| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| If Windows failed to duplicate a handle during process creation, the sandbox code may have inadvertently freed a pointer twice, resulting in a use-after-free and a potentially exploitable crash.
*This bug only affects Firefox on Windows when run in non-standard configurations (such as using `runas`). Other operating systems are unaffected.* This vulnerability affects Firefox < 118, Firefox ESR < 115.3, and Thunderbird < 115.3. |
| A use after free issue was addressed with improved memory management. This issue is fixed in macOS Ventura 13, iOS 16.1 and iPadOS 16, Safari 16.1. Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to arbitrary code execution. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: endpoint: Fix PCI domain ID release in pci_epc_destroy()
pci_epc_destroy() invokes pci_bus_release_domain_nr() to release the PCI
domain ID, but there are two issues:
- 'epc->dev' is passed to pci_bus_release_domain_nr() which was already
freed by device_unregister(), leading to a use-after-free issue.
- Domain ID corresponds to the EPC device parent, so passing 'epc->dev'
is also wrong.
Fix these issues by passing 'epc->dev.parent' to
pci_bus_release_domain_nr() and also do it before device_unregister().
[mani: reworded subject and description] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: microchip: vcap api: Fix memory leaks in vcap_api_encode_rule_test()
Commit a3c1e45156ad ("net: microchip: vcap: Fix use-after-free error in
kunit test") fixed the use-after-free error, but introduced below
memory leaks by removing necessary vcap_free_rule(), add it to fix it.
unreferenced object 0xffffff80ca58b700 (size 192):
comm "kunit_try_catch", pid 1215, jiffies 4294898264
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 12 7a 00 05 00 00 00 0a 00 00 00 64 00 00 00 ..z.........d...
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 0b cc 80 ff ff ff ................
backtrace (crc 9c09c3fe):
[<0000000052a0be73>] kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40
[<0000000043605459>] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x26c/0x2f4
[<0000000040a01b8d>] vcap_alloc_rule+0x3cc/0x9c4
[<000000003fe86110>] vcap_api_encode_rule_test+0x1ac/0x16b0
[<00000000b3595fc4>] kunit_try_run_case+0x13c/0x3ac
[<0000000010f5d2bf>] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x80/0xec
[<00000000c5d82c9a>] kthread+0x2e8/0x374
[<00000000f4287308>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
unreferenced object 0xffffff80cc0b0400 (size 64):
comm "kunit_try_catch", pid 1215, jiffies 4294898265
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
80 04 0b cc 80 ff ff ff 18 b7 58 ca 80 ff ff ff ..........X.....
39 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 06 05 04 03 02 01 ff ff 9...............
backtrace (crc daf014e9):
[<0000000052a0be73>] kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40
[<0000000043605459>] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x26c/0x2f4
[<000000000ff63fd4>] vcap_rule_add_key+0x2cc/0x528
[<00000000dfdb1e81>] vcap_api_encode_rule_test+0x224/0x16b0
[<00000000b3595fc4>] kunit_try_run_case+0x13c/0x3ac
[<0000000010f5d2bf>] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x80/0xec
[<00000000c5d82c9a>] kthread+0x2e8/0x374
[<00000000f4287308>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
unreferenced object 0xffffff80cc0b0700 (size 64):
comm "kunit_try_catch", pid 1215, jiffies 4294898265
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
80 07 0b cc 80 ff ff ff 28 b7 58 ca 80 ff ff ff ........(.X.....
3c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 2f 03 b3 ec ff ff ff <......../......
backtrace (crc 8d877792):
[<0000000052a0be73>] kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40
[<0000000043605459>] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x26c/0x2f4
[<000000006eadfab7>] vcap_rule_add_action+0x2d0/0x52c
[<00000000323475d1>] vcap_api_encode_rule_test+0x4d4/0x16b0
[<00000000b3595fc4>] kunit_try_run_case+0x13c/0x3ac
[<0000000010f5d2bf>] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x80/0xec
[<00000000c5d82c9a>] kthread+0x2e8/0x374
[<00000000f4287308>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
unreferenced object 0xffffff80cc0b0900 (size 64):
comm "kunit_try_catch", pid 1215, jiffies 4294898266
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
80 09 0b cc 80 ff ff ff 80 06 0b cc 80 ff ff ff ................
