| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| An high privileged remote attacker can exploit an authenticated OS command injection vulnerability in the system_certificates view due to improper neutralization of special elements in an OS command. This can result in a total loss of confidentiality, availability and integrity. |
| view_component is a framework for building reusable, testable, and encapsulated view components in Ruby on Rails. From 4.0.0 until 4.12.0, ViewComponent::Base instances retain render-scoped objects across calls to render_in; if the same component, collection, or spacer component instance is reused across requests, users, tenants, or threads, later renders can use stale helpers, controller, request, view_flow, format/variant details, and slot child context from an earlier render. This can cause authorization-aware components to render privileged UI for a lower-privileged user, generate links using a stale Host header, leak slot/helper state, and mix request context under concurrent rendering. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.0. |
| A vulnerability was identified in SourceCodester Class and Exam Timetabling System 1.0. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /forCYS.php. Such manipulation of the argument course leads to cross site scripting. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. |
| Authentication bypass using an alternate path or channel in Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) allows an unauthorized attacker to perform tampering over a network. |
| A vulnerability was determined in Sipeed PicoClaw up to 0.2.9. The affected element is an unknown function of the file web/backend/api/auth.go. Executing a manipulation can lead to cross-site request forgery. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. This patch is called 4b0229351678f479429b8d8b19207757266f246b. Applying a patch is advised to resolve this issue. |
| A flaw has been found in Shibby Tomato 1.28 RT-N5x MIPSR2 Build 124. Affected by this issue is the function setup_conntrack of the file /sbin/rc. Executing a manipulation of the argument ct_tcp_timeout can lead to out-of-bounds write. The attack may be performed from remote. This project is superseded by FreshTomato. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7996: Clear wcid pointer in mt7996_mac_sta_deinit_link()
Clear WCID pointer removing the sta link in mt7996_mac_sta_deinit_link
routine. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to do sanity check on f2fs_get_node_folio_ra()
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/file.c:845!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5336 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:f2fs_do_truncate_blocks+0x1115/0x1140 fs/f2fs/file.c:845
Code: fc fc 90 0f 0b e8 8b 9d 9a fd 90 0f 0b e8 83 9d 9a fd 48 89 df 48 c7 c6 60 d1 1a 8c e8 54 f1 fc fc 90 0f 0b e8 6c 9d 9a fd 90 <0f> 0b e8 64 9d 9a fd 90 0f 0b 90 e9 93 fd ff ff e8 56 9d 9a fd 90
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000e4474c0 EFLAGS: 00010283
RAX: ffffffff842b1d34 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000100000
RDX: ffffc9000f03a000 RSI: 0000000000035503 RDI: 0000000000035504
RBP: ffffc9000e447608 R08: ffff8880123b0000 R09: 0000000000000002
R10: 00000000fffffffe R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 1ffff92001c88ea0 R15: 00000000ffff039c
FS: 00007f7e02ee36c0(0000) GS:ffff88808c887000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ff0305c4000 CR3: 0000000012d4c000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
f2fs_truncate_blocks+0x10a/0x300 fs/f2fs/file.c:882
f2fs_truncate+0x471/0x7c0 fs/f2fs/file.c:940
f2fs_evict_inode+0xa3f/0x1ac0 fs/f2fs/inode.c:907
evict+0x61e/0xb10 fs/inode.c:841
f2fs_fill_super+0x5f43/0x78f0 fs/f2fs/super.c:5224
get_tree_bdev_flags+0x431/0x4f0 fs/super.c:1694
vfs_get_tree+0x92/0x2a0 fs/super.c:1754
fc_mount fs/namespace.c:1193 [inline]
do_new_mount_fc fs/namespace.c:3758 [inline]
do_new_mount+0x341/0xd30 fs/namespace.c:3834
do_mount fs/namespace.c:4167 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4383 [inline]
__se_sys_mount+0x31d/0x420 fs/namespace.c:4360
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x15f/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
count = ADDRS_PER_PAGE(dn.node_folio, inode);
count -= dn.ofs_in_node;
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, count < 0);
The fuzz test will trigger above bug_on in f2fs.
