| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hns3: fix kernel crash when uninstalling driver
When the driver is uninstalled and the VF is disabled concurrently, a
kernel crash occurs. The reason is that the two actions call function
pci_disable_sriov(). The num_VFs is checked to determine whether to
release the corresponding resources. During the second calling, num_VFs
is not 0 and the resource release function is called. However, the
corresponding resource has been released during the first invoking.
Therefore, the problem occurs:
[15277.839633][T50670] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000020
...
[15278.131557][T50670] Call trace:
[15278.134686][T50670] klist_put+0x28/0x12c
[15278.138682][T50670] klist_del+0x14/0x20
[15278.142592][T50670] device_del+0xbc/0x3c0
[15278.146676][T50670] pci_remove_bus_device+0x84/0x120
[15278.151714][T50670] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device+0x6c/0x80
[15278.157447][T50670] pci_iov_remove_virtfn+0xb4/0x12c
[15278.162485][T50670] sriov_disable+0x50/0x11c
[15278.166829][T50670] pci_disable_sriov+0x24/0x30
[15278.171433][T50670] hnae3_unregister_ae_algo_prepare+0x60/0x90 [hnae3]
[15278.178039][T50670] hclge_exit+0x28/0xd0 [hclge]
[15278.182730][T50670] __se_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x164/0x230
[15278.188550][T50670] __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x1c/0x30
[15278.193848][T50670] invoke_syscall+0x50/0x11c
[15278.198278][T50670] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x158/0x164
[15278.203837][T50670] do_el0_svc+0x34/0xcc
[15278.207834][T50670] el0_svc+0x20/0x30
For details, see the following figure.
rmmod hclge disable VFs
----------------------------------------------------
hclge_exit() sriov_numvfs_store()
... device_lock()
pci_disable_sriov() hns3_pci_sriov_configure()
pci_disable_sriov()
sriov_disable()
sriov_disable() if !num_VFs :
if !num_VFs : return;
return; sriov_del_vfs()
sriov_del_vfs() ...
... klist_put()
klist_put() ...
... num_VFs = 0;
num_VFs = 0; device_unlock();
In this patch, when driver is removing, we get the device_lock()
to protect num_VFs, just like sriov_numvfs_store(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix NULL dereference in AEAD crypto operation
When sealing or unsealing a key blob we currently do not wait for
the AEAD cipher operation to finish and simply return after submitting
the request. If there is some load on the system we can exit before
the cipher operation is done and the buffer we read from/write to
is already removed from the stack. This will e.g. result in NULL
pointer dereference errors in the DCP driver during blob creation.
Fix this by waiting for the AEAD cipher operation to finish before
resuming the seal and unseal calls. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
phy: qcom: qmp-usbc: fix NULL-deref on runtime suspend
Commit 413db06c05e7 ("phy: qcom-qmp-usb: clean up probe initialisation")
removed most users of the platform device driver data from the
qcom-qmp-usb driver, but mistakenly also removed the initialisation
despite the data still being used in the runtime PM callbacks. This bug
was later reproduced when the driver was copied to create the qmp-usbc
driver.
Restore the driver data initialisation at probe to avoid a NULL-pointer
dereference on runtime suspend.
Apparently no one uses runtime PM, which currently needs to be enabled
manually through sysfs, with these drivers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: improve shutdown sequence
Alexander Sverdlin presents 2 problems during shutdown with the
lan9303 driver. One is specific to lan9303 and the other just happens
to reproduce there.
The first problem is that lan9303 is unique among DSA drivers in that it
calls dev_get_drvdata() at "arbitrary runtime" (not probe, not shutdown,
not remove):
phy_state_machine()
-> ...
-> dsa_user_phy_read()
-> ds->ops->phy_read()
-> lan9303_phy_read()
-> chip->ops->phy_read()
-> lan9303_mdio_phy_read()
-> dev_get_drvdata()
But we never stop the phy_state_machine(), so it may continue to run
after dsa_switch_shutdown(). Our common pattern in all DSA drivers is
to set drvdata to NULL to suppress the remove() method that may come
afterwards. But in this case it will result in an NPD.
