| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: renesas_usb3: validate endpoint index in standard request handlers
The GET_STATUS and SET/CLEAR_FEATURE handlers extract the endpoint
number from the host-supplied wIndex without any sort of validation.
Fix this up by validating the number of endpoints actually match up with
the number the device has before attempting to dereference a pointer
based on this math.
This is just like what was done in commit ee0d382feb44 ("usb: gadget:
aspeed_udc: validate endpoint index for ast udc") for the aspeed driver. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: udlfb: avoid divide-by-zero on FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO
Much like commit 19f953e74356 ("fbdev: fb_pm2fb: Avoid potential divide
by zero error"), we also need to prevent that same crash from happening
in the udlfb driver as it uses pixclock directly when dividing, which
will crash. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: sm750fb: fix division by zero in ps_to_hz()
ps_to_hz() is called from hw_sm750_crtc_set_mode() without validating
that pixclock is non-zero. A zero pixclock passed via FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO
causes a division by zero.
Fix by rejecting zero pixclock in lynxfb_ops_check_var(), consistent
with other framebuffer drivers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: ctxfi: Limit PTP to a single page
Commit 391e69143d0a increased CT_PTP_NUM from 1 to 4 to support 256
playback streams, but the additional pages are not used by the card
correctly. The CT20K2 hardware already has multiple VMEM_PTPAL
registers, but using them separately would require refactoring the
entire virtual memory allocation logic.
ct_vm_map() always uses PTEs in vm->ptp[0].area regardless of
CT_PTP_NUM. On AMD64 systems, a single PTP covers 512 PTEs (2M). When
aggregate memory allocations exceed this limit, ct_vm_map() tries to
access beyond the allocated space and causes a page fault:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffd4ae8a10a000
Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI
RIP: 0010:ct_vm_map+0x17c/0x280 [snd_ctxfi]
Call Trace:
atc_pcm_playback_prepare+0x225/0x3b0
ct_pcm_playback_prepare+0x38/0x60
snd_pcm_do_prepare+0x2f/0x50
snd_pcm_action_single+0x36/0x90
snd_pcm_action_nonatomic+0xbf/0xd0
snd_pcm_ioctl+0x28/0x40
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x81/0x610
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Revert CT_PTP_NUM to 1. The 256 SRC_RESOURCE_NUM and playback_count
remain unchanged. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: vidtv: fix NULL pointer dereference in vidtv_channel_pmt_match_sections
syzbot reported a general protection fault in vidtv_psi_desc_assign [1].
vidtv_psi_pmt_stream_init() can return NULL on memory allocation
failure, but vidtv_channel_pmt_match_sections() does not check for
this. When tail is NULL, the subsequent call to
vidtv_psi_desc_assign(&tail->descriptor, desc) dereferences a NULL
pointer offset, causing a general protection fault.
Add a NULL check after vidtv_psi_pmt_stream_init(). On failure, clean
up the already-allocated stream chain and return.
[1]
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
RIP: 0010:vidtv_psi_desc_assign+0x24/0x90 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_psi.c:629
Call Trace:
<TASK>
vidtv_channel_pmt_match_sections drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_channel.c:349 [inline]
vidtv_channel_si_init+0x1445/0x1a50 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_channel.c:479
vidtv_mux_init+0x526/0xbe0 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_mux.c:519
vidtv_start_streaming drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_bridge.c:194 [inline]
vidtv_start_feed+0x33e/0x4d0 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_bridge.c:239 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: fix use-after-free in ocfs2_fault() when VM_FAULT_RETRY
filemap_fault() may drop the mmap_lock before returning VM_FAULT_RETRY,
as documented in mm/filemap.c:
"If our return value has VM_FAULT_RETRY set, it's because the mmap_lock
may be dropped before doing I/O or by lock_folio_maybe_drop_mmap()."
When this happens, a concurrent munmap() can call remove_vma() and free
the vm_area_struct via RCU. The saved 'vma' pointer in ocfs2_fault() then
becomes a dangling pointer, and the subsequent trace_ocfs2_fault() call
dereferences it -- a use-after-free.
Fix this by saving ip_blkno as a plain integer before calling
filemap_fault(), and removing vma from the trace event. Since
ip_blkno is copied by value before the lock can be dropped, it
remains valid regardless of what happens to the vma or inode
afterward. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: handle invalid dinode in ocfs2_group_extend
[BUG]
kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/resize.c:308!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:ocfs2_group_extend+0x10aa/0x1ae0 fs/ocfs2/resize.c:308
Code: 8b8520ff ffff83f8 860f8580 030000e8 5cc3c1fe
Call Trace:
...
ocfs2_ioctl+0x175/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:869
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x1e0 fs/ioctl.c:583
x64_sys_call+0x1144/0x26a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:17
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x93/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
...