The root cause should be: in the corrupted inode, there is a direct node
which has the same ino and nid in its footer, so in f2fs_do_truncate_blocks(),
after f2fs_get_dnode_of_data() finds such dnode:
1) ADDRS_PER_PAGE(dn.node_folio, inode) will return 923
2) once dn.ofs_in_node points to addr[923, 1017]
Then it will trigger the system panic.
Let's introduce NODE_TYPE_NON_IXNODE to indicate current node should
not be an inode or xattr node, and then use it in below path to detect
inconsistent node chain in inode mapping table:
- f2fs_do_truncate_blocks
- f2fs_get_dnode_of_data
- f2fs_get_node_folio_ra
- __get_node_folio
- f2fs_sanity_check_node_footer
- case NODE_TYPE_NON_IXNODE -> check whether it is inode|xnode |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: validate ACL entry sizes in f2fs_acl_from_disk()
f2fs_acl_count() only validates the aggregate ACL xattr length. A
malformed ACL can still place ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP in a slot that only
contains struct f2fs_acl_entry_short bytes, and f2fs_acl_from_disk()
then reads entry->e_id before verifying that a full entry fits.
Require a short entry before reading e_tag and e_perm, and require a
full entry before reading e_id for ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP. Return
-EFSCORRUPTED from these new truncated-entry checks, while keeping the
pre-existing -EINVAL paths unchanged.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0
RIP: 0033:0x7f4b835ea7aa
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888114589960 which belongs
to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 8-byte
region [ffff888114589960, ffff888114589968)
Read of size 4
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?)
print_report+0xce/0x630 (?:?)
__f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169)
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
__virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x430 (?:?)
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?)
__f2fs_get_acl+0x5/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169)
__get_acl+0x281/0x380 (?:?)
vfs_get_acl+0x10b/0x190 (?:?)
do_get_acl+0x2a/0x410 (?:?)
do_get_acl+0x9/0x410 (?:?)
do_getxattr+0xe8/0x260 (?:?)
filename_getxattr+0xd1/0x140 (?:?)
do_getname+0x2d/0x2d0 (?:?)
path_getxattrat+0x16c/0x200 (?:?)
lock_release+0xc8/0x290 (?:?)
cgroup_update_frozen+0x9d/0x320 (?:?)
lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0 (?:?)
trace_hardirqs_on+0x1a/0x170 (?:?)
_raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 (?:?)
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "f2fs: remove non-uptodate folio from the page cache in move_data_block"
This reverts commit 9609dd704725a40cd63d915f2ab6c44248a44598.
The kernel panics are keeping to be reported especially when the f2fs
partition get almost full. By investigation, we find that the reason is
one f2fs page got freed to buddy without being deleted from LRU and the
root cause is the race happened in [2] which is enrolled by this commit.
There are 3 race processes in this scenario, please find below for their
main activities.
The changed code in move_data_block() lets the GC path evict the tail-end
folio from the page cache through folio_end_dropbehind(). Once
folio_unmap_invalidate() removes the folio from mapping->i_pages, the
page-cache references for all pages in the folio are dropped. The folio
is then kept alive only by temporary external references, which allows a
later split to operate on a folio whose subpages are no longer protected
by page-cache references.
After the page-cache references are gone, split_folio_to_order() can
split the big folio into individual pages and put the resulting subpages
back on the LRU. For tail pages beyond EOF, split removes them from the
page cache and drops their page-cache references. A tail page can then
remain on the LRU with PG_lru set while holding only the split caller's
temporary reference. When free_folio_and_swap_cache() drops that final
reference, the page enters the final folio_put() release path.
