| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: serialize QUERY_DIRECTORY requests per file
smb2_query_dir() stores a pointer to its stack-allocated private data in
the ksmbd_file readdir_data. Concurrent QUERY_DIRECTORY requests using the
same file handle can overwrite this pointer while an iterate_dir() callback
is still using it, resulting in a stack use-after-free.
Add a per-file mutex and hold it while accessing the shared directory
enumeration state. The lock covers scan restart, dot entry state,
readdir_data setup and iteration, and response construction. This prevents
another request from replacing readdir_data.private before the current
request has finished using it and also serializes the shared file position. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: require source read access for duplicate extents
FSCTL_DUPLICATE_EXTENTS_TO_FILE passes the source file directly to
vfs_clone_file_range() or vfs_copy_file_range() without checking the SMB
access mask granted to the source handle. A handle opened with attribute
access can consequently be used to copy file contents into an
attacker-readable destination.
Require FILE_READ_DATA on the source handle before either VFS operation,
matching other ksmbd data-copy paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: run set info with opener credentials
SMB2 SET_INFO handlers call path-based VFS helpers after checking the
access mask granted to the SMB handle. Those helpers perform their owner,
inode permission and LSM checks using the current ksmbd worker credentials.
Run the complete SET_INFO dispatch with the credentials captured when the
handle was opened. This also removes the separate security information
credential setup and keeps all SET_INFO classes under one credential scope.
Direct override_creds() is used because it can nest with the request
credential overrides already used by rename and link helpers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: mask server-provided mode to 07777 in modefromsid
When modefromsid is active, parse_dacl() applies the server-provided
sub_auth[2] value from the NFS mode SID to cf_mode without masking to
07777. Apply the correct masking, same as in the read path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: Fix out-of-bounds access for twsk in tcp_ao_established_key().
lockdep_sock_is_held() was added in tcp_ao_established_key()
by the cited commit.
It can be called from tcp_v[46]_timewait_ack() with twsk.
Since it does not have sk->sk_lock, the lockdep annotation
results in out-of-bound access.
$ pahole -C tcp_timewait_sock vmlinux | grep size
/* size: 288, cachelines: 5, members: 8 */
$ pahole -C sock vmlinux | grep sk_lock
socket_lock_t sk_lock; /* 440 192 */
Let's not use lockdep_sock_is_held() for TCP_TIME_WAIT. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
proc: protect ptrace_may_access() with exec_update_lock (FD links)
proc_pid_get_link() and proc_pid_readlink() currently look up the task from
the pid once, then do the ptrace access check on that task, then look up
the task from the pid a second time to do the actual access.
That's racy in several ways.
To fix it, pass the task to the ->proc_get_link() handler, and instead of
proc_fd_access_allowed(), introduce a new helper call_proc_get_link() that
looks up and locks the task, does the access check, and calls
->proc_get_link(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: hid-goodix-spi: validate report size to prevent stack buffer overflow
goodix_hid_set_raw_report() builds a protocol frame in a 128-byte stack
buffer (tmp_buf), writing an 11-12 byte header followed by the
caller-supplied report data. The HID core caps report size at
HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE (16384) by default, while the driver does not set
hid_ll_driver.max_buffer_size and performs no bounds checking before
copying the payload:
memcpy(tmp_buf + tx_len, buf, len);
A hidraw SET_REPORT ioctl with a report larger than ~116 bytes
overflows the stack buffer.
Add a size check after constructing the header, rejecting reports that
would exceed the buffer capacity.
Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
partitions: aix: bound the pp_count scan to the ppe array
aix_partition() reads the physical volume descriptor into a fixed-size
struct pvd and then scans its physical-partition-extent array:
int numpps = be16_to_cpu(pvd->pp_count);
...
for (i = 0; i < numpps; i += 1) {
struct ppe *p = pvd->ppe + i;
...
lp_ix = be16_to_cpu(p->lp_ix);
pvd points at a single kmalloc()'d struct pvd whose ppe[] member holds a
fixed ARRAY_SIZE(pvd->ppe) (1016) entries, but the loop runs up to the
on-disk pp_count. pp_count is an unvalidated __be16 read straight from
the descriptor, so a crafted AIX image with pp_count larger than 1016
drives the loop to read pvd->ppe[i] past the end of the allocation (up
to 65535 entries, ~2 MB out of bounds).
The partition scan runs without mounting anything, when a block device
with a crafted AIX/IBM partition table appears (an attacker-supplied
image attached with losetup -P, or a device auto-scanned by udev), via
msdos_partition() -> aix_partition().
