| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fsdax: force clear dirty mark if CoW
XFS allows CoW on non-shared extents to combat fragmentation[1]. The old
non-shared extent could be mwrited before, its dax entry is marked dirty.
This results in a WARNing:
[ 28.512349] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 28.512622] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 5255 at fs/dax.c:390 dax_insert_entry+0x342/0x390
[ 28.513050] Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 nfs lockd grace fscache netfs nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set nf_tables
[ 28.515462] CPU: 2 PID: 5255 Comm: fsstress Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.3.0-rc1-00001-g85e1481e19c1-dirty #117
[ 28.515902] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.1-1-1 04/01/2014
[ 28.516307] RIP: 0010:dax_insert_entry+0x342/0x390
[ 28.516536] Code: 30 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 cc cc cc cc 48 8b 45 20 48 83 c0 01 e9 e2 fe ff ff 48 8b 45 20 48 83 c0 01 e9 cd fe ff ff <0f> 0b e9 53 ff ff ff 48 8b 7c 24 08 31 f6 e8 1b 61 a1 00 eb 8c 48
[ 28.517417] RSP: 0000:ffffc9000845fb18 EFLAGS: 00010086
[ 28.517721] RAX: 0000000000000053 RBX: 0000000000000155 RCX: 000000000018824b
[ 28.518113] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff827525a6 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[ 28.518515] RBP: ffffea00062092c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc9000845f9c8
[ 28.518905] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffffff82ddb7e8 R12: 0000000000000155
[ 28.519301] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000018824b R15: ffff88810cfa76b8
[ 28.519703] FS: 00007f14a0c94740(0000) GS:ffff88817bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 28.520148] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 28.520472] CR2: 00007f14a0c8d000 CR3: 000000010321c004 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[ 28.520863] PKRU: 55555554
[ 28.521043] Call Trace:
[ 28.521219] <TASK>
[ 28.521368] dax_fault_iter+0x196/0x390
[ 28.521595] dax_iomap_pte_fault+0x19b/0x3d0
[ 28.521852] __xfs_filemap_fault+0x234/0x2b0
[ 28.522116] __do_fault+0x30/0x130
[ 28.522334] do_fault+0x193/0x340
[ 28.522586] __handle_mm_fault+0x2d3/0x690
[ 28.522975] handle_mm_fault+0xe6/0x2c0
[ 28.523259] do_user_addr_fault+0x1bc/0x6f0
[ 28.523521] exc_page_fault+0x60/0x140
[ 28.523763] asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[ 28.524001] RIP: 0033:0x7f14a0b589ca
[ 28.524225] Code: c5 fe 7f 07 c5 fe 7f 47 20 c5 fe 7f 47 40 c5 fe 7f 47 60 c5 f8 77 c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 40 0f b6 c6 48 89 d1 48 89 fa <f3> aa 48 89 d0 c5 f8 77 c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90
[ 28.525198] RSP: 002b:00007fff1dea1c98 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 28.525505] RAX: 000000000000001e RBX: 000000000014a000 RCX: 0000000000006046
[ 28.525895] RDX: 00007f14a0c82000 RSI: 000000000000001e RDI: 00007f14a0c8d000
[ 28.526290] RBP: 000000000000006f R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 000000000014a000
[ 28.526681] R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 028f5c28f5c28f5c
[ 28.527067] R13: 8f5c28f5c28f5c29 R14: 0000000000011046 R15: 00007f14a0c946c0
[ 28.527449] </TASK>
[ 28.527600] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
To be able to delete this entry, clear its dirty mark before
invalidate_inode_pages2_range().
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-xfs/20230321151339.GA11376@frogsfrogsfrogs/ |
| osCommerce versions up to and including 2.2 RC2a contain a vulnerability in its administrative file manager utility (admin/file_manager.php). The interface allows file uploads and edits without sufficient input validation or access control. An unauthenticated attacker can craft a POST request to upload a .php file containing arbitrary code, which is then executed by the server. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
efi: stmm: Fix incorrect buffer allocation method
The communication buffer allocated by setup_mm_hdr() is later on passed
to tee_shm_register_kernel_buf(). The latter expects those buffers to be
contiguous pages, but setup_mm_hdr() just uses kmalloc(). That can cause
various corruptions or BUGs, specifically since commit 9aec2fb0fd5e
("slab: allocate frozen pages"), though it was broken before as well.