7d 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff 00 00 00 }...............
backtrace (crc 34181e56):
[<0000000052a0be73>] kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40
[<0000000043605459>] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x26c/0x2f4
[<000000000ff63fd4>] vcap_rule_add_key+0x2cc/0x528
[<00000000991e3564>] vcap_val_rule+0xcf0/0x13e8
[<00000000fc9868e5>] vcap_api_encode_rule_test+0x678/0x16b0
[<00000000b3595fc4>] kunit_try_run_case+0x13c/0x3ac
[<0000000010f5d2bf>] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x80/0xec
[<00000000c5d82c9a>] kthread+0x2e8/0x374
[<00000000f4287308>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
unreferenced object 0xffffff80cc0b0980 (size 64):
comm "kunit_try_catch", pid 1215, jiffies 4294898266
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
18 b7 58 ca 80 ff ff ff 00 09 0b cc 80 ff ff ff ..X.............
67 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 01 74 88 c0 ff ff ff g.........t.....
backtrace (crc 275fd9be):
[<0000000052a0be73>] kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40
[<0000000043605459>] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x26c/0x2f4
[<000000000ff63fd4>] vcap_rule_add_key+0x2cc/0x528
[<000000001396a1a2>] test_add_de
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Don't return OOB skb in manage_oob().
syzbot reported use-after-free in unix_stream_recv_urg(). [0]
The scenario is
1. send(MSG_OOB)
2. recv(MSG_OOB)
-> The consumed OOB remains in recv queue
3. send(MSG_OOB)
4. recv()
-> manage_oob() returns the next skb of the consumed OOB
-> This is also OOB, but unix_sk(sk)->oob_skb is not cleared
5. recv(MSG_OOB)
-> unix_sk(sk)->oob_skb is used but already freed
The recent commit 8594d9b85c07 ("af_unix: Don't call skb_get() for OOB
skb.") uncovered the issue.
If the OOB skb is consumed and the next skb is peeked in manage_oob(),
we still need to check if the skb is OOB.
Let's do so by falling back to the following checks in manage_oob()
and add the test case in selftest.
Note that we need to add a similar check for SIOCATMARK.
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in unix_stream_read_actor+0xa6/0xb0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2959
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880326abcc4 by task syz-executor178/5235
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5235 Comm: syz-executor178 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc5-syzkaller-00742-gfbdaffe41adc #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
unix_stream_read_actor+0xa6/0xb0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2959
unix_stream_recv_urg+0x1df/0x320 net/unix/af_unix.c:2640
unix_stream_read_generic+0x2456/0x2520 net/unix/af_unix.c:2778
unix_stream_recvmsg+0x22b/0x2c0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2996
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1046 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0x22f/0x280 net/socket.c:1068
____sys_recvmsg+0x1db/0x470 net/socket.c:2816
___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2858 [inline]
__sys_recvmsg+0x2f0/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2888
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f5360d6b4e9
Code: 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 37 17 00 00 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fff29b3a458 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fff29b3a638 RCX: 00007f5360d6b4e9
RDX: 0000000000002001 RSI: 0000000020000640 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f5360dde610 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 00007fff29b3a628 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001
</TASK>
Allocated by task 5235:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:312 [inline]
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x66/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:338
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3988 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4037 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x16b/0x320 mm/slub.c:4080
__alloc_skb+0x1c3/0x440 net/core/skbuff.c:667
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1320 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc3/0x770 net/core/skbuff.c:6528
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x91a/0xa60 net/core/sock.c:2815
sock_alloc_send_skb include/net/sock.h:1778 [inline]
queue_oob+0x108/0x680 net/unix/af_unix.c:2198
