| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: Fix oops due to uncleared server->smbd_conn in reconnect
In smbd_destroy(), clear the server->smbd_conn pointer after freeing the
smbd_connection struct that it points to so that reconnection doesn't get
confused. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt: Do not read past the end of test names
Test names were being concatenated based on a offset beyond the end of
the first name, which tripped the buffer overflow detection logic:
detected buffer overflow in strnlen
[...]
Call Trace:
bnxt_ethtool_init.cold+0x18/0x18
Refactor struct hwrm_selftest_qlist_output to use an actual array,
and adjust the concatenation to use snprintf() rather than a series of
strncat() calls. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gfs2: Always check inode size of inline inodes
Check if the inode size of stuffed (inline) inodes is within the allowed
range when reading inodes from disk (gfs2_dinode_in()). This prevents
us from on-disk corruption.
The two checks in stuffed_readpage() and gfs2_unstuffer_page() that just
truncate inline data to the maximum allowed size don't actually make
sense, and they can be removed now as well. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: dts: imx8mm-verdin: Do not power down eth-phy
Currently if suspending using either freeze or memory state, the fec
driver tries to power down the phy which leads to crash of the kernel
and non-responsible kernel with the following call trace:
[ 24.839889 ] Call trace:
[ 24.839892 ] phy_error+0x18/0x60
[ 24.839898 ] kszphy_handle_interrupt+0x6c/0x80
[ 24.839903 ] phy_interrupt+0x20/0x2c
[ 24.839909 ] irq_thread_fn+0x30/0xa0
[ 24.839919 ] irq_thread+0x178/0x2c0
[ 24.839925 ] kthread+0x154/0x160
[ 24.839932 ] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Since there is currently no functionality in the phy subsystem to power
down phys let's just disable the feature of powering-down the ethernet
phy. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: Fix deinitializing VF in error path
If ice_ena_vfs() fails after calling ice_create_vf_entries(), it frees
all VFs without removing them from snapshot PF-VF mailbox list, leading
to list corruption.
Reproducer:
devlink dev eswitch set $PF1_PCI mode switchdev
ip l s $PF1 up
ip l s $PF1 promisc on
sleep 1
echo 1 > /sys/class/net/$PF1/device/sriov_numvfs
sleep 1
echo 1 > /sys/class/net/$PF1/device/sriov_numvfs
Trace (minimized):
list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (ffff8882e241c6f0), but was 0000000000000000. (next=ffff888455da1330).
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:29!
RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0xa6/0x100
ice_mbx_init_vf_info+0xa7/0x180 [ice]
ice_initialize_vf_entry+0x1fa/0x250 [ice]
ice_sriov_configure+0x8d7/0x1520 [ice]
? __percpu_ref_switch_mode+0x1b1/0x5d0
? __pfx_ice_sriov_configure+0x10/0x10 [ice]
Sometimes a KASAN report can be seen instead with a similar stack trace:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_add_valid_or_report+0xf1/0x100
VFs are added to this list in ice_mbx_init_vf_info(), but only removed
in ice_free_vfs(). Move the removing to ice_free_vf_entries(), which is
also being called in other places where VFs are being removed (including
ice_free_vfs() itself). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: lpfc: Fix call trace observed during I/O with CMF enabled
The following was seen with CMF enabled:
BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible
code: systemd-udevd/31711
kernel: caller is lpfc_update_cmf_cmd+0x214/0x420 [lpfc]
kernel: CPU: 12 PID: 31711 Comm: systemd-udevd
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: <TASK>
kernel: dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x57
kernel: check_preemption_disabled+0xbf/0xe0
kernel: lpfc_update_cmf_cmd+0x214/0x420 [lpfc]
kernel: lpfc_nvme_fcp_io_submit+0x23b4/0x4df0 [lpfc]
this_cpu_ptr() calls smp_processor_id() in a preemptible context.
Fix by using per_cpu_ptr() with raw_smp_processor_id() instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nbd: fix io hung while disconnecting device
In our tests, "qemu-nbd" triggers a io hung:
INFO: task qemu-nbd:11445 blocked for more than 368 seconds.