Clamp the scan to the number of entries the ppe[] array can hold. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: pcrypt - restore callback for non-parallel fallback
pcrypt installs pcrypt_aead_done() on the child AEAD request before
trying to submit it through padata. If padata_do_parallel() returns
-EBUSY, pcrypt falls back to calling the child AEAD directly.
That fallback must not keep the padata completion callback. Otherwise
an asynchronous completion runs pcrypt_aead_done() even though the
request was never enrolled in padata.
Restore the original request callback and callback data before calling
the child AEAD directly. This keeps the fallback path aligned with a
direct AEAD request while leaving the parallel path unchanged. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
exfat: bound uniname advance in exfat_find_dir_entry()
In exfat_find_dir_entry(), each TYPE_EXTEND (file name) entry advances the
output pointer by a fixed amount while the loop guard only tracks the
accumulated name length:
if (++order == 2)
uniname = p_uniname->name;
else
uniname += EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN;
len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname);
name_len += len;
unichar = *(uniname+len);
*(uniname+len) = 0x0;
uniname grows by EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN (15) per name entry, but name_len
grows only by the actual extracted length, which is shorter when a name
fragment contains an early NUL. The only guard is
`name_len >= MAX_NAME_LENGTH`, so a crafted directory with many short
name fragments lets uniname run far past the
p_uniname->name[MAX_NAME_LENGTH + 3] buffer while name_len stays small,
causing an out-of-bounds read and write at *(uniname+len).
The sibling extractor exfat_get_uniname_from_ext_entry() already stops
on a short fragment (the lockstep `len != EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN` guard
added in commit d42334578eba ("exfat: check if filename entries exceeds
max filename length")); exfat_find_dir_entry() never got the
equivalent. Track the per-entry write offset as a count and reject a
fragment once the offset, or the offset plus the extracted length, would
exceed MAX_NAME_LENGTH, before forming the output pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd: Use sizeof(*hdr) instead of sizeof(hdr) in veventq read
The bound-check in iommufd_veventq_fops_read() for the normal vEVENT
path uses sizeof(hdr) where the surrounding code uses sizeof(*hdr):
if (!vevent_for_lost_events_header(cur) &&
sizeof(hdr) + cur->data_len > count - done) {
hdr is declared as struct iommufd_vevent_header *, so sizeof(hdr)
evaluates to the size of the pointer. Surrounding code uses
sizeof(*hdr) consistently:
if (done >= count || sizeof(*hdr) > count - done) {
...
if (copy_to_user(buf + done, hdr, sizeof(*hdr))) {
...
done += sizeof(*hdr);
struct iommufd_vevent_header is currently 8 bytes (two __u32 fields,
flags and sequence), so on 64-bit (sizeof(void *) == 8) the two
expressions happen to be equal and the check works as intended.
On 32-bit (sizeof(void *) == 4) the check under-counts the header by
4 bytes: a vEVENT whose data_len causes 8 + cur->data_len to exceed
count - done while 4 + cur->data_len does not will pass the check,
then the loop will copy_to_user 8 bytes of header followed by data_len
bytes of payload, writing past the user-supplied buffer.
It is also a latent bug for any future expansion of struct
iommufd_vevent_header beyond sizeof(void *) on 64-bit; the check
should not depend on the type happening to match the host pointer
width.
Use sizeof(*hdr) to match the rest of the function and the actual
amount that will be copied. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
svcrdma: wake sq waiters when the transport closes
Threads parked in svc_rdma_sq_wait() on sc_sq_ticket_wait or
sc_send_wait can hang indefinitely in TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE state
across transport teardown, pinning svc_xprt references and
blocking svc_rdma_free().
The close path sets XPT_CLOSE before invoking xpo_detach and both
wait_event predicates include an XPT_CLOSE term, but the
predicates are re-evaluated only on wakeup. sc_sq_ticket_wait has
no completion-driven wake path; it is advanced solely by the
chained ticket handoff inside svc_rdma_sq_wait() itself. Without
an explicit wake at close, parked threads never observe
XPT_CLOSE, hold their svc_xprt_get reference forever, and
svc_rdma_free() blocks on xpt_ref dropping to zero.
Two close entry points reach this transport. Local teardown runs
svc_rdma_detach() from svc_handle_xprt() -> svc_delete_xprt() ->
xpo_detach() on a worker thread. A remote disconnect arrives at
svc_rdma_cma_handler(), which calls svc_xprt_deferred_close():
that sets XPT_CLOSE and enqueues the transport but does not
access either RDMA waitqueue, so a worker already parked in
svc_rdma_sq_wait() never re-evaluates its predicate. With every
worker parked on this transport, no thread is available to run
the local teardown either, and the wake site there is
unreachable.
