| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: correct grp validation in ext4_mb_good_group
Group corruption check will access memory of grp and will trigger kernel
crash if grp is NULL. So do NULL check before corruption check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915: Fix NULL ptr deref by checking new_crtc_state
intel_atomic_get_new_crtc_state can return NULL, unless crtc state wasn't
obtained previously with intel_atomic_get_crtc_state, so we must check it
for NULLness here, just as in many other places, where we can't guarantee
that intel_atomic_get_crtc_state was called.
We are currently getting NULL ptr deref because of that, so this fix was
confirmed to help.
(cherry picked from commit 1d5b09f8daf859247a1ea65b0d732a24d88980d8) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm/dp: Drop aux devices together with DP controller
Using devres to depopulate the aux bus made sure that upon a probe
deferral the EDP panel device would be destroyed and recreated upon next
attempt.
But the struct device which the devres is tied to is the DPUs
(drm_dev->dev), which may be happen after the DP controller is torn
down.
Indications of this can be seen in the commonly seen EDID-hexdump full
of zeros in the log, or the occasional/rare KASAN fault where the
panel's attempt to read the EDID information causes a use after free on
DP resources.
It's tempting to move the devres to the DP controller's struct device,
but the resources used by the device(s) on the aux bus are explicitly
torn down in the error path. The KASAN-reported use-after-free also
remains, as the DP aux "module" explicitly frees its devres-allocated
memory in this code path.
As such, explicitly depopulate the aux bus in the error path, and in the
component unbind path, to avoid these issues.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/542163/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Fix skb refcnt race after locking changes
There is a race where skb's from the sk_psock_backlog can be referenced
after userspace side has already skb_consumed() the sk_buff and its refcnt
dropped to zer0 causing use after free.
The flow is the following:
while ((skb = skb_peek(&psock->ingress_skb))
sk_psock_handle_Skb(psock, skb, ..., ingress)
if (!ingress) ...
sk_psock_skb_ingress
sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue(skb)
msg->skb = skb
sk_psock_queue_msg(psock, msg)
skb_dequeue(&psock->ingress_skb)
The sk_psock_queue_msg() puts the msg on the ingress_msg queue. This is
what the application reads when recvmsg() is called. An application can
read this anytime after the msg is placed on the queue. The recvmsg hook
will also read msg->skb and then after user space reads the msg will call
consume_skb(skb) on it effectively free'ing it.
But, the race is in above where backlog queue still has a reference to
the skb and calls skb_dequeue(). If the skb_dequeue happens after the
user reads and free's the skb we have a use after free.
The !ingress case does not suffer from this problem because it uses
sendmsg_*(sk, msg) which does not pass the sk_buff further down the
stack.
The following splat was observed with 'test_progs -t sockmap_listen':
[ 1022.710250][ T2556] general protection fault, ...
[...]
[ 1022.712830][ T2556] Workqueue: events sk_psock_backlog
[ 1022.713262][ T2556] RIP: 0010:skb_dequeue+0x4c/0x80
[ 1022.713653][ T2556] Code: ...
[...]
[ 1022.720699][ T2556] Call Trace:
[ 1022.720984][ T2556] <TASK>
[ 1022.721254][ T2556] ? die_addr+0x32/0x80^M
[ 1022.721589][ T2556] ? exc_general_protection+0x25a/0x4b0
[ 1022.722026][ T2556] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30
[ 1022.722489][ T2556] ? skb_dequeue+0x4c/0x80
[ 1022.722854][ T2556] sk_psock_backlog+0x27a/0x300
[ 1022.723243][ T2556] process_one_work+0x2a7/0x5b0
[ 1022.723633][ T2556] worker_thread+0x4f/0x3a0
[ 1022.723998][ T2556] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 1022.724386][ T2556] kthread+0xfd/0x130
[ 1022.724709][ T2556] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 1022.725066][ T2556] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
[ 1022.725409][ T2556] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 1022.725799][ T2556] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
[ 1022.726201][ T2556] </TASK>
To fix we add an skb_get() before passing the skb to be enqueued in the
engress queue. This bumps the skb->users refcnt so that consume_skb()
and kfree_skb will not immediately free the sk_buff. With this we can
be sure the skb is still around when we do the dequeue. Then we just
need to decrement the refcnt or free the skb in the backlog case which
we do by calling kfree_skb() on the ingress case as well as the sendmsg
case.