Fix this by using alloc_pages_exact() instead of kmalloc(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: Fix SKB corruption in REO destination ring
While running traffics for a long time, randomly an RX descriptor
filled with value "0" from REO destination ring is received.
This descriptor which is invalid causes the wrong SKB (SKB stored in
the IDR lookup with buffer id "0") to be fetched which in turn
causes SKB memory corruption issue and the same leads to crash
after some time.
Changed the start id for idr allocation to "1" and the buffer id "0"
is reserved for error validation. Introduced Sanity check to validate
the descriptor, before processing the SKB.
Crash Signature :
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 3f004900
PC points to "b15_dma_inv_range+0x30/0x50"
LR points to "dma_cache_maint_page+0x8c/0x128".
The Backtrace obtained is as follows:
[<8031716c>] (b15_dma_inv_range) from [<80313a4c>] (dma_cache_maint_page+0x8c/0x128)
[<80313a4c>] (dma_cache_maint_page) from [<80313b90>] (__dma_page_dev_to_cpu+0x28/0xcc)
[<80313b90>] (__dma_page_dev_to_cpu) from [<7fb5dd68>] (ath11k_dp_process_rx+0x1e8/0x4a4 [ath11k])
[<7fb5dd68>] (ath11k_dp_process_rx [ath11k]) from [<7fb53c20>] (ath11k_dp_service_srng+0xb0/0x2ac [ath11k])
[<7fb53c20>] (ath11k_dp_service_srng [ath11k]) from [<7f67bba4>] (ath11k_pci_ext_grp_napi_poll+0x1c/0x78 [ath11k_pci])
[<7f67bba4>] (ath11k_pci_ext_grp_napi_poll [ath11k_pci]) from [<807d5cf4>] (__napi_poll+0x28/0xb8)
[<807d5cf4>] (__napi_poll) from [<807d5f28>] (net_rx_action+0xf0/0x280)
[<807d5f28>] (net_rx_action) from [<80302148>] (__do_softirq+0xd0/0x280)
[<80302148>] (__do_softirq) from [<80320408>] (irq_exit+0x74/0xd4)
[<80320408>] (irq_exit) from [<803638a4>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x90/0xb4)
[<803638a4>] (__handle_domain_irq) from [<805bedec>] (gic_handle_irq+0x58/0x90)
[<805bedec>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<80301a78>] (__irq_svc+0x58/0x8c)
Tested-on: IPQ8074 hw2.0 AHB WLAN.HK.2.7.0.1-01744-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/vm: Clear the scratch_pt pointer on error
Avoid triggering a dereference of an error pointer on cleanup in
xe_vm_free_scratch() by clearing any scratch_pt error pointer.
(cherry picked from commit 358ee50ab565f3c8ea32480e9d03127a81ba32f8) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev/ep93xx-fb: Do not assign to struct fb_info.dev
Do not assing the Linux device to struct fb_info.dev. The call to
register_framebuffer() initializes the field to the fbdev device.
Drivers should not override its value.
Fixes a bug where the driver incorrectly decreases the hardware
device's reference counter and leaks the fbdev device.
v2:
* add Fixes tag (Dan) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix WARNING in mb_find_extent
Syzbot found the following issue:
EXT4-fs: Warning: mounting with data=journal disables delayed allocation, dioread_nolock, O_DIRECT and fast_commit support!