In parallel, folio_isolate_lru() can observe the same tail page with a
non-zero refcount and PG_lru set. It clears PG_lru before taking its own
reference. If this races with the final folio_put() from the split path,
__folio_put() sees PG_lru already cleared and skips lruvec_del_folio().
The page is then freed back to the allocator while its lru links are
still present in the LRU list. A later LRU operation on a neighboring
page detects the stale link and reports list corruption.
[1]
[ 22.486082] list_del corruption. next->prev should be fffffffec10e0ac8, but was dead000000000122. (next=fffffffec10e0a88)
[ 22.486130] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 22.486134] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:67!
[ 22.486141] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP
[ 22.488502] Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE
[ 22.488506] Hardware name: Spreadtrum UMS9230 1H10 SoC (DT)
[ 22.488511] pstate: 604000c5 (nZCv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 22.488517] pc : __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x14c/0x154
[ 22.488531] lr : __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x14c/0x154
[ 22.488539] sp : ffffffc08006b830
[ 22.488542] x29: ffffffc08006b868 x28: 0000000000003020 x27: 0000000000000000
[ 22.488553] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000004 x24: fffffffec10e0ac0
[ 22.488564] x23: 00000000000000e8 x22: 0000000000000024 x21: dead000000000122
[ 22.488574] x20: fffffffec10e0a88 x19: fffffffec10e0ac8 x18: ffffffc080061060
[ 22.488585] x17: 20747562202c3863 x16: 6130653031636566 x15: 0000000000000058
[ 22.488595] x14: 0000000000000004 x13: ffffff80f91e0000 x12: 0000000000000003
[ 22.488605] x11: 0000000000000003 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : ffe85721f0e25f00
[ 22.488615] x8 : ffe85721f0e25f00 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 6c65645f7473696c
[ 22.488625] x5 : ffffffed39b23026 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000010
[ 22.488636] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 000000000000006d
[ 22.488647] Call trace:
[ 22.488651] __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x14c/0x154 (P)
[ 22.488661] __folio_put+0x2bc/0x434
[ 22.488670] folio_put+0x28/0x58
[ 22.488678] do_garbage_collect+0x1a34/0x2584
[ 22.488689] f2fs_gc+0x230/0x9b4
[ 22.488697] f2fs_fallocate+0xb90/0xdf4
[ 22.488706] vfs_fallocate+0x1b4/0x2bc
[ 22.488716] __arm64_sys_fallocate+0x44/0x78
[ 22.488725] invoke_syscall+0x58/0xe4
[ 22.488732] do_el0_svc+0x48/0xdc
[ 22.488739] el0
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix incorrect FI_NO_EXTENT handling in __destroy_extent_node()
When __destroy_extent_node() sets the inode flag FI_NO_EXTENT, it does
not reset the length of the largest extent to 0 and update the inode
folio. Since modifications to the extent tree are disallowed afterward,
the cached largest extent may become stale. This can trigger the
following error in xfstests generic/388:
F2FS-fs (dm-0): sanity_check_extent_cache: inode (ino=1761) extent info [220057, 57, 6] is incorrect, run fsck to fix
In the f2fs_drop_inode path, __destroy_extent_node() does not need to
guarantee that et->node_cnt is 0, because concurrency with writeback
is expected in this path, and writeback may update the extent cache.
This patch reverts commit ed78aeebef05 ("f2fs: fix node_cnt race between
extent node destroy and writeback"), and remove the unnecessary zero
check of et->node_cnt. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: nx - fix nx_crypto_ctx_exit argument
nx_crypto_ctx_shash_exit calls nx_crypto_ctx_exit with crypto_shash_ctx(...)
but crypto_shash_ctx gives a nx_crypto_ctx *, not a crypto_tfm *.
Fix the type in nx_crypto_ctx_exit and drop the bogus crypto_tfm_ctx
call.
