| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nilfs2: fix hang in nilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers()
Syzbot reported a hang issue in migrate_pages_batch() called by mbind()
and nilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers() called in the log writer of nilfs2.
While migrate_pages_batch() locks a folio and waits for the writeback to
complete, the log writer thread that should bring the writeback to
completion picks up the folio being written back in
nilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers() that it calls for subsequent log
creation and was trying to lock the folio. Thus causing a deadlock.
In the first place, it is unexpected that folios/pages in the middle of
writeback will be updated and become dirty. Nilfs2 adds a checksum to
verify the validity of the log being written and uses it for recovery at
mount, so data changes during writeback are suppressed. Since this is
broken, an unclean shutdown could potentially cause recovery to fail.
Investigation revealed that the root cause is that the wait for writeback
completion in nilfs_page_mkwrite() is conditional, and if the backing
device does not require stable writes, data may be modified without
waiting.
Fix these issues by making nilfs_page_mkwrite() wait for writeback to
finish regardless of the stable write requirement of the backing device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: prevent use-after-free in encode_cap_msg()
In fs/ceph/caps.c, in encode_cap_msg(), "use after free" error was
caught by KASAN at this line - 'ceph_buffer_get(arg->xattr_buf);'. This
implies before the refcount could be increment here, it was freed.
In same file, in "handle_cap_grant()" refcount is decremented by this
line - 'ceph_buffer_put(ci->i_xattrs.blob);'. It appears that a race
occurred and resource was freed by the latter line before the former
line could increment it.
encode_cap_msg() is called by __send_cap() and __send_cap() is called by
ceph_check_caps() after calling __prep_cap(). __prep_cap() is where
arg->xattr_buf is assigned to ci->i_xattrs.blob. This is the spot where
the refcount must be increased to prevent "use after free" error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs,hugetlb: fix NULL pointer dereference in hugetlbs_fill_super
When configuring a hugetlb filesystem via the fsconfig() syscall, there is
a possible NULL dereference in hugetlbfs_fill_super() caused by assigning
NULL to ctx->hstate in hugetlbfs_parse_param() when the requested pagesize
is non valid.
E.g: Taking the following steps:
fd = fsopen("hugetlbfs", FSOPEN_CLOEXEC);
fsconfig(fd, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "pagesize", "1024", 0);
fsconfig(fd, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 0);
Given that the requested "pagesize" is invalid, ctxt->hstate will be replaced
with NULL, losing its previous value, and we will print an error:
...
...
case Opt_pagesize:
ps = memparse(param->string, &rest);
ctx->hstate = h;
if (!ctx->hstate) {
pr_err("Unsupported page size %lu MB\n", ps / SZ_1M);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
...
...
This is a problem because later on, we will dereference ctxt->hstate in
hugetlbfs_fill_super()
...
...
sb->s_blocksize = huge_page_size(ctx->hstate);
...
...
Causing below Oops.
Fix this by replacing cxt->hstate value only when then pagesize is known
to be valid.
kernel: hugetlbfs: Unsupported page size 0 MB
kernel: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028
kernel: #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
kernel: #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
kernel: PGD 800000010f66c067 P4D 800000010f66c067 PUD 1b22f8067 PMD 0
kernel: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
kernel: CPU: 4 PID: 5659 Comm: syscall Tainted: G E 6.8.0-rc2-default+ #22 5a47c3fef76212addcc6eb71344aabc35190ae8f
kernel: Hardware name: Intel Corp. GROVEPORT/GROVEPORT, BIOS GVPRCRB1.86B.0016.D04.1705030402 05/03/2017
kernel: RIP: 0010:hugetlbfs_fill_super+0xb4/0x1a0
kernel: Code: 48 8b 3b e8 3e c6 ed ff 48 85 c0 48 89 45 20 0f 84 d6 00 00 00 48 b8 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 7f 4c 89 e7 49 89 44 24 20 48 8b 03 <8b> 48 28 b8 00 10 00 00 48 d3 e0 49 89 44 24 18 48 8b 03 8b 40 28
kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffbe9960fcbd48 EFLAGS: 00010246
kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9af5272ae780 RCX: 0000000000372004
kernel: RDX: ffffffffffffffff RSI: ffffffffffffffff RDI: ffff9af555e9b000
kernel: RBP: ffff9af52ee66b00 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 0000000000370004
kernel: R10: ffffbe9960fcbd48 R11: 0000000000000040 R12: ffff9af555e9b000
kernel: R13: ffffffffa66b86c0 R14: ffff9af507d2f400 R15: ffff9af507d2f400
kernel: FS: 00007ffbc0ba4740(0000) GS:ffff9b0bd7000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
kernel: CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 00000001b1ee0000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: <TASK>
kernel: ? __die_body+0x1a/0x60
kernel: ? page_fault_oops+0x16f/0x4a0
