
[ 365.565591] __do_sys_reboot+0x10c/0x220
[ 365.565605] __arm64_sys_reboot+0x2c/0x38
[ 365.565619] invoke_syscall+0x4c/0x110
[ 365.565634] el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xfc/0x120
[ 365.565648] do_el0_svc+0x2c/0x90
[ 365.565661] el0_svc+0x4c/0xf0
[ 365.565671] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x90/0xb8
[ 365.565682] el0t_64_sync+0x180/0x184 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix deadlock between quota disable and qgroup rescan worker
Quota disable ioctl starts a transaction before waiting for the qgroup
rescan worker completes. However, this wait can be infinite and results
in deadlock because of circular dependency among the quota disable
ioctl, the qgroup rescan worker and the other task with transaction such
as block group relocation task.
The deadlock happens with the steps following:
1) Task A calls ioctl to disable quota. It starts a transaction and
waits for qgroup rescan worker completes.
2) Task B such as block group relocation task starts a transaction and
joins to the transaction that task A started. Then task B commits to
the transaction. In this commit, task B waits for a commit by task A.
3) Task C as the qgroup rescan worker starts its job and starts a
transaction. In this transaction start, task C waits for completion
of the transaction that task A started and task B committed.
This deadlock was found with fstests test case btrfs/115 and a zoned
null_blk device. The test case enables and disables quota, and the
block group reclaim was triggered during the quota disable by chance.
The deadlock was also observed by running quota enable and disable in
parallel with 'btrfs balance' command on regular null_blk devices.
An example report of the deadlock:
[372.469894] INFO: task kworker/u16:6:103 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
[372.479944] Not tainted 5.16.0-rc8 #7
[372.485067] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[372.493898] task:kworker/u16:6 state:D stack: 0 pid: 103 ppid: 2 flags:0x00004000
[372.503285] Workqueue: btrfs-qgroup-rescan btrfs_work_helper [btrfs]
[372.510782] Call Trace:
[372.514092] <TASK>
[372.521684] __schedule+0xb56/0x4850
[372.530104] ? io_schedule_timeout+0x190/0x190
[372.538842] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100
[372.547092] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3e/0x60
[372.555591] schedule+0xe0/0x270
[372.561894] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x18bb/0x2610 [btrfs]
[372.570506] ? btrfs_apply_pending_changes+0x50/0x50 [btrfs]
[372.578875] ? free_unref_page+0x3f2/0x650
[372.585484] ? finish_wait+0x270/0x270
[372.591594] ? release_extent_buffer+0x224/0x420 [btrfs]
[372.599264] btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0xc13/0x10c0 [btrfs]
[372.607157] ? lock_release+0x3a9/0x6d0
[372.613054] ? btrfs_qgroup_account_extent+0xda0/0xda0 [btrfs]
[372.620960] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x11e/0x250
[372.627137] ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90
[372.633215] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe4/0x140
[372.639404] btrfs_work_helper+0x1ae/0xa90 [btrfs]
[372.646268] process_one_work+0x7e9/0x1320
[372.652321] ? lock_release+0x6d0/0x6d0
[372.658081] ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x230/0x230
[372.664513] ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90
[372.670529] worker_thread+0x59e/0xf90
[372.676172] ? process_one_work+0x1320/0x1320
[372.682440] kthread+0x3b9/0x490
[372.687550] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50
[372.693811] ? set_kthread_struct+0x100/0x100
[372.700052] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[372.705517] </TASK>
[372.709747] INFO: task btrfs-transacti:2347 blocked for more than 123 seconds.
[372.729827] Not tainted 5.16.0-rc8 #7
[372.745907] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[372.767106] task:btrfs-transacti state:D stack: 0 pid: 2347 ppid: 2 flags:0x00004000
[372.787776] Call Trace:
[372.801652] <TASK>
[372.812961] __schedule+0xb56/0x4850
[372.830011] ? io_schedule_timeout+0x190/0x190
[372.852547] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100
[372.871761] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3e/0x60
[372.886792] schedule+0xe0/0x270
[372.901685] wait_current_trans+0x22c/0x310 [btrfs]
[372.919743] ? btrfs_put_transaction+0x3d0/0x3d0 [btrfs]
[372.938923] ? finish_wait+0x270/0x270
[372.959085] ? join_transaction+0xc7
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/kmemleak: avoid scanning potential huge holes
When using devm_request_free_mem_region() and devm_memremap_pages() to
add ZONE_DEVICE memory, if requested free mem region's end pfn were
huge(e.g., 0x400000000), the node_end_pfn() will be also huge (see
move_pfn_range_to_zone()). Thus it creates a huge hole between
node_start_pfn() and node_end_pfn().
We found on some AMD APUs, amdkfd requested such a free mem region and
created a huge hole. In such a case, following code snippet was just
doing busy test_bit() looping on the huge hole.
for (pfn = start_pfn; pfn < end_pfn; pfn++) {
struct page *page = pfn_to_online_page(pfn);
if (!page)
continue;
...
}
So we got a soft lockup:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#6 stuck for 26s! [bash:1221]
CPU: 6 PID: 1221 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.15.0-custom #1
RIP: 0010:pfn_to_online_page+0x5/0xd0
Call Trace:
? kmemleak_scan+0x16a/0x440
kmemleak_write+0x306/0x3a0
? common_file_perm+0x72/0x170
full_proxy_write+0x5c/0x90
vfs_write+0xb9/0x260
ksys_write+0x67/0xe0
__x64_sys_write+0x1a/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
I did some tests with the patch.