Before locking change from fixes tag we had the sock locked so we
couldn't race with user and there was no issue here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: ina2xx: avoid NULL pointer dereference on OF device match
The affected lines were resulting in a NULL pointer dereference on our
platform because the device tree contained the following list of
compatible strings:
power-sensor@40 {
compatible = "ti,ina232", "ti,ina231";
...
};
Since the driver doesn't declare a compatible string "ti,ina232", the OF
matching succeeds on "ti,ina231". But the I2C device ID info is
populated via the first compatible string, cf. modalias population in
of_i2c_get_board_info(). Since there is no "ina232" entry in the legacy
I2C device ID table either, the struct i2c_device_id *id pointer in the
probe function is NULL.
Fix this by using the already populated type variable instead, which
points to the proper driver data. Since the name is also wanted, add a
generic one to the ina2xx_config table. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: Avoid use-after-free in dbg for hci_add_adv_monitor()
KSAN reports use-after-free in hci_add_adv_monitor().
While adding an adv monitor,
hci_add_adv_monitor() calls ->
msft_add_monitor_pattern() calls ->
msft_add_monitor_sync() calls ->
msft_le_monitor_advertisement_cb() calls in an error case ->
hci_free_adv_monitor() which frees the *moniter.
This is referenced by bt_dev_dbg() in hci_add_adv_monitor().
Fix the bt_dev_dbg() by using handle instead of monitor->handle. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: Fix xid leak in cifs_copy_file_range()
If the file is used by swap, before return -EOPNOTSUPP, should
free the xid, otherwise, the xid will be leaked. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix warning when putting transaction with qgroups enabled after abort
If we have a transaction abort with qgroups enabled we get a warning
triggered when doing the final put on the transaction, like this:
[552.6789] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[552.6815] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 81745 at fs/btrfs/transaction.c:144 btrfs_put_transaction+0x123/0x130 [btrfs]
[552.6817] Modules linked in: btrfs blake2b_generic xor (...)
[552.6819] CPU: 4 PID: 81745 Comm: btrfs-transacti Tainted: G W 6.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-134+ #1
[552.6819] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[552.6819] RIP: 0010:btrfs_put_transaction+0x123/0x130 [btrfs]
[552.6821] Code: bd a0 01 00 (...)
[552.6821] RSP: 0018:ffffa168c0527e28 EFLAGS: 00010286
[552.6821] RAX: ffff936042caed00 RBX: ffff93604a3eb448 RCX: 0000000000000000
[552.6821] RDX: ffff93606421b028 RSI: ffffffff92ff0878 RDI: ffff93606421b010
[552.6821] RBP: ffff93606421b000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffa168c0d07c20
[552.6821] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff93608dc52950 R12: ffffa168c0527e70
[552.6821] R13: ffff93606421b000 R14: ffff93604a3eb420 R15: ffff93606421b028
[552.6821] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff93675fb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[552.6821] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[552.6821] CR2: 0000558ad262b000 CR3: 000000014feda005 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
[552.6822] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[552.6822] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[552.6822] Call Trace:
[552.6822] <TASK>
[552.6822] ? __warn+0x80/0x130
[552.6822] ? btrfs_put_transaction+0x123/0x130 [btrfs]
[552.6824] ? report_bug+0x1f4/0x200
[552.6824] ? handle_bug+0x42/0x70
[552.6824] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
[552.6824] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[552.6824] ? btrfs_put_transaction+0x123/0x130 [btrfs]
[552.6826] btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0xe7/0x5e0 [btrfs]
[552.6828] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x23/0x40
[552.6828] ? try_to_wake_up+0x94/0x5e0
[552.6828] ? __pfx_process_timeout+0x10/0x10
[552.6828] transaction_kthread+0x103/0x1d0 [btrfs]
[552.6830] ? __pfx_transaction_kthread+0x10/0x10 [btrfs]
[552.6832] kthread+0xee/0x120
[552.6832] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[552.6832] ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50
[552.6832] </TASK>
[552.6832] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
This corresponds to this line of code:
void btrfs_put_transaction(struct btrfs_transaction *transaction)
{
(...)
WARN_ON(!RB_EMPTY_ROOT(
&transaction->delayed_refs.dirty_extent_root));
(...)
}
The warning happens because btrfs_qgroup_destroy_extent_records(), called
in the transaction abort path, we free all entries from the rbtree
"dirty_extent_root" with rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(), but we
don't actually empty the rbtree - it's still pointing to nodes that were
freed.
