| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: media: tegra-video: fix device_node use after free
At probe time this code path is followed:
* tegra_csi_init
* tegra_csi_channels_alloc
* for_each_child_of_node(node, channel) -- iterates over channels
* automatically gets 'channel'
* tegra_csi_channel_alloc()
* saves into chan->of_node a pointer to the channel OF node
* automatically gets and puts 'channel'
* now the node saved in chan->of_node has refcount 0, can disappear
* tegra_csi_channels_init
* iterates over channels
* tegra_csi_channel_init -- uses chan->of_node
After that, chan->of_node keeps storing the node until the device is
removed.
of_node_get() the node and of_node_put() it during teardown to avoid any
risk. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: Validate index root when initialize NTFS security
This enhances the sanity check for $SDH and $SII while initializing NTFS
security, guarantees these index root are legit.
[ 162.459513] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320
[ 162.460176] Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880037bca99 by task mount/243
[ 162.460851]
[ 162.461252] CPU: 0 PID: 243 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.0.0-rc7 #42
[ 162.461744] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 162.462609] Call Trace:
[ 162.462954] <TASK>
[ 162.463276] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63
[ 162.463822] print_report.cold+0xf5/0x689
[ 162.464608] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x3a/0x60
[ 162.465766] ? hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320
[ 162.466975] kasan_report+0xa7/0x130
[ 162.467506] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0xc0/0xf0
[ 162.467998] ? hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320
[ 162.468536] __asan_load2+0x68/0x90
[ 162.468923] hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320
[ 162.469282] ? cmp_uints+0xe0/0xe0
[ 162.469557] ? cmp_sdh+0x90/0x90
[ 162.469864] ? ni_find_attr+0x214/0x300
[ 162.470217] ? ni_load_mi+0x80/0x80
[ 162.470479] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 162.470931] ? ntfs_bread_run+0x190/0x190
[ 162.471307] ? indx_get_root+0xe4/0x190
[ 162.471556] ? indx_get_root+0x140/0x190
[ 162.471833] ? indx_init+0x1e0/0x1e0
[ 162.472069] ? fnd_clear+0x115/0x140
[ 162.472363] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x100/0x100
[ 162.472731] indx_find+0x184/0x470
[ 162.473461] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0
[ 162.474429] ? indx_find_buffer+0x2d0/0x2d0
[ 162.474704] ? do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 162.474962] dir_search_u+0x196/0x2f0
[ 162.475381] ? ntfs_nls_to_utf16+0x450/0x450
[ 162.475661] ? ntfs_security_init+0x3d6/0x440
[ 162.475906] ? is_sd_valid+0x180/0x180
[ 162.476191] ntfs_extend_init+0x13f/0x2c0
[ 162.476496] ? ntfs_fix_post_read+0x130/0x130
[ 162.476861] ? iput.part.0+0x286/0x320
[ 162.477325] ntfs_fill_super+0x11e0/0x1b50
[ 162.477709] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 162.477970] ? vsprintf+0x20/0x20
[ 162.478258] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150
[ 162.478538] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370
[ 162.478789] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 162.479038] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20
[ 162.479374] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130
[ 162.479729] path_mount+0x654/0xfe0
[ 162.480124] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 162.480484] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0
[ 162.480894] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 162.481467] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1c4/0x440
[ 162.482280] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 162.482714] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0
[ 162.483264] ? path_mount+0xfe0/0xfe0
[ 162.484782] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 162.485593] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110
[ 162.486024] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 162.486543] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 162.487141] RIP: 0033:0x7f9d374e948a
[ 162.488324] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008
[ 162.489728] RSP: 002b:00007ffe30e73d18 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 162.490971] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000561cdb43a060 RCX: 00007f9d374e948a
[ 162.491669] RDX: 0000561cdb43a260 RSI: 0000561cdb43a2e0 RDI: 0000561cdb442af0
[ 162.492050] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000561cdb43a280 R09: 0000000000000020
[ 162.492459] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000561cdb442af0
[ 162.493183] R13: 0000561cdb43a260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff
[ 162.493644] </TASK>
[ 162.493908]
[ 162.494214] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[ 162.494761] page:000000003e38a3d5 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x37bc
[ 162.496064] flags: 0xfffffc0000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[ 162.497278] raw: 000fffffc0000000 ffffea00000df1c8 ffffea00000df008 0000000000000000
[ 162.498928] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000240000 0
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/siw: Fix immediate work request flush to completion queue
Correctly set send queue element opcode during immediate work request
flushing in post sendqueue operation, if the QP is in ERROR state.