EXT4-fs (loop0): orphan cleanup on readonly fs
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5067 at fs/ext4/mballoc.c:1869 mb_find_extent+0x8a1/0xe30
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 5067 Comm: syz-executor307 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
RIP: 0010:mb_find_extent+0x8a1/0xe30 fs/ext4/mballoc.c:1869
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003c9e098 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffffffff82405731 RBX: 0000000000000041 RCX: ffff8880783457c0
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000041 RDI: 0000000000000040
RBP: 0000000000000040 R08: ffffffff82405723 R09: ffffed10053c9402
R10: ffffed10053c9402 R11: 1ffff110053c9401 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffc90003c9e538 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffffc90003c9e2cc
FS: 0000555556665300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000056312f6796f8 CR3: 0000000022437000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ext4_mb_complex_scan_group+0x353/0x1100 fs/ext4/mballoc.c:2307
ext4_mb_regular_allocator+0x1533/0x3860 fs/ext4/mballoc.c:2735
ext4_mb_new_blocks+0xddf/0x3db0 fs/ext4/mballoc.c:5605
ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x1868/0x6880 fs/ext4/extents.c:4286
ext4_map_blocks+0xa49/0x1cc0 fs/ext4/inode.c:651
ext4_getblk+0x1b9/0x770 fs/ext4/inode.c:864
ext4_bread+0x2a/0x170 fs/ext4/inode.c:920
ext4_quota_write+0x225/0x570 fs/ext4/super.c:7105
write_blk fs/quota/quota_tree.c:64 [inline]
get_free_dqblk+0x34a/0x6d0 fs/quota/quota_tree.c:130
do_insert_tree+0x26b/0x1aa0 fs/quota/quota_tree.c:340
do_insert_tree+0x722/0x1aa0 fs/quota/quota_tree.c:375
do_insert_tree+0x722/0x1aa0 fs/quota/quota_tree.c:375
do_insert_tree+0x722/0x1aa0 fs/quota/quota_tree.c:375
dq_insert_tree fs/quota/quota_tree.c:401 [inline]
qtree_write_dquot+0x3b6/0x530 fs/quota/quota_tree.c:420
v2_write_dquot+0x11b/0x190 fs/quota/quota_v2.c:358
dquot_acquire+0x348/0x670 fs/quota/dquot.c:444
ext4_acquire_dquot+0x2dc/0x400 fs/ext4/super.c:6740
dqget+0x999/0xdc0 fs/quota/dquot.c:914
__dquot_initialize+0x3d0/0xcf0 fs/quota/dquot.c:1492
ext4_process_orphan+0x57/0x2d0 fs/ext4/orphan.c:329
ext4_orphan_cleanup+0xb60/0x1340 fs/ext4/orphan.c:474
__ext4_fill_super fs/ext4/super.c:5516 [inline]
ext4_fill_super+0x81cd/0x8700 fs/ext4/super.c:5644
get_tree_bdev+0x400/0x620 fs/super.c:1282
vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1489
do_new_mount+0x289/0xad0 fs/namespace.c:3145
do_mount fs/namespace.c:3488 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3697 [inline]
__se_sys_mount+0x2d3/0x3c0 fs/namespace.c:3674
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Add some debug information:
mb_find_extent: mb_find_extent block=41, order=0 needed=64 next=0 ex=0/41/1@3735929054 64 64 7
block_bitmap: ff 3f 0c 00 fc 01 00 00 d2 3d 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
Acctually, blocks per group is 64, but block bitmap indicate at least has
128 blocks. Now, ext4_validate_block_bitmap() didn't check invalid block's
bitmap if set.
To resolve above issue, add check like fsck "Padding at end of block bitmap is
not set". |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: intel-thc-hid: intel-thc: Fix incorrect pointer arithmetic in I2C regs save
Improper use of secondary pointer (&dev->i2c_subip_regs) caused
kernel crash and out-of-bounds error:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _regmap_bulk_read+0x449/0x510
Write of size 4 at addr ffff888136005dc0 by task kworker/u33:5/5107
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 5107 Comm: kworker/u33:5 Not tainted 6.16.0+ #3 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0
print_report+0xd1/0x660
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x26/0x200
kasan_report+0xe1/0x120
? _regmap_bulk_read+0x449/0x510
? _regmap_bulk_read+0x449/0x510
__asan_report_store4_noabort+0x17/0x30
_regmap_bulk_read+0x449/0x510
? __pfx__regmap_bulk_read+0x10/0x10
regmap_bulk_read+0x270/0x3d0
pio_complete+0x1ee/0x2c0 [intel_thc]
? __pfx_pio_complete+0x10/0x10 [intel_thc]
? __pfx_pio_wait+0x10/0x10 [intel_thc]
? regmap_update_bits_base+0x13b/0x1f0
thc_i2c_subip_pio_read+0x117/0x270 [intel_thc]
thc_i2c_subip_regs_save+0xc2/0x140 [intel_thc]
? __pfx_thc_i2c_subip_regs_save+0x10/0x10 [intel_thc]
[...]