So set the rbtree's root node to NULL to avoid this warning (assign
RB_ROOT). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netlink: do not hard code device address lenth in fdb dumps
syzbot reports that some netdev devices do not have a six bytes
address [1]
Replace ETH_ALEN by dev->addr_len.
[1] (Case of a device where dev->addr_len = 4)
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in copyout+0xb8/0x100 lib/iov_iter.c:169
instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline]
copyout+0xb8/0x100 lib/iov_iter.c:169
_copy_to_iter+0x6d8/0x1d00 lib/iov_iter.c:536
copy_to_iter include/linux/uio.h:206 [inline]
simple_copy_to_iter+0x68/0xa0 net/core/datagram.c:513
__skb_datagram_iter+0x123/0xdc0 net/core/datagram.c:419
skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x5c/0x200 net/core/datagram.c:527
skb_copy_datagram_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:3960 [inline]
netlink_recvmsg+0x4ae/0x15a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1970
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1019 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1040 [inline]
____sys_recvmsg+0x283/0x7f0 net/socket.c:2722
___sys_recvmsg+0x223/0x840 net/socket.c:2764
do_recvmmsg+0x4f9/0xfd0 net/socket.c:2858
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2937 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2960 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2953 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x397/0x490 net/socket.c:2953
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Uninit was stored to memory at:
__nla_put lib/nlattr.c:1009 [inline]
nla_put+0x1c6/0x230 lib/nlattr.c:1067
nlmsg_populate_fdb_fill+0x2b8/0x600 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4071
nlmsg_populate_fdb net/core/rtnetlink.c:4418 [inline]
ndo_dflt_fdb_dump+0x616/0x840 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4456
rtnl_fdb_dump+0x14ff/0x1fc0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4629
netlink_dump+0x9d1/0x1310 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2268
netlink_recvmsg+0xc5c/0x15a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1995
sock_recvmsg_nosec+0x7a/0x120 net/socket.c:1019
____sys_recvmsg+0x664/0x7f0 net/socket.c:2720
___sys_recvmsg+0x223/0x840 net/socket.c:2764
do_recvmmsg+0x4f9/0xfd0 net/socket.c:2858
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2937 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2960 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2953 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x397/0x490 net/socket.c:2953
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook+0x12d/0xb60 mm/slab.h:716
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3451 [inline]
__kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x4ff/0x8b0 mm/slub.c:3490
kmalloc_trace+0x51/0x200 mm/slab_common.c:1057
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:559 [inline]
__hw_addr_create net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:60 [inline]
__hw_addr_add_ex+0x2e5/0x9e0 net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:118
__dev_mc_add net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:867 [inline]
dev_mc_add+0x9a/0x130 net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:885
igmp6_group_added+0x267/0xbc0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:680
ipv6_mc_up+0x296/0x3b0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2754
ipv6_mc_remap+0x1e/0x30 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2708
addrconf_type_change net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3731 [inline]
addrconf_notify+0x4d3/0x1d90 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3699
notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:93 [inline]
raw_notifier_call_chain+0xe4/0x430 kernel/notifier.c:461
call_netdevice_notifiers_info net/core/dev.c:1935 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1973 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers+0x1ee/0x2d0 net/core/dev.c:1987
bond_enslave+0xccd/0x53f0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:1906
do_set_master net/core/rtnetlink.c:2626 [inline]
rtnl_newlink_create net/core/rtnetlink.c:3460 [inline]
__rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3660 [inline]
rtnl_newlink+0x378c/0x40e0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3673
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x16a6/0x1840 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6395
netlink_rcv_skb+0x371/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2546
rtnetlink_rcv+0x34/0x40 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6413
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1339 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0xf28/0x1230 net/netlink/af_
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix reference state management for synchronous callbacks
Currently, verifier verifies callback functions (sync and async) as if
they will be executed once, (i.e. it explores execution state as if the
function was being called once). The next insn to explore is set to
start of subprog and the exit from nested frame is handled using
curframe > 0 and prepare_func_exit. In case of async callback it uses a
customized variant of push_stack simulating a kind of branch to set up
custom state and execution context for the async callback.
While this approach is simple and works when callback really will be
executed only once, it is unsafe for all of our current helpers which
are for_each style, i.e. they execute the callback multiple times.