An undefined ocode value results in out-of-bounds access to an array
for mapping the opcode between siw internal and RDMA core representation
in work completion generation. It resulted in a KASAN BUG report
of type 'global-out-of-bounds' during NFSoRDMA testing.
This patch further fixes a potential case of a malicious user which may
write undefined values for completion queue elements status or opcode,
if the CQ is memory mapped to user land. It avoids the same out-of-bounds
access to arrays for status and opcode mapping as described above. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8192u: Fix use after free in ieee80211_rx()
We cannot dereference the "skb" pointer after calling
ieee80211_monitor_rx(), because it is a use after free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Fix possible use-after-free in async command interface
mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx should return only after all its callback
handlers were completed. Before this patch, the below race between
mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx and mlx5_cmd_exec_cb_handler was possible and
lead to a use-after-free:
1. mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx is called while num_inflight is 2 (i.e.
elevated by 1, a single inflight callback).
2. mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx decreases num_inflight to 1.
3. mlx5_cmd_exec_cb_handler is called, decreases num_inflight to 0 and
is about to call wake_up().
4. mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx calls wait_event, which returns
immediately as the condition (num_inflight == 0) holds.
5. mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx returns.
6. The caller of mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx frees the mlx5_async_ctx
object.
7. mlx5_cmd_exec_cb_handler goes on and calls wake_up() on the freed
object.
Fix it by syncing using a completion object. Mark it completed when
num_inflight reaches 0.
Trace:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in do_raw_spin_lock+0x23d/0x270
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888139cd12f4 by task swapper/5/0
CPU: 5 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/5 Not tainted 6.0.0-rc3_for_upstream_debug_2022_08_30_13_10 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d
print_report.cold+0x2d5/0x684
? do_raw_spin_lock+0x23d/0x270
kasan_report+0xb1/0x1a0
? do_raw_spin_lock+0x23d/0x270
do_raw_spin_lock+0x23d/0x270
? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90
? __delete_object+0xb8/0x100
? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x43/0x60
? __wake_up_common_lock+0xb9/0x140
__wake_up_common_lock+0xb9/0x140
? __wake_up_common+0x650/0x650
? destroy_tis_callback+0x53/0x70 [mlx5_core]
? kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
? destroy_tis_callback+0x53/0x70 [mlx5_core]
? kfree+0x1ba/0x520
? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x54/0x220
mlx5_cmd_exec_cb_handler+0x136/0x1a0 [mlx5_core]
? mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx+0x220/0x220 [mlx5_core]
? mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx+0x220/0x220 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_cmd_comp_handler+0x65a/0x12b0 [mlx5_core]
? dump_command+0xcc0/0xcc0 [mlx5_core]
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400
? cmd_comp_notifier+0x7e/0xb0 [mlx5_core]
cmd_comp_notifier+0x7e/0xb0 [mlx5_core]
atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xd7/0x1d0
mlx5_eq_async_int+0x3ce/0xa20 [mlx5_core]
atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xd7/0x1d0
? irq_release+0x140/0x140 [mlx5_core]
irq_int_handler+0x19/0x30 [mlx5_core]
__handle_irq_event_percpu+0x1f2/0x620
handle_irq_event+0xb2/0x1d0
handle_edge_irq+0x21e/0xb00
__common_interrupt+0x79/0x1a0
common_interrupt+0x78/0xa0
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40
RIP: 0010:default_idle+0x42/0x60
Code: c1 83 e0 07 48 c1 e9 03 83 c0 03 0f b6 14 11 38 d0 7c 04 84 d2 75 14 8b 05 eb 47 22 02 85 c0 7e 07 0f 00 2d e0 9f 48 00 fb f4 <c3> 48 c7 c7 80 08 7f 85 e8 d1 d3 3e fe eb de 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00
RSP: 0018:ffff888100dbfdf0 EFLAGS: 00000242
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffffff84ecbd48 RCX: 1ffffffff0afe110
RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff835cc9bc
RBP: 0000000000000005 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff88881dec4ac3
R10: ffffed1103bd8958 R11: 0000017d0ca571c9 R12: 0000000000000005
R13: ffffffff84f024e0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: dffffc0000000000
? default_idle_call+0xcc/0x450
default_idle_call+0xec/0x450
do_idle+0x394/0x450
? arch_cpu_idle_exit+0x40/0x40
? do_idle+0x17/0x450
cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20
start_secondary+0x221/0x2b0
? set_cpu_sibling_map+0x2070/0x2070
secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xcd/0xdb
</TASK>
Allocated by task 49502:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
__kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0
kvmalloc_node+0x48/0xe0
mlx5e_bulk_async_init+0x35/0x110 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_tls_priv_tx_list_cleanup+0x84/0x3e0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_ktls_cleanup_tx+0x38f/0x760 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_cleanup_nic_tx+0xa7/0x100 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_detach_netdev+0x1c
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-tcp: add bounds check on Transfer Tag
ttag is used as an index to get cmd in nvmet_tcp_handle_h2c_data_pdu(),
add a bounds check to avoid out-of-bounds access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: rds: don't hold sock lock when cancelling work from rds_tcp_reset_callbacks()
syzbot is reporting lockdep warning at rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() [1], for
commit ac3615e7f3cffe2a ("RDS: TCP: Reduce code duplication in
rds_tcp_reset_callbacks()") added cancel_delayed_work_sync() into a section
protected by lock_sock() without realizing that rds_send_xmit() might call
lock_sock().
We don't need to protect cancel_delayed_work_sync() using lock_sock(), for
even if rds_{send,recv}_worker() re-queued this work while __flush_work()
from cancel_delayed_work_sync() was waiting for this work to complete,
retried rds_{send,recv}_worker() is no-op due to the absence of RDS_CONN_UP
bit. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix use-after-free in ext4_orphan_cleanup
I caught a issue as follows:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_add_valid+0x28/0x1a0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88814b13f378 by task mount/710
CPU: 1 PID: 710 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.1.0-rc3-next #370
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0x9f
print_report+0x25d/0x759
kasan_report+0xc0/0x120
__asan_load8+0x99/0x140
__list_add_valid+0x28/0x1a0
ext4_orphan_cleanup+0x564/0x9d0 [ext4]
__ext4_fill_super+0x48e2/0x5300 [ext4]
ext4_fill_super+0x19f/0x3a0 [ext4]
get_tree_bdev+0x27b/0x450
ext4_get_tree+0x19/0x30 [ext4]
vfs_get_tree+0x49/0x150
path_mount+0xaae/0x1350
do_mount+0xe2/0x110
__x64_sys_mount+0xf0/0x190
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
</TASK>
[...]
==================================================================
Above issue may happen as follows:
-------------------------------------
ext4_fill_super
ext4_orphan_cleanup
--- loop1: assume last_orphan is 12 ---
list_add(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_orphan, &EXT4_SB(sb)->s_orphan)
ext4_truncate --> return 0
ext4_inode_attach_jinode --> return -ENOMEM
iput(inode) --> free inode<12>
--- loop2: last_orphan is still 12 ---
list_add(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_orphan, &EXT4_SB(sb)->s_orphan);
// use inode<12> and trigger UAF
To solve this issue, we need to propagate the return value of
ext4_inode_attach_jinode() appropriately. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix deadlock due to mbcache entry corruption
When manipulating xattr blocks, we can deadlock infinitely looping
inside ext4_xattr_block_set() where we constantly keep finding xattr
block for reuse in mbcache but we are unable to reuse it because its
reference count is too big. This happens because cache entry for the
xattr block is marked as reusable (e_reusable set) although its
reference count is too big. When this inconsistency happens, this
inconsistent state is kept indefinitely and so ext4_xattr_block_set()
keeps retrying indefinitely.