kernel: ? search_bpf_extables+0x65/0x70
kernel: ? fixup_exception+0x22/0x310
kernel: ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x150
kernel: ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
kernel: ? __pfx_hugetlbfs_fill_super+0x10/0x10
kernel: ? hugetlbfs_fill_super+0xb4/0x1a0
kernel: ? hugetlbfs_fill_super+0x28/0x1a0
kernel: ? __pfx_hugetlbfs_fill_super+0x10/0x10
kernel: vfs_get_super+0x40/0xa0
kernel: ? __pfx_bpf_lsm_capable+0x10/0x10
kernel: vfs_get_tree+0x25/0xd0
kernel: vfs_cmd_create+0x64/0xe0
kernel: __x64_sys_fsconfig+0x395/0x410
kernel: do_syscall_64+0x80/0x160
kernel: ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x82/0x240
kernel: ? do_syscall_64+0x8d/0x160
kernel: ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x82/0x240
kernel: ? do_syscall_64+0x8d/0x160
kernel: ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x150
kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7ffbc0cb87c9
kernel: Code: 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 97 96 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
kernel: RSP: 002b:00007ffc29d2f388 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001af
kernel: RAX: fffffffffff
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen/events: close evtchn after mapping cleanup
shutdown_pirq and startup_pirq are not taking the
irq_mapping_update_lock because they can't due to lock inversion. Both
are called with the irq_desc->lock being taking. The lock order,
however, is first irq_mapping_update_lock and then irq_desc->lock.
This opens multiple races:
- shutdown_pirq can be interrupted by a function that allocates an event
channel:
CPU0 CPU1
shutdown_pirq {
xen_evtchn_close(e)
__startup_pirq {
EVTCHNOP_bind_pirq
-> returns just freed evtchn e
set_evtchn_to_irq(e, irq)
}
xen_irq_info_cleanup() {
set_evtchn_to_irq(e, -1)
}
}
Assume here event channel e refers here to the same event channel
number.
After this race the evtchn_to_irq mapping for e is invalid (-1).
- __startup_pirq races with __unbind_from_irq in a similar way. Because
__startup_pirq doesn't take irq_mapping_update_lock it can grab the
evtchn that __unbind_from_irq is currently freeing and cleaning up. In
this case even though the event channel is allocated, its mapping can
be unset in evtchn_to_irq.
The fix is to first cleanup the mappings and then close the event
channel. In this way, when an event channel gets allocated it's
potential previous evtchn_to_irq mappings are guaranteed to be unset already.
This is also the reverse order of the allocation where first the event
channel is allocated and then the mappings are setup.
On a 5.10 kernel prior to commit 3fcdaf3d7634 ("xen/events: modify internal
[un]bind interfaces"), we hit a BUG like the following during probing of NVMe
devices. The issue is that during nvme_setup_io_queues, pci_free_irq
is called for every device which results in a call to shutdown_pirq.
With many nvme devices it's therefore likely to hit this race during
boot because there will be multiple calls to shutdown_pirq and
startup_pirq are running potentially in parallel.
------------[ cut here ]------------
blkfront: xvda: barrier or flush: disabled; persistent grants: enabled; indirect descriptors: enabled; bounce buffer: enabled
kernel BUG at drivers/xen/events/events_base.c:499!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 44 PID: 375 Comm: kworker/u257:23 Not tainted 5.10.201-191.748.amzn2.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.11.amazon 08/24/2006
Workqueue: nvme-reset-wq nvme_reset_work
RIP: 0010:bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
Code: 5d 41 5e c3 cc cc cc cc 44 89 f7 e8 2b 55 ad ff 49 89 c5 48 85 c0 0f 84 64 ff ff ff 4c 8b 68 30 41 83 fe ff 0f 85 60 ff ff ff <0f> 0b 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 0f 1f 44 00 00
RSP: 0000:ffffc9000d533b08 EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 0000000000000028 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: ffff888107419680 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff82d72b00
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000000001ed
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: 0000000000000002
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88bc8b500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000002610001 CR4: 00000000001706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9
? set_affinity_irq+0xdc/0x1c0
? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd
? die+0x2b/0x50
? do_trap+0x90/0x110
? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80
? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70
? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x12/0x20
? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0x
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: xgmac: fix handling of DPP safety error for DMA channels
Commit 56e58d6c8a56 ("net: stmmac: Implement Safety Features in
XGMAC core") checks and reports safety errors, but leaves the
Data Path Parity Errors for each channel in DMA unhandled at all, lead to
a storm of interrupt.