Not tainted 5.18.0-rc3-next-20220422-00003-g2176915513ca #884
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:qemu-nbd state:D stack: 0 pid:11445 ppid: 1 flags:0x00000000
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x480/0x1050
? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3e/0xb0
schedule+0x9c/0x1b0
blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0x9d/0xf0
? ipi_rseq+0x70/0x70
blk_mq_freeze_queue+0x2b/0x40
nbd_add_socket+0x6b/0x270 [nbd]
nbd_ioctl+0x383/0x510 [nbd]
blkdev_ioctl+0x18e/0x3e0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0x120
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7fd8ff706577
RSP: 002b:00007fd8fcdfebf8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000040000000 RCX: 00007fd8ff706577
RDX: 000000000000000d RSI: 000000000000ab00 RDI: 000000000000000f
RBP: 000000000000000f R08: 000000000000fbe8 R09: 000055fe497c62b0
R10: 00000002aff20000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000006d
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffe82dc5e70 R15: 00007fd8fcdff9c0
"qemu-ndb -d" will call ioctl 'NBD_DISCONNECT' first, however, following
message was found:
block nbd0: Send disconnect failed -32
Which indicate that something is wrong with the server. Then,
"qemu-nbd -d" will call ioctl 'NBD_CLEAR_SOCK', however ioctl can't clear
requests after commit 2516ab1543fd("nbd: only clear the queue on device
teardown"). And in the meantime, request can't complete through timeout
because nbd_xmit_timeout() will always return 'BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER', which
means such request will never be completed in this situation.
Now that the flag 'NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT' can make sure requests won't
complete multiple times, switch back to call nbd_clear_sock() in
nbd_clear_sock_ioctl(), so that inflight requests can be cleared. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Squashfs: fix handling and sanity checking of xattr_ids count
A Sysbot [1] corrupted filesystem exposes two flaws in the handling and
sanity checking of the xattr_ids count in the filesystem. Both of these
flaws cause computation overflow due to incorrect typing.
In the corrupted filesystem the xattr_ids value is 4294967071, which
stored in a signed variable becomes the negative number -225.
Flaw 1 (64-bit systems only):
The signed integer xattr_ids variable causes sign extension.
This causes variable overflow in the SQUASHFS_XATTR_*(A) macros. The
variable is first multiplied by sizeof(struct squashfs_xattr_id) where the
type of the sizeof operator is "unsigned long".
On a 64-bit system this is 64-bits in size, and causes the negative number
to be sign extended and widened to 64-bits and then become unsigned. This
produces the very large number 18446744073709548016 or 2^64 - 3600. This
number when rounded up by SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE - 1 (8191 bytes) and
divided by SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE overflows and produces a length of 0
(stored in len).
Flaw 2 (32-bit systems only):
On a 32-bit system the integer variable is not widened by the unsigned
long type of the sizeof operator (32-bits), and the signedness of the
variable has no effect due it always being treated as unsigned.
The above corrupted xattr_ids value of 4294967071, when multiplied
overflows and produces the number 4294963696 or 2^32 - 3400. This number
when rounded up by SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE - 1 (8191 bytes) and divided by
SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE overflows again and produces a length of 0.
The effect of the 0 length computation:
In conjunction with the corrupted xattr_ids field, the filesystem also has
a corrupted xattr_table_start value, where it matches the end of
filesystem value of 850.
This causes the following sanity check code to fail because the
incorrectly computed len of 0 matches the incorrect size of the table
reported by the superblock (0 bytes).
len = SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCK_BYTES(*xattr_ids);
indexes = SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCKS(*xattr_ids);
/*
* The computed size of the index table (len bytes) should exactly
* match the table start and end points
*/
start = table_start + sizeof(*id_table);
end = msblk->bytes_used;
if (len != (end - start))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
Changing the xattr_ids variable to be "usigned int" fixes the flaw on a
64-bit system. This relies on the fact the computation is widened by the
unsigned long type of the sizeof operator.
Casting the variable to u64 in the above macro fixes this flaw on a 32-bit
system.
It also means 64-bit systems do not implicitly rely on the type of the
sizeof operator to widen the computation.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/000000000000cd44f005f1a0f17f@google.com/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: multi-gen LRU: fix crash during cgroup migration
lru_gen_migrate_mm() assumes lru_gen_add_mm() runs prior to itself. This
isn't true for the following scenario:
CPU 1 CPU 2
clone()
cgroup_can_fork()
cgroup_procs_write()
cgroup_post_fork()
task_lock()
lru_gen_migrate_mm()
task_unlock()
task_lock()
lru_gen_add_mm()
task_unlock()
And when the above happens, kernel crashes because of linked list
corruption (mm_struct->lru_gen.list). |
| It was discovered that a nft object or expression could reference a nft set on a different nft table, leading to a use-after-free once that table was deleted. |
| A use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux kernel's netfilter: nf_tables component can be exploited to achieve local privilege escalation.
