| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Inadequate encryption strength for some BMRA software before version 22.08 may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via local access. |
| CyberGhostVPNSetup.exe (Windows installer) is signed using the weak cryptographic hash algorithm SHA-1, which is vulnerable to collision attacks. This allows a malicious actor to craft a fake installer with a forged SHA-1 certificate that may still be accepted by Windows signature verification mechanisms, particularly on systems without strict SmartScreen or trust policy enforcement. Additionally, the installer lacks High Entropy Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), as confirmed by BinSkim (BA2015 rule) and repeated WinDbg analysis. The binary consistently loads into predictable memory ranges, increasing the success rate of memory corruption exploits. These two misconfigurations, when combined, significantly lower the bar for successful supply-chain style attacks or privilege escalation through fake installers. |
| A vulnerability has been identified in RUGGEDCOM i800 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM i801 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM i802 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM i803 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM M2100 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM M2200 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM M969 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RMC30 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RMC8388 V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RMC8388 V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RP110 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS1600 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS1600F (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS1600T (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS400 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS401 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS416 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS416P (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS416Pv2 V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS416Pv2 V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RS416v2 V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS416v2 V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RS8000 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS8000A (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS8000H (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS8000T (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900 (32M) V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900 (32M) V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RS900G (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900G (32M) V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900G (32M) V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RS900GP (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900L (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900M-GETS-C01 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900M-GETS-XX (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900M-STND-C01 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900M-STND-XX (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900W (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS910 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS910L (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS910W (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS920L (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS920W (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS930L (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS930W (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS940G (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS969 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2100 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2100 (32M) V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2100 (32M) V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG2100P (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2100P (32M) V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2100P (32M) V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG2200 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2288 V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2288 V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG2300 V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2300 V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG2300P V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2300P V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG2488 V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2488 V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG907R (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG908C (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG909R (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG910C (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG920P V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG920P V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSL910 (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RST2228 (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RST2228P (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RST916C (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RST916P (All versions < V5.10.0). The affected devices support the TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 cipher suite, which uses CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode that is known to be vulnerable to timing attacks. This could allow an attacker to compromise the integrity and confidentiality of encrypted communications. |
| hpke-js is a Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) module built on top of Web Cryptography API. Prior to version 1.7.5, the public SenderContext Seal() API has a race condition which allows for the same AEAD nonce to be re-used for multiple Seal() calls. This can lead to complete loss of Confidentiality and Integrity of the produced messages. This issue has been patched in version 1.7.5. |
| The NXP Data Co-Processor (DCP) is a built-in hardware module for specific NXP SoCs¹ that implements a dedicated AES cryptographic engine for encryption/decryption operations. The dcp_tool reference implementation included in the repository selected the test key, regardless of its `-t` argument. This issue has been patched in commit 26a7. |
| This vulnerability exists in Tapo C500 Wi-Fi camera due to hard-coded RSA private key embedded within the device firmware. An attacker with physical access could exploit this vulnerability to obtain cryptographic private keys which can then be used to perform impersonation, data decryption and man in the middle attacks on the targeted device. |
| sigstore-python is a Python tool for generating and verifying Sigstore signatures. Versions of sigstore-python newer than 2.0.0 but prior to 3.6.0 perform insufficient validation of the "integration time" present in "v2" and "v3" bundles during the verification flow: the "integration time" is verified *if* a source of signed time (such as an inclusion promise) is present, but is otherwise trusted if no source of signed time is present. This does not affect "v1" bundles, as the "v1" bundle format always requires an inclusion promise.
Sigstore uses signed time to support verification of signatures made against short-lived signing keys. The impact and severity of this weakness is *low*, as Sigstore contains multiple other enforcing components that prevent an attacker who modifies the integration timestamp within a bundle from impersonating a valid signature. In particular, an attacker who modifies the integration timestamp can induce a Denial of Service, but in no different manner than already possible with bundle access (e.g. modifying the signature itself such that it fails to verify). Separately, an attacker could upload a *new* entry to the transparency service, and substitute their new entry's time. However, this would still be rejected at validation time, as the new entry's (valid) signed time would be outside the validity window of the original signing certificate and would nonetheless render the attacker auditable. |
| Programs/P73_SimplePythonEncryption.py illustrates a simple Python encryption example using the RSA Algorithm. In versions prior to commit 6ce60b1, an attacker may be able to decrypt the data using brute force attacks and because of this the whole application can be impacted. This issue has been patched in commit 6ce60b1. A workaround involves increasing the key size, for RSA or DSA this is at least 2048 bits, for ECC this is at least 256 bits. |
| Weak server key used for TLS encryption. The following products are affected: Acronis Cyber Protect 16 (Linux, macOS, Windows) before build 39938. |
| CWE-328: Use of Weak Hash |
| Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key vulnerability in ABB RMC-100, ABB RMC-100 LITE.