This fixes the following oops:
BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access at 0xc0403effffffffc8
Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000396cb4
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#15]
Call Trace:
nx_crypto_ctx_shash_exit+0x24/0x60
crypto_shash_exit_tfm+0x28/0x40
crypto_destroy_tfm+0x98/0x140
crypto_exit_ahash_using_shash+0x20/0x40
crypto_destroy_tfm+0x98/0x140
hash_release+0x1c/0x30
alg_sock_destruct+0x38/0x60
__sk_destruct+0x48/0x2b0
af_alg_release+0x58/0xb0
__sock_release+0x68/0x150
sock_close+0x20/0x40
__fput+0x110/0x3a0
sys_close+0x48/0xa0
system_call_exception+0x140/0x2d0
system_call_common+0xf4/0x258
.. which came from hardlink(1) opportunistically using AF_ALG.
The same problem exists with nx_crypto_ctx_skcipher_exit getting a context
it wasn't expecting, but apparently nobody hit that for years. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pNFS: Fix use-after-free in pnfs_update_layout()
When hitting the NFS_LAYOUT_RETURN branch in pnfs_update_layout(),
the code calls pnfs_prepare_to_retry_layoutget(lo). If it succeeds,
pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo) is called before trace_pnfs_update_layout(),
which still references 'lo'. This results in a use-after-free when the
tracepoint accesses lo's fields.
Fix this by moving the tracepoint call before pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/mmcid: Fix OOB clear_bit when CID is MM_CID_UNSET in fixup path
In mm_cid_fixup_cpus_to_tasks(), when rq->curr has the target mm and
mm_cid.active is set, the CID is checked with cid_in_transit() before
setting the transition bit. In per-CPU mode a newly forked or exec'd
task can be running with mm_cid.cid == MM_CID_UNSET because CIDs are
assigned lazily on schedule-in. With cid_in_transit() the guard passes
for MM_CID_UNSET (no transit bit), converts it to MM_CID_UNSET |
MM_CID_TRANSIT and stores it back; later mm_cid_schedout() feeds this
to clear_bit() with MM_CID_UNSET as the bit number, triggering an
out-of-bounds write.
Symptoms: this is genuine memory corruption, but a bounded out-of-bounds
write, not an arbitrary one. MM_CID_UNSET is the fixed sentinel BIT(31),
so once the bad value reaches mm_cid_schedout() the cid_from_transit_cid()
strip leaves MM_CID_UNSET, which fails the "cid < max_cids" convergence
test and falls into mm_drop_cid() -> clear_bit(MM_CID_UNSET,
mm_cidmask(mm)). The cid bitmap is embedded in the mm_struct slab object
(after cpu_bitmap and mm_cpus_allowed) and is only num_possible_cpus()
bits wide, so clearing bit 31 is a deterministic OOB bit-clear at a
fixed offset of 2^31 / 8 == 256 MiB past the bitmap base. The address is
not attacker-influenced (fixed sentinel -> fixed offset) and the op only
clears a single bit; what sits 256 MiB further along the direct map is
whatever kernel object happens to live there, so this corrupts one bit of
unpredictable kernel memory -- it is not an arbitrary-address or
arbitrary-value write.
It triggers only in per-CPU CID mode, when a CPU is running an active
task of the target mm whose cid is still MM_CID_UNSET -- the
fork()/execve() window before that task's next schedule-in assigns it a
real CID -- and a per-CPU -> per-task fixup walks over it (the mode
fallback driven by a thread exit, sched_mm_cid_exit(), or by the deferred
max_cids recompute in mm_cid_work_fn()).
In practice syzkaller surfaced it as a KASAN use-after-free reported in
__schedule -> mm_cid_switch_to, where the offending clear_bit() is inlined
via mm_cid_schedout() -> mm_drop_cid().