The nft_verdict_init() function allows positive values as drop error within the hook verdict, and hence the nf_hook_slow() function can cause a double free vulnerability when NF_DROP is issued with a drop error which resembles NF_ACCEPT.
We recommend upgrading past commit f342de4e2f33e0e39165d8639387aa6c19dff660. |
| A heap out-of-bounds write affecting Linux since v2.6.19-rc1 was discovered in net/netfilter/x_tables.c. This allows an attacker to gain privileges or cause a DoS (via heap memory corruption) through user name space |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: use get_random_u32 instead of prandom
bh might occur while updating per-cpu rnd_state from user context,
ie. local_out path.
BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: nginx/2725
caller is nft_ng_random_eval+0x24/0x54 [nft_numgen]
Call Trace:
check_preemption_disabled+0xde/0xe0
nft_ng_random_eval+0x24/0x54 [nft_numgen]
Use the random driver instead, this also avoids need for local prandom
state. Moreover, prandom now uses the random driver since d4150779e60f
("random32: use real rng for non-deterministic randomness").
Based on earlier patch from Pablo Neira. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/reset: Fix error_state_read ptr + offset use
Fix our pointer offset usage in error_state_read
when there is no i915_gpu_coredump but buf offset
is non-zero.
This fixes a kernel page fault can happen when
multiple tests are running concurrently in a loop
and one is producing engine resets and consuming
the i915 error_state dump while the other is
forcing full GT resets. (takes a while to trigger).
The dmesg call trace:
[ 5590.803000] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address:
ffffffffa0b0e000
[ 5590.803009] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 5590.803013] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 5590.803016] PGD 5814067 P4D 5814067 PUD 5815063 PMD 109de4067
PTE 0
[ 5590.803022] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 5590.803026] CPU: 5 PID: 13656 Comm: i915_hangman Tainted: G U
5.17.0-rc5-ups69-guc-err-capt-rev6+ #136
[ 5590.803033] Hardware name: Intel Corporation Alder Lake Client
Platform/AlderLake-M LP4x RVP, BIOS ADLPFWI1.R00.
3031.A02.2201171222 01/17/2022
[ 5590.803039] RIP: 0010:memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10
[ 5590.803045] Code: fe ff ff cc eb 1e 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 d1
48 c1 e9 03 83 e2 07 f3 48 a5 89 d1 f3 a4 c3
66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 d1 <f3> a4
c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 83 fa 20
72 7e 40 38 fe
[ 5590.803054] RSP: 0018:ffffc90003a8fdf0 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 5590.803057] RAX: ffff888107ee9000 RBX: ffff888108cb1a00
RCX: 0000000000000f8f
[ 5590.803061] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: ffffffffa0b0e000
RDI: ffff888107ee9071
[ 5590.803065] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001
R09: 0000000000000001
[ 5590.803069] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000002
R12: 0000000000000019
[ 5590.803073] R13: 0000000000174fff R14: 0000000000001000
R15: ffff888107ee9000
[ 5590.803077] FS: 00007f62a99bee80(0000) GS:ffff88849f880000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5590.803082] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5590.803085] CR2: ffffffffa0b0e000 CR3: 000000010a1a8004
CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[ 5590.803089] PKRU: 55555554
[ 5590.803091] Call Trace:
[ 5590.803093] <TASK>
[ 5590.803096] error_state_read+0xa1/0xd0 [i915]
[ 5590.803175] kernfs_fop_read_iter+0xb2/0x1b0
[ 5590.803180] new_sync_read+0x116/0x1a0
[ 5590.803185] vfs_read+0x114/0x1b0
[ 5590.803189] ksys_read+0x63/0xe0
[ 5590.803193] do_syscall_64+0x38/0xc0
[ 5590.803197] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 5590.803201] RIP: 0033:0x7f62aaea5912
[ 5590.803204] Code: c0 e9 b2 fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d 5a b9 0c 00 e8 05
19 02 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25
18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff
ff 77 56 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24
[ 5590.803213] RSP: 002b:00007fff5b659ae8 EFLAGS: 00000246
ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
[ 5590.803218] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000100000
RCX: 00007f62aaea5912
[ 5590.803221] RDX: 000000000008b000 RSI: 00007f62a8c4000f
RDI: 0000000000000006
[ 5590.803225] RBP: 00007f62a8bcb00f R08: 0000000000200010
R09: 0000000000101000
[ 5590.803229] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246
R12: 0000000000000006
[ 5590.803233] R13: 0000000000075000 R14: 00007f62a8acb010
R15: 0000000000200000
[ 5590.803238] </TASK>
[ 5590.803240] Modules linked in: i915 ttm drm_buddy drm_dp_helper
drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt
fb_sys_fops prime_numbers nfnetlink br_netfilter
overlay mei_pxp mei_hdcp x86_pkg_temp_thermal
coretemp kvm_intel snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clocksource: hyper-v: unexport __init-annotated hv_init_clocksource()
EXPORT_SYMBOL and __init is a bad combination because the .init.text
section is freed up after the initialization. Hence, modules cannot
use symbols annotated __init. The access to a freed symbol may end up
with kernel panic.