The second problem is that the way in which we set
dp->conduit->dsa_ptr = NULL; is concurrent with receive packet
processing. dsa_switch_rcv() checks once whether dev->dsa_ptr is NULL,
but afterwards, rather than continuing to use that non-NULL value,
dev->dsa_ptr is dereferenced again and again without NULL checks:
dsa_conduit_find_user() and many other places. In between dereferences,
there is no locking to ensure that what was valid once continues to be
valid.
Both problems have the common aspect that closing the conduit interface
solves them.
In the first case, dev_close(conduit) triggers the NETDEV_GOING_DOWN
event in dsa_user_netdevice_event() which closes user ports as well.
dsa_port_disable_rt() calls phylink_stop(), which synchronously stops
the phylink state machine, and ds->ops->phy_read() will thus no longer
call into the driver after this point.
In the second case, dev_close(conduit) should do this, as per
Documentation/networking/driver.rst:
| Quiescence
| ----------
|
| After the ndo_stop routine has been called, the hardware must
| not receive or transmit any data. All in flight packets must
| be aborted. If necessary, poll or wait for completion of
| any reset commands.
So it should be sufficient to ensure that later, when we zeroize
conduit->dsa_ptr, there will be no concurrent dsa_switch_rcv() call
on this conduit.
The addition of the netif_device_detach() function is to ensure that
ioctls, rtnetlinks and ethtool requests on the user ports no longer
propagate down to the driver - we're no longer prepared to handle them.
The race condition actually did not exist when commit 0650bf52b31f
("net: dsa: be compatible with masters which unregister on shutdown")
first introduced dsa_switch_shutdown(). It was created later, when we
stopped unregistering the user interfaces from a bad spot, and we just
replaced that sequence with a racy zeroization of conduit->dsa_ptr
(one which doesn't ensure that the interfaces aren't up). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: avoid potential underflow in qdisc_pkt_len_init() with UFO
After commit 7c6d2ecbda83 ("net: be more gentle about silly gso
requests coming from user") virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() had sanity check
to detect malicious attempts from user space to cook a bad GSO packet.
Then commit cf9acc90c80ec ("net: virtio_net_hdr_to_skb: count
transport header in UFO") while fixing one issue, allowed user space
to cook a GSO packet with the following characteristic :
IPv4 SKB_GSO_UDP, gso_size=3, skb->len = 28.
When this packet arrives in qdisc_pkt_len_init(), we end up
with hdr_len = 28 (IPv4 header + UDP header), matching skb->len
Then the following sets gso_segs to 0 :
gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len - hdr_len,
shinfo->gso_size);
Then later we set qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len to back to zero :/
qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len += (gso_segs - 1) * hdr_len;
This leads to the following crash in fq_codel [1]
qdisc_pkt_len_init() is best effort, we only want an estimation
of the bytes sent on the wire, not crashing the kernel.
This patch is fixing this particular issue, a following one
adds more sanity checks for another potential bug.
[1]
[ 70.724101] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[ 70.724561] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 70.724561] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 70.724561] PGD 10ac61067 P4D 10ac61067 PUD 107ee2067 PMD 0
[ 70.724561] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 70.724561] CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 2163 Comm: b358537762 Not tainted 6.11.0-virtme #991
[ 70.724561] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 70.724561] RIP: 0010:fq_codel_enqueue (net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:120 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:168 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:230) sch_fq_codel
[ 70.724561] Code: 24 08 49 c1 e1 06 44 89 7c 24 18 45 31 ed 45 31 c0 31 ff 89 44 24 14 4c 03 8b 90 01 00 00 eb 04 39 ca 73 37 4d 8b 39 83 c7 01 <49> 8b 17 49 89 11 41 8b 57 28 45 8b 5f 34 49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 49
All code
========
0: 24 08 and $0x8,%al
2: 49 c1 e1 06 shl $0x6,%r9
6: 44 89 7c 24 18 mov %r15d,0x18(%rsp)
b: 45 31 ed xor %r13d,%r13d
e: 45 31 c0 xor %r8d,%r8d
11: 31 ff xor %edi,%edi
13: 89 44 24 14 mov %eax,0x14(%rsp)
17: 4c 03 8b 90 01 00 00 add 0x190(%rbx),%r9
1e: eb 04 jmp 0x24
20: 39 ca cmp %ecx,%edx
22: 73 37 jae 0x5b
24: 4d 8b 39 mov (%r9),%r15
27: 83 c7 01 add $0x1,%edi
2a:* 49 8b 17 mov (%r15),%rdx <-- trapping instruction
2d: 49 89 11 mov %rdx,(%r9)
30: 41 8b 57 28 mov 0x28(%r15),%edx
34: 45 8b 5f 34 mov 0x34(%r15),%r11d
38: 49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 movq $0x0,(%r15)
3f: 49 rex.WB
Code starting with the faulting instruction
===========================================
0: 49 8b 17 mov (%r15),%rdx
3: 49 89 11 mov %rdx,(%r9)
6: 41 8b 57 28 mov 0x28(%r15),%edx
a: 45 8b 5f 34 mov 0x34(%r15),%r11d
e: 49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 movq $0x0,(%r15)
15: 49 rex.WB
[ 70.724561] RSP: 0018:ffff95ae85e6fb90 EFLAGS: 00000202