A callback releasing acquired references of the caller may do so
multiple times, but currently verifier sees it as one call inside the
frame, which then returns to caller. Hence, it thinks it released some
reference that the cb e.g. got access through callback_ctx (register
filled inside cb from spilled typed register on stack).
Similarly, it may see that an acquire call is unpaired inside the
callback, so the caller will copy the reference state of callback and
then will have to release the register with new ref_obj_ids. But again,
the callback may execute multiple times, but the verifier will only
account for acquired references for a single symbolic execution of the
callback, which will cause leaks.
Note that for async callback case, things are different. While currently
we have bpf_timer_set_callback which only executes it once, even for
multiple executions it would be safe, as reference state is NULL and
check_reference_leak would force program to release state before
BPF_EXIT. The state is also unaffected by analysis for the caller frame.
Hence async callback is safe.
Since we want the reference state to be accessible, e.g. for pointers
loaded from stack through callback_ctx's PTR_TO_STACK, we still have to
copy caller's reference_state to callback's bpf_func_state, but we
enforce that whatever references it adds to that reference_state has
been released before it hits BPF_EXIT. This requires introducing a new
callback_ref member in the reference state to distinguish between caller
vs callee references. Hence, check_reference_leak now errors out if it
sees we are in callback_fn and we have not released callback_ref refs.
Since there can be multiple nested callbacks, like frame 0 -> cb1 -> cb2
etc. we need to also distinguish between whether this particular ref
belongs to this callback frame or parent, and only error for our own, so
we store state->frameno (which is always non-zero for callbacks).
In short, callbacks can read parent reference_state, but cannot mutate
it, to be able to use pointers acquired by the caller. They must only
undo their changes (by releasing their own acquired_refs before
BPF_EXIT) on top of caller reference_state before returning (at which
point the caller and callback state will match anyway, so no need to
copy it back to caller). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ip6_vti: fix slab-use-after-free in decode_session6
When ipv6_vti device is set to the qdisc of the sfb type, the cb field
of the sent skb may be modified during enqueuing. Then,
slab-use-after-free may occur when ipv6_vti device sends IPv6 packets.
The stack information is as follows:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in decode_session6+0x103f/0x1890
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88802e08edc2 by task swapper/0/0
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.4.0-next-20230707-00001-g84e2cad7f979 #410
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1.fc33 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3c0
kasan_report+0x11d/0x130
decode_session6+0x103f/0x1890
__xfrm_decode_session+0x54/0xb0
vti6_tnl_xmit+0x3e6/0x1ee0
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x187/0x700
sch_direct_xmit+0x1a3/0xc30
__qdisc_run+0x510/0x17a0
__dev_queue_xmit+0x2215/0x3b10
neigh_connected_output+0x3c2/0x550
ip6_finish_output2+0x55a/0x1550
ip6_finish_output+0x6b9/0x1270
ip6_output+0x1f1/0x540
ndisc_send_skb+0xa63/0x1890
ndisc_send_rs+0x132/0x6f0
addrconf_rs_timer+0x3f1/0x870
call_timer_fn+0x1a0/0x580
expire_timers+0x29b/0x4b0
run_timer_softirq+0x326/0x910
__do_softirq+0x1d4/0x905
irq_exit_rcu+0xb7/0x120
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x97/0xc0
</IRQ>
Allocated by task 9176:
kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x7f/0x90
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1cd/0x410
kmalloc_reserve+0x165/0x270
__alloc_skb+0x129/0x330
netlink_sendmsg+0x9b1/0xe30
sock_sendmsg+0xde/0x190
____sys_sendmsg+0x739/0x920
___sys_sendmsg+0x110/0x1b0
__sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x1c0
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Freed by task 9176:
kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x40
____kasan_slab_free+0x160/0x1c0
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x11b/0x220
kmem_cache_free+0xf0/0x490
skb_free_head+0x17f/0x1b0
skb_release_data+0x59c/0x850
consume_skb+0xd2/0x170
netlink_unicast+0x54f/0x7f0
netlink_sendmsg+0x926/0xe30
sock_sendmsg+0xde/0x190
____sys_sendmsg+0x739/0x920
___sys_sendmsg+0x110/0x1b0
__sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x1c0
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802e08ed00
which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 640
The buggy address is located 194 bytes inside of
freed 640-byte region [ffff88802e08ed00, ffff88802e08ef80)
As commit f855691975bb ("xfrm6: Fix the nexthdr offset in
_decode_session6.") showed, xfrm_decode_session was originally intended
only for the receive path. IP6CB(skb)->nhoff is not set during
transmission. Therefore, set the cb field in the skb to 0 before
sending packets. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mmc: atmel-mci: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
mmc_add_host() may return error, if we ignore its return value,
it will lead two issues:
1. The memory that allocated in mmc_alloc_host() is leaked.
2. In the remove() path, mmc_remove_host() will be called to
delete device, but it's not added yet, it will lead a kernel
crash because of null-ptr-deref in device_del().