Guard the transition-bit assignment against MM_CID_UNSET, in addition to
the existing cid_in_transit() check, so the bit is only set on a genuine
task-owned CID. A CPU-owned (MM_CID_ONCPU) CID of a running active task
is handled by the cid_on_cpu(pcp->cid) branch above and never reaches
this path, so excluding MM_CID_UNSET (and the already-transitioning case)
is sufficient. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: reject oversized group bitmap descriptors
ocfs2_validate_gd_parent() only bounds bg_bits against the parent
allocator's chain geometry. A malicious descriptor can still claim a
bg_size/bg_bits pair that exceeds the bitmap bytes that physically fit in
the group descriptor block, so later bitmap scans and bit updates can run
past bg_bitmap.
Add a physical-cap check based on ocfs2_group_bitmap_size() for the parent
allocator type and reject descriptors whose bg_size or bg_bits exceed that
capacity. Keep the existing chain geometry check so both the on-disk
bitmap layout and the allocator metadata must agree before the descriptor
is used.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN use-after-free in _find_next_bit+0x7f/0xc0
Read of size 8
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?)
print_report+0xd0/0x630 (?:?)
_find_next_bit+0x7f/0xc0 (?:?)
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
__virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x2f0 (?:?)
kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 (?:?)
ocfs2_find_max_contig_free_bits+0x35/0x70 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1375)
ocfs2_block_group_set_bits+0x472/0x4b0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1457)
ocfs2_cluster_group_search+0x16b/0x440 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:86)
ocfs2_bg_discontig_fix_result+0x1ef/0x230 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1786)
ocfs2_search_chain+0x8f8/0x10a0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1886)
get_page_from_freelist+0x70e/0x2370 (?:?)
lock_release+0xc6/0x290 (?:?)
do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0x100 (?:?)
kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60 (?:?)
__bfs+0x147/0x240 (?:?)
get_page_from_freelist+0x83d/0x2370 (?:?)
ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits+0x38c/0xe70 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:96)
sched_domains_numa_masks_clear+0x70/0xd0 (?:?)
check_irq_usage+0xe8/0xb70 (?:?)
__ocfs2_claim_clusters+0x18d/0x4c0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:2497)
check_path+0x24/0x50 (?:?)
rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50 (?:?)
check_prev_add+0xfd/0xd00 (?:?)
ocfs2_add_clusters_in_btree+0x17d/0x810 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
__folio_batch_add_and_move+0x1f5/0x3d0 (?:?)
ocfs2_add_inode_data+0xd9/0x120 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
filemap_add_folio+0x105/0x1f0 (?:?)
ocfs2_write_begin_nolock+0x29f7/0x2f80 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:3043)
ocfs2_read_inode_block+0xb5/0x110 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
down_write+0xf5/0x180 (?:?)
ocfs2_write_begin+0x180/0x240 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
__mark_inode_dirty+0x758/0x9a0 (?:?)
inode_to_bdi+0x41/0x90 (?:?)
balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited_flags+0xf8/0x1d0 (?:?)
generic_perform_write+0x252/0x440 (?:?)
mnt_put_write_access_file+0x16/0x70 (?:?)
file_update_time_flags+0xe4/0x200 (?:?)
ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x80a/0x1320 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
lock_acquire+0x184/0x2f0 (?:?)
ksys_write+0xd2/0x170 (?:?)
apparmor_file_permission+0xf5/0x310 (?:?)
read_zero+0x8d/0x140 (?:?)
lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100 (?:?) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
9p: avoid putting oldfid in p9_client_walk() error path
When p9_client_walk() is called with clone set to false, fid aliases
oldfid. If the walk subsequently fails after the request has been sent,
the error path jumps to clunk_fid, which currently calls p9_fid_put(fid)
unconditionally.
This drops a reference to oldfid even though ownership of oldfid remains
with the caller. If this is the last reference, oldfid can be clunked and
destroyed while the caller still expects it to be valid. A later use or
put of oldfid can then trigger a use-after-free or refcount underflow.
Fix this by only putting fid in the clunk_fid error path when it does not
alias oldfid, matching the existing guard in the error path below.