[ 70.724561] RAX: 0000000002000000 RBX: ffff95ae841de000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 70.724561] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000001
[ 70.724561] RBP: ffff95ae85e6fbf8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff95b710a30000
[ 70.724561] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: bdf289445ce31881 R12: ffff95ae85e6fc58
[ 70.724561] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000040 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 70.724561] FS: 000000002c5c1380(0000) GS:ffff95bd7fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 70.724561] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 C
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: fix possible null-ptr-deref in ocfs2_set_buffer_uptodate
When doing cleanup, if flags without OCFS2_BH_READAHEAD, it may trigger
NULL pointer dereference in the following ocfs2_set_buffer_uptodate() if
bh is NULL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bcache: revert replacing IS_ERR_OR_NULL with IS_ERR again
Commit 028ddcac477b ("bcache: Remove unnecessary NULL point check in
node allocations") leads a NULL pointer deference in cache_set_flush().
1721 if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(c->root))
1722 list_add(&c->root->list, &c->btree_cache);
>From the above code in cache_set_flush(), if previous registration code
fails before allocating c->root, it is possible c->root is NULL as what
it is initialized. __bch_btree_node_alloc() never returns NULL but
c->root is possible to be NULL at above line 1721.
This patch replaces IS_ERR() by IS_ERR_OR_NULL() to fix this. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: wilc1000: fix potential RCU dereference issue in wilc_parse_join_bss_param
In the `wilc_parse_join_bss_param` function, the TSF field of the `ies`
structure is accessed after the RCU read-side critical section is
unlocked. According to RCU usage rules, this is illegal. Reusing this
pointer can lead to unpredictable behavior, including accessing memory
that has been updated or causing use-after-free issues.
This possible bug was identified using a static analysis tool developed
by myself, specifically designed to detect RCU-related issues.
To address this, the TSF value is now stored in a local variable
`ies_tsf` before the RCU lock is released. The `param->tsf_lo` field is
then assigned using this local variable, ensuring that the TSF value is
safely accessed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: avoid possible NULL deref in rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev()
Blamed commit accidentally removed a check for rt->rt6i_idev being NULL,
as spotted by syzbot:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 10998 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00208-g625403177711 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
RIP: 0010:rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev net/ipv6/route.c:177 [inline]
RIP: 0010:rt6_disable_ip+0x33e/0x7e0 net/ipv6/route.c:4914
Code: 41 80 3c 04 00 74 0a e8 90 d0 9b f7 48 8b 7c 24 08 48 8b 07 48 89 44 24 10 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df <80> 3c 08 00 74 08 4c 89 f7 e8 64 d0 9b f7 48 8b 44 24 18 49 39 06
RSP: 0018:ffffc900047374e0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff1100fdf8f33 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff88807efc78c0
RBP: ffffc900047375d0 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: fffff520008e6e8c
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff520008e6e8c R12: 1ffff1100fdf8f18
R13: ffff88807efc7998 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88807efc7930
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020002a80 CR3: 0000000022f62000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
addrconf_ifdown+0x15d/0x1bd0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3856
addrconf_notify+0x3cb/0x1020
notifier_call_chain+0x19f/0x3e0 kernel/notifier.c:93
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2032 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2046 [inline]
unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0xd81/0x1c40 net/core/dev.c:11352
unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:11414 [inline]
unregister_netdevice_queue+0x303/0x370 net/core/dev.c:11289
unregister_netdevice include/linux/netdevice.h:3129 [inline]
__tun_detach+0x6b9/0x1600 drivers/net/tun.c:685
tun_detach drivers/net/tun.c:701 [inline]
tun_chr_close+0x108/0x1b0 drivers/net/tun.c:3510
__fput+0x24a/0x8a0 fs/file_table.c:422
task_work_run+0x24f/0x310 kernel/task_work.c:228
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:40 [inline]
do_exit+0xa2f/0x27f0 kernel/exit.c:882
do_group_exit+0x207/0x2c0 kernel/exit.c:1031
__do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1042 [inline]
__se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1040 [inline]
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1040
x64_sys_call+0x2634/0x2640 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:232
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f1acc77def9
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f1acc77decf.