Introduce svc_rdma_xprt_deferred_close(), a thin svcrdma wrapper
that calls svc_xprt_deferred_close() and then wakes both
sc_sq_ticket_wait and sc_send_wait. Convert the svcrdma producers
that called svc_xprt_deferred_close() directly:
svc_rdma_cma_handler(), qp_event_handler(),
svc_rdma_post_send_err(), svc_rdma_wc_send(), the sendto drop
path, the rw completion error paths, and the recvfrom flush and
read-list error paths.
Wake both waitqueues from svc_rdma_detach() as well. The
synchronous svc_xprt_close() path (backchannel ENOTCONN, device
removal via svc_rdma_xprt_done) reaches detach without flowing
through svc_xprt_deferred_close() and therefore does not invoke
the new helper.
[ cel: add svc_rdma_xprt_deferred_close() to complete the fix ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: synaptics-rmi4 - bound the F30 keymap to the GPIO/LED count
rmi_f30_map_gpios() allocates gpioled_key_map with
min(gpioled_count, TRACKSTICK_RANGE_END) == at most 6 entries, but
rmi_f30_attention() iterates the full f30->gpioled_count (device query
register, range 0..31) and dereferences gpioled_key_map[i], and
input->keycodemax is set to the full gpioled_count while input->keycode
points at the 6-entry allocation.
A device that reports gpioled_count > 6 with GPIO support enabled
therefore causes an out-of-bounds read on the attention interrupt and
out-of-bounds read/write through the EVIOCGKEYCODE/EVIOCSKEYCODE ioctls,
which bound the index only against keycodemax. This is the same defect
as the F3A handler, which was copied from F30.
Size the keymap for the full gpioled_count; the mapping loop still
assigns only the first min(gpioled_count, TRACKSTICK_RANGE_END) entries. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse-uring: Avoid queue->stopped races and set/read that value under lock
There are several readers of queue->stopped that check the value
under lock, but fuse_uring_commit_fetch() did not and actually
the value was not set under the lock in fuse_uring_abort_end_requests()
either. Especially in fuse_uring_commit_fetch it is important
to check under a lock, because due to races 'struct fuse_req'
might be freed with fuse_request_end, but another thread/cpu
might already do teardown work. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: hyper-v: Bound the bank index when querying sparse banks
When checking if a VP ID is included in a sparse bank set, explicitly check
that the ID can actually be contained in a sparse bank (the TLFS allows for
a maximum of 64 banks of 64 vCPUs each). When handling a paravirtual TLB
flush for L2, the VP ID is copied verbatim from the enlightened VMCS,
without any bounds check, i.e. isn't guaranteed to be under the limit of
4096.
Failure to check the bounds of the VP ID leads to an out-of-bounds read
when testing the sparse bank, and super strictly speaking could lead to KVM
performing an unnecessary TLB flush for an L2 vCPU.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hv_is_vp_in_sparse_set+0x85/0x100 [kvm]
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88811ba5f598 by task hyperv_evmcs/2802
CPU: 12 UID: 1000 PID: 2802 Comm: hyperv_evmcs Not tainted 7.1.0-rc2 #7 PREEMPT
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x60
print_report+0xcb/0x5d0
kasan_report+0xb4/0xe0
kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
hv_is_vp_in_sparse_set+0x85/0x100 [kvm]
kvm_hv_flush_tlb+0xe9e/0x16c0 [kvm]
kvm_hv_hypercall+0xe6b/0x1e60 [kvm]
vmx_handle_exit+0x485/0x1b60 [kvm_intel]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x22e3/0x5070 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x5d0/0x10c0 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x129/0x1a0
do_syscall_64+0xb9/0xcf0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7f0e62d1a9bf
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffffffffffffffff pfn:0x11ba5f
flags: 0x4000000000000000(zone=1)
raw: 4000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
raw: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88811ba5f480: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff88811ba5f500: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
>ffff88811ba5f580: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
^
ffff88811ba5f600: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff88811ba5f680: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
==================================================================
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
Opportunistically add a compile time assertion to ensure the maximum number
of sparse banks exactly matches the number of possible bits in the passed
in mask.
[sean: add KASAN splat, drop comment, add assert, massage changelog] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: codecs: simple-mux: Fix enum control bounds check
simple_mux_control_put() rejects values greater than e->items, but
enum control values are zero based. For the two-entry mux used by this
driver, valid values are 0 and 1, so value 2 must be rejected as well.
Accepting e->items can store an invalid mux state, pass it to the GPIO
setter, and pass it on to the DAPM mux update path where it is used as
an index into the enum text array.
