| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: light: vcnl4035: fix information leak in triggered buffer
The 'buffer' local array is used to push data to userspace from a
triggered buffer, but it does not set an initial value for the single
data element, which is an u16 aligned to 8 bytes. That leaves at least
4 bytes uninitialized even after writing an integer value with
regmap_read().
Initialize the array to zero before using it to avoid pushing
uninitialized information to userspace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: imu: kmx61: fix information leak in triggered buffer
The 'buffer' local array is used to push data to user space from a
triggered buffer, but it does not set values for inactive channels, as
it only uses iio_for_each_active_channel() to assign new values.
Initialize the array to zero before using it to avoid pushing
uninitialized information to userspace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: rockchip_saradc: fix information leak in triggered buffer
The 'data' local struct is used to push data to user space from a
triggered buffer, but it does not set values for inactive channels, as
it only uses iio_for_each_active_channel() to assign new values.
Initialize the struct to zero before using it to avoid pushing
uninitialized information to userspace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: ti-ads8688: fix information leak in triggered buffer
The 'buffer' local array is used to push data to user space from a
triggered buffer, but it does not set values for inactive channels, as
it only uses iio_for_each_active_channel() to assign new values.
Initialize the array to zero before using it to avoid pushing
uninitialized information to userspace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: ptrace: fix partial SETREGSET for NT_ARM_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL
Currently tagged_addr_ctrl_set() doesn't initialize the temporary 'ctrl'
variable, and a SETREGSET call with a length of zero will leave this
uninitialized. Consequently tagged_addr_ctrl_set() will consume an
arbitrary value, potentially leaking up to 64 bits of memory from the
kernel stack. The read is limited to a specific slot on the stack, and
the issue does not provide a write mechanism.
As set_tagged_addr_ctrl() only accepts values where bits [63:4] zero and
rejects other values, a partial SETREGSET attempt will randomly succeed
or fail depending on the value of the uninitialized value, and the
exposure is significantly limited.
Fix this by initializing the temporary value before copying the regset
from userspace, as for other regsets (e.g. NT_PRSTATUS, NT_PRFPREG,
NT_ARM_SYSTEM_CALL). In the case of a zero-length write, the existing
value of the tagged address ctrl will be retained.
The NT_ARM_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL regset is only visible in the
user_aarch64_view used by a native AArch64 task to manipulate another
native AArch64 task. As get_tagged_addr_ctrl() only returns an error
value when called for a compat task, tagged_addr_ctrl_get() and
tagged_addr_ctrl_set() should never observe an error value from
get_tagged_addr_ctrl(). Add a WARN_ON_ONCE() to both to indicate that
such an error would be unexpected, and error handlnig is not missing in
either case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netrom: check buffer length before accessing it
Syzkaller reports an uninit value read from ax25cmp when sending raw message
through ieee802154 implementation.
=====================================================
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ax25cmp+0x3a5/0x460 net/ax25/ax25_addr.c:119
ax25cmp+0x3a5/0x460 net/ax25/ax25_addr.c:119
nr_dev_get+0x20e/0x450 net/netrom/nr_route.c:601
nr_route_frame+0x1a2/0xfc0 net/netrom/nr_route.c:774
nr_xmit+0x5a/0x1c0 net/netrom/nr_dev.c:144
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4940 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4954 [inline]
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3548 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x247/0xa10 net/core/dev.c:3564
__dev_queue_xmit+0x33b8/0x5130 net/core/dev.c:4349
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3134 [inline]
raw_sendmsg+0x654/0xc10 net/ieee802154/socket.c:299
ieee802154_sock_sendmsg+0x91/0xc0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:96
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x9c2/0xd60 net/socket.c:2584
___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x490 net/socket.c:2674
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook+0x129/0xa70 mm/slab.h:768
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5e9/0xb10 mm/slub.c:3523
kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:560
__alloc_skb+0x318/0x740 net/core/skbuff.c:651
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1286 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xbd0 net/core/skbuff.c:6334
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa80/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2780
sock_alloc_send_skb include/net/sock.h:1884 [inline]
raw_sendmsg+0x36d/0xc10 net/ieee802154/socket.c:282
ieee802154_sock_sendmsg+0x91/0xc0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:96
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x9c2/0xd60 net/socket.c:2584
___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x490 net/socket.c:2674
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
CPU: 0 PID: 5037 Comm: syz-executor166 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc7-syzkaller-00003-gfbafc3e621c3 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023
=====================================================
This issue occurs because the skb buffer is too small, and it's actual
allocation is aligned. This hides an actual issue, which is that nr_route_frame
does not validate the buffer size before using it.