When the REST interface is enabled by the user, and an attacker gains access to
source code and control network, the attacker can bypass the REST interface authentication and gain access to MQTT configuration data.
This issue affects RMC-100: from 2105457-043 through 2105457-045; RMC-100 LITE: from 2106229-015 through 2106229-016. |
| The certificate and private key used for providing transport layer security for connections to the web interface (TCP port 443) is hard-coded in the firmware and are shipped with the update files. An attacker can use the private key to perform man-in-the-middle attacks against users of the admin interface. The files are located in /etc/ssl (e.g. salia.local.crt, salia.local.key and salia.local.pem). There is no option to upload/configure custom TLS certificates. |
| An issue in the index.js decryptCookie function of cookie-encrypter v1.0.1 allows attackers to execute a bit flipping attack. |
| Cryptographic Flaw in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 147.0.7727.55 allowed an attacker to read potentially sensitive information from encrypted PDFs via a brute-force attack. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Configured cipher preference order not preserved vulnerability in Apache Tomcat.
This issue affects Apache Tomcat: from 11.0.16 through 11.0.18, from 10.1.51 through 10.1.52, from 9.0.114 through 9.0.115.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 11.0.20, 10.1.53 or 9.0.116, which fix the issue. |
| A Key Exchange without Entity Authentication vulnerability in the SSH implementation of Juniper Networks Apstra allows a unauthenticated, MITM
attacker to impersonate managed devices.
Due to insufficient SSH host key validation an attacker can perform a machine-in-the-middle attack on the SSH connections from Apstra to managed devices, enabling an attacker to impersonate a managed device and capture user credentials.
This issue affects all versions of Apstra before 6.1.1. |
| An issue was discovered in the ALFA Windows 10 driver 6.1316.1209 for AWUS036H. The WEP, WPA, WPA2, and WPA3 implementations accept plaintext frames in a protected Wi-Fi network. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary data frames independent of the network configuration. |
| The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802.11n), an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets. |
| Cocos AI is a confidential computing system for AI. The current implementation of attested TLS (aTLS) in CoCoS is vulnerable to a relay attack affecting all versions from v0.4.0 through v0.8.2. This vulnerability is present in both the AMD SEV-SNP and Intel TDX deployment targets supported by CoCoS. In the affected design, an attacker may be able to extract the ephemeral TLS private key used during the intra-handshake attestation. Because the attestation evidence is bound to the ephemeral key but not to the TLS channel, possession of that key is sufficient to relay or divert the attested TLS session. A client will accept the connection under false assumptions about the endpoint it is communicating with — the attestation report cannot distinguish the genuine attested service from the attacker's relay. This undermines the intended authentication guarantees of attested TLS. A successful attack may allow an attacker to impersonate an attested CoCoS service and access data or operations that the client intended to send only to the genuine attested endpoint. Exploitation requires the attacker to first extract the ephemeral TLS private key, which is possible through physical access to the server hardware, transient execution attacks, or side-channel attacks. Note that the aTLS implementation was fully redesigned in v0.7.0, but the redesign does not address this vulnerability. The relay attack weakness is architectural and affects all releases in the v0.4.0–v0.8.2 range. This vulnerability class was formally analyzed and demonstrated across multiple attested TLS implementations, including CoCoS, by researchers whose findings were disclosed to the IETF TLS Working Group. Formal verification was conducted using ProVerif. As of time of publication, there is no patch available. No complete workaround is available. The following hardening measures reduce but do not eliminate the risk: Keep TEE firmware and microcode up to date to reduce the key-extraction surface; define strict attestation policies that validate all available report fields, including firmware versions, TCB levels, and platform configuration registers; and/or enable mutual aTLS with CA-signed certificates where deployment architecture permits. |
| OrangeHRM is a comprehensive human resource management (HRM) system. From 5.0 to 5.8, OrangeHRM Open Source encrypts certain sensitive fields with AES in ECB mode, which preserves block-aligned plaintext patterns in ciphertext and enables pattern disclosure against stored data. This vulnerability is fixed in 5.8.1. |