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888136005d00
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-rnd-12-192 of size 192
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 192-byte region [ffff888136005d00, ffff888136005dc0)
Replaced with direct array indexing (&dev->i2c_subip_regs[i]) to ensure
safe memory access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: Fix a memory leak in an error handling path
If this memdup_user() call fails, the memory allocated in a previous call
a few lines above should be freed. Otherwise it leaks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/kbuf: fix signedness in this_len calculation
When importing and using buffers, buf->len is considered unsigned.
However, buf->len is converted to signed int when committing. This can
lead to unexpected behavior if the buffer is large enough to be
interpreted as a negative value. Make min_t calculation unsigned. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: intel-thc-hid: intel-quicki2c: Fix ACPI dsd ICRS/ISUB length
The QuickI2C ACPI _DSD methods return ICRS and ISUB data with a
trailing byte, making the actual length is one more byte than the
structs defined.
It caused stack-out-of-bounds and kernel crash:
kernel: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in quicki2c_acpi_get_dsd_property.constprop.0+0x111/0x1b0 [intel_quicki2c]
kernel: Write of size 12 at addr ffff888106d1f900 by task kworker/u33:2/75
kernel:
kernel: CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 75 Comm: kworker/u33:2 Not tainted 6.16.0+ #3 PREEMPT(voluntary)
kernel: Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: <TASK>
kernel: dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0
kernel: print_report+0xd1/0x660
kernel: ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
kernel: ? __kasan_slab_free+0x5d/0x80
kernel: ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0xd/0xb0
kernel: kasan_report+0xe1/0x120
kernel: ? quicki2c_acpi_get_dsd_property.constprop.0+0x111/0x1b0 [intel_quicki2c]
kernel: ? quicki2c_acpi_get_dsd_property.constprop.0+0x111/0x1b0 [intel_quicki2c]
kernel: kasan_check_range+0x11c/0x200
kernel: __asan_memcpy+0x3b/0x80
kernel: quicki2c_acpi_get_dsd_property.constprop.0+0x111/0x1b0 [intel_quicki2c]
kernel: ? __pfx_quicki2c_acpi_get_dsd_property.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 [intel_quicki2c]
kernel: quicki2c_get_acpi_resources+0x237/0x730 [intel_quicki2c]
[...]
kernel: </TASK>
kernel:
kernel: The buggy address belongs to stack of task kworker/u33:2/75
kernel: and is located at offset 48 in frame:
kernel: quicki2c_get_acpi_resources+0x0/0x730 [intel_quicki2c]
kernel:
kernel: This frame has 3 objects:
kernel: [32, 36) 'hid_desc_addr'
kernel: [48, 59) 'i2c_param'
kernel: [80, 224) 'i2c_config'
ACPI DSD methods return:
\_SB.PC00.THC0.ICRS Buffer 000000003fdc947b 001 Len 0C = 0A 00 80 1A 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
\_SB.PC00.THC0.ISUB Buffer 00000000f2fcbdc4 001 Len 91 = 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Adding reserved padding to quicki2c_subip_acpi_parameter/config. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: fec: Better handle pm_runtime_get() failing in .remove()
In the (unlikely) event that pm_runtime_get() (disguised as
pm_runtime_resume_and_get()) fails, the remove callback returned an
error early. The problem with this is that the driver core ignores the
error value and continues removing the device. This results in a
resource leak. Worse the devm allocated resources are freed and so if a
callback of the driver is called later the register mapping is already
gone which probably results in a crash. |
| Greenshot is an open source Windows screenshot utility. Greenshot 1.3.300 and earlier deserializes attacker-controlled data received in a WM_COPYDATA message using BinaryFormatter.Deserialize without prior validation or authentication, allowing a local process at the same integrity level to trigger arbitrary code execution inside the Greenshot process. The vulnerable logic resides in a WinForms WndProc handler for WM_COPYDATA (message 74) that copies the supplied bytes into a MemoryStream and invokes BinaryFormatter.Deserialize, and only afterward checks whether the specified channel is authorized. Because the authorization check occurs after deserialization, any gadget chain embedded in the serialized payload executes regardless of channel membership. A local attacker who can send WM_COPYDATA to the Greenshot main window can achieve in-process code execution, which may aid evasion of application control policies by running payloads within the trusted, signed Greenshot.exe process. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.301. No known workarounds exist. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/kbuf: always use READ_ONCE() to read ring provided buffer lengths
Since the buffers are mapped from userspace, it is prudent to use
READ_ONCE() to read the value into a local variable, and use that for
any other actions taken. Having a stable read of the buffer length
avoids worrying about it changing after checking, or being read multiple
times.