modpost used to detect it, but it has been broken for a decade.
Recently, I fixed modpost so it started to warn it again, then this
showed up in linux-next builds.
There are two ways to fix it:
- Remove __init
- Remove EXPORT_SYMBOL
I chose the latter for this case because the only in-tree call-site,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c is never compiled as modular.
(CONFIG_HYPERVISOR_GUEST is boolean) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sock: redo the psock vs ULP protection check
Commit 8a59f9d1e3d4 ("sock: Introduce sk->sk_prot->psock_update_sk_prot()")
has moved the inet_csk_has_ulp(sk) check from sk_psock_init() to
the new tcp_bpf_update_proto() function. I'm guessing that this
was done to allow creating psocks for non-inet sockets.
Unfortunately the destruction path for psock includes the ULP
unwind, so we need to fail the sk_psock_init() itself.
Otherwise if ULP is already present we'll notice that later,
and call tcp_update_ulp() with the sk_proto of the ULP
itself, which will most likely result in the ULP looping
its callbacks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
filemap: Handle sibling entries in filemap_get_read_batch()
If a read races with an invalidation followed by another read, it is
possible for a folio to be replaced with a higher-order folio. If that
happens, we'll see a sibling entry for the new folio in the next iteration
of the loop. This manifests as a NULL pointer dereference while holding
the RCU read lock.
Handle this by simply returning. The next call will find the new folio
and handle it correctly. The other ways of handling this rare race are
more complex and it's just not worth it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix bug_on ext4_mb_use_inode_pa
Hulk Robot reported a BUG_ON:
==================================================================
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/mballoc.c:3211!
[...]
RIP: 0010:ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used.cold+0x85/0x136f
[...]
Call Trace:
ext4_mb_new_blocks+0x9df/0x5d30
ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x1803/0x4d80
ext4_map_blocks+0x3a4/0x1a10
ext4_writepages+0x126d/0x2c30
do_writepages+0x7f/0x1b0
__filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x285/0x3b0
file_write_and_wait_range+0xb1/0x140
ext4_sync_file+0x1aa/0xca0
vfs_fsync_range+0xfb/0x260
do_fsync+0x48/0xa0
[...]
==================================================================
Above issue may happen as follows:
-------------------------------------
do_fsync
vfs_fsync_range
ext4_sync_file
file_write_and_wait_range
__filemap_fdatawrite_range
do_writepages
ext4_writepages
mpage_map_and_submit_extent
mpage_map_one_extent
ext4_map_blocks
ext4_mb_new_blocks
ext4_mb_normalize_request
>>> start + size <= ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical
ext4_mb_regular_allocator
ext4_mb_simple_scan_group
ext4_mb_use_best_found
ext4_mb_new_preallocation
ext4_mb_new_inode_pa
ext4_mb_use_inode_pa
>>> set ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len <= 0
ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used
>>> BUG_ON(ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len <= 0);
we can easily reproduce this problem with the following commands:
`fallocate -l100M disk`
`mkfs.ext4 -b 1024 -g 256 disk`
`mount disk /mnt`
`fsstress -d /mnt -l 0 -n 1000 -p 1`
The size must be smaller than or equal to EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP.
Therefore, "start + size <= ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical" may occur
when the size is truncated. So start should be the start position of
the group where ac_o_ex.fe_logical is located after alignment.
In addition, when the value of fe_logical or EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP
is very large, the value calculated by start_off is more accurate. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm mirror log: round up region bitmap size to BITS_PER_LONG
The code in dm-log rounds up bitset_size to 32 bits. It then uses
find_next_zero_bit_le on the allocated region. find_next_zero_bit_le
accesses the bitmap using unsigned long pointers. So, on 64-bit
architectures, it may access 4 bytes beyond the allocated size.