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_group_extend() assumes that the global bitmap inode block
returned from ocfs2_inode_lock() has already been validated and
BUG_ONs when the signature is not a dinode. That assumption is too
strong for crafted filesystems because the JBD2-managed buffer path
can bypass structural validation and return an invalid dinode to the
resize ioctl.
[FIX]
Validate the dinode explicitly in ocfs2_group_extend(). If the global
bitmap buffer does not contain a valid dinode, report filesystem
corruption with ocfs2_error() and fail the resize operation instead of
crashing the kernel. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: endpoint: pci-epf-vntb: Stop cmd_handler work in epf_ntb_epc_cleanup
Disable the delayed work before clearing BAR mappings and doorbells to
avoid running the handler after resources have been torn down.
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff800083f46004
[...]
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000007 [#1] SMP
[...]
Call trace:
epf_ntb_cmd_handler+0x54/0x200 [pci_epf_vntb] (P)
process_one_work+0x154/0x3b0
worker_thread+0x2c8/0x400
kthread+0x148/0x210
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: endpoint: pci-epf-vntb: Remove duplicate resource teardown
epf_ntb_epc_destroy() duplicates the teardown that the caller is
supposed to perform later. This leads to an oops when .allow_link fails
or when .drop_link is performed. The following is an example oops of the
former case:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dead000000000108
[...]
[dead000000000108] address between user and kernel address ranges
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000044 [#1] SMP
[...]
Call trace:
pci_epc_remove_epf+0x78/0xe0 (P)
pci_primary_epc_epf_link+0x88/0xa8
configfs_symlink+0x1f4/0x5a0
vfs_symlink+0x134/0x1d8
do_symlinkat+0x88/0x138
__arm64_sys_symlinkat+0x74/0xe0
[...]
Remove the helper, and drop pci_epc_put(). EPC device refcounting is
tied to the configfs EPC group lifetime, and pci_epc_put() in the
.drop_link path is sufficient. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Drop WARN on large size for KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION
Drop the WARN in sev_pin_memory() on npages overflowing an int, as the
WARN is comically trivially to trigger from userspace, e.g. by doing:
struct kvm_enc_region range = {
.addr = 0,
.size = -1ul,
};
__vm_ioctl(vm, KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION, &range);
Note, the checks in sev_mem_enc_register_region() that presumably exist to
verify the incoming address+size are completely worthless, as both "addr"
and "size" are u64s and SEV is 64-bit only, i.e. they _can't_ be greater
than ULONG_MAX. That wart will be cleaned up in the near future.
if (range->addr > ULONG_MAX || range->size > ULONG_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
Opportunistically add a comment to explain why the code calculates the
number of pages the "hard" way, e.g. instead of just shifting @ulen. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: qcom: q6apm: move component registration to unmanaged version
q6apm component registers dais dynamically from ASoC toplology, which
are allocated using device managed version apis. Allocating both
component and dynamic dais using managed version could lead to incorrect
free ordering, dai will be freed while component still holding references
to it.
Fix this issue by moving component to unmanged version so
that the dai pointers are only freeded after the component is removed.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in snd_soc_del_component_unlocked+0x3d4/0x400 [snd_soc_core]
Read of size 8 at addr ffff00084493a6e8 by task kworker/u48:0/3426
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: LENOVO 21N2ZC5PUS/21N2ZC5PUS, BIOS N42ET57W (1.31 ) 08/08/2024
Workqueue: pdr_notifier_wq pdr_notifier_work [pdr_interface]
Call trace:
show_stack+0x28/0x7c (C)
dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x80
print_report+0x160/0x4b4
kasan_report+0xac/0xfc
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x20/0x34
snd_soc_del_component_unlocked+0x3d4/0x400 [snd_soc_core]
snd_soc_unregister_component_by_driver+0x50/0x88 [snd_soc_core]
devm_component_release+0x30/0x5c [snd_soc_core]
devres_release_all+0x13c/0x210
device_unbind_cleanup+0x20/0x190
device_release_driver_internal+0x350/0x468
device_release_driver+0x18/0x30
bus_remove_device+0x1a0/0x35c
device_del+0x314/0x7f0
device_unregister+0x20/0xbc
apr_remove_device+0x5c/0x7c [apr]
device_for_each_child+0xd8/0x160
apr_pd_status+0x7c/0xa8 [apr]
pdr_notifier_work+0x114/0x240 [pdr_interface]
process_one_work+0x500/0xb70
worker_thread+0x630/0xfb0
kthread+0x370/0x6c0
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Allocated by task 77:
kasan_save_stack+0x40/0x68
kasan_save_track+0x20/0x40
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x44/0x58