Fix this issue by checking skb->len before accessing any fields in skb->data.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: dvb-frontends: dib3000mb: fix uninit-value in dib3000_write_reg
Syzbot reports [1] an uninitialized value issue found by KMSAN in
dib3000_read_reg().
Local u8 rb[2] is used in i2c_transfer() as a read buffer; in case
that call fails, the buffer may end up with some undefined values.
Since no elaborate error handling is expected in dib3000_write_reg(),
simply zero out rb buffer to mitigate the problem.
[1] Syzkaller report
dvb-usb: bulk message failed: -22 (6/0)
=====================================================
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in dib3000mb_attach+0x2d8/0x3c0 drivers/media/dvb-frontends/dib3000mb.c:758
dib3000mb_attach+0x2d8/0x3c0 drivers/media/dvb-frontends/dib3000mb.c:758
dibusb_dib3000mb_frontend_attach+0x155/0x2f0 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dibusb-mb.c:31
dvb_usb_adapter_frontend_init+0xed/0x9a0 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-dvb.c:290
dvb_usb_adapter_init drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:90 [inline]
dvb_usb_init drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:186 [inline]
dvb_usb_device_init+0x25a8/0x3760 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:310
dibusb_probe+0x46/0x250 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dibusb-mb.c:110
...
Local variable rb created at:
dib3000_read_reg+0x86/0x4e0 drivers/media/dvb-frontends/dib3000mb.c:54
dib3000mb_attach+0x123/0x3c0 drivers/media/dvb-frontends/dib3000mb.c:758
... |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rtc: check if __rtc_read_time was successful in rtc_timer_do_work()
If the __rtc_read_time call fails,, the struct rtc_time tm; may contain
uninitialized data, or an illegal date/time read from the RTC hardware.
When calling rtc_tm_to_ktime later, the result may be a very large value
(possibly KTIME_MAX). If there are periodic timers in rtc->timerqueue,
they will continually expire, may causing kernel softlockup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mfd: intel_soc_pmic_bxtwc: Use IRQ domain for TMU device
While design wise the idea of converting the driver to use
the hierarchy of the IRQ chips is correct, the implementation
has (inherited) flaws. This was unveiled when platform_get_irq()
had started WARN() on IRQ 0 that is supposed to be a Linux
IRQ number (also known as vIRQ).
Rework the driver to respect IRQ domain when creating each MFD
device separately, as the domain is not the same for all of them. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/fadump: Move fadump_cma_init to setup_arch() after initmem_init()
During early init CMA_MIN_ALIGNMENT_BYTES can be PAGE_SIZE,
since pageblock_order is still zero and it gets initialized
later during initmem_init() e.g.
setup_arch() -> initmem_init() -> sparse_init() -> set_pageblock_order()
One such use case where this causes issue is -
early_setup() -> early_init_devtree() -> fadump_reserve_mem() -> fadump_cma_init()
This causes CMA memory alignment check to be bypassed in
cma_init_reserved_mem(). Then later cma_activate_area() can hit
a VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(pfn & ((1 << order) - 1)) if the reserved memory
area was not pageblock_order aligned.
Fix it by moving the fadump_cma_init() after initmem_init(),
where other such cma reservations also gets called.
<stack trace>
==============
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10010
flags: 0x13ffff800000000(node=1|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x7ffff) CMA
raw: 013ffff800000000 5deadbeef0000100 5deadbeef0000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(pfn & ((1 << order) - 1))
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at mm/page_alloc.c:778!
Call Trace:
__free_one_page+0x57c/0x7b0 (unreliable)
free_pcppages_bulk+0x1a8/0x2c8
free_unref_page_commit+0x3d4/0x4e4
free_unref_page+0x458/0x6d0
init_cma_reserved_pageblock+0x114/0x198
cma_init_reserved_areas+0x270/0x3e0
do_one_initcall+0x80/0x2f8
kernel_init_freeable+0x33c/0x530
kernel_init+0x34/0x26c
ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hsr: avoid potential out-of-bound access in fill_frame_info()
syzbot is able to feed a packet with 14 bytes, pretending
it is a vlan one.