Fix it by checking and clearing the DMA_DPP_Interrupt_Status register. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ppp_async: limit MRU to 64K
syzbot triggered a warning [1] in __alloc_pages():
WARN_ON_ONCE_GFP(order > MAX_PAGE_ORDER, gfp)
Willem fixed a similar issue in commit c0a2a1b0d631 ("ppp: limit MRU to 64K")
Adopt the same sanity check for ppp_async_ioctl(PPPIOCSMRU)
[1]:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 11 at mm/page_alloc.c:4543 __alloc_pages+0x308/0x698 mm/page_alloc.c:4543
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2-syzkaller-g41bccc98fb79 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023
Workqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc
pstate: 204000c5 (nzCv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __alloc_pages+0x308/0x698 mm/page_alloc.c:4543
lr : __alloc_pages+0xc8/0x698 mm/page_alloc.c:4537
sp : ffff800093967580
x29: ffff800093967660 x28: ffff8000939675a0 x27: dfff800000000000
x26: ffff70001272ceb4 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff8000939675c0
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000060820 x21: 1ffff0001272ceb8
x20: ffff8000939675e0 x19: 0000000000000010 x18: ffff800093967120
x17: ffff800083bded5c x16: ffff80008ac97500 x15: 0000000000000005
x14: 1ffff0001272cebc x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: ffff70001272cec1 x10: 1ffff0001272cec0 x9 : 0000000000000001
x8 : ffff800091c91000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f
x5 : 00000000ffffffff x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000020
x2 : 0000000000000008 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff8000939675e0
Call trace:
__alloc_pages+0x308/0x698 mm/page_alloc.c:4543
__alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:238 [inline]
alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:261 [inline]
__kmalloc_large_node+0xbc/0x1fc mm/slub.c:3926
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3969 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x418/0x620 mm/slub.c:4001
kmalloc_reserve+0x17c/0x23c net/core/skbuff.c:590
__alloc_skb+0x1c8/0x3d8 net/core/skbuff.c:651
__netdev_alloc_skb+0xb8/0x3e8 net/core/skbuff.c:715
netdev_alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:3235 [inline]
dev_alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:3248 [inline]
ppp_async_input drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:863 [inline]
ppp_asynctty_receive+0x588/0x186c drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:341
tty_ldisc_receive_buf+0x12c/0x15c drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:390
tty_port_default_receive_buf+0x74/0xac drivers/tty/tty_port.c:37
receive_buf drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:444 [inline]
flush_to_ldisc+0x284/0x6e4 drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:494
process_one_work+0x694/0x1204 kernel/workqueue.c:2633
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:2706 [inline]
worker_thread+0x938/0xef4 kernel/workqueue.c:2787
kthread+0x288/0x310 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:860 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_ct: sanitize layer 3 and 4 protocol number in custom expectations
- Disallow families other than NFPROTO_{IPV4,IPV6,INET}.
- Disallow layer 4 protocol with no ports, since destination port is a
mandatory attribute for this object. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-mq: fix IO hang from sbitmap wakeup race
In blk_mq_mark_tag_wait(), __add_wait_queue() may be re-ordered
with the following blk_mq_get_driver_tag() in case of getting driver
tag failure.
Then in __sbitmap_queue_wake_up(), waitqueue_active() may not observe
the added waiter in blk_mq_mark_tag_wait() and wake up nothing, meantime
blk_mq_mark_tag_wait() can't get driver tag successfully.
This issue can be reproduced by running the following test in loop, and
fio hang can be observed in < 30min when running it on my test VM
in laptop.
modprobe -r scsi_debug
modprobe scsi_debug delay=0 dev_size_mb=4096 max_queue=1 host_max_queue=1 submit_queues=4
dev=`ls -d /sys/bus/pseudo/drivers/scsi_debug/adapter*/host*/target*/*/block/* | head -1 | xargs basename`
fio --filename=/dev/"$dev" --direct=1 --rw=randrw --bs=4k --iodepth=1 \
--runtime=100 --numjobs=40 --time_based --name=test \
--ioengine=libaio
Fix the issue by adding one explicit barrier in blk_mq_mark_tag_wait(), which
is just fine in case of running out of tag. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tunnels: fix out of bounds access when building IPv6 PMTU error
If the ICMPv6 error is built from a non-linear skb we get the following
splat,
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in do_csum+0x220/0x240
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811d402c80 by task netperf/820
CPU: 0 PID: 820 Comm: netperf Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1+ #543
...
kasan_report+0xd8/0x110
do_csum+0x220/0x240
csum_partial+0xc/0x20
skb_tunnel_check_pmtu+0xeb9/0x3280
vxlan_xmit_one+0x14c2/0x4080
vxlan_xmit+0xf61/0x5c00
dev_hard_start_xmit+0xfb/0x510
__dev_queue_xmit+0x7cd/0x32a0
br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0x39d/0x6a0
Use skb_checksum instead of csum_partial who cannot deal with non-linear
SKBs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: Check the bearer type before calling tipc_udp_nl_bearer_add()
syzbot reported the following general protection fault [1]:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000010: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000080-0x0000000000000087]
...