__kasan_kmalloc+0xbc/0xdc
__kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x1f4/0x620
devm_kmalloc+0x7c/0x1c8
snd_soc_register_dai+0x50/0x4f0 [snd_soc_core]
soc_tplg_pcm_elems_load+0x55c/0x1eb8 [snd_soc_core]
snd_soc_tplg_component_load+0x4f8/0xb60 [snd_soc_core]
audioreach_tplg_init+0x124/0x1fc [snd_q6apm]
q6apm_audio_probe+0x10/0x1c [snd_q6apm]
snd_soc_component_probe+0x5c/0x118 [snd_soc_core]
soc_probe_component+0x44c/0xaf0 [snd_soc_core]
snd_soc_bind_card+0xad0/0x2370 [snd_soc_core]
snd_soc_register_card+0x3b0/0x4c0 [snd_soc_core]
devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x50/0xc8 [snd_soc_core]
x1e80100_platform_probe+0x208/0x368 [snd_soc_x1e80100]
platform_probe+0xc0/0x188
really_probe+0x188/0x804
__driver_probe_device+0x158/0x358
driver_probe_device+0x60/0x190
__device_attach_driver+0x16c/0x2a8
bus_for_each_drv+0x100/0x194
__device_attach+0x174/0x380
device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20
bus_probe_device+0x124/0x154
deferred_probe_work_func+0x140/0x220
process_one_work+0x500/0xb70
worker_thread+0x630/0xfb0
kthread+0x370/0x6c0
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Freed by task 3426:
kasan_save_stack+0x40/0x68
kasan_save_track+0x20/0x40
__kasan_save_free_info+0x4c/0x80
__kasan_slab_free+0x78/0xa0
kfree+0x100/0x4a4
devres_release_all+0x144/0x210
device_unbind_cleanup+0x20/0x190
device_release_driver_internal+0x350/0x468
device_release_driver+0x18/0x30
bus_remove_device+0x1a0/0x35c
device_del+0x314/0x7f0
device_unregister+0x20/0xbc
apr_remove_device+0x5c/0x7c [apr]
device_for_each_child+0xd8/0x160
apr_pd_status+0x7c/0xa8 [apr]
pdr_notifier_work+0x114/0x240 [pdr_interface]
process_one_work+0x500/0xb70
worker_thread+0x630/0xfb0
kthread+0x370/0x6c0
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: vidtv: fix nfeeds state corruption on start_streaming failure
syzbot reported a memory leak in vidtv_psi_service_desc_init [1].
When vidtv_start_streaming() fails inside vidtv_start_feed(), the
nfeeds counter is left incremented even though no feed was actually
started. This corrupts the driver state: subsequent start_feed calls
see nfeeds > 1 and skip starting the mux, while stop_feed calls
eventually try to stop a non-existent stream.
This state corruption can also lead to memory leaks, since the mux
and channel resources may be partially allocated during a failed
start_streaming but never cleaned up, as the stop path finds
dvb->streaming == false and returns early.
Fix by decrementing nfeeds back when start_streaming fails, keeping
the counter in sync with the actual number of active feeds.
[1]
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888145b50820 (size 32):
comm "syz.0.17", pid 6068, jiffies 4294944486
backtrace (crc 90a0c7d4):
vidtv_psi_service_desc_init+0x74/0x1b0 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_psi.c:288
vidtv_channel_s302m_init+0xb1/0x2a0 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_channel.c:83
vidtv_channels_init+0x1b/0x40 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_channel.c:524
vidtv_mux_init+0x516/0xbe0 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_mux.c:518
vidtv_start_streaming drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_bridge.c:194 [inline]
vidtv_start_feed+0x33e/0x4d0 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_bridge.c:239 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: 6fire: fix use-after-free on disconnect
In usb6fire_chip_abort(), the chip struct is allocated as the card's
private data (via snd_card_new with sizeof(struct sfire_chip)). When
snd_card_free_when_closed() is called and no file handles are open, the
card and embedded chip are freed synchronously. The subsequent
chip->card = NULL write then hits freed slab memory.
Call trace:
usb6fire_chip_abort sound/usb/6fire/chip.c:59 [inline]
usb6fire_chip_disconnect+0x348/0x358 sound/usb/6fire/chip.c:182
usb_unbind_interface+0x1a8/0x88c drivers/usb/core/driver.c:458
...
hub_event+0x1a04/0x4518 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5953
Fix by moving the card lifecycle out of usb6fire_chip_abort() and into
usb6fire_chip_disconnect(). The card pointer is saved in a local
before any teardown, snd_card_disconnect() is called first to prevent
new opens, URBs are aborted while chip is still valid, and
snd_card_free_when_closed() is called last so chip is never accessed
after the card may be freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: as102: fix to not free memory after the device is registered in as102_usb_probe()
In as102_usb driver, the following race condition occurs:
```
CPU0 CPU1
as102_usb_probe()
kzalloc(); // alloc as102_dev_t
....
usb_register_dev();
fd = sys_open("/path/to/dev"); // open as102 fd
....
usb_deregister_dev();
....
kfree(); // free as102_dev_t
....
sys_close(fd);
as102_release() // UAF!!
as102_usb_release()
kfree(); // DFB!!