Since fill_frame_info() is relying on skb->mac_len already,
extend the check to cover this case.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in fill_frame_info net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:709 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in hsr_forward_skb+0x9ee/0x3b10 net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:724
fill_frame_info net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:709 [inline]
hsr_forward_skb+0x9ee/0x3b10 net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:724
hsr_dev_xmit+0x2f0/0x350 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:235
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5002 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5011 [inline]
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3590 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x247/0xa20 net/core/dev.c:3606
__dev_queue_xmit+0x366a/0x57d0 net/core/dev.c:4434
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3168 [inline]
packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3146 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x91ae/0xa6f0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3178
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:726
__sys_sendto+0x594/0x750 net/socket.c:2197
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2204 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2200 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2200
x64_sys_call+0x346a/0x3c30 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:45
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4091 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4134 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x6bf/0xb80 mm/slub.c:4186
kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:587
__alloc_skb+0x363/0x7b0 net/core/skbuff.c:678
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1323 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xd00 net/core/skbuff.c:6612
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa81/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2881
packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2995 [inline]
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3089 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x74c6/0xa6f0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3178
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:726
__sys_sendto+0x594/0x750 net/socket.c:2197
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2204 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2200 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2200
x64_sys_call+0x346a/0x3c30 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:45
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp_bpf: Fix the sk_mem_uncharge logic in tcp_bpf_sendmsg
The current sk memory accounting logic in __SK_REDIRECT is pre-uncharging
tosend bytes, which is either msg->sg.size or a smaller value apply_bytes.
Potential problems with this strategy are as follows:
- If the actual sent bytes are smaller than tosend, we need to charge some
bytes back, as in line 487, which is okay but seems not clean.
- When tosend is set to apply_bytes, as in line 417, and (ret < 0), we may
miss uncharging (msg->sg.size - apply_bytes) bytes.
[...]
415 tosend = msg->sg.size;
416 if (psock->apply_bytes && psock->apply_bytes < tosend)
417 tosend = psock->apply_bytes;
[...]
443 sk_msg_return(sk, msg, tosend);
444 release_sock(sk);
446 origsize = msg->sg.size;
447 ret = tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir(sk_redir, redir_ingress,
448 msg, tosend, flags);
449 sent = origsize - msg->sg.size;
[...]
454 lock_sock(sk);
455 if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
456 int free = sk_msg_free_nocharge(sk, msg);
458 if (!cork)
459 *copied -= free;
460 }
[...]
487 if (eval == __SK_REDIRECT)
488 sk_mem_charge(sk, tosend - sent);
[...]
When running the selftest test_txmsg_redir_wait_sndmem with txmsg_apply,
the following warning will be reported:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 57 at net/ipv4/af_inet.c:156 inet_sock_destruct+0x190/0x1a0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 57 Comm: kworker/6:0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1.bm.1-amd64+ #43
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events sk_psock_destroy
RIP: 0010:inet_sock_destruct+0x190/0x1a0
RSP: 0018:ffffad0a8021fe08 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000011 RBX: ffff9aab4475b900 RCX: ffff9aab481a0800
RDX: 0000000000000303 RSI: 0000000000000011 RDI: ffff9aab4475b900
RBP: ffff9aab4475b990 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9aab40050ec0
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff9aae6fdb1d01 R12: ffff9aab49c60400
R13: ffff9aab49c60598 R14: ffff9aab49c60598 R15: dead000000000100
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9aae6fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffec7e47bd8 CR3: 00000001a1a1c004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x89/0x130
? inet_sock_destruct+0x190/0x1a0
? report_bug+0xfc/0x1e0
? handle_bug+0x5c/0xa0
? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? inet_sock_destruct+0x190/0x1a0
__sk_destruct+0x25/0x220
sk_psock_destroy+0x2b2/0x310
process_scheduled_works+0xa3/0x3e0
worker_thread+0x117/0x240
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xcf/0x100
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
In __SK_REDIRECT, a more concise way is delaying the uncharging after sent
bytes are finalized, and uncharge this value. When (ret < 0), we shall
invoke sk_msg_free.