So fix this by checking the return value and calling mmc_free_host()
in the error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HSI: omap_ssi: Fix refcount leak in ssi_probe
When returning or breaking early from a
for_each_available_child_of_node() loop, we need to explicitly call
of_node_put() on the child node to possibly release the node. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm: fix workqueue leak on bind errors
Make sure to destroy the workqueue also in case of early errors during
bind (e.g. a subcomponent failing to bind).
Since commit c3b790ea07a1 ("drm: Manage drm_mode_config_init with
drmm_") the mode config will be freed when the drm device is released
also when using the legacy interface, but add an explicit cleanup for
consistency and to facilitate backporting.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/525093/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: early: xhci-dbc: Fix a potential out-of-bound memory access
If xdbc_bulk_write() fails, the values in 'buf' can be anything. So the
string is not guaranteed to be NULL terminated when xdbc_trace() is called.
Reserve an extra byte, which will be zeroed automatically because 'buf' is
a static variable, in order to avoid troubles, should it happen. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netlink: annotate lockless accesses to nlk->max_recvmsg_len
syzbot reported a data-race in data-race in netlink_recvmsg() [1]
Indeed, netlink_recvmsg() can be run concurrently,
and netlink_dump() also needs protection.
[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in netlink_recvmsg / netlink_recvmsg
read to 0xffff888141840b38 of 8 bytes by task 23057 on cpu 0:
netlink_recvmsg+0xea/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1988
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1017 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1038 [inline]
__sys_recvfrom+0x1ee/0x2e0 net/socket.c:2194
__do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2212 [inline]
__se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2208 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvfrom+0x78/0x90 net/socket.c:2208
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
write to 0xffff888141840b38 of 8 bytes by task 23037 on cpu 1:
netlink_recvmsg+0x114/0x730 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1989
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1017 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1038 [inline]
____sys_recvmsg+0x156/0x310 net/socket.c:2720
___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2762 [inline]
do_recvmmsg+0x2e5/0x710 net/socket.c:2856
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2935 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2958 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2951 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xe2/0x160 net/socket.c:2951
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
value changed: 0x0000000000000000 -> 0x0000000000001000
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 23037 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc4-syzkaller-00195-g5a57b48fdfcb #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/02/2023 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-core: fix memory leak in dhchap_ctrl_secret
Free dhchap_secret in nvme_ctrl_dhchap_ctrl_secret_store() before we
return when nvme_auth_generate_key() returns error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dccp: Fix out of bounds access in DCCP error handler
There was a previous attempt to fix an out-of-bounds access in the DCCP
error handlers, but that fix assumed that the error handlers only want
to access the first 8 bytes of the DCCP header. Actually, they also look
at the DCCP sequence number, which is stored beyond 8 bytes, so an
explicit pskb_may_pull() is required. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drivers: perf: marvell_cn10k: Fix hotplug callback leak in tad_pmu_init()
tad_pmu_init() won't remove the callback added by cpuhp_setup_state_multi()
when platform_driver_register() failed. Remove the callback by
cpuhp_remove_multi_state() in fail path.
Similar to the handling of arm_ccn_init() in commit 26242b330093 ("bus:
arm-ccn: Prevent hotplug callback leak") |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm: bridge: dw_hdmi: fix connector access for scdc
Commit 5d844091f237 ("drm/scdc-helper: Pimp SCDC debugs") changed the scdc
interface to pick up an i2c adapter from a connector instead. However, in
the case of dw-hdmi, the wrong connector was being used to pass i2c adapter
information, since dw-hdmi's embedded connector structure is only populated
when the bridge attachment callback explicitly asks for it.
drm-meson is handling connector creation, so this won't happen, leading to
a NULL pointer dereference.
Fix it by having scdc functions access dw-hdmi's current connector pointer
instead, which is assigned during the bridge enablement stage.
[narmstrong: moved Fixes tag before first S-o-b and added Reported-by tag] |