unix_stream_sendmsg+0xd24/0xf80 net/unix/af_unix.c:2351
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2597
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2651 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2680
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 5235:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix a potential use-after-free in bpf_link_free()
After commit 1a80dbcb2dba, bpf_link can be freed by
link->ops->dealloc_deferred, but the code still tests and uses
link->ops->dealloc afterward, which leads to a use-after-free as
reported by syzbot. Actually, one of them should be sufficient, so
just call one of them instead of both. Also add a WARN_ON() in case
of any problematic implementation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7921e: fix use-after-free in free_irq()
From commit a304e1b82808 ("[PATCH] Debug shared irqs"), there is a test
to make sure the shared irq handler should be able to handle the unexpected
event after deregistration. For this case, let's apply MT76_REMOVED flag to
indicate the device was removed and do not run into the resource access
anymore.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mt7921_irq_handler+0xd8/0x100 [mt7921e]
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88824a7d3b78 by task rmmod/11115
CPU: 28 PID: 11115 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G W L 5.17.0 #10
Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7D73/MPG B650I
EDGE WIFI (MS-7D73), BIOS 1.81 01/05/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xa0
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x190
? mt7921_irq_handler+0xd8/0x100 [mt7921e]
? mt7921_irq_handler+0xd8/0x100 [mt7921e]
kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
? mt7921_irq_handler+0xd8/0x100 [mt7921e]
mt7921_irq_handler+0xd8/0x100 [mt7921e]
free_irq+0x627/0xaa0
devm_free_irq+0x94/0xd0
? devm_request_any_context_irq+0x160/0x160
? kobject_put+0x18d/0x4a0
mt7921_pci_remove+0x153/0x190 [mt7921e]
pci_device_remove+0xa2/0x1d0
__device_release_driver+0x346/0x6e0
driver_detach+0x1ef/0x2c0
bus_remove_driver+0xe7/0x2d0
? __check_object_size+0x57/0x310
pci_unregister_driver+0x26/0x250
__do_sys_delete_module+0x307/0x510
? free_module+0x6a0/0x6a0
? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x4b/0xb0
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x10/0x70
? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x20/0x70
? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x130
do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x80
? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x72/0x160
? do_syscall_64+0x68/0x80
? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x72/0x160
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix double free of anonymous device after snapshot creation failure
When creating a snapshot we may do a double free of an anonymous device
in case there's an error committing the transaction. The second free may
result in freeing an anonymous device number that was allocated by some
other subsystem in the kernel or another btrfs filesystem.
The steps that lead to this:
1) At ioctl.c:create_snapshot() we allocate an anonymous device number
and assign it to pending_snapshot->anon_dev;
2) Then we call btrfs_commit_transaction() and end up at
transaction.c:create_pending_snapshot();
3) There we call btrfs_get_new_fs_root() and pass it the anonymous device
number stored in pending_snapshot->anon_dev;
4) btrfs_get_new_fs_root() frees that anonymous device number because
btrfs_lookup_fs_root() returned a root - someone else did a lookup
of the new root already, which could some task doing backref walking;
5) After that some error happens in the transaction commit path, and at
ioctl.c:create_snapshot() we jump to the 'fail' label, and after
that we free again the same anonymous device number, which in the
meanwhile may have been reallocated somewhere else, because
pending_snapshot->anon_dev still has the same value as in step 1.
Recently syzbot ran into this and reported the following trace:
------------[ cut here ]------------
ida_free called for id=51 which is not allocated.
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 31038 at lib/idr.c:525 ida_free+0x370/0x420 lib/idr.c:525
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 31038 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-00410-gc02197fc9076 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024
RIP: 0010:ida_free+0x370/0x420 lib/idr.c:525
Code: 10 42 80 3c 28 (...)