Same thing happens in case __SK_DROP, when tosend is set to apply_bytes,
we may miss uncharging (msg->sg.size - apply_bytes) bytes. The same
warning will be reported in selftest.
[...]
468 case __SK_DROP:
469 default:
470 sk_msg_free_partial(sk, msg, tosend);
471 sk_msg_apply_bytes(psock, tosend);
472 *copied -= (tosend + delta);
473 return -EACCES;
[...]
So instead of sk_msg_free_partial we can do sk_msg_free here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: free inode when ocfs2_get_init_inode() fails
syzbot is reporting busy inodes after unmount, for commit 9c89fe0af826
("ocfs2: Handle error from dquot_initialize()") forgot to call iput() when
new_inode() succeeded and dquot_initialize() failed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xsk: fix OOB map writes when deleting elements
Jordy says:
"
In the xsk_map_delete_elem function an unsigned integer
(map->max_entries) is compared with a user-controlled signed integer
(k). Due to implicit type conversion, a large unsigned value for
map->max_entries can bypass the intended bounds check:
if (k >= map->max_entries)
return -EINVAL;
This allows k to hold a negative value (between -2147483648 and -2),
which is then used as an array index in m->xsk_map[k], which results
in an out-of-bounds access.
spin_lock_bh(&m->lock);
map_entry = &m->xsk_map[k]; // Out-of-bounds map_entry
old_xs = unrcu_pointer(xchg(map_entry, NULL)); // Oob write
if (old_xs)
xsk_map_sock_delete(old_xs, map_entry);
spin_unlock_bh(&m->lock);
The xchg operation can then be used to cause an out-of-bounds write.
Moreover, the invalid map_entry passed to xsk_map_sock_delete can lead
to further memory corruption.
"
It indeed results in following splat:
[76612.897343] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc8fc2e461108
[76612.904330] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[76612.909639] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[76612.914855] PGD 0 P4D 0
[76612.917431] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[76612.921859] CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 10318 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1+ #470
[76612.929189] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019
[76612.939781] RIP: 0010:xsk_map_delete_elem+0x2d/0x60
[76612.944738] Code: 00 00 41 54 55 53 48 63 2e 3b 6f 24 73 38 4c 8d a7 f8 00 00 00 48 89 fb 4c 89 e7 e8 2d bf 05 00 48 8d b4 eb 00 01 00 00 31 ff <48> 87 3e 48 85 ff 74 05 e8 16 ff ff ff 4c 89 e7 e8 3e bc 05 00 31
[76612.963774] RSP: 0018:ffffc9002e407df8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[76612.969079] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9002e461000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[76612.976323] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffc8fc2e461108 RDI: 0000000000000000
[76612.983569] RBP: ffffffff80000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000007
[76612.990812] R10: ffffc9002e407e18 R11: ffff888108a38858 R12: ffffc9002e4610f8
[76612.998060] R13: ffff888108a38858 R14: 00007ffd1ae0ac78 R15: ffffc9002e4610c0
[76613.005303] FS: 00007f80b6f59740(0000) GS:ffff8897e0ec0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[76613.013517] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[76613.019349] CR2: ffffc8fc2e461108 CR3: 000000011e3ef001 CR4: 00000000007726f0
[76613.026595] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[76613.033841] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[76613.041086] PKRU: 55555554
[76613.043842] Call Trace:
[76613.046331] <TASK>
[76613.048468] ? __die+0x20/0x60
[76613.051581] ? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x450
[76613.055747] ? search_extable+0x22/0x30
[76613.059649] ? search_bpf_extables+0x5f/0x80
[76613.063988] ? exc_page_fault+0xa9/0x140
[76613.067975] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[76613.072229] ? xsk_map_delete_elem+0x2d/0x60