RSP: 002b:00007ffeb26fa738 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1acc77def9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000043
RBP: 00007f1acc7dd508 R08: 00007ffeb26f84d7 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: 00007ffeb26fa8e0
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev net/ipv6/route.c:177 [inline]
RIP: 0010:rt6_disable_ip+0x33e/0x7e0 net/ipv6/route.c:4914
Code: 41 80 3c 04 00 74 0a e8 90 d0 9b f7 48 8b 7c 24 08 48 8b 07 48 89 44 24 10 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df <80> 3c 08 00 74 08 4c 89 f7 e8 64 d0 9b f7 48 8b 44 24 18 49 39 06
RSP: 0018:ffffc900047374e0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff1100fdf8f33 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff88807efc78c0
R
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
driver core: Fix a potential null-ptr-deref in module_add_driver()
Inject fault while probing of-fpga-region, if kasprintf() fails in
module_add_driver(), the second sysfs_remove_link() in exit path will cause
null-ptr-deref as below because kernfs_name_hash() will call strlen() with
NULL driver_name.
Fix it by releasing resources based on the exit path sequence.
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000005
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000
CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[dfffffc000000000] address between user and kernel address ranges
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in: of_fpga_region(+) fpga_region fpga_bridge cfg80211 rfkill 8021q garp mrp stp llc ipv6 [last unloaded: of_fpga_region]
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 2036 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.11.0-rc2-g6a0e38264012 #295
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : strlen+0x24/0xb0
lr : kernfs_name_hash+0x1c/0xc4
sp : ffffffc081f97380
x29: ffffffc081f97380 x28: ffffffc081f97b90 x27: ffffff80c821c2a0
x26: ffffffedac0be418 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffffff80c09d2000
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000000
x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000001840
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 1ffffff8103f2e42
x14: 00000000f1f1f1f1 x13: 0000000000000004 x12: ffffffb01812d61d
x11: 1ffffff01812d61c x10: ffffffb01812d61c x9 : dfffffc000000000
x8 : 0000004fe7ed29e4 x7 : ffffff80c096b0e7 x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : ffffff80c096b0e0 x4 : 1ffffffdb990efa2 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : dfffffc000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
strlen+0x24/0xb0
kernfs_name_hash+0x1c/0xc4
kernfs_find_ns+0x118/0x2e8
kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x80/0x100
sysfs_remove_link+0x74/0xa8
module_add_driver+0x278/0x394
bus_add_driver+0x1f0/0x43c
driver_register+0xf4/0x3c0
__platform_driver_register+0x60/0x88
of_fpga_region_init+0x20/0x1000 [of_fpga_region]
do_one_initcall+0x110/0x788
do_init_module+0x1dc/0x5c8
load_module+0x3c38/0x4cac
init_module_from_file+0xd4/0x128
idempotent_init_module+0x2cc/0x528
__arm64_sys_finit_module+0xac/0x100
invoke_syscall+0x6c/0x258
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x160/0x22c
do_el0_svc+0x44/0x5c
el0_svc+0x48/0xb8
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x13c/0x158
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
Code: f2fbffe1 a90157f4 12000802 aa0003f5 (38e16861)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: check skb is non-NULL in tcp_rto_delta_us()
We have some machines running stock Ubuntu 20.04.6 which is their 5.4.0-174-generic
kernel that are running ceph and recently hit a null ptr dereference in
tcp_rearm_rto(). Initially hitting it from the TLP path, but then later we also
saw it getting hit from the RACK case as well. Here are examples of the oops
messages we saw in each of those cases:
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.780353] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.787572] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.792971] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.798362] PGD 0 P4D 0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.801164] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.805091] CPU: 0 PID: 9180 Comm: msgr-worker-1 Tainted: G W 5.4.0-174-generic #193-Ubuntu