RIP: 0010:tipc_udp_is_known_peer+0x9c/0x250 net/tipc/udp_media.c:291
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
tipc_udp_nl_bearer_add+0x212/0x2f0 net/tipc/udp_media.c:646
tipc_nl_bearer_add+0x21e/0x360 net/tipc/bearer.c:1089
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1fc/0x2e0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:972
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1052 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x561/0x800 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1067
netlink_rcv_skb+0x16b/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2544
genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1076
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x53b/0x810 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1367
netlink_sendmsg+0x8b7/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1909
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x180 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x6ac/0x940 net/socket.c:2584
___sys_sendmsg+0x135/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2638
__sys_sendmsg+0x117/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2667
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x40/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
The cause of this issue is that when tipc_nl_bearer_add() is called with
the TIPC_NLA_BEARER_UDP_OPTS attribute, tipc_udp_nl_bearer_add() is called
even if the bearer is not UDP.
tipc_udp_is_known_peer() called by tipc_udp_nl_bearer_add() assumes that
the media_ptr field of the tipc_bearer has an udp_bearer type object, so
the function goes crazy for non-UDP bearers.
This patch fixes the issue by checking the bearer type before calling
tipc_udp_nl_bearer_add() in tipc_nl_bearer_add(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xhci: handle isoc Babble and Buffer Overrun events properly
xHCI 4.9 explicitly forbids assuming that the xHC has released its
ownership of a multi-TRB TD when it reports an error on one of the
early TRBs. Yet the driver makes such assumption and releases the TD,
allowing the remaining TRBs to be freed or overwritten by new TDs.
The xHC should also report completion of the final TRB due to its IOC
flag being set by us, regardless of prior errors. This event cannot
be recognized if the TD has already been freed earlier, resulting in
"Transfer event TRB DMA ptr not part of current TD" error message.
Fix this by reusing the logic for processing isoc Transaction Errors.
This also handles hosts which fail to report the final completion.
Fix transfer length reporting on Babble errors. They may be caused by
device malfunction, no guarantee that the buffer has been filled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: sh: aica: reorder cleanup operations to avoid UAF bugs
The dreamcastcard->timer could schedule the spu_dma_work and the
spu_dma_work could also arm the dreamcastcard->timer.
When the snd_pcm_substream is closing, the aica_channel will be
deallocated. But it could still be dereferenced in the worker
thread. The reason is that del_timer() will return directly
regardless of whether the timer handler is running or not and
the worker could be rescheduled in the timer handler. As a result,
the UAF bug will happen. The racy situation is shown below:
(Thread 1) | (Thread 2)
snd_aicapcm_pcm_close() |
... | run_spu_dma() //worker
| mod_timer()
flush_work() |
del_timer() | aica_period_elapsed() //timer
kfree(dreamcastcard->channel) | schedule_work()
| run_spu_dma() //worker
... | dreamcastcard->channel-> //USE
In order to mitigate this bug and other possible corner cases,
call mod_timer() conditionally in run_spu_dma(), then implement
PCM sync_stop op to cancel both the timer and worker. The sync_stop
op will be called from PCM core appropriately when needed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Ensure visibility when inserting an element into tracing_map
Running the following two commands in parallel on a multi-processor
AArch64 machine can sporadically produce an unexpected warning about
duplicate histogram entries:
$ while true; do
echo hist:key=id.syscall:val=hitcount > \
/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/raw_syscalls/sys_enter/trigger
cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/raw_syscalls/sys_enter/hist
sleep 0.001
done
$ stress-ng --sysbadaddr $(nproc)
The warning looks as follows:
[ 2911.172474] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 2911.173111] Duplicates detected: 1
[ 2911.173574] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 12247 at kernel/trace/tracing_map.c:983 tracing_map_sort_entries+0x3e0/0x408
[ 2911.174702] Modules linked in: iscsi_ibft(E) iscsi_boot_sysfs(E) rfkill(E) af_packet(E) nls_iso8859_1(E) nls_cp437(E) vfat(E) fat(E) ena(E) tiny_power_button(E) qemu_fw_cfg(E) button(E) fuse(E) efi_pstore(E) ip_tables(E) x_tables(E) xfs(E) libcrc32c(E) aes_ce_blk(E) aes_ce_cipher(E) crct10dif_ce(E) polyval_ce(E) polyval_generic(E) ghash_ce(E) gf128mul(E) sm4_ce_gcm(E) sm4_ce_ccm(E) sm4_ce(E) sm4_ce_cipher(E) sm4(E) sm3_ce(E) sm3(E) sha3_ce(E) sha512_ce(E) sha512_arm64(E) sha2_ce(E) sha256_arm64(E) nvme(E) sha1_ce(E) nvme_core(E) nvme_auth(E) t10_pi(E) sg(E) scsi_mod(E) scsi_common(E) efivarfs(E)
[ 2911.174738] Unloaded tainted modules: cppc_cpufreq(E):1
[ 2911.180985] CPU: 2 PID: 12247 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 6.7.0-default #2 1b58bbb22c97e4399dc09f92d309344f69c44a01
[ 2911.182398] Hardware name: Amazon EC2 c7g.8xlarge/, BIOS 1.0 11/1/2018
[ 2911.183208] pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 2911.184038] pc : tracing_map_sort_entries+0x3e0/0x408
[ 2911.184667] lr : tracing_map_sort_entries+0x3e0/0x408
[ 2911.185310] sp : ffff8000a1513900
[ 2911.185750] x29: ffff8000a1513900 x28: ffff0003f272fe80 x27: 0000000000000001
[ 2911.186600] x26: ffff0003f272fe80 x25: 0000000000000030 x24: 0000000000000008
[ 2911.187458] x23: ffff0003c5788000 x22: ffff0003c16710c8 x21: ffff80008017f180
[ 2911.188310] x20: ffff80008017f000 x19: ffff80008017f180 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 2911.189160] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff8000a15134b8
[ 2911.190015] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 205d373432323154 x12: 5b5d313131333731
[ 2911.190844] x11: 00000000fffeffff x10: 00000000fffeffff x9 : ffffd1b78274a13c
[ 2911.191716] x8 : 000000000017ffe8 x7 : c0000000fffeffff x6 : 000000000057ffa8
[ 2911.192554] x5 : ffff0012f6c24ec0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff2e5b72b5d000
[ 2911.193404] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0003ff254480
[ 2911.194259] Call trace:
[ 2911.194626] tracing_map_sort_entries+0x3e0/0x408
[ 2911.195220] hist_show+0x124/0x800
[ 2911.195692] seq_read_iter+0x1d4/0x4e8
[ 2911.196193] seq_read+0xe8/0x138
[ 2911.196638] vfs_read+0xc8/0x300
[ 2911.197078] ksys_read+0x70/0x108
[ 2911.197534] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x38
[ 2911.198046] invoke_syscall+0x78/0x108
[ 2911.198553] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xd0/0xf8
[ 2911.199157] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x40
[ 2911.199613] el0_svc+0x40/0x178
[ 2911.200048] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x13c/0x158
[ 2911.200621] el0t_64_sync+0x1a8/0x1b0
[ 2911.201115] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
The problem appears to be caused by CPU reordering of writes issued from
__tracing_map_insert().
The check for the presence of an element with a given key in this
function is:
val = READ_ONCE(entry->val);
if (val && keys_match(key, val->key, map->key_size)) ...
The write of a new entry is:
elt = get_free_elt(map);
memcpy(elt->key, key, map->key_size);
entry->val = elt;
The "memcpy(elt->key, key, map->key_size);" and "entry->val = elt;"
stores may become visible in the reversed order on another CPU. This
second CPU might then incorrectly determine that a new key doesn't match
an already present val->key and subse
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: disallow anonymous set with timeout flag
Anonymous sets are never used with timeout from userspace, reject this.
Exception to this rule is NFT_SET_EVAL to ensure legacy meters still work. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ip6_tunnel: make sure to pull inner header in __ip6_tnl_rcv()
syzbot found __ip6_tnl_rcv() could access unitiliazed data [1].
Call pskb_inet_may_pull() to fix this, and initialize ipv6h
variable after this call as it can change skb->head.