The inconsistent state is caused by non-atomic update of e_reusable bit.
e_reusable is part of a bitfield and e_reusable update can race with
update of e_referenced bit in the same bitfield resulting in loss of one
of the updates. Fix the problem by using atomic bitops instead.
This bug has been around for many years, but it became *much* easier
to hit after commit 65f8b80053a1 ("ext4: fix race when reusing xattr
blocks"). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: pn533: Clear nfc_target before being used
Fix a slab-out-of-bounds read that occurs in nla_put() called from
nfc_genl_send_target() when target->sensb_res_len, which is duplicated
from an nfc_target in pn533, is too large as the nfc_target is not
properly initialized and retains garbage values. Clear nfc_targets with
memset() before they are used.
Found by a modified version of syzkaller.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nla_put
Call Trace:
memcpy
nla_put
nfc_genl_dump_targets
genl_lock_dumpit
netlink_dump
__netlink_dump_start
genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit
genl_rcv_msg
netlink_rcv_skb
genl_rcv
netlink_unicast
netlink_sendmsg
sock_sendmsg
____sys_sendmsg
___sys_sendmsg
__sys_sendmsg
do_syscall_64 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fpga: prevent integer overflow in dfl_feature_ioctl_set_irq()
The "hdr.count * sizeof(s32)" multiplication can overflow on 32 bit
systems leading to memory corruption. Use array_size() to fix that. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hfs: fix OOB Read in __hfs_brec_find
Syzbot reported a OOB read bug:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hfs_strcmp+0x117/0x190
fs/hfs/string.c:84
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88807eb62c4e by task kworker/u4:1/11
CPU: 1 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u4:1 Not tainted
6.1.0-rc6-syzkaller-00308-g644e9524388a #0
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-7:0)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x28e lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description+0x74/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:284
print_report+0x107/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:395
kasan_report+0xcd/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:495
hfs_strcmp+0x117/0x190 fs/hfs/string.c:84
__hfs_brec_find+0x213/0x5c0 fs/hfs/bfind.c:75
hfs_brec_find+0x276/0x520 fs/hfs/bfind.c:138
hfs_write_inode+0x34c/0xb40 fs/hfs/inode.c:462
write_inode fs/fs-writeback.c:1440 [inline]
If the input inode of hfs_write_inode() is incorrect:
struct inode
struct hfs_inode_info
struct hfs_cat_key
struct hfs_name
u8 len # len is greater than HFS_NAMELEN(31) which is the
maximum length of an HFS filename
OOB read occurred:
hfs_write_inode()
hfs_brec_find()
__hfs_brec_find()
hfs_cat_keycmp()
hfs_strcmp() # OOB read occurred due to len is too large
Fix this by adding a Check on len in hfs_write_inode() before calling
hfs_brec_find(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/chrome: fix memory corruption in ioctl
If "s_mem.bytes" is larger than the buffer size it leads to memory
corruption. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: Update ipcomp_scratches with NULL when freed
Currently if ipcomp_alloc_scratches() fails to allocate memory
ipcomp_scratches holds obsolete address. So when we try to free the
percpu scratches using ipcomp_free_scratches() it tries to vfree non
existent vm area. Described below:
static void * __percpu *ipcomp_alloc_scratches(void)
{
...
scratches = alloc_percpu(void *);
if (!scratches)
return NULL;
ipcomp_scratches does not know about this allocation failure.
Therefore holding the old obsolete address.
...