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.814996] Hardware name: Supermicro SMC 2x26 os-gen8 64C NVME-Y 256G/H12SSW-NTR, BIOS 2.5.V1.2U.NVMe.UEFI 05/09/2023
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.825952] RIP: 0010:tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.830656] Code: 87 ca 04 00 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d c3 c3 49 8b bc 24 40 06 00 00 eb 8d 48 bb cf f7 53 e3 a5 9b c4 20 4c 89 ef e8 0c fe 0e 00 <48> 8b 78 20 48 c1 ef 03 48 89 f8 41 8b bc 24 80 04 00 00 48 f7 e3
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.849665] RSP: 0018:ffffb75d40003e08 EFLAGS: 00010246
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.855149] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 20c49ba5e353f7cf RCX: 0000000000000000
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.862542] RDX: 0000000062177c30 RSI: 000000000000231c RDI: ffff9874ad283a60
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.869933] RBP: ffffb75d40003e20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff987605e20aa8
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.877318] R10: ffffb75d40003f00 R11: ffffb75d4460f740 R12: ffff9874ad283900
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.884710] R13: ffff9874ad283a60 R14: ffff9874ad283980 R15: ffff9874ad283d30
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.892095] FS: 00007f1ef4a2e700(0000) GS:ffff987605e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.900438] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.906435] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000003e450ba003 CR4: 0000000000760ef0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.913822] PKRU: 55555554
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.916786] Call Trace:
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.919488]
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.921765] ? show_regs.cold+0x1a/0x1f
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.925859] ? __die+0x90/0xd9
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.929169] ? no_context+0x196/0x380
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.933088] ? ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x4e0/0x4e0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.938216] ? ip6_sublist_rcv_finish+0x3d/0x50
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.943000] ? __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x50/0x1a0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.947873] ? bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16/0x20
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.952486] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x267/0x450
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.957104] ? ipv6_list_rcv+0x112/0x140
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.961279] ? __do_page_fault+0x58/0x90
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.965458] ? do_page_fault+0x2c/0xe0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.969465] ? page_fault+0x34/0x40
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.973217] ? tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.977313] ? tcp_rearm_rto+0xe4/0x160
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.981408] tcp_send_loss_probe+0x10b/0x220
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.985937] tcp_write_timer_handler+0x1b4/0x240
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.990809] tcp_write_timer+0x9e/0xe0
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.994814] ? tcp_write_timer_handler+0x240/0x240
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061395.999866] call_timer_fn+0x32/0x130
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.003782] __run_timers.part.0+0x180/0x280
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.008309] ? recalibrate_cpu_khz+0x10/0x10
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.012841] ? native_x2apic_icr_write+0x30/0x30
Jul 26 15:05:02 rx [11061396.017718] ? lapic_next_even
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eventfs: Use list_del_rcu() for SRCU protected list variable
Chi Zhiling reported:
We found a null pointer accessing in tracefs[1], the reason is that the
variable 'ei_child' is set to LIST_POISON1, that means the list was
removed in eventfs_remove_rec. so when access the ei_child->is_freed, the
panic triggered.