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:253 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:275 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in IP6_ECN_decapsulate+0x7df/0x1e50 include/net/inet_ecn.h:321
__INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:253 [inline]
INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:275 [inline]
IP6_ECN_decapsulate+0x7df/0x1e50 include/net/inet_ecn.h:321
ip6ip6_dscp_ecn_decapsulate+0x178/0x1b0 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:727
__ip6_tnl_rcv+0xd4e/0x1590 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:845
ip6_tnl_rcv+0xce/0x100 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:888
gre_rcv+0x143f/0x1870
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xda6/0x2a60 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438
ip6_input_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:483 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
ip6_input+0x15d/0x430 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:492
ip6_mc_input+0xa7e/0xc80 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:586
dst_input include/net/dst.h:461 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish+0x5db/0x870 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
ipv6_rcv+0xda/0x390 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:310
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5532 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb+0x1a6/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:5646
netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5732 [inline]
netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x660 net/core/dev.c:5791
tun_rx_batched+0x3ee/0x980 drivers/net/tun.c:1555
tun_get_user+0x53af/0x66d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2002
tun_chr_write_iter+0x3af/0x5d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2084 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline]
vfs_write+0x786/0x1200 fs/read_write.c:590
ksys_write+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:643
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0x93/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:652
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook+0x129/0xa70 mm/slab.h:768
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5e9/0xb10 mm/slub.c:3523
kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:560
__alloc_skb+0x318/0x740 net/core/skbuff.c:651
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1286 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xbd0 net/core/skbuff.c:6334
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa80/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2787
tun_alloc_skb drivers/net/tun.c:1531 [inline]
tun_get_user+0x1e8a/0x66d0 drivers/net/tun.c:1846
tun_chr_write_iter+0x3af/0x5d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2084 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline]
vfs_write+0x786/0x1200 fs/read_write.c:590
ksys_write+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:643
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0x93/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:652
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
CPU: 0 PID: 5034 Comm: syz-executor331 Not tainted 6.7.0-syzkaller-00562-g9f8413c4a66f #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: add sanity checks to rx zerocopy
TCP rx zerocopy intent is to map pages initially allocated
from NIC drivers, not pages owned by a fs.
This patch adds to can_map_frag() these additional checks:
- Page must not be a compound one.
- page->mapping must be NULL.
This fixes the panic reported by ZhangPeng.
syzbot was able to loopback packets built with sendfile(),
mapping pages owned by an ext4 file to TCP rx zerocopy.
r3 = socket$inet_tcp(0x2, 0x1, 0x0)
mmap(&(0x7f0000ff9000/0x4000)=nil, 0x4000, 0x0, 0x12, r3, 0x0)
r4 = socket$inet_tcp(0x2, 0x1, 0x0)
bind$inet(r4, &(0x7f0000000000)={0x2, 0x4e24, @multicast1}, 0x10)
connect$inet(r4, &(0x7f00000006c0)={0x2, 0x4e24, @empty}, 0x10)
r5 = openat$dir(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f00000000c0)='./file0\x00',
0x181e42, 0x0)
fallocate(r5, 0x0, 0x0, 0x85b8)
sendfile(r4, r5, 0x0, 0x8ba0)
getsockopt$inet_tcp_TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE(r4, 0x6, 0x23,
&(0x7f00000001c0)={&(0x7f0000ffb000/0x3000)=nil, 0x3000, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0}, &(0x7f0000000440)=0x40)
r6 = openat$dir(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f00000000c0)='./file0\x00',
0x181e42, 0x0) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
llc: make llc_ui_sendmsg() more robust against bonding changes
syzbot was able to trick llc_ui_sendmsg(), allocating an skb with no
headroom, but subsequently trying to push 14 bytes of Ethernet header [1]
Like some others, llc_ui_sendmsg() releases the socket lock before
calling sock_alloc_send_skb().
Then it acquires it again, but does not redo all the sanity checks
that were performed.
This fix:
- Uses LL_RESERVED_SPACE() to reserve space.
- Check all conditions again after socket lock is held again.
- Do not account Ethernet header for mtu limitation.
[1]
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffff800088baa334 len:1514 put:14 head:ffff0000c9c37000 data:ffff0000c9c36ff2 tail:0x5dc end:0x6c0 dev:bond0
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:193 !
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 6875 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc8-syzkaller-00101-g0802e17d9aca-dirty #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline]
pc : skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203
lr : skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline]
lr : skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203
sp : ffff800096f97000
x29: ffff800096f97010 x28: ffff80008cc8d668 x27: dfff800000000000
x26: ffff0000cb970c90 x25: 00000000000005dc x24: ffff0000c9c36ff2
x23: ffff0000c9c37000 x22: 00000000000005ea x21: 00000000000006c0
x20: 000000000000000e x19: ffff800088baa334 x18: 1fffe000368261ce
x17: ffff80008e4ed000 x16: ffff80008a8310f8 x15: 0000000000000001
x14: 1ffff00012df2d58 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000ff0100 x9 : e28a51f1087e8400
x8 : e28a51f1087e8400 x7 : ffff80008028f8d0 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : ffff800082b78714
x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 0000000000000089
Call trace:
skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline]
skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203
skb_push+0xf0/0x108 net/core/skbuff.c:2451
eth_header+0x44/0x1f8 net/ethernet/eth.c:83
dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3188 [inline]
llc_mac_hdr_init+0x110/0x17c net/llc/llc_output.c:33
llc_sap_action_send_xid_c+0x170/0x344 net/llc/llc_s_ac.c:85
llc_exec_sap_trans_actions net/llc/llc_sap.c:153 [inline]
llc_sap_next_state net/llc/llc_sap.c:182 [inline]
llc_sap_state_process+0x1ec/0x774 net/llc/llc_sap.c:209
llc_build_and_send_xid_pkt+0x12c/0x1c0 net/llc/llc_sap.c:270
llc_ui_sendmsg+0x7bc/0xb1c net/llc/af_llc.c:997
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0x194/0x274 net/socket.c:767
splice_to_socket+0x7cc/0xd58 fs/splice.c:881
do_splice_from fs/splice.c:933 [inline]
direct_splice_actor+0xe4/0x1c0 fs/splice.c:1142
splice_direct_to_actor+0x2a0/0x7e4 fs/splice.c:1088
do_splice_direct+0x20c/0x348 fs/splice.c:1194
do_sendfile+0x4bc/0xc70 fs/read_write.c:1254
__do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1322 [inline]
__se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1308 [inline]
__arm64_sys_sendfile64+0x160/0x3b4 fs/read_write.c:1308
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:51
el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:136
do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:155
el0_svc+0x54/0x158 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:678
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:696
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:595
Code: aa1803e6 aa1903e7 a90023f5 94792f6a (d4210000) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
llc: Drop support for ETH_P_TR_802_2.