}
So when we free,
static void ipcomp_free_scratches(void)
{
...
scratches = ipcomp_scratches;
Assigning obsolete address from ipcomp_scratches
if (!scratches)
return;
for_each_possible_cpu(i)
vfree(*per_cpu_ptr(scratches, i));
Trying to free non existent page, causing warning: trying to vfree
existent vm area.
...
}
Fix this breakage by updating ipcomp_scrtches with NULL when scratches
is freed |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: jfs: fix shift-out-of-bounds in dbAllocAG
Syzbot found a crash : UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in dbAllocAG. The
underlying bug is the missing check of bmp->db_agl2size. The field can
be greater than 64 and trigger the shift-out-of-bounds.
Fix this bug by adding a check of bmp->db_agl2size in dbMount since this
field is used in many following functions. The upper bound for this
field is L2MAXL2SIZE - L2MAXAG, thanks for the help of Dave Kleikamp.
Note that, for maintenance, I reorganized error handling code of dbMount. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix a null-ptr-deref in tipc_topsrv_accept
syzbot found a crash in tipc_topsrv_accept:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
Workqueue: tipc_rcv tipc_topsrv_accept
RIP: 0010:kernel_accept+0x22d/0x350 net/socket.c:3487
Call Trace:
<TASK>
tipc_topsrv_accept+0x197/0x280 net/tipc/topsrv.c:460
process_one_work+0x991/0x1610 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
worker_thread+0x665/0x1080 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
kthread+0x2e4/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:306
It was caused by srv->listener that might be set to null by
tipc_topsrv_stop() in net .exit whereas it's still used in
tipc_topsrv_accept() worker.
srv->listener is protected by srv->idr_lock in tipc_topsrv_stop(), so add
a check for srv->listener under srv->idr_lock in tipc_topsrv_accept() to
avoid the null-ptr-deref. To ensure the lsock is not released during the
tipc_topsrv_accept(), move sock_release() after tipc_topsrv_work_stop()
where it's waiting until the tipc_topsrv_accept worker to be done.
Note that sk_callback_lock is used to protect sk->sk_user_data instead of
srv->listener, and it should check srv in tipc_topsrv_listener_data_ready()
instead. This also ensures that no more tipc_topsrv_accept worker will be
started after tipc_conn_close() is called in tipc_topsrv_stop() where it
sets sk->sk_user_data to null. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/huge_memory: do not clobber swp_entry_t during THP split
The following has been observed when running stressng mmap since commit
b653db77350c ("mm: Clear page->private when splitting or migrating a page")
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#75 stuck for 26s! [stress-ng:9546]
CPU: 75 PID: 9546 Comm: stress-ng Tainted: G E 6.0.0-revert-b653db77-fix+ #29 0357d79b60fb09775f678e4f3f64ef0579ad1374
Hardware name: SGI.COM C2112-4GP3/X10DRT-P-Series, BIOS 2.0a 05/09/2016
RIP: 0010:xas_descend+0x28/0x80
Code: cc cc 0f b6 0e 48 8b 57 08 48 d3 ea 83 e2 3f 89 d0 48 83 c0 04 48 8b 44 c6 08 48 89 77 18 48 89 c1 83 e1 03 48 83 f9 02 75 08 <48> 3d fd 00 00 00 76 08 88 57 12 c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c1 e8 02 89 c2
RSP: 0018:ffffbbf02a2236a8 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: ffff9cab7d6a0002 RBX: ffffe04b0af88040 RCX: 0000000000000002
RDX: 0000000000000030 RSI: ffff9cab60509b60 RDI: ffffbbf02a2236c0
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff9cab60509b60 R09: ffffbbf02a2236c0
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffbbf02a223698 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff9cab4e28da80 R14: 0000000000039c01 R15: ffff9cab4e28da88
FS: 00007fab89b85e40(0000) GS:ffff9cea3fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fab84e00000 CR3: 00000040b73a4003 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
xas_load+0x3a/0x50
__filemap_get_folio+0x80/0x370
? put_swap_page+0x163/0x360
pagecache_get_page+0x13/0x90
__try_to_reclaim_swap+0x50/0x190
scan_swap_map_slots+0x31e/0x670
get_swap_pages+0x226/0x3c0
folio_alloc_swap+0x1cc/0x240
add_to_swap+0x14/0x70
shrink_page_list+0x968/0xbc0
reclaim_page_list+0x70/0xf0
reclaim_pages+0xdd/0x120
madvise_cold_or_pageout_pte_range+0x814/0xf30
walk_pgd_range+0x637/0xa30
__walk_page_range+0x142/0x170
walk_page_range+0x146/0x170
madvise_pageout+0xb7/0x280
? asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40
madvise_vma_behavior+0x3b7/0xac0
? find_vma+0x4a/0x70
? find_vma+0x64/0x70
? madvise_vma_anon_name+0x40/0x40
madvise_walk_vmas+0xa6/0x130
do_madvise+0x2f4/0x360
__x64_sys_madvise+0x26/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x80
? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40
? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40
? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
? common_interrupt+0x8b/0xa0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
The problem can be reproduced with the mmtests config
config-workload-stressng-mmap. It does not always happen and when it
triggers is variable but it has happened on multiple machines.
