| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/mempolicy: fix memory leaks in weighted_interleave_auto_store()
weighted_interleave_auto_store() fetches old_wi_state inside the if
(!input) block only. This causes two memory leaks:
1. When a user writes "false" and the current mode is already manual,
the function returns early without freeing the freshly allocated
new_wi_state.
2. When a user writes "true", old_wi_state stays NULL because the
fetch is skipped entirely. The old state is then overwritten by
rcu_assign_pointer() but never freed, since the cleanup path is
gated on old_wi_state being non-NULL. A user can trigger this
repeatedly by writing "1" in a loop.
Fix both leaks by moving the old_wi_state fetch before the input check,
making it unconditional. This also allows a unified early return for both
"true" and "false" when the requested mode matches the current mode.
Reviewed by: Donet Tom <donettom@linux.ibm.com> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv
rxe_rcv() currently checks only that the incoming packet is at least
header_size(pkt) bytes long before payload_size() is used.
However, payload_size() subtracts both the attacker-controlled BTH pad
field and RXE_ICRC_SIZE from pkt->paylen:
payload_size = pkt->paylen - offset[RXE_PAYLOAD] - bth_pad(pkt)
- RXE_ICRC_SIZE
This means a short packet can still make payload_size() underflow even
if it includes enough bytes for the fixed headers. Simply requiring
header_size(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE is not sufficient either, because a
packet with a forged non-zero BTH pad can still leave payload_size()
negative and pass an underflowed value to later receive-path users.
Fix this by validating pkt->paylen against the full minimum length
required by payload_size(): header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) +
RXE_ICRC_SIZE. |
| Subscriber Broken Access Control in Ultra Addons for WPForms <= 1.0.11 versions. |
| Discuz! X5.0 releases 20260320 through 20260610 contain a local file inclusion vulnerability that allows authenticated administrators to execute arbitrary code by importing a specially crafted plugin configuration containing path traversal sequences in the directory attribute. Attackers can trigger an exception during plugin installation to bypass sanitization routines, causing malicious paths to be stored unsanitized and subsequently passed to include(), which combined with file upload functionality escalates to arbitrary code execution in the context of the web server user. |
| Subscriber SQL Injection in MasterStudy LMS <= 3.7.25 versions. |
| Subscriber Cross Site Scripting (XSS) in WP Job Portal <= 2.5.2 versions. |
| A lack of authorization validation in version 0.4.17 or later of the ChromaDB Python project allows any authenticated users to arbitrarily read, write, update, or delete data in any tenant's collection regardless of which tenant they belong to. |
| The SimpleRBACAuthorizationProvider authorization provider in versions 0.5.0 or later of the ChromaDB Python project evaluates whether a user holds a given permission but never checks which tenant, database, or collection that permission applies to allowing users to perform cross tenant actions. |
| All V1 collection-level endpoints in ChromaDB's Python project pass None for the tenant and database to the authorization layer, allowing attackers to bypass authorization controls by using the V1 endpoints. |
| Unauthenticated Cross Site Scripting (XSS) in MW WP Form <= 5.1.3 versions. |
| A vulnerability was found in the GStreamer RealMedia demuxer (gst-plugins-ugly). When processing a RealMedia (.rm) file, the demuxer parses MDPR (media properties) chunks to configure audio streams. For audio stream header versions 4 and 5, the parser reads fields such as codec type, packet size, sample rate, channel count, and extra codec data length from fixed offsets within the chunk without first checking that the chunk contains enough data. If a malicious file provides an MDPR chunk that is too small to contain a complete audio stream header, the parser reads beyond the end of the buffer. This can cause the application to crash. In some cases, bytes read past the buffer boundary may be incorporated into stream metadata, which could result in limited information disclosure. |
| Subscriber Sensitive Data Exposure in Contest Gallery <= 28.1.7 versions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipmi:ssif: Clean up kthread on errors
If an error occurs after the ssif kthread is created, but before the
main IPMI code starts the ssif interface, the ssif kthread will not
be stopped.
So make sure the kthread is stopped on an error condition if it is
running. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/md-llbitmap: skip reading rdevs that are not in_sync
When reading bitmap pages from member disks, the code iterates through
all rdevs and attempts to read from the first available one. However,
it only checks for raid_disk assignment and Faulty flag, missing the
In_sync flag check.
This can cause bitmap data to be read from spare disks that are still
being rebuilt and don't have valid bitmap information yet. Reading
stale or uninitialized bitmap data from such disks can lead to
incorrect dirty bit tracking, potentially causing data corruption
during recovery or normal operation.
Add the In_sync flag check to ensure bitmap pages are only read from
fully synchronized member disks that have valid bitmap data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: ctxfi: Add fallback to default RSR for S/PDIF
spdif_passthru_playback_get_resources() uses atc->pll_rate as the RSR
for the MSR calculation loop. However, pll_rate is only updated in
atc_pll_init() and not in hw_pll_init(), so it remains 0 after the
card init.
When spdif_passthru_playback_setup() skips atc_pll_init() for
32000 Hz, (rsr * desc.msr) always becomes 0, causing the loop to spin
indefinitely.