Use the same >= e->items check used by the ASoC enum helpers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: recompute nr_integrity_segments in blk_insert_cloned_request
blk_insert_cloned_request() already recomputes nr_phys_segments
against the bottom queue, because "the queue settings related to
segment counting may differ from the original queue." The exact same
reasoning applies to integrity segments: a stacked driver's underlying
queue can have tighter virt_boundary_mask, seg_boundary_mask, or
max_segment_size than the top queue, in which case
blk_rq_count_integrity_sg() against the bottom queue produces a
different count than the cached rq->nr_integrity_segments inherited
from the source request by blk_rq_prep_clone().
When the cached count is lower than the bottom queue's actual count,
blk_rq_map_integrity_sg() trips
BUG_ON(segments > rq->nr_integrity_segments);
on dispatch. The same families of stacked setups that motivated the
existing nr_phys_segments recompute -- dm-multipath fanning out to
nvme-rdma in particular -- can produce this.
Mirror the nr_phys_segments handling: when the request carries
integrity, recompute nr_integrity_segments against the bottom queue
and reject the request if it exceeds the bottom queue's
max_integrity_segments. blk_rq_count_integrity_sg() and
queue_max_integrity_segments() are both already available via
<linux/blk-integrity.h>, which blk-mq.c includes.
This closes a latent gap in the stacking contract and brings the
integrity-segment accounting in line with the existing
phys-segment accounting. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Validate payload length and link_index in dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async
[Why&How]
dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async() copies payload->length bytes into a
16-byte stack buffer (dpaux.data[16]) guarded only by an ASSERT(), which
is a no-op in release builds. If a caller ever passes length > 16 this
results in a stack buffer overflow via memcpy.
Additionally, link_index is used to dereference dc->links[] without
bounds checking against dc->link_count, risking an out-of-bounds access.
Replace the ASSERT with a hard runtime check that returns false when
payload->length exceeds the destination buffer size, and add a bounds
check for link_index before it is used.
(cherry picked from commit ba4caa9fecdf7a38f98c878ad05a8a64148b6881) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: cancel pending_rx_work before taking conn->lock
l2cap_conn_del() takes conn->lock and then calls cancel_work_sync() for
pending_rx_work. process_pending_rx() takes the same mutex, so teardown
can deadlock against the worker it is flushing.
This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually
reviewed against the current tree.
The grounded PoC kept the l2cap_conn_ready() -> queue_work(...,
&conn->pending_rx_work) submit path, the l2cap_conn_del() ->
cancel_work_sync(&conn->pending_rx_work) teardown path, and the
process_pending_rx() -> mutex_lock(&conn->lock) worker edge. Lockdep
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
process_pending_rx+0x21/0x2a [vuln_msv]
l2cap_conn_del.constprop.0+0x3f/0x4e [vuln_msv]
*** DEADLOCK ***
Cancel pending_rx_work before taking conn->lock, matching the existing
lock-before-drain ordering used for the two delayed works in the same
teardown path. The pending_rx queue is still purged after the work has
been cancelled and conn->lock has been acquired. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: stub: Reject I2C block transfers with invalid length
The I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA case in stub_xfer() uses data->block[0]
as the transfer length. The existing check only clamps it to avoid
overrunning the chip->words[256] register array, but does not validate
it against I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX (32), which is the limit of the union
i2c_smbus_data.block buffer (34 bytes total). The driver is a
development/test tool (CONFIG_I2C_STUB=m, not built by default)
that must be loaded with a chip_addr= parameter.
A local user with access to /dev/i2c-* can issue an I2C_SMBUS ioctl
with I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA and data->block[0] > 32, causing
stub_xfer() to read or write past the end of the union
i2c_smbus_data.block buffer:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in stub_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c:223)
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800abcfd92 by task exploit/81
Call Trace:
<TASK>
stub_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c:223)
__i2c_smbus_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-core-smbus.c:593)
i2c_smbus_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-core-smbus.c:536)
i2cdev_ioctl_smbus (drivers/i2c/i2c-dev.c:391)
i2cdev_ioctl (drivers/i2c/i2c-dev.c:478)
__x64_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:583)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
</TASK>
The bug exists because i2c-stub implements .smbus_xfer directly,
bypassing the I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX validation in
i2c_smbus_xfer_emulated(). The I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_DATA case in the same
function correctly validates against I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX, but the
I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA case does not.
Fix by rejecting transfers with data->block[0] == 0 or
data->block[0] > I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX with -EINVAL, consistent with
both the I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_DATA case in the same function and the
I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA validation in i2c_smbus_xfer_emulated(). |