Similarly, the buffer may well change in between it being picked and
being committed. Ensure the looping for incremental ring buffer commit
stops if it hits a zero sized buffer, as no further progress can be made
at that point. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
floppy: Fix memory leak in do_floppy_init()
A memory leak was reported when floppy_alloc_disk() failed in
do_floppy_init().
unreferenced object 0xffff888115ed25a0 (size 8):
comm "modprobe", pid 727, jiffies 4295051278 (age 25.529s)
hex dump (first 8 bytes):
00 ac 67 5b 81 88 ff ff ..g[....
backtrace:
[<000000007f457abb>] __kmalloc_node+0x4c/0xc0
[<00000000a87bfa9e>] blk_mq_realloc_tag_set_tags.part.0+0x6f/0x180
[<000000006f02e8b1>] blk_mq_alloc_tag_set+0x573/0x1130
[<0000000066007fd7>] 0xffffffffc06b8b08
[<0000000081f5ac40>] do_one_initcall+0xd0/0x4f0
[<00000000e26d04ee>] do_init_module+0x1a4/0x680
[<000000001bb22407>] load_module+0x6249/0x7110
[<00000000ad31ac4d>] __do_sys_finit_module+0x140/0x200
[<000000007bddca46>] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
[<00000000b5afec39>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
unreferenced object 0xffff88810fc30540 (size 32):
comm "modprobe", pid 727, jiffies 4295051278 (age 25.529s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<000000007f457abb>] __kmalloc_node+0x4c/0xc0
[<000000006b91eab4>] blk_mq_alloc_tag_set+0x393/0x1130
[<0000000066007fd7>] 0xffffffffc06b8b08
[<0000000081f5ac40>] do_one_initcall+0xd0/0x4f0
[<00000000e26d04ee>] do_init_module+0x1a4/0x680
[<000000001bb22407>] load_module+0x6249/0x7110
[<00000000ad31ac4d>] __do_sys_finit_module+0x140/0x200
[<000000007bddca46>] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
[<00000000b5afec39>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
If the floppy_alloc_disk() failed, disks of current drive will not be set,
thus the lastest allocated set->tag cannot be freed in the error handling
path. A simple call graph shown as below:
floppy_module_init()
floppy_init()
do_floppy_init()
for (drive = 0; drive < N_DRIVE; drive++)
blk_mq_alloc_tag_set()
blk_mq_alloc_tag_set_tags()
blk_mq_realloc_tag_set_tags() # set->tag allocated
floppy_alloc_disk()
blk_mq_alloc_disk() # error occurred, disks failed to allocated
->out_put_disk:
for (drive = 0; drive < N_DRIVE; drive++)
if (!disks[drive][0]) # the last disks is not set and loop break
break;
blk_mq_free_tag_set() # the latest allocated set->tag leaked
Fix this problem by free the set->tag of current drive before jump to
error handling path.
[efremov: added stable list, changed title] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: asus: fix UAF via HID_CLAIMED_INPUT validation
After hid_hw_start() is called hidinput_connect() will eventually be
called to set up the device with the input layer since the
HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT connect mask is used. During hidinput_connect()
all input and output reports are processed and corresponding hid_inputs
are allocated and configured via hidinput_configure_usages(). This
process involves slot tagging report fields and configuring usages
by setting relevant bits in the capability bitmaps. However it is possible
that the capability bitmaps are not set at all leading to the subsequent
hidinput_has_been_populated() check to fail leading to the freeing of the
hid_input and the underlying input device.