Fix this bug by rounding up bitset_size to BITS_PER_LONG.
This bug was found by running the lvm2 testsuite with kasan. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: ftrace: consistently handle PLTs.
Sometimes it is necessary to use a PLT entry to call an ftrace
trampoline. This is handled by ftrace_make_call() and ftrace_make_nop(),
with each having *almost* identical logic, but this is not handled by
ftrace_modify_call() since its introduction in commit:
3b23e4991fb66f6d ("arm64: implement ftrace with regs")
Due to this, if we ever were to call ftrace_modify_call() for a callsite
which requires a PLT entry for a trampoline, then either:
a) If the old addr requires a trampoline, ftrace_modify_call() will use
an out-of-range address to generate the 'old' branch instruction.
This will result in warnings from aarch64_insn_gen_branch_imm() and
ftrace_modify_code(), and no instructions will be modified. As
ftrace_modify_call() will return an error, this will result in
subsequent internal ftrace errors.
b) If the old addr does not require a trampoline, but the new addr does,
ftrace_modify_call() will use an out-of-range address to generate the
'new' branch instruction. This will result in warnings from
aarch64_insn_gen_branch_imm(), and ftrace_modify_code() will replace
the 'old' branch with a BRK. This will result in a kernel panic when
this BRK is later executed.
Practically speaking, case (a) is vastly more likely than case (b), and
typically this will result in internal ftrace errors that don't
necessarily affect the rest of the system. This can be demonstrated with
an out-of-tree test module which triggers ftrace_modify_call(), e.g.
| # insmod test_ftrace.ko
| test_ftrace: Function test_function raw=0xffffb3749399201c, callsite=0xffffb37493992024
| branch_imm_common: offset out of range
| branch_imm_common: offset out of range
| ------------[ ftrace bug ]------------
| ftrace failed to modify
| [<ffffb37493992024>] test_function+0x8/0x38 [test_ftrace]
| actual: 1d:00:00:94
| Updating ftrace call site to call a different ftrace function
| ftrace record flags: e0000002
| (2) R
| expected tramp: ffffb374ae42ed54
| ------------[ cut here ]------------
| WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 165 at kernel/trace/ftrace.c:2085 ftrace_bug+0x280/0x2b0
| Modules linked in: test_ftrace(+)
| CPU: 0 PID: 165 Comm: insmod Not tainted 5.19.0-rc2-00002-g4d9ead8b45ce #13
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
| pc : ftrace_bug+0x280/0x2b0
| lr : ftrace_bug+0x280/0x2b0
| sp : ffff80000839ba00
| x29: ffff80000839ba00 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff80000839bcf0
| x26: ffffb37493994180 x25: ffffb374b0991c28 x24: ffffb374b0d70000
| x23: 00000000ffffffea x22: ffffb374afcc33b0 x21: ffffb374b08f9cc8
| x20: ffff572b8462c000 x19: ffffb374b08f9000 x18: ffffffffffffffff
| x17: 6c6c6163202c6331 x16: ffffb374ae5ad110 x15: ffffb374b0d51ee4
| x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 3435646532346561 x12: 3437336266666666
| x11: 203a706d61727420 x10: 6465746365707865 x9 : ffffb374ae5149e8
| x8 : 336266666666203a x7 : 706d617274206465 x6 : 00000000fffff167
| x5 : ffff572bffbc4a08 x4 : 00000000fffff167 x3 : 0000000000000000
| x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff572b84461e00 x0 : 0000000000000022
| Call trace:
| ftrace_bug+0x280/0x2b0
| ftrace_replace_code+0x98/0xa0
| ftrace_modify_all_code+0xe0/0x144
| arch_ftrace_update_code+0x14/0x20
| ftrace_startup+0xf8/0x1b0
| register_ftrace_function+0x38/0x90
| test_ftrace_init+0xd0/0x1000 [test_ftrace]
| do_one_initcall+0x50/0x2b0
| do_init_module+0x50/0x1f0
| load_module+0x17c8/0x1d64
| __do_sys_finit_module+0xa8/0x100
| __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x2c/0x3c
| invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120
| el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xdc/0x100
| do_el0_svc+0x3c/0xd0
| el0_svc+0x34/0xb0
| el0t_64_sync_handler+0xbc/0x140
| el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190
| ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
We can solve this by consistently determining whether to use a PLT entry
for an address.
Note that since (the earlier) commit:
f1a54ae9
---truncated--- |