RSP: 0018:ffffc90015a67300 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: be5130472f5dd000 RBX: 0000000000000033 RCX: 0000000000040000
RDX: ffffc90009a7a000 RSI: 000000000003ffff RDI: 0000000000040000
RBP: ffffc90015a673f0 R08: ffffffff81577992 R09: 1ffff92002b4cdb4
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff52002b4cdb5 R12: 0000000000000246
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffffffff8e256b80 R15: 0000000000000246
FS: 00007fca3f4b46c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f167a17b978 CR3: 000000001ed26000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
btrfs_get_root_ref+0xa48/0xaf0 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1346
create_pending_snapshot+0xff2/0x2bc0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1837
create_pending_snapshots+0x195/0x1d0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1931
btrfs_commit_transaction+0xf1c/0x3740 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2404
create_snapshot+0x507/0x880 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:848
btrfs_mksubvol+0x5d0/0x750 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:998
btrfs_mksnapshot+0xb5/0xf0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1044
__btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x387/0x4b0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1306
btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x1ca/0x400 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1393
btrfs_ioctl+0xa74/0xd40
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:871 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xfe/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:857
do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77
RIP: 0033:0x7fca3e67dda9
Code: 28 00 00 00 (...)
RSP: 002b:00007fca3f4b40c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fca3e7abf80 RCX: 00007fca3e67dda9
RDX: 00000000200005c0 RSI: 0000000050009417 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fca3e6ca47a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fca3e7abf80 R15: 00007fff6bf95658
</TASK>
Where we get an explicit message where we attempt to free an anonymous
device number that is not currently allocated. It happens in a different
code path from the example below, at btrfs_get_root_ref(), so this change
may not fix the case triggered by sy
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
inet: read sk->sk_family once in inet_recv_error()
inet_recv_error() is called without holding the socket lock.
IPv6 socket could mutate to IPv4 with IPV6_ADDRFORM
socket option and trigger a KCSAN warning. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: fix UaF in netns ops registration error path
If net_assign_generic() fails, the current error path in ops_init() tries
to clear the gen pointer slot. Anyway, in such error path, the gen pointer
itself has not been modified yet, and the existing and accessed one is
smaller than the accessed index, causing an out-of-bounds error:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ops_init+0x2de/0x320
Write of size 8 at addr ffff888109124978 by task modprobe/1018
CPU: 2 PID: 1018 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.2.0-rc2.mptcp_ae5ac65fbed5+ #1641
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x6a/0x9f
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x86/0x2b5
print_report+0x11b/0x1fb
kasan_report+0x87/0xc0
ops_init+0x2de/0x320
register_pernet_operations+0x2e4/0x750
register_pernet_subsys+0x24/0x40
tcf_register_action+0x9f/0x560
do_one_initcall+0xf9/0x570
do_init_module+0x190/0x650
load_module+0x1fa5/0x23c0
__do_sys_finit_module+0x10d/0x1b0
do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
RIP: 0033:0x7f42518f778d
Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48
89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff
ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d cb 56 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fff96869688 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005568ef7f7c90 RCX: 00007f42518f778d
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005568ef41d796 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00005568ef41d796 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00005568ef7f7d30 R14: 0000000000040000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
This change addresses the issue by skipping the gen pointer
de-reference in the mentioned error-path.
Found by code inspection and verified with explicit error injection
on a kasan-enabled kernel. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block, bfq: fix uaf for bfqq in bic_set_bfqq()
After commit 64dc8c732f5c ("block, bfq: fix possible uaf for 'bfqq->bic'"),
bic->bfqq will be accessed in bic_set_bfqq(), however, in some context
bic->bfqq will be freed, and bic_set_bfqq() is called with the freed
bic->bfqq.