syzbot reported an uninit-value bug below. [0]
llc supports ETH_P_802_2 (0x0004) and used to support ETH_P_TR_802_2
(0x0011), and syzbot abused the latter to trigger the bug.
write$tun(r0, &(0x7f0000000040)={@val={0x0, 0x11}, @val, @mpls={[], @llc={@snap={0xaa, 0x1, ')', "90e5dd"}}}}, 0x16)
llc_conn_handler() initialises local variables {saddr,daddr}.mac
based on skb in llc_pdu_decode_sa()/llc_pdu_decode_da() and passes
them to __llc_lookup().
However, the initialisation is done only when skb->protocol is
htons(ETH_P_802_2), otherwise, __llc_lookup_established() and
__llc_lookup_listener() will read garbage.
The missing initialisation existed prior to commit 211ed865108e
("net: delete all instances of special processing for token ring").
It removed the part to kick out the token ring stuff but forgot to
close the door allowing ETH_P_TR_802_2 packets to sneak into llc_rcv().
Let's remove llc_tr_packet_type and complete the deprecation.
[0]:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __llc_lookup_established+0xe9d/0xf90
__llc_lookup_established+0xe9d/0xf90
__llc_lookup net/llc/llc_conn.c:611 [inline]
llc_conn_handler+0x4bd/0x1360 net/llc/llc_conn.c:791
llc_rcv+0xfbb/0x14a0 net/llc/llc_input.c:206
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5527 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb+0x1a6/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:5641
netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5727 [inline]
netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x660 net/core/dev.c:5786
tun_rx_batched+0x3ee/0x980 drivers/net/tun.c:1555
tun_get_user+0x53af/0x66d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2002
tun_chr_write_iter+0x3af/0x5d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2020 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]
vfs_write+0x8ef/0x1490 fs/read_write.c:584
ksys_write+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:637
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:649 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:646 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0x93/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:646
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
Local variable daddr created at:
llc_conn_handler+0x53/0x1360 net/llc/llc_conn.c:783
llc_rcv+0xfbb/0x14a0 net/llc/llc_input.c:206
CPU: 1 PID: 5004 Comm: syz-executor994 Not tainted 6.6.0-syzkaller-14500-g1c41041124bd #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/09/2023 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
llc: call sock_orphan() at release time
syzbot reported an interesting trace [1] caused by a stale sk->sk_wq
pointer in a closed llc socket.
In commit ff7b11aa481f ("net: socket: set sock->sk to NULL after
calling proto_ops::release()") Eric Biggers hinted that some protocols
are missing a sock_orphan(), we need to perform a full audit.