by the way, the following script can reproduce this panic
loop1 (){
while true
do
echo "p:kp submit_bio" > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events
echo "" > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events
done
}
loop2 (){
while true
do
tree /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kprobes/
done
}
loop1 &
loop2
[1]:
[ 1147.959632][T17331] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dead000000000150
[ 1147.968239][T17331] Mem abort info:
[ 1147.971739][T17331] ESR = 0x0000000096000004
[ 1147.976172][T17331] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1147.982171][T17331] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1147.985906][T17331] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1147.989734][T17331] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[ 1147.995292][T17331] Data abort info:
[ 1147.998858][T17331] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[ 1148.005023][T17331] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[ 1148.010759][T17331] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[ 1148.016752][T17331] [dead000000000150] address between user and kernel address ranges
[ 1148.024571][T17331] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP
[ 1148.030825][T17331] Modules linked in: team_mode_loadbalance team nlmon act_gact cls_flower sch_ingress bonding tls macvlan dummy ib_core bridge stp llc veth amdgpu amdxcp mfd_core gpu_sched drm_exec drm_buddy radeon crct10dif_ce video drm_suballoc_helper ghash_ce drm_ttm_helper sha2_ce ttm sha256_arm64 i2c_algo_bit sha1_ce sbsa_gwdt cp210x drm_display_helper cec sr_mod cdrom drm_kms_helper binfmt_misc sg loop fuse drm dm_mod nfnetlink ip_tables autofs4 [last unloaded: tls]
[ 1148.072808][T17331] CPU: 3 PID: 17331 Comm: ls Tainted: G W ------- ---- 6.6.43 #2
[ 1148.081751][T17331] Source Version: 21b3b386e948bedd29369af66f3e98ab01b1c650
[ 1148.088783][T17331] Hardware name: Greatwall GW-001M1A-FTF/GW-001M1A-FTF, BIOS KunLun BIOS V4.0 07/16/2020
[ 1148.098419][T17331] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 1148.106060][T17331] pc : eventfs_iterate+0x2c0/0x398
[ 1148.111017][T17331] lr : eventfs_iterate+0x2fc/0x398
[ 1148.115969][T17331] sp : ffff80008d56bbd0
[ 1148.119964][T17331] x29: ffff80008d56bbf0 x28: ffff001ff5be2600 x27: 0000000000000000
[ 1148.127781][T17331] x26: ffff001ff52ca4e0 x25: 0000000000009977 x24: dead000000000100
[ 1148.135598][T17331] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 000000000000000b x21: ffff800082645f10
[ 1148.143415][T17331] x20: ffff001fddf87c70 x19: ffff80008d56bc90 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 1148.151231][T17331] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff001ff52ca4e0
[ 1148.159048][T17331] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1148.166864][T17331] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffff8000804391d0
[ 1148.174680][T17331] x8 : 0000000180000000 x7 : 0000000000000018 x6 : 0000aaab04b92862
[ 1148.182498][T17331] x5 : 0000aaab04b92862 x4 : 0000000080000000 x3 : 0000000000000068
[ 1148.190314][T17331] x2 : 000000000000000f x1 : 0000000000007ea8 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 1148.198131][T17331] Call trace:
[ 1148.201259][T17331] eventfs_iterate+0x2c0/0x398
[ 1148.205864][T17331] iterate_dir+0x98/0x188
[ 1148.210036][T17331] __arm64_sys_getdents64+0x78/0x160
[ 1148.215161][T17331] invoke_syscall+0x78/0x108
[ 1148.219593][T17331] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf0
[ 1148.224977][T17331] do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
[ 1148.228974][T17331] el0_svc+0x40/0x168
[ 1148.232798][T17
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
video/aperture: optionally match the device in sysfb_disable()
In aperture_remove_conflicting_pci_devices(), we currently only
call sysfb_disable() on vga class devices. This leads to the
following problem when the pimary device is not VGA compatible:
1. A PCI device with a non-VGA class is the boot display
2. That device is probed first and it is not a VGA device so
sysfb_disable() is not called, but the device resources
are freed by aperture_detach_platform_device()
3. Non-primary GPU has a VGA class and it ends up calling sysfb_disable()
4. NULL pointer dereference via sysfb_disable() since the resources
have already been freed by aperture_detach_platform_device() when
it was called by the other device.
Fix this by passing a device pointer to sysfb_disable() and checking
the device to determine if we should execute it or not.
v2: Fix build when CONFIG_SCREEN_INFO is not set
v3: Move device check into the mutex
Drop primary variable in aperture_remove_conflicting_pci_devices()
Drop __init on pci sysfb_pci_dev_is_enabled() |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: ucsi: Move unregister out of atomic section
Commit '9329933699b3 ("soc: qcom: pmic_glink: Make client-lock
non-sleeping")' moved the pmic_glink client list under a spinlock, as it
is accessed by the rpmsg/glink callback, which in turn is invoked from
IRQ context.
This means that ucsi_unregister() is now called from atomic context,
which isn't feasible as it's expecting a sleepable context. An effort is
under way to get GLINK to invoke its callbacks in a sleepable context,
but until then lets schedule the unregistration.