Fix the problem by always freeing bfqq after bic_set_bfqq(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
padata: Fix refcnt handling in padata_free_shell()
In a high-load arm64 environment, the pcrypt_aead01 test in LTP can lead
to system UAF (Use-After-Free) issues. Due to the lengthy analysis of
the pcrypt_aead01 function call, I'll describe the problem scenario
using a simplified model:
Suppose there's a user of padata named `user_function` that adheres to
the padata requirement of calling `padata_free_shell` after `serial()`
has been invoked, as demonstrated in the following code:
```c
struct request {
struct padata_priv padata;
struct completion *done;
};
void parallel(struct padata_priv *padata) {
do_something();
}
void serial(struct padata_priv *padata) {
struct request *request = container_of(padata,
struct request,
padata);
complete(request->done);
}
void user_function() {
DECLARE_COMPLETION(done)
padata->parallel = parallel;
padata->serial = serial;
padata_do_parallel();
wait_for_completion(&done);
padata_free_shell();
}
```
In the corresponding padata.c file, there's the following code:
```c
static void padata_serial_worker(struct work_struct *serial_work) {
...
cnt = 0;
while (!list_empty(&local_list)) {
...
padata->serial(padata);
cnt++;
}
local_bh_enable();
if (refcount_sub_and_test(cnt, &pd->refcnt))
padata_free_pd(pd);
}
```
Because of the high system load and the accumulation of unexecuted
softirq at this moment, `local_bh_enable()` in padata takes longer
to execute than usual. Subsequently, when accessing `pd->refcnt`,
`pd` has already been released by `padata_free_shell()`, resulting
in a UAF issue with `pd->refcnt`.
The fix is straightforward: add `refcount_dec_and_test` before calling
`padata_free_pd` in `padata_free_shell`. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: imsttfb: fix a resource leak in probe
I've re-written the error handling but the bug is that if init_imstt()
fails we need to call iounmap(par->cmap_regs). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "tty: n_gsm: fix UAF in gsm_cleanup_mux"
This reverts commit 9b9c8195f3f0d74a826077fc1c01b9ee74907239.
The commit above is reverted as it did not solve the original issue.
gsm_cleanup_mux() tries to free up the virtual ttys by calling
gsm_dlci_release() for each available DLCI. There, dlci_put() is called to
decrease the reference counter for the DLCI via tty_port_put() which
finally calls gsm_dlci_free(). This already clears the pointer which is
being checked in gsm_cleanup_mux() before calling gsm_dlci_release().
Therefore, it is not necessary to clear this pointer in gsm_cleanup_mux()
as done in the reverted commit. The commit introduces a null pointer
dereference:
<TASK>
? __die+0x1f/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x156/0x420
? search_exception_tables+0x37/0x50
? fixup_exception+0x21/0x310
? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x150
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
? tty_port_put+0x19/0xa0
gsmtty_cleanup+0x29/0x80 [n_gsm]
release_one_tty+0x37/0xe0
process_one_work+0x1e6/0x3e0
worker_thread+0x4c/0x3d0
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xe1/0x110
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
</TASK>
The actual issue is that nothing guards dlci_put() from being called
multiple times while the tty driver was triggered but did not yet finished
calling gsm_dlci_free(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: nfc: llcp: Add lock when modifying device list
The device list needs its associated lock held when modifying it, or the
list could become corrupted, as syzbot discovered. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
serial: 8250: omap: Don't skip resource freeing if pm_runtime_resume_and_get() failed
Returning an error code from .remove() makes the driver core emit the
little helpful error message:
remove callback returned a non-zero value. This will be ignored.
and then remove the device anyhow. So all resources that were not freed
are leaked in this case. Skipping serial8250_unregister_port() has the
potential to keep enough of the UART around to trigger a use-after-free.