(1) amdgpu module unloaded
before the patch:
real 0m0.976s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m0.968s
after the patch:
real 0m0.981s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m0.973s
(2) amdgpu module loaded
before the patch:
real 0m35.365s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m35.354s
after the patch:
real 0m1.049s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m1.042s |
| Tornado is a Python web framework and asynchronous networking library. Versions 6.5.2 and below use an inefficient algorithm when parsing parameters for HTTP header values, potentially causing a DoS. The _parseparam function in httputil.py is used to parse specific HTTP header values, such as those in multipart/form-data and repeatedly calls string.count() within a nested loop while processing quoted semicolons. If an attacker sends a request with a large number of maliciously crafted parameters in a Content-Disposition header, the server's CPU usage increases quadratically (O(n²)) during parsing. Due to Tornado's single event loop architecture, a single malicious request can cause the entire server to become unresponsive for an extended period. This issue is fixed in version 6.5.3. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-multipath: defer partition scanning
We need to suppress the partition scan from occuring within the
controller's scan_work context. If a path error occurs here, the IO will
wait until a path becomes available or all paths are torn down, but that
action also occurs within scan_work, so it would deadlock. Defer the
partion scan to a different context that does not block scan_work. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-fc: avoid deadlock on delete association path
When deleting an association the shutdown path is deadlocking because we
try to flush the nvmet_wq nested. Avoid this by deadlock by deferring
the put work into its own work item. |
| Sending an HTTP request/response body with greater than 2^31 bytes triggers an infinite loop in proxygen::coro::HTTPQuicCoroSession which blocks the backing event loop and unconditionally appends data to a std::vector per-loop iteration. This issue leads to unbounded memory growth and eventually causes the process to run out of memory. |
| Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in Arm Ltd Bifrost GPU Kernel Driver, Arm Ltd Valhall GPU Kernel Driver, Arm Ltd Arm 5th Gen GPU Architecture Kernel Driver allows a non-privileged user process to make valid GPU memory processing operations, including via WebGL or WebGPU, to cause the whole system to become unresponsive.This issue affects Bifrost GPU Kernel Driver: r44p1, from r46p0 through r49p0, from r50p0 through r51p0; Valhall GPU Kernel Driver: r44p1, from r46p0 through r49p0, from r50p0 through r51p0; Arm 5th Gen GPU Architecture Kernel Driver: r44p1, from r46p0 through r49p0, from r50p0 through r51p0. |
| In OpenSSH 7.9, due to accepting and displaying arbitrary stderr output from the server, a malicious server (or Man-in-The-Middle attacker) can manipulate the client output, for example to use ANSI control codes to hide additional files being transferred. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ufs: Fix a deadlock in the error handler
The following deadlock has been observed on a test setup:
- All tags allocated
- The SCSI error handler calls ufshcd_eh_host_reset_handler()
- ufshcd_eh_host_reset_handler() queues work that calls
ufshcd_err_handler()
- ufshcd_err_handler() locks up as follows:
Workqueue: ufs_eh_wq_0 ufshcd_err_handler.cfi_jt
Call trace:
__switch_to+0x298/0x5d8
__schedule+0x6cc/0xa94
schedule+0x12c/0x298
blk_mq_get_tag+0x210/0x480
__blk_mq_alloc_request+0x1c8/0x284
blk_get_request+0x74/0x134
ufshcd_exec_dev_cmd+0x68/0x640
ufshcd_verify_dev_init+0x68/0x35c
ufshcd_probe_hba+0x12c/0x1cb8
ufshcd_host_reset_and_restore+0x88/0x254
ufshcd_reset_and_restore+0xd0/0x354
ufshcd_err_handler+0x408/0xc58
process_one_work+0x24c/0x66c
worker_thread+0x3e8/0xa4c
kthread+0x150/0x1b4
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30
Fix this lockup by making ufshcd_exec_dev_cmd() allocate a reserved
request. |
| A flaw was found in python. An improperly handled HTTP response in the HTTP client code of python may allow a remote attacker, who controls the HTTP server, to make the client script enter an infinite loop, consuming CPU time. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to system availability. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net_sched: hfsc: Address reentrant enqueue adding class to eltree twice
Savino says:
"We are writing to report that this recent patch
(141d34391abbb315d68556b7c67ad97885407547) [1]
can be bypassed, and a UAF can still occur when HFSC is utilized with
NETEM.
The patch only checks the cl->cl_nactive field to determine whether
it is the first insertion or not [2], but this field is only
incremented by init_vf [3].
By using HFSC_RSC (which uses init_ed) [4], it is possible to bypass the
check and insert the class twice in the eltree.
Under normal conditions, this would lead to an infinite loop in
hfsc_dequeue for the reasons we already explained in this report [5].
However, if TBF is added as root qdisc and it is configured with a
very low rate,
it can be utilized to prevent packets from being dequeued.
This behavior can be exploited to perform subsequent insertions in the
HFSC eltree and cause a UAF."
To fix both the UAF and the infinite loop, with netem as an hfsc child,
check explicitly in hfsc_enqueue whether the class is already in the eltree
whenever the HFSC_RSC flag is set.
[1] https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=141d34391abbb315d68556b7c67ad97885407547
[2] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.15-rc5/source/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c#L1572
[3] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.15-rc5/source/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c#L677
[4] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.15-rc5/source/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c#L1574
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/8DuRWwfqjoRDLDmBMlIfbrsZg9Gx50DHJc1ilxsEBNe2D6NMoigR_eIRIG0LOjMc3r10nUUZtArXx4oZBIdUfZQrwjcQhdinnMis_0G7VEk=@willsroot.io/T/#u |