In net-next, I plan to clear sock->sk from sock_orphan() and
amend Eric patch to add a warning.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in list_empty include/linux/list.h:373 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in waitqueue_active include/linux/wait.h:127 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sock_def_write_space_wfree net/core/sock.c:3384 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sock_wfree+0x9a8/0x9d0 net/core/sock.c:2468
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88802f4fc880 by task ksoftirqd/1/27
CPU: 1 PID: 27 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1-syzkaller-00049-g6098d87eaf31 #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0xc4/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0xda/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:601
list_empty include/linux/list.h:373 [inline]
waitqueue_active include/linux/wait.h:127 [inline]
sock_def_write_space_wfree net/core/sock.c:3384 [inline]
sock_wfree+0x9a8/0x9d0 net/core/sock.c:2468
skb_release_head_state+0xa3/0x2b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1080
skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1092 [inline]
napi_consume_skb+0x119/0x2b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1404
e1000_unmap_and_free_tx_resource+0x144/0x200 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:1970
e1000_clean_tx_irq drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3860 [inline]
e1000_clean+0x4a1/0x26e0 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3801
__napi_poll.constprop.0+0xb4/0x540 net/core/dev.c:6576
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6645 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x956/0xe90 net/core/dev.c:6778
__do_softirq+0x21a/0x8de kernel/softirq.c:553
run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:921 [inline]
run_ksoftirqd+0x31/0x60 kernel/softirq.c:913
smpboot_thread_fn+0x660/0xa10 kernel/smpboot.c:164
kthread+0x2c6/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242
</TASK>
Allocated by task 5167:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:47
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68
unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:314 [inline]
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x81/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:340
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3813 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3860 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x142/0x6f0 mm/slub.c:3879
alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3019 [inline]
sock_alloc_inode+0x25/0x1c0 net/socket.c:308
alloc_inode+0x5d/0x220 fs/inode.c:260
new_inode_pseudo+0x16/0x80 fs/inode.c:1005
sock_alloc+0x40/0x270 net/socket.c:634
__sock_create+0xbc/0x800 net/socket.c:1535
sock_create net/socket.c:1622 [inline]
__sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1659 [inline]
__sys_socket+0x14c/0x260 net/socket.c:1706
__do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1720 [inline]
__se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1718 [inline]
__x64_sys_socket+0x72/0xb0 net/socket.c:1718
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
Freed by task 0:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:47
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x3f/0x60 mm/kasan/generic.c:640
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:241 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x121/0x1b0 mm/kasan/common.c:257
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2121 [inlin
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: make sure init the accept_queue's spinlocks once
When I run syz's reproduction C program locally, it causes the following
issue:
pvqspinlock: lock 0xffff9d181cd5c660 has corrupted value 0x0!
WARNING: CPU: 19 PID: 21160 at __pv_queued_spin_unlock_slowpath (kernel/locking/qspinlock_paravirt.h:508)
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__pv_queued_spin_unlock_slowpath (kernel/locking/qspinlock_paravirt.h:508)
Code: 73 56 3a ff 90 c3 cc cc cc cc 8b 05 bb 1f 48 01 85 c0 74 05 c3 cc cc cc cc 8b 17 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7
30 20 ce 8f e8 ad 56 42 ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 0b 0f 1f 40 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
RSP: 0018:ffffa8d200604cb8 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff9d1ef60e0908
RDX: 00000000ffffffd8 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff9d1ef60e0900
RBP: ffff9d181cd5c280 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffff7fff
R10: ffffa8d200604b68 R11: ffffffff907dcdc8 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff9d181cd5c660 R14: ffff9d1813a3f330 R15: 0000000000001000
FS: 00007fa110184640(0000) GS:ffff9d1ef60c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000000 CR3: 000000011f65e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
_raw_spin_unlock (kernel/locking/spinlock.c:186)
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1321)
inet_csk_complete_hashdance (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1358)
tcp_check_req (net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:868)
tcp_v4_rcv (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2260)
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205)
ip_local_deliver_finish (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:234)
__netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:5529)
process_backlog (./include/linux/rcupdate.h:779)
__napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6533)
net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:6604)
__do_softirq (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:27)
do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:454 kernel/softirq.c:441)
</IRQ>
<TASK>
__local_bh_enable_ip (kernel/softirq.c:381)
__dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:4374)
ip_finish_output2 (./include/net/neighbour.h:540 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235)
__ip_queue_xmit (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:535)
__tcp_transmit_skb (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1462)
tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process (net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6469)
tcp_rcv_state_process (net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6657)
tcp_v4_do_rcv (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1929)
__release_sock (./include/net/sock.h:1121 net/core/sock.c:2968)
release_sock (net/core/sock.c:3536)
inet_wait_for_connect (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:609)
__inet_stream_connect (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:702)
inet_stream_connect (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:748)
__sys_connect (./include/linux/file.h:45 net/socket.c:2064)
__x64_sys_connect (net/socket.c:2073 net/socket.c:2070 net/socket.c:2070)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:129)
RIP: 0033:0x7fa10ff05a3d
Code: 5b 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89
c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ab a3 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fa110183de8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020000054 RCX: 00007fa10ff05a3d
RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fa110183e20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fa110184640
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fa10fe8b060 R15: 00007fff73e23b20
</TASK>
The issue triggering process is analyzed as follows:
Thread A Thread B
tcp_v4_rcv //receive ack TCP packet inet_shutdown
tcp_check_req tcp_disconnect //disconnect sock
... tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_CLOSE)
inet_csk_complete_hashdance ...
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add
---truncated--- |