So replace the error return (and with it the little helpful error
message) by a more useful error message and continue to cleanup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
uio: Fix use-after-free in uio_open
core-1 core-2
-------------------------------------------------------
uio_unregister_device uio_open
idev = idr_find()
device_unregister(&idev->dev)
put_device(&idev->dev)
uio_device_release
get_device(&idev->dev)
kfree(idev)
uio_free_minor(minor)
uio_release
put_device(&idev->dev)
kfree(idev)
-------------------------------------------------------
In the core-1 uio_unregister_device(), the device_unregister will kfree
idev when the idev->dev kobject ref is 1. But after core-1
device_unregister, put_device and before doing kfree, the core-2 may
get_device. Then:
1. After core-1 kfree idev, the core-2 will do use-after-free for idev.
2. When core-2 do uio_release and put_device, the idev will be double
freed.
To address this issue, we can get idev atomic & inc idev reference with
minor_lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix use-after-free Read in tipc_named_reinit
syzbot found the following issue on:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tipc_named_reinit+0x94f/0x9b0
net/tipc/name_distr.c:413
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88805299a000 by task kworker/1:9/23764
CPU: 1 PID: 23764 Comm: kworker/1:9 Not tainted
5.18.0-rc4-syzkaller-00878-g17d49e6e8012 #0
Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine,
BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events tipc_net_finalize_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xeb/0x495
mm/kasan/report.c:313
print_report mm/kasan/report.c:429 [inline]
kasan_report.cold+0xf4/0x1c6 mm/kasan/report.c:491
tipc_named_reinit+0x94f/0x9b0 net/tipc/name_distr.c:413
tipc_net_finalize+0x234/0x3d0 net/tipc/net.c:138
process_one_work+0x996/0x1610 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
worker_thread+0x665/0x1080 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
kthread+0x2e9/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:298
</TASK>
[...]
==================================================================
In the commit
d966ddcc3821 ("tipc: fix a deadlock when flushing scheduled work"),
the cancel_work_sync() function just to make sure ONLY the work
tipc_net_finalize_work() is executing/pending on any CPU completed before
tipc namespace is destroyed through tipc_exit_net(). But this function
is not guaranteed the work is the last queued. So, the destroyed instance
may be accessed in the work which will try to enqueue later.
In order to completely fix, we re-order the calling of cancel_work_sync()
to make sure the work tipc_net_finalize_work() was last queued and it
must be completed by calling cancel_work_sync(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFC: NULL out the dev->rfkill to prevent UAF
Commit 3e3b5dfcd16a ("NFC: reorder the logic in nfc_{un,}register_device")
assumes the device_is_registered() in function nfc_dev_up() will help
to check when the rfkill is unregistered. However, this check only
take effect when device_del(&dev->dev) is done in nfc_unregister_device().
Hence, the rfkill object is still possible be dereferenced.
The crash trace in latest kernel (5.18-rc2):
[ 68.760105] ==================================================================
[ 68.760330] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x3ec1/0x6750
[ 68.760756] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888009c93018 by task fuzz/313
[ 68.760756]
[ 68.760756] CPU: 0 PID: 313 Comm: fuzz Not tainted 5.18.0-rc2 #4
[ 68.760756] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 68.760756] Call Trace:
[ 68.760756] <TASK>
[ 68.760756] dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d
[ 68.760756] print_report.cold+0x5e/0x5db
[ 68.760756] ? __lock_acquire+0x3ec1/0x6750
[ 68.760756] kasan_report+0xbe/0x1c0
[ 68.760756] ? __lock_acquire+0x3ec1/0x6750
[ 68.760756] __lock_acquire+0x3ec1/0x6750
[ 68.760756] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x410/0x410