[76613.076573] ? xsk_map_delete_elem+0x23/0x60
[76613.080914] __sys_bpf+0x19b7/0x23c0
[76613.084555] __x64_sys_bpf+0x1a/0x20
[76613.088194] do_syscall_64+0x37/0xb0
[76613.091832] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
[76613.096962] RIP: 0033:0x7f80b6d1e88d
[76613.100592] Code: 5b 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 b5 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[76613.119631] RSP: 002b:00007ffd1ae0ac68 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141
[76613.131330] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f80b6d1e88d
[76613.142632] RDX: 0000000000000098 RSI: 00007ffd1ae0ad20 RDI: 0000000000000003
[76613.153967] RBP: 00007ffd1ae0adc0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[76613.166030] R10: 00007f80b6f77040 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffd1ae0aed8
[76613.177130] R13: 000055ddf42ce1e9 R14: 000055ddf42d0d98 R15: 00
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: hisi_sas: Add cond_resched() for no forced preemption model
For no forced preemption model kernel, in the scenario where the
expander is connected to 12 high performance SAS SSDs, the following
call trace may occur:
[ 214.409199][ C240] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#240 stuck for 22s! [irq/149-hisi_sa:3211]
[ 214.568533][ C240] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
[ 214.575224][ C240] pc : fput_many+0x8c/0xdc
[ 214.579480][ C240] lr : fput+0x1c/0xf0
[ 214.583302][ C240] sp : ffff80002de2b900
[ 214.587298][ C240] x29: ffff80002de2b900 x28: ffff1082aa412000
[ 214.593291][ C240] x27: ffff3062a0348c08 x26: ffff80003a9f6000
[ 214.599284][ C240] x25: ffff1062bbac5c40 x24: 0000000000001000
[ 214.605277][ C240] x23: 000000000000000a x22: 0000000000000001
[ 214.611270][ C240] x21: 0000000000001000 x20: 0000000000000000
[ 214.617262][ C240] x19: ffff3062a41ae580 x18: 0000000000010000
[ 214.623255][ C240] x17: 0000000000000001 x16: ffffdb3a6efe5fc0
[ 214.629248][ C240] x15: ffffffffffffffff x14: 0000000003ffffff
[ 214.635241][ C240] x13: 000000000000ffff x12: 000000000000029c
[ 214.641234][ C240] x11: 0000000000000006 x10: ffff80003a9f7fd0
[ 214.647226][ C240] x9 : ffffdb3a6f0482fc x8 : 0000000000000001
[ 214.653219][ C240] x7 : 0000000000000002 x6 : 0000000000000080
[ 214.659212][ C240] x5 : ffff55480ee9b000 x4 : fffffde7f94c6554
[ 214.665205][ C240] x3 : 0000000000000002 x2 : 0000000000000020
[ 214.671198][ C240] x1 : 0000000000000021 x0 : ffff3062a41ae5b8
[ 214.677191][ C240] Call trace:
[ 214.680320][ C240] fput_many+0x8c/0xdc
[ 214.684230][ C240] fput+0x1c/0xf0
[ 214.687707][ C240] aio_complete_rw+0xd8/0x1fc
[ 214.692225][ C240] blkdev_bio_end_io+0x98/0x140
[ 214.696917][ C240] bio_endio+0x160/0x1bc
[ 214.701001][ C240] blk_update_request+0x1c8/0x3bc
[ 214.705867][ C240] scsi_end_request+0x3c/0x1f0
[ 214.710471][ C240] scsi_io_completion+0x7c/0x1a0
[ 214.715249][ C240] scsi_finish_command+0x104/0x140
[ 214.720200][ C240] scsi_softirq_done+0x90/0x180
[ 214.724892][ C240] blk_mq_complete_request+0x5c/0x70
[ 214.730016][ C240] scsi_mq_done+0x48/0xac
[ 214.734194][ C240] sas_scsi_task_done+0xbc/0x16c [libsas]
[ 214.739758][ C240] slot_complete_v3_hw+0x260/0x760 [hisi_sas_v3_hw]
[ 214.746185][ C240] cq_thread_v3_hw+0xbc/0x190 [hisi_sas_v3_hw]
[ 214.752179][ C240] irq_thread_fn+0x34/0xa4
[ 214.756435][ C240] irq_thread+0xc4/0x130
[ 214.760520][ C240] kthread+0x108/0x13c
[ 214.764430][ C240] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
This is because in the hisi_sas driver, both the hardware interrupt
handler and the interrupt thread are executed on the same CPU. In the
performance test scenario, function irq_wait_for_interrupt() will always
return 0 if lots of interrupts occurs and the CPU will be continuously
consumed. As a result, the CPU cannot run the watchdog thread. When the
watchdog time exceeds the specified time, call trace occurs.
