| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Memory corruption while handling file descriptor during listener registration/de-registration. |
| Memory corruption while processing multiple IOCTL calls from HLOS to DSP. |
| A flaw has been found in appneta tcpreplay up to 4.5.1. The affected element is the function fix_ipv6_checksums of the file edit_packet.c of the component tcprewrite. This manipulation causes use after free. The attack is restricted to local execution. The exploit has been published and may be used. Upgrading to version 4.5.2-beta3 is sufficient to fix this issue. It is advisable to upgrade the affected component. |
| A vulnerability has been found in appneta tcpreplay up to 4.5.1. The impacted element is the function get_l2len_protocol of the file get.c of the component tcprewrite. Such manipulation leads to use after free. The attack must be carried out locally. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. Upgrading to version 4.5.2-beta3 is sufficient to resolve this issue. You should upgrade the affected component. |
| The module will parse a <pattern> node which is not a child of a structural node. The node will be deleted after creation but might be accessed later leading to a use after free. |
| Memory corruption while releasing shared resources in MinkSocket listener thread. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: idxd: Avoid unnecessary destruction of file_ida
file_ida is allocated during cdev open and is freed accordingly
during cdev release. This sequence is guaranteed by driver file
operations. Therefore, there is no need to destroy an already empty
file_ida when the WQ cdev is removed.
Worse, ida_free() in cdev release may happen after destruction of
file_ida per WQ cdev. This can lead to accessing an id in file_ida
after it has been destroyed, resulting in a kernel panic.
Remove ida_destroy(&file_ida) to address these issues. |
| OpenSynergy BlueSDK (aka Blue SDK) through 6.x has a Use-After-Free. The specific flaw exists within the BlueSDK Bluetooth stack. The issue results from the lack of validating the existence of an object before performing operations on the object (aka use after free). An attacker can leverage this to achieve remote code execution in the context of a user account under which the Bluetooth process runs. |
| Use after free in Windows Bluetooth Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Microsoft Graphics Component allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows Hyper-V allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Use after free in Windows Management Services allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Microsoft Brokering File System allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Use after free in Windows Connected Devices Platform Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows Win32K - GRFX allows an authorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows UI XAML Maps MapControlSettings allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Use after free in Windows BitLocker allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Capability Access Management Service (camsvc) allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/migrate_device: don't add folio to be freed to LRU in migrate_device_finalize()
If migration succeeded, we called
folio_migrate_flags()->mem_cgroup_migrate() to migrate the memcg from the
old to the new folio. This will set memcg_data of the old folio to 0.
Similarly, if migration failed, memcg_data of the dst folio is left unset.
If we call folio_putback_lru() on such folios (memcg_data == 0), we will
add the folio to be freed to the LRU, making memcg code unhappy. Running
the hmm selftests:
# ./hmm-tests
...
# RUN hmm.hmm_device_private.migrate ...
[ 102.078007][T14893] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x7ff27d200 pfn:0x13cc00
[ 102.079974][T14893] anon flags: 0x17ff00000020018(uptodate|dirty|swapbacked|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
[ 102.082037][T14893] raw: 017ff00000020018 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff8881353896c9
[ 102.083687][T14893] raw: 00000007ff27d200 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 102.085331][T14893] page dumped because: VM_WARN_ON_ONCE_FOLIO(!memcg && !mem_cgroup_disabled())
[ 102.087230][T14893] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 102.088279][T14893] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 14893 at ./include/linux/memcontrol.h:726 folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x10e/0x170
[ 102.090478][T14893] Modules linked in:
[ 102.091244][T14893] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 14893 Comm: hmm-tests Not tainted 6.13.0-09623-g6c216bc522fd #151
[ 102.093089][T14893] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
[ 102.094848][T14893] RIP: 0010:folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x10e/0x170
[ 102.096104][T14893] Code: ...
[ 102.099908][T14893] RSP: 0018:ffffc900236c37b0 EFLAGS: 00010293
[ 102.101152][T14893] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffea0004f30000 RCX: ffffffff8183f426
[ 102.102684][T14893] RDX: ffff8881063cb880 RSI: ffffffff81b8117f RDI: ffff8881063cb880
[ 102.104227][T14893] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 102.105757][T14893] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffffc900236c37d8
[ 102.107296][T14893] R13: ffff888277a2bcb0 R14: 000000000000001f R15: 0000000000000000
[ 102.108830][T14893] FS: 00007ff27dbdd740(0000) GS:ffff888277a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 102.110643][T14893] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 102.111924][T14893] CR2: 00007ff27d400000 CR3: 000000010866e000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
[ 102.113478][T14893] PKRU: 55555554
[ 102.114172][T14893] Call Trace:
[ 102.114805][T14893] <TASK>
[ 102.115397][T14893] ? folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x10e/0x170
[ 102.116547][T14893] ? __warn.cold+0x110/0x210
[ 102.117461][T14893] ? folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x10e/0x170
[ 102.118667][T14893] ? report_bug+0x1b9/0x320
[ 102.119571][T14893] ? handle_bug+0x54/0x90
[ 102.120494][T14893] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x50
[ 102.121433][T14893] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 102.122435][T14893] ? __wake_up_klogd.part.0+0x76/0xd0
[ 102.123506][T14893] ? dump_page+0x4f/0x60
[ 102.124352][T14893] ? folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x10e/0x170
[ 102.125500][T14893] folio_batch_move_lru+0xd4/0x200
[ 102.126577][T14893] ? __pfx_lru_add+0x10/0x10
[ 102.127505][T14893] __folio_batch_add_and_move+0x391/0x720
[ 102.128633][T14893] ? __pfx_lru_add+0x10/0x10
[ 102.129550][T14893] folio_putback_lru+0x16/0x80
[ 102.130564][T14893] migrate_device_finalize+0x9b/0x530
[ 102.131640][T14893] dmirror_migrate_to_device.constprop.0+0x7c5/0xad0
[ 102.133047][T14893] dmirror_fops_unlocked_ioctl+0x89b/0xc80
Likely, nothing else goes wrong: putting the last folio reference will
remove the folio from the LRU again. So besides memcg complaining, adding
the folio to be freed to the LRU is just an unnecessary step.
The new flow resembles what we have in migrate_folio_move(): add the dst
to the lru, rem
---truncated--- |
| Use after free in some Zoom Workplace Apps and SDKs may allow an authenticated user to conduct a denial of service via network access. |