This can be triggered when a multi-component walk is split into multiple
p9_client_walk() calls and a later non-cloning walk fails. A reproducer
and refcount warning logs are available on request. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: serialize volume label accesses
Protect vol->volume_label with a mutex and snaphost the label before
copy_to_user. This prevent a use-after-free when FS_IOC_SETFSLABEL
replaces the vol->volume_label and FS_IOC_GETTSLABEL reads it
concurrently. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: fix posix_acl leak on SETACL decode failure
nfsaclsvc_decode_setaclargs() and nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs() each
call nfs_stream_decode_acl() twice, first for NFS_ACL and then for
NFS_DFACL. Each successful call transfers ownership of a freshly
allocated posix_acl into argp->acl_access or argp->acl_default. If
the first call succeeds but the second fails, the decoder returns
false and argp->acl_access is left dangling.
ACLPROC2_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfssvc_release_attrstat and
ACLPROC3_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfs3svc_release_fhandle.
Both only call fh_put() and have no knowledge of the ACL fields on
argp. The posix_acl_release() pairs sat at the out: labels inside
nfsacld_proc_setacl() and nfsd3_proc_setacl(), but svc_process()
skips pc_func when pc_decode returns false, so that cleanup is
unreachable on decode failure:
svc_process_common()
pc_decode() /* decode_setaclargs: false */
/* pc_func skipped */
pc_release() /* fh_put only -- ACLs leaked */
The orphaned posix_acl is leaked for the lifetime of the server.
Fix by adding nfsaclsvc_release_setacl() and nfs3svc_release_setacl(),
which release both argp->acl_access and argp->acl_default in addition
to fh_put(), and wiring them as pc_release for their respective SETACL
procedures. pc_release runs on every path svc_process() takes after
decode, including decode failure, so the posix_acl_release() pairs are
removed from the proc functions' out: labels to keep ownership in one
place. This matches the existing release_getacl() pattern used by
the sibling GETACL procedures. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: fix posix_acl leak and ignored error in nfsd4_create_file
nfsd4_create_file() has two bugs in its ACL handling:
The return value of nfsd4_acl_to_attr() is silently discarded. When
the NFSv4-to-POSIX ACL conversion fails (e.g., -EINVAL for
unsupported ACE types), the file is created without any ACL and the
client receives NFS4_OK. This violates RFC 7530/8881 which require
the server to reject unsupported attributes on CREATE.
When start_creating() fails after ACL attributes have been populated
in attrs (either via nfsd4_acl_to_attr or via ownership transfer from
open->op_dpacl/op_pacl), the function jumps to out_write which skips
nfsd_attrs_free(). The posix_acl allocations are leaked. A client
can trigger this repeatedly with OPEN(CREATE), ACL attributes, and an
invalid filename (e.g., longer than NAME_MAX).
Fix both by capturing the nfsd4_acl_to_attr() return value and by
changing the early error paths to jump to out instead of out_write.
Initialize child to ERR_PTR(-EINVAL) so that end_creating() is safe
to call even if start_creating() was never reached. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: fix dead ACL conflict guard in nfsd4_create
nfsd4_create() steals create->cr_dpacl/cr_pacl into the local
nfsd_attrs via the designated initializer, then immediately sets the
source pointers to NULL. The subsequent conflict guard tests the
already-nilled source fields, making it permanently dead code:
if (create->cr_acl) {
if (create->cr_dpacl || create->cr_pacl) /* always false */
When a client encodes both FATTR4_WORD0_ACL and
FATTR4_WORD2_POSIX_{DEFAULT,ACCESS}_ACL in the same CREATE fattr
bitmap, nfsd4_acl_to_attr() overwrites attrs.na_pacl/na_dpacl without
releasing the originals, leaking two posix_acl slab objects per
request. Repeated requests cause unbounded slab exhaustion.
Fix by checking attrs.na_dpacl/na_pacl (the stolen values) instead of
the nilled create->cr_dpacl/cr_pacl, matching the correct pattern
already used in nfsd4_setattr(). |