The intent of commit b653db77350c patch was to avoid the case where
PG_private is clear but folio->private is not-NULL. However, THP tail
pages uses page->private for "swp_entry_t if folio_test_swapcache()" as
stated in the documentation for struct folio. This patch only clobbers
page->private for tail pages if the head page was not in swapcache and
warns once if page->private had an unexpected value. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt76x0: fix oob access in mt76x0_phy_get_target_power
After 'commit ba45841ca5eb ("wifi: mt76: mt76x02: simplify struct
mt76x02_rate_power")', mt76x02 relies on ht[0-7] rate_power data for
vht mcs{0,7}, while it uses vth[0-1] rate_power for vht mcs {8,9}.
Fix a possible out-of-bound access in mt76x0_phy_get_target_power routine. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: Validate data run offset
This adds sanity checks for data run offset. We should make sure data
run offset is legit before trying to unpack them, otherwise we may
encounter use-after-free or some unexpected memory access behaviors.
[ 82.940342] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570
[ 82.941180] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888008a8487f by task mount/240
[ 82.941670]
[ 82.942069] CPU: 0 PID: 240 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.19.0+ #15
[ 82.942482] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 82.943720] Call Trace:
[ 82.944204] <TASK>
[ 82.944471] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63
[ 82.944908] print_report.cold+0xf5/0x67b
[ 82.945141] ? __wait_on_bit+0x106/0x120
[ 82.945750] ? run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570
[ 82.946626] kasan_report+0xa7/0x120
[ 82.947046] ? run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570
[ 82.947280] __asan_load1+0x51/0x60
[ 82.947483] run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570
[ 82.947709] ? memcpy+0x4e/0x70
[ 82.947927] ? run_pack+0x7a0/0x7a0
[ 82.948158] run_unpack_ex+0xad/0x3f0
[ 82.948399] ? mi_enum_attr+0x14a/0x200
[ 82.948717] ? run_unpack+0x570/0x570
[ 82.949072] ? ni_enum_attr_ex+0x1b2/0x1c0
[ 82.949332] ? ni_fname_type.part.0+0xd0/0xd0
[ 82.949611] ? mi_read+0x262/0x2c0
[ 82.949970] ? ntfs_cmp_names_cpu+0x125/0x180
[ 82.950249] ntfs_iget5+0x632/0x1870
[ 82.950621] ? ntfs_get_block_bmap+0x70/0x70
[ 82.951192] ? evict+0x223/0x280
[ 82.951525] ? iput.part.0+0x286/0x320
[ 82.951969] ntfs_fill_super+0x1321/0x1e20
[ 82.952436] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 82.952822] ? vsprintf+0x20/0x20
[ 82.953188] ? mutex_unlock+0x81/0xd0
[ 82.953379] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150
[ 82.954001] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370
[ 82.954438] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 82.954700] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20
[ 82.955049] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130
[ 82.955292] path_mount+0x645/0xfd0
[ 82.955615] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 82.955955] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0
[ 82.956310] ? kmem_cache_free+0x110/0x390
[ 82.956723] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 82.957023] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0
[ 82.957411] ? path_mount+0xfd0/0xfd0
[ 82.957638] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 82.957948] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110
[ 82.958310] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 82.958719] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 82.959341] RIP: 0033:0x7fd0d1ce948a
[ 82.960193] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008
[ 82.961532] RSP: 002b:00007ffe59ff69a8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 82.962527] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000564dcc107060 RCX: 00007fd0d1ce948a
[ 82.963266] RDX: 0000564dcc107260 RSI: 0000564dcc1072e0 RDI: 0000564dcc10fce0
[ 82.963686] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000564dcc107280 R09: 0000000000000020
[ 82.964272] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000564dcc10fce0
[ 82.964785] R13: 0000564dcc107260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: enetc: avoid buffer leaks on xdp_do_redirect() failure
Before enetc_clean_rx_ring_xdp() calls xdp_do_redirect(), each software
BD in the RX ring between index orig_i and i can have one of 2 refcount
values on its page.