[ 68.760756] ? register_lock_class+0x18d0/0x18d0
[ 68.760756] lock_acquire+0x1ac/0x4f0
[ 68.760756] ? rfkill_blocked+0xe/0x60
[ 68.760756] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x410/0x410
[ 68.760756] ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x12c0/0x12c0
[ 68.760756] ? nla_get_range_signed+0x540/0x540
[ 68.760756] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4e/0x50
[ 68.760756] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x39/0x50
[ 68.760756] ? rfkill_blocked+0xe/0x60
[ 68.760756] rfkill_blocked+0xe/0x60
[ 68.760756] nfc_dev_up+0x84/0x260
[ 68.760756] nfc_genl_dev_up+0x90/0xe0
[ 68.760756] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1f4/0x2f0
[ 68.760756] ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.constprop.0+0x230/0x230
[ 68.760756] ? security_capable+0x51/0x90
[ 68.760756] genl_rcv_msg+0x280/0x500
[ 68.760756] ? genl_get_cmd+0x3c0/0x3c0
[ 68.760756] ? lock_acquire+0x1ac/0x4f0
[ 68.760756] ? nfc_genl_dev_down+0xe0/0xe0
[ 68.760756] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x410/0x410
[ 68.760756] netlink_rcv_skb+0x11b/0x340
[ 68.760756] ? genl_get_cmd+0x3c0/0x3c0
[ 68.760756] ? netlink_ack+0x9c0/0x9c0
[ 68.760756] ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x136/0xb00
[ 68.760756] genl_rcv+0x1f/0x30
[ 68.760756] netlink_unicast+0x430/0x710
[ 68.760756] ? memset+0x20/0x40
[ 68.760756] ? netlink_attachskb+0x740/0x740
[ 68.760756] ? __build_skb_around+0x1f4/0x2a0
[ 68.760756] netlink_sendmsg+0x75d/0xc00
[ 68.760756] ? netlink_unicast+0x710/0x710
[ 68.760756] ? netlink_unicast+0x710/0x710
[ 68.760756] sock_sendmsg+0xdf/0x110
[ 68.760756] __sys_sendto+0x19e/0x270
[ 68.760756] ? __ia32_sys_getpeername+0xa0/0xa0
[ 68.760756] ? fd_install+0x178/0x4c0
[ 68.760756] ? fd_install+0x195/0x4c0
[ 68.760756] ? kernel_fpu_begin_mask+0x1c0/0x1c0
[ 68.760756] __x64_sys_sendto+0xd8/0x1b0
[ 68.760756] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0xbf/0x130
[ 68.760756] ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1d/0x50
[ 68.760756] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 68.760756] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 68.760756] RIP: 0033:0x7f67fb50e6b3
...
[ 68.760756] RSP: 002b:00007f67fa91fe90 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[ 68.760756] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f67fb50e6b3
[ 68.760756] RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000559354603090 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 68.760756] RBP: 00007f67fa91ff00 R08: 00007f67fa91fedc R09: 000000000000000c
[ 68.760756] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007ffe824d496e
[ 68.760756] R13: 00007ffe824d496f R14: 00007f67fa120000 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 68.760756] </TASK>
[ 68.760756]
[ 68.760756] Allocated by task 279:
[ 68.760756] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
[
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: fix dangling sco_conn and use-after-free in sco_sock_timeout
Connecting the same socket twice consecutively in sco_sock_connect()
could lead to a race condition where two sco_conn objects are created
but only one is associated with the socket. If the socket is closed
before the SCO connection is established, the timer associated with the
dangling sco_conn object won't be canceled. As the sock object is being
freed, the use-after-free problem happens when the timer callback
function sco_sock_timeout() accesses the socket. Here's the call trace:
dump_stack+0x107/0x163
? refcount_inc+0x1c/
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1c/0x47e
? refcount_inc+0x1c/0x7b
kasan_report+0x13a/0x173
? refcount_inc+0x1c/0x7b
check_memory_region+0x132/0x139
refcount_inc+0x1c/0x7b
sco_sock_timeout+0xb2/0x1ba
process_one_work+0x739/0xbd1
? cancel_delayed_work+0x13f/0x13f
? __raw_spin_lock_init+0xf0/0xf0
? to_kthread+0x59/0x85
worker_thread+0x593/0x70e
kthread+0x346/0x35a
? drain_workqueue+0x31a/0x31a
? kthread_bind+0x4b/0x4b
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 |