A side effect of this is that ucsi_unregister() can now happen
after the remote processor, and thereby the communication link with it, is
gone. pmic_glink_send() is amended with a check to avoid the resulting NULL
pointer dereference.
This does however result in the user being informed about this error by
the following entry in the kernel log:
ucsi_glink.pmic_glink_ucsi pmic_glink.ucsi.0: failed to send UCSI write request: -5 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/client: avoid dereferencing rdata=NULL in smb2_new_read_req()
This happens when called from SMB2_read() while using rdma
and reaching the rdma_readwrite_threshold. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: core: Check for unset descriptor
Make sure the descriptor has been set before looking at maxpacket.
This fixes a null pointer panic in this case.
This may happen if the gadget doesn't properly set up the endpoint
for the current speed, or the gadget descriptors are malformed and
the descriptor for the speed/endpoint are not found.
No current gadget driver is known to have this problem, but this
may cause a hard-to-find bug during development of new gadgets. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Always drain health in shutdown callback
There is no point in recovery during device shutdown. if health
work started need to wait for it to avoid races and NULL pointer
access.
Hence, drain health WQ on shutdown callback. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: fix deadlock between mddev_suspend and flush bio
Deadlock occurs when mddev is being suspended while some flush bio is in
progress. It is a complex issue.
T1. the first flush is at the ending stage, it clears 'mddev->flush_bio'
and tries to submit data, but is blocked because mddev is suspended
by T4.
T2. the second flush sets 'mddev->flush_bio', and attempts to queue
md_submit_flush_data(), which is already running (T1) and won't
execute again if on the same CPU as T1.
T3. the third flush inc active_io and tries to flush, but is blocked because
'mddev->flush_bio' is not NULL (set by T2).
T4. mddev_suspend() is called and waits for active_io dec to 0 which is inc
by T3.
T1 T2 T3 T4
(flush 1) (flush 2) (third 3) (suspend)
md_submit_flush_data
mddev->flush_bio = NULL;
.
. md_flush_request
. mddev->flush_bio = bio
. queue submit_flushes
. .
. . md_handle_request
. . active_io + 1
. . md_flush_request
. . wait !mddev->flush_bio
. .
. . mddev_suspend
. . wait !active_io
. .
. submit_flushes
. queue_work md_submit_flush_data
. //md_submit_flush_data is already running (T1)
.
md_handle_request
wait resume
The root issue is non-atomic inc/dec of active_io during flush process.
active_io is dec before md_submit_flush_data is queued, and inc soon
after md_submit_flush_data() run.
md_flush_request
active_io + 1
submit_flushes
active_io - 1
md_submit_flush_data
md_handle_request
active_io + 1
make_request
active_io - 1
If active_io is dec after md_handle_request() instead of within
submit_flushes(), make_request() can be called directly intead of
md_handle_request() in md_submit_flush_data(), and active_io will
only inc and dec once in the whole flush process. Deadlock will be
fixed.
Additionally, the only difference between fixing the issue and before is
that there is no return error handling of make_request(). But after
previous patch cleaned md_write_start(), make_requst() only return error
in raid5_make_request() by dm-raid, see commit 41425f96d7aa ("dm-raid456,
md/raid456: fix a deadlock for dm-raid456 while io concurrent with
reshape)". Since dm always splits data and flush operation into two
separate io, io size of flush submitted by dm always is 0, make_request()
will not be called in md_submit_flush_data(). To prevent future
modifications from introducing issues, add WARN_ON to ensure
make_request() no error is returned in this context. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/dasd: fix error checks in dasd_copy_pair_store()
dasd_add_busid() can return an error via ERR_PTR() if an allocation
fails. However, two callsites in dasd_copy_pair_store() do not check
the result, potentially resulting in a NULL pointer dereference. Fix
this by checking the result with IS_ERR() and returning the error up
the stack. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: fix potential null pointer use in destroy_workqueue in init_cifs error path
Dan Carpenter reported a Smack static checker warning:
fs/smb/client/cifsfs.c:1981 init_cifs()
error: we previously assumed 'serverclose_wq' could be null (see line 1895)
The patch which introduced the serverclose workqueue used the wrong
oredering in error paths in init_cifs() for freeing it on errors. |