To fix it, add cond_resched() to execute the watchdog thread. |
| In elisp-mode.el in GNU Emacs before 30.1, a user who chooses to invoke elisp-completion-at-point (for code completion) on untrusted Emacs Lisp source code can trigger unsafe Lisp macro expansion that allows attackers to execute arbitrary code. (This unsafe expansion also occurs if a user chooses to enable on-the-fly diagnosis that byte compiles untrusted Emacs Lisp source code.) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: fix UB due to uninitialized stack access in ip_vs_protocol_init()
Under certain kernel configurations when building with Clang/LLVM, the
compiler does not generate a return or jump as the terminator
instruction for ip_vs_protocol_init(), triggering the following objtool
warning during build time:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: ip_vs_protocol_init() falls through to next function __initstub__kmod_ip_vs_rr__935_123_ip_vs_rr_init6()
At runtime, this either causes an oops when trying to load the ipvs
module or a boot-time panic if ipvs is built-in. This same issue has
been reported by the Intel kernel test robot previously.
Digging deeper into both LLVM and the kernel code reveals this to be a
undefined behavior problem. ip_vs_protocol_init() uses a on-stack buffer
of 64 chars to store the registered protocol names and leaves it
uninitialized after definition. The function calls strnlen() when
concatenating protocol names into the buffer. With CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE
strnlen() performs an extra step to check whether the last byte of the
input char buffer is a null character (commit 3009f891bb9f ("fortify:
Allow strlen() and strnlen() to pass compile-time known lengths")).
This, together with possibly other configurations, cause the following
IR to be generated:
define hidden i32 @ip_vs_protocol_init() local_unnamed_addr #5 section ".init.text" align 16 !kcfi_type !29 {
%1 = alloca [64 x i8], align 16
...
14: ; preds = %11
%15 = getelementptr inbounds i8, ptr %1, i64 63
%16 = load i8, ptr %15, align 1
%17 = tail call i1 @llvm.is.constant.i8(i8 %16)
%18 = icmp eq i8 %16, 0
%19 = select i1 %17, i1 %18, i1 false
br i1 %19, label %20, label %23
20: ; preds = %14
%21 = call i64 @strlen(ptr noundef nonnull dereferenceable(1) %1) #23
...
23: ; preds = %14, %11, %20
%24 = call i64 @strnlen(ptr noundef nonnull dereferenceable(1) %1, i64 noundef 64) #24
...
}
The above code calculates the address of the last char in the buffer
(value %15) and then loads from it (value %16). Because the buffer is
never initialized, the LLVM GVN pass marks value %16 as undefined:
%13 = getelementptr inbounds i8, ptr %1, i64 63
br i1 undef, label %14, label %17
This gives later passes (SCCP, in particular) more DCE opportunities by
propagating the undef value further, and eventually removes everything
after the load on the uninitialized stack location:
define hidden i32 @ip_vs_protocol_init() local_unnamed_addr #0 section ".init.text" align 16 !kcfi_type !11 {
%1 = alloca [64 x i8], align 16
...
12: ; preds = %11
%13 = getelementptr inbounds i8, ptr %1, i64 63
unreachable
}
In this way, the generated native code will just fall through to the
next function, as LLVM does not generate any code for the unreachable IR
instruction and leaves the function without a terminator.