We are the owner of the current buffer that is being processed, so the
refcount will be at least 1.
If the current owner of the buffer at the diametrically opposed index
in the RX ring (i.o.w, the other half of this page) has not yet called
kfree(), this page's refcount could even be 2.
enetc_page_reusable() in enetc_flip_rx_buff() tests for the page
refcount against 1, and [ if it's 2 ] does not attempt to reuse it.
But if enetc_flip_rx_buff() is put after the xdp_do_redirect() call,
the page refcount can have one of 3 values. It can also be 0, if there
is no owner of the other page half, and xdp_do_redirect() for this
buffer ran so far that it triggered a flush of the devmap/cpumap bulk
queue, and the consumers of those bulk queues also freed the buffer,
all by the time xdp_do_redirect() returns the execution back to enetc.
This is the reason why enetc_flip_rx_buff() is called before
xdp_do_redirect(), but there is a big flaw with that reasoning:
enetc_flip_rx_buff() will set rx_swbd->page = NULL on both sides of the
enetc_page_reusable() branch, and if xdp_do_redirect() returns an error,
we call enetc_xdp_free(), which does not deal gracefully with that.
In fact, what happens is quite special. The page refcounts start as 1.
enetc_flip_rx_buff() figures they're reusable, transfers these
rx_swbd->page pointers to a different rx_swbd in enetc_reuse_page(), and
bumps the refcount to 2. When xdp_do_redirect() later returns an error,
we call the no-op enetc_xdp_free(), but we still haven't lost the
reference to that page. A copy of it is still at rx_ring->next_to_alloc,
but that has refcount 2 (and there are no concurrent owners of it in
flight, to drop the refcount). What really kills the system is when
we'll flip the rx_swbd->page the second time around. With an updated
refcount of 2, the page will not be reusable and we'll really leak it.
Then enetc_new_page() will have to allocate more pages, which will then
eventually leak again on further errors from xdp_do_redirect().
The problem, summarized, is that we zeroize rx_swbd->page before we're
completely done with it, and this makes it impossible for the error path
to do something with it.
Since the packet is potentially multi-buffer and therefore the
rx_swbd->page is potentially an array, manual passing of the old
pointers between enetc_flip_rx_buff() and enetc_xdp_free() is a bit
difficult.
For the sake of going with a simple solution, we accept the possibility
of racing with xdp_do_redirect(), and we move the flip procedure to
execute only on the redirect success path. By racing, I mean that the
page may be deemed as not reusable by enetc (having a refcount of 0),
but there will be no leak in that case, either.
Once we accept that, we have something better to do with buffers on
XDP_REDIRECT failure. Since we haven't performed half-page flipping yet,
we won't, either (and this way, we can avoid enetc_xdp_free()
completely, which gives the entire page to the slab allocator).
Instead, we'll call enetc_xdp_drop(), which will recycle this half of
the buffer back to the RX ring. |