Add fallback to use atc->rsr when atc->pll_rate is 0. This reflects
the hardware state, since hw_card_init() already configures the PLL
to the default RSR. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: qrtr: ns: Fix use-after-free in driver remove()
In the remove callback, if a packet arrives after destroy_workqueue() is
called, but before sock_release(), the qrtr_ns_data_ready() callback will
try to queue the work, causing use-after-free issue.
Fix this issue by saving the default 'sk_data_ready' callback during
qrtr_ns_init() and use it to replace the qrtr_ns_data_ready() callback at
the start of remove(). This ensures that even if a packet arrives after
destroy_workqueue(), the work struct will not be dereferenced.
Note that it is also required to ensure that the RX threads are completed
before destroying the workqueue, because the threads could be using the
qrtr_ns_data_ready() callback. |
| A denial of service vulnerability was found in GStreamer's AV1 codec parser in gst-plugins-bad. The gst_av1_parser_parse_tile_list_obu() function passes a byte count to a bit-reader API that expects a bit count, causing parser desynchronization. A remote attacker could trick a user into opening a specially crafted AV1 media file, triggering an assertion abort and causing the application to crash. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: caiaq: fix usb_dev refcount leak on probe failure
create_card() takes a reference on the USB device with usb_get_dev()
and stores the matching usb_put_dev() in card_free(), which is
installed as the snd_card's ->private_free destructor.
However, ->private_free is only assigned near the end of init_card(),
after several failure points (usb_set_interface(), EP type checks,
usb_submit_urb(), the EP1_CMD_GET_DEVICE_INFO exchange, and its
timeout). When any of those fail, init_card() returns an error to
snd_probe(), which calls snd_card_free(card). Because ->private_free
is still NULL, card_free() never runs, the usb_get_dev() reference
is not dropped, and the struct usb_device leaks along with its
descriptor allocations and device_private.
syzbot reproduces this with a malformed UAC3 device whose only valid
altsetting is 0; init_card()'s usb_set_interface(usb_dev, 0, 1) call
fails with -EIO and triggers the leak.
Move the ->private_free assignment into create_card(), immediately
after usb_get_dev(), so that every error path reaching snd_card_free()
balances the reference. card_free()'s callees (snd_usb_caiaq_input_free,
free_urbs, kfree) already tolerate the partially-initialized state
because the chip private area is zero-initialized by snd_card_new(). |
| A code injection vulnerability in version 0.4.17 or later of the ChromaDB Python project allows an authenticated attacker to run arbitrary code on the server by sending a malicious model repository and trust_remote_code set to true in the /api/v2/tenants/default_tenant/databases/default_database/collections/{collection_id} if they have the UPDATE_COLLECTION permission. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/raid10: fix deadlock with check operation and nowait requests
When an array check is running it will raise the barrier at which point
normal requests will become blocked and increment the nr_pending value to
signal there is work pending inside of wait_barrier(). NOWAIT requests
do not block and so will return immediately with an error, and additionally
do not increment nr_pending in wait_barrier(). Upstream change commit
43806c3d5b9b ("raid10: cleanup memleak at raid10_make_request") added a
call to raid_end_bio_io() to fix a memory leak when NOWAIT requests hit
this condition. raid_end_bio_io() eventually calls allow_barrier() and
it will unconditionally do an atomic_dec_and_test(&conf->nr_pending) even
though the corresponding increment on nr_pending didn't happen in the
NOWAIT case.
This can be easily seen by starting a check operation while an application
is doing nowait IO on the same array. This results in a deadlocked state
due to nr_pending value underflowing and so the md resync thread gets stuck
waiting for nr_pending to == 0.
Output of r10conf state of the array when we hit this condition:
crash> struct r10conf
barrier = 1,
nr_pending = {
counter = -41
},
nr_waiting = 15,
nr_queued = 0,
Example of md_sync thread stuck waiting on raise_barrier() and other
requests stuck in wait_barrier():
md1_resync
[<0>] raise_barrier+0xce/0x1c0
[<0>] raid10_sync_request+0x1ca/0x1ed0
[<0>] md_do_sync+0x779/0x1110
[<0>] md_thread+0x90/0x160
[<0>] kthread+0xbe/0xf0
[<0>] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
[<0>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
kworker/u1040:2+flush-253:4
[<0>] wait_barrier+0x1de/0x220
[<0>] regular_request_wait+0x30/0x180
[<0>] raid10_make_request+0x261/0x1000
[<0>] md_handle_request+0x13b/0x230
[<0>] __submit_bio+0x107/0x1f0
[<0>] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x16f/0x390
[<0>] ext4_io_submit+0x24/0x40
[<0>] ext4_do_writepages+0x254/0xc80
[<0>] ext4_writepages+0x84/0x120
[<0>] do_writepages+0x7a/0x260
[<0>] __writeback_single_inode+0x3d/0x300
[<0>] writeback_sb_inodes+0x1dd/0x470
[<0>] __writeback_inodes_wb+0x4c/0xe0
[<0>] wb_writeback+0x18b/0x2d0
[<0>] wb_workfn+0x2a1/0x400
[<0>] process_one_work+0x149/0x330
[<0>] worker_thread+0x2d2/0x410
[<0>] kthread+0xbe/0xf0
[<0>] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
[<0>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 |