This becomes problematic because a malicious HID device like a
ASUS ROG N-Key keyboard can trigger the above scenario via a
specially crafted descriptor which then leads to a user-after-free
when the name of the freed input device is written to later on after
hid_hw_start(). Below, report 93 intentionally utilises the
HID_UP_UNDEFINED Usage Page which is skipped during usage
configuration, leading to the frees.
0x05, 0x0D, // Usage Page (Digitizer)
0x09, 0x05, // Usage (Touch Pad)
0xA1, 0x01, // Collection (Application)
0x85, 0x0D, // Report ID (13)
0x06, 0x00, 0xFF, // Usage Page (Vendor Defined 0xFF00)
0x09, 0xC5, // Usage (0xC5)
0x15, 0x00, // Logical Minimum (0)
0x26, 0xFF, 0x00, // Logical Maximum (255)
0x75, 0x08, // Report Size (8)
0x95, 0x04, // Report Count (4)
0xB1, 0x02, // Feature (Data,Var,Abs)
0x85, 0x5D, // Report ID (93)
0x06, 0x00, 0x00, // Usage Page (Undefined)
0x09, 0x01, // Usage (0x01)
0x15, 0x00, // Logical Minimum (0)
0x26, 0xFF, 0x00, // Logical Maximum (255)
0x75, 0x08, // Report Size (8)
0x95, 0x1B, // Report Count (27)
0x81, 0x02, // Input (Data,Var,Abs)
0xC0, // End Collection
Below is the KASAN splat after triggering the UAF:
[ 21.672709] ==================================================================
[ 21.673700] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in asus_probe+0xeeb/0xf80
[ 21.673700] Write of size 8 at addr ffff88810a0ac000 by task kworker/1:2/54
[ 21.673700]
[ 21.673700] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc4-g9773391cf4dd-dirty #36 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[ 21.673700] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
[ 21.673700] Call Trace:
[ 21.673700] <TASK>
[ 21.673700] dump_stack_lvl+0x5f/0x80
[ 21.673700] print_report+0xd1/0x660
[ 21.673700] kasan_report+0xe5/0x120
[ 21.673700] __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x1b/0x30
[ 21.673700] asus_probe+0xeeb/0xf80
[ 21.673700] hid_device_probe+0x2ee/0x700
[ 21.673700] really_probe+0x1c6/0x6b0
[ 21.673700] __driver_probe_device+0x24f/0x310
[ 21.673700] driver_probe_device+0x4e/0x220
[...]
[ 21.673700]
[ 21.673700] Allocated by task 54:
[ 21.673700] kasan_save_stack+0x3d/0x60
[ 21.673700] kasan_save_track+0x18/0x40
[ 21.673700] kasan_save_alloc_info+0x3b/0x50
[ 21.673700] __kasan_kmalloc+0x9c/0xa0
[ 21.673700] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x139/0x340
[ 21.673700] input_allocate_device+0x44/0x370
[ 21.673700] hidinput_connect+0xcb6/0x2630
[ 21.673700] hid_connect+0xf74/0x1d60
[ 21.673700] hid_hw_start+0x8c/0x110
[ 21.673700] asus_probe+0x5a3/0xf80
[ 21.673700] hid_device_probe+0x2ee/0x700
[ 21.673700] really_probe+0x1c6/0x6b0
[ 21.673700] __driver_probe_device+0x24f/0x310
[ 21.673700] driver_probe_device+0x4e/0x220
[...]
[ 21.673700]
[ 21.673700] Freed by task 54:
[ 21.673700] kasan_save_stack+0x3d/0x60
[ 21.673700] kasan_save_track+0x18/0x40
[ 21.673700] kasan_save_free_info+0x3f/0x60
[ 21.673700] __kasan_slab_free+0x3c/0x50
[ 21.673700] kfre
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ftrace: Fix potential warning in trace_printk_seq during ftrace_dump
When calling ftrace_dump_one() concurrently with reading trace_pipe,
a WARN_ON_ONCE() in trace_printk_seq() can be triggered due to a race
condition.