Zero the on-stack buffer to avoid this possible UB. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: fix uninitialized value in ocfs2_file_read_iter()
Syzbot has reported the following KMSAN splat:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ocfs2_file_read_iter+0x9a4/0xf80
ocfs2_file_read_iter+0x9a4/0xf80
__io_read+0x8d4/0x20f0
io_read+0x3e/0xf0
io_issue_sqe+0x42b/0x22c0
io_wq_submit_work+0xaf9/0xdc0
io_worker_handle_work+0xd13/0x2110
io_wq_worker+0x447/0x1410
ret_from_fork+0x6f/0x90
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Uninit was created at:
__alloc_pages_noprof+0x9a7/0xe00
alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x299/0x990
alloc_pages_noprof+0x1bf/0x1e0
allocate_slab+0x33a/0x1250
___slab_alloc+0x12ef/0x35e0
kmem_cache_alloc_bulk_noprof+0x486/0x1330
__io_alloc_req_refill+0x84/0x560
io_submit_sqes+0x172f/0x2f30
__se_sys_io_uring_enter+0x406/0x41c0
__x64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x11f/0x1a0
x64_sys_call+0x2b54/0x3ba0
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1e0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Since an instance of 'struct kiocb' may be passed from the block layer
with 'private' field uninitialized, introduce 'ocfs2_iocb_init_rw_locked()'
and use it from where 'ocfs2_dio_end_io()' might take care, i.e. in
'ocfs2_file_read_iter()' and 'ocfs2_file_write_iter()'. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: ip_tunnel: Fix suspicious RCU usage warning in ip_tunnel_find()
The per-netns IP tunnel hash table is protected by the RTNL mutex and
ip_tunnel_find() is only called from the control path where the mutex is
taken.
Add a lockdep expression to hlist_for_each_entry_rcu() in
ip_tunnel_find() in order to validate that the mutex is held and to
silence the suspicious RCU usage warning [1].
[1]
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.12.0-rc3-custom-gd95d9a31aceb #139 Not tainted
-----------------------------
net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:221 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by ip/362:
#0: ffffffff86fc7cb0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x377/0xf60
stack backtrace:
CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 362 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3-custom-gd95d9a31aceb #139
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xba/0x110
lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x4f/0xd6
ip_tunnel_find+0x435/0x4d0
ip_tunnel_newlink+0x517/0x7a0
ipgre_newlink+0x14c/0x170
__rtnl_newlink+0x1173/0x19c0
rtnl_newlink+0x6c/0xa0
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3cc/0xf60
netlink_rcv_skb+0x171/0x450
netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7f0
netlink_sendmsg+0x8c1/0xd80
____sys_sendmsg+0x8f9/0xc20
___sys_sendmsg+0x197/0x1e0
__sys_sendmsg+0x122/0x1f0
do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64/sve: Discard stale CPU state when handling SVE traps
The logic for handling SVE traps manipulates saved FPSIMD/SVE state
incorrectly, and a race with preemption can result in a task having
TIF_SVE set and TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE clear even though the live CPU state
is stale (e.g. with SVE traps enabled). This has been observed to result
in warnings from do_sve_acc() where SVE traps are not expected while
TIF_SVE is set:
| if (test_and_set_thread_flag(TIF_SVE))
| WARN_ON(1); /* SVE access shouldn't have trapped */
Warnings of this form have been reported intermittently, e.g.
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/CA+G9fYtEGe_DhY2Ms7+L7NKsLYUomGsgqpdBj+QwDLeSg=JhGg@mail.gmail.com/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/000000000000511e9a060ce5a45c@google.com/
The race can occur when the SVE trap handler is preempted before and
after manipulating the saved FPSIMD/SVE state, starting and ending on
the same CPU, e.g.
| void do_sve_acc(unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
| {
| // Trap on CPU 0 with TIF_SVE clear, SVE traps enabled
| // task->fpsimd_cpu is 0.
| // per_cpu_ptr(&fpsimd_last_state, 0) is task.
|
| ...
|
| // Preempted; migrated from CPU 0 to CPU 1.
| // TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE is set.
|
| get_cpu_fpsimd_context();
|
| if (test_and_set_thread_flag(TIF_SVE))
| WARN_ON(1); /* SVE access shouldn't have trapped */
|
| sve_init_regs() {
| if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE)) {
| ...
| } else {
| fpsimd_to_sve(current);
| current->thread.fp_type = FP_STATE_SVE;
| }
| }
|
| put_cpu_fpsimd_context();
|
| // Preempted; migrated from CPU 1 to CPU 0.
| // task->fpsimd_cpu is still 0
| // If per_cpu_ptr(&fpsimd_last_state, 0) is still task then:
| // - Stale HW state is reused (with SVE traps enabled)
| // - TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE is cleared
| // - A return to userspace skips HW state restore
| }
Fix the case where the state is not live and TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE is set
by calling fpsimd_flush_task_state() to detach from the saved CPU
state. This ensures that a subsequent context switch will not reuse the
stale CPU state, and will instead set TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE, forcing the
new state to be reloaded from memory prior to a return to userspace. |