```
When a USB character device registered with usb_register_dev() is later
unregistered (via usb_deregister_dev() or disconnect), the device node is
removed so new open() calls fail. However, file descriptors that are
already open do not go away immediately: they remain valid until the last
reference is dropped and the driver's .release() is invoked.
In as102, as102_usb_probe() calls usb_register_dev() and then, on an
error path, does usb_deregister_dev() and frees as102_dev_t right away.
If userspace raced a successful open() before the deregistration, that
open FD will later hit as102_release() --> as102_usb_release() and access
or free as102_dev_t again, occur a race to use-after-free and
double-free vuln.
The fix is to never kfree(as102_dev_t) directly once usb_register_dev()
has succeeded. After deregistration, defer freeing memory to .release().
In other words, let release() perform the last kfree when the final open
FD is closed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nilfs2: fix NULL i_assoc_inode dereference in nilfs_mdt_save_to_shadow_map
The DAT inode's btree node cache (i_assoc_inode) is initialized lazily
during btree operations. However, nilfs_mdt_save_to_shadow_map()
assumes i_assoc_inode is already initialized when copying dirty pages
to the shadow map during GC.
If NILFS_IOCTL_CLEAN_SEGMENTS is called immediately after mount before
any btree operation has occurred on the DAT inode, i_assoc_inode is
NULL leading to a general protection fault.
Fix this by calling nilfs_attach_btree_node_cache() on the DAT inode
in nilfs_dat_read() at mount time, ensuring i_assoc_inode is always
initialized before any GC operation can use it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: hackrf: fix to not free memory after the device is registered in hackrf_probe()
In hackrf driver, the following race condition occurs:
```
CPU0 CPU1
hackrf_probe()
kzalloc(); // alloc hackrf_dev
....
v4l2_device_register();
....
fd = sys_open("/path/to/dev"); // open hackrf fd
....
v4l2_device_unregister();
....
kfree(); // free hackrf_dev
....
sys_ioctl(fd, ...);
v4l2_ioctl();
video_is_registered() // UAF!!
....
sys_close(fd);
v4l2_release() // UAF!!
hackrf_video_release()
kfree(); // DFB!!
```
When a V4L2 or video device is unregistered, the device node is removed so
new open() calls are blocked.
However, file descriptors that are already open-and any in-flight I/O-do
not terminate immediately; they remain valid until the last reference is
dropped and the driver's release() is invoked.
Therefore, freeing device memory on the error path after hackrf_probe()
has registered dev it will lead to a race to use-after-free vuln, since
those already-open handles haven't been released yet.
And since release() free memory too, race to use-after-free and
double-free vuln occur.
To prevent this, if device is registered from probe(), it should be
modified to free memory only through release() rather than calling
kfree() directly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: spi-dw-dma: fix print error log when wait finish transaction
If an error occurs, the device may not have a current message. In this
case, the system will crash.
In this case, it's better to use dev from the struct ctlr (struct spi_controller*). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
driver core: platform: use generic driver_override infrastructure
When a driver is probed through __driver_attach(), the bus' match()
callback is called without the device lock held, thus accessing the
driver_override field without a lock, which can cause a UAF.
Fix this by using the driver-core driver_override infrastructure taking
care of proper locking internally.
Note that calling match() from __driver_attach() without the device lock
held is intentional. [1] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: do not expire session on binding failure
When a multichannel session binding request fails (e.g. wrong password),
the error path unconditionally sets sess->state = SMB2_SESSION_EXPIRED.
However, during binding, sess points to the target session looked up via
ksmbd_session_lookup_slowpath() -- which belongs to another connection's
user. This allows a remote attacker to invalidate any active session by
simply sending a binding request with a wrong password (DoS).
Fix this by skipping session expiration when the failed request was
a binding attempt, since the session does not belong to the current
connection. The reference taken by ksmbd_session_lookup_slowpath() is
still correctly released via ksmbd_user_session_put(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: unset conn->binding on failed binding request
When a multichannel SMB2_SESSION_SETUP request with
SMB2_SESSION_REQ_FLAG_BINDING fails ksmbd sets conn->binding = true
but never clears it on the error path. This leaves the connection in
a binding state where all subsequent ksmbd_session_lookup_all() calls
fall back to the global sessions table. This fix it by clearing
conn->binding = false in the error path. |