The issue occurs because:
CPU0 (ftrace_dump) CPU1 (reader)
echo z > /proc/sysrq-trigger
!trace_empty(&iter)
trace_iterator_reset(&iter) <- len = size = 0
cat /sys/kernel/tracing/trace_pipe
trace_find_next_entry_inc(&iter)
__find_next_entry
ring_buffer_empty_cpu <- all empty
return NULL
trace_printk_seq(&iter.seq)
WARN_ON_ONCE(s->seq.len >= s->seq.size)
In the context between trace_empty() and trace_find_next_entry_inc()
during ftrace_dump, the ring buffer data was consumed by other readers.
This caused trace_find_next_entry_inc to return NULL, failing to populate
`iter.seq`. At this point, due to the prior trace_iterator_reset, both
`iter.seq.len` and `iter.seq.size` were set to 0. Since they are equal,
the WARN_ON_ONCE condition is triggered.
Move the trace_printk_seq() into the if block that checks to make sure the
return value of trace_find_next_entry_inc() is non-NULL in
ftrace_dump_one(), ensuring the 'iter.seq' is properly populated before
subsequent operations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix null-ptr-deref in ext4_write_info
I caught a null-ptr-deref bug as follows:
==================================================================
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000068-0x000000000000006f]
CPU: 1 PID: 1589 Comm: umount Not tainted 5.10.0-02219-dirty #339
RIP: 0010:ext4_write_info+0x53/0x1b0
[...]
Call Trace:
dquot_writeback_dquots+0x341/0x9a0
ext4_sync_fs+0x19e/0x800
__sync_filesystem+0x83/0x100
sync_filesystem+0x89/0xf0
generic_shutdown_super+0x79/0x3e0
kill_block_super+0xa1/0x110
deactivate_locked_super+0xac/0x130
deactivate_super+0xb6/0xd0
cleanup_mnt+0x289/0x400
__cleanup_mnt+0x16/0x20
task_work_run+0x11c/0x1c0
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x203/0x210
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x5b/0x3a0
do_syscall_64+0x59/0x70
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
==================================================================
Above issue may happen as follows:
-------------------------------------
exit_to_user_mode_prepare
task_work_run
__cleanup_mnt
cleanup_mnt
deactivate_super
deactivate_locked_super
kill_block_super
generic_shutdown_super
shrink_dcache_for_umount
dentry = sb->s_root
sb->s_root = NULL <--- Here set NULL
sync_filesystem
__sync_filesystem
sb->s_op->sync_fs > ext4_sync_fs
dquot_writeback_dquots
sb->dq_op->write_info > ext4_write_info
ext4_journal_start(d_inode(sb->s_root), EXT4_HT_QUOTA, 2)
d_inode(sb->s_root)
s_root->d_inode <--- Null pointer dereference
To solve this problem, we use ext4_journal_start_sb directly
to avoid s_root being used. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix race with concurrent opens in rename(2)
Besides sending the rename request to the server, the rename process
also involves closing any deferred close, waiting for outstanding I/O
to complete as well as marking all existing open handles as deleted to
prevent them from deferring closes, which increases the race window
for potential concurrent opens on the target file.
Fix this by unhashing the dentry in advance to prevent any concurrent
opens on the target. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: vimc: Fix wrong function called when vimc_init() fails
In vimc_init(), when platform_driver_register(&vimc_pdrv) fails,
platform_driver_unregister(&vimc_pdrv) is wrongly called rather than
platform_device_unregister(&vimc_pdev), which causes kernel warning:
Unexpected driver unregister!
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 14517 at drivers/base/driver.c:270 driver_unregister+0x8f/0xb0
RIP: 0010:driver_unregister+0x8f/0xb0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
vimc_init+0x7d/0x1000 [vimc]
do_one_initcall+0xd0/0x4e0
do_init_module+0x1cf/0x6b0
load_module+0x65c2/0x7820 |
